The Russian Attrition Advantage
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine ????????
Chernivtsi If the average number of launches in December remains consistent with last month,the Russian Armed Forces will have launched nearly 55,000 long-range drones against Ukraine by the end of this year. This is about six times more than in 2024.
Among ballistic and cruise missiles,other missiles will have numbered approximately 2,000, whileguided glide bombs hard to intercept and each capable of destroying a five-story building may reach as many as 66,000. Increasingly lethal in range and precision,FPV drones could number up to half a million. With daily peaks of nearly 40,000,artillery rounds fired could total approximately 4 million.
Depleting a large part of Soviet stockpiles,Moscowlaunchedapproximately 15,000,000 missiles over the three-year period 202220232024. However, relying on its own industry (whichproducesapproximately 2,500,000 per year) and external support,it maintained even higher production levels in 2025.
Concerning strategic missiles, Ukrainian intelligenceestimatedin mid-2025 that the Russian Federation had approximately 2,000Iskander, Kalibr, Kh-101, Kinzhal, and other types. Driven by 77.2% of GDP (over 15.5 trillion rubles in 2025,accordingto SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute),Russian annual missile production surpasses those estimates. Ukrainian military intelligence (GRU) alsoconfirmsthis trend in glide bomb production: anestimated120,000 units annually by 2025, which is substantially higher than thecurrentinventory.
These devices didnt even exist before the war, because without recently produced UMPK kits, the old FAB glide bombs would not have become smart KABs.In addition to newly produced ones, the Russians can therefore rely on the recycling of Soviet stockpiles.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)confirmsthatRussian production of Shahed/Geran-type drones has also increased, from around 200 per week to around 1,000, with an upward trend consistent with the 55,000 exploded this year. These figures are consistent with thosereleasedby Ukrainian intelligence, which also takes into account models imported from countries such as Iran. Regarding FPV drones, the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW)estimatesthat a single Russian brigade requires more than 2,500. Considering that at least sixty are engaged on the hottest fronts of the war, its plausible that with Beijings help Moscow already has well over the estimated half a million.
So Russia produces more than it fires.
By sacrificing growth and welfare, it has converted a large share of its energy exports into munitions. Goldman Sachs and the IEAconfirmthat sanctions are having a significant effect, with Russian oil revenuesdroppingby half as a share of GDP. However, what the Ukrainians callsanctions that workhave played a major role: deep-sea strikes as part of Operation Deep Strike havecutRussias nominal refining capacity by at least 20%.
Russian military spending in 2025 was four times the pre-war level and will continue to rise.
Furthermore,Moscow has strengthened crucial alliances with other autocratic regimes that have proven to be reliable partners. From North Korea alone,accordingtoReutersand theOpen Source Center, it has received4 million artillery rounds in at least 64 naval and rail shipments.This constant flow alsoincludedshort-range ballistic missilessuch as the KN-23 and Hwasong-11,multiple rocket launchers,andtens of thousands of soldiers. In addition to the permit and know-how to produce them, the Russian regime hasobtainedthousands of Shahed drones from the Iranian regime, worthnearly$2 billion.
Every year, China supplies the Russian Federation with dual-use goodsvaluedat approximately $5 billion. As early as December two years ago, the Carnegie Endowmentestimateda peak of $600 million per month inhigh priority goods.
Without them, Moscow would be unable to convert its old FAB bombs into KABs, nor would it be able to produce large quantities of Geran drones.
Then there are themore than 128 countries where the Russian Federationrecruitscannon fodder.
Others, including European ones, continue to finance its war machine; suffice it to recall that the ban on Russian hydrocarbon importsimposedby the 19th EU sanctions package will take effect in 18 months.
And Ukraine?
In 2024, the EUdeliveredfewer than 1 million artillery shells to Ukraine, and by the end of the year it aims toprovideeven fewer,despitethe Czech initiative. Amid delays and implementation problems,the EUaimsto deliver 2 million to Ukraine in the future, which alone could produce about half.
The US has ceased backing Kyiv and is slowing initiatives such as the PURL, asreportedrecently.
Ukraines response to Russias overwhelming superiority in artillery has been to saturate the skies with drones: 4.5 millionby2025, which the Ministry of Strategic Industries hasannouncedit can double with adequate funding. For 2026, the government and ministries are openlytalkingabout a theoretical capacity of up to 20 million drones.
Butmoney is needed.
The gap in missiles and guided bombs remains enormous in Russias favor: starting virtually from scratch,Ukraines national missile programaimedto produce 3,000 missiles and 30,000 long-range drones this year, butthe freeze on US aid and the lack of support for the Danish model have left Ukraines long-range strike capabilities dependent on Western missilessuch as Storm Shadow/Scalp and ATACMS.
In the field of glide bombs, Ukraine has nothing comparable to the Russian mass: it responds with drones, precision artillery, and air defense, butit lacks similar air-launched weapons in large volumes.
This is the Russian attrition advantage, as Donald Trumpexpressedyesterday. Being complicit in it.
THANKS TO ALL WHO BACK US IN THESE HARD TIMES
感謝所有在這些艱難時刻支持我們的人
????????感謝所有相信我們工作並願意支持我們的人????????????
在過去三年裏，作為自由撰稿人，我們一直在烏克蘭戰爭的所有前線進行報道，自從大規模
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俄羅斯的消耗優勢
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
烏克蘭前線報道????????
切爾尼夫齊如果十二月的發射平均次數與上個月持平，俄羅斯武裝部隊到今年年底將對烏克蘭發射近55,000架遠程無人機。
這是2024年的約六倍。
在彈道導彈和巡航導彈中，其他類型的導彈數量將達到約2,000，而導引滑翔炸彈難以攔截且每枚炸彈能摧毀一棟五層樓高的建築可能達到66,000枚。隨著射程和精度的日益提升，FPV無人機數量可能達到50萬架。日均最高發射量接近40,000發，炮彈發射總數可能達到約400萬發。
（圖：我在烏克蘭的帕夫洛格勒錄製了這段視頻版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
消耗了大量蘇聯的庫存，莫斯科在2022至2024三年期間發射了約15,000,000枚導彈。然而，依靠自身工業（每年生產約2,500,000枚）和外部支持，其在2025年的生產水平保持在更高的水平。
關於戰略導彈，烏克蘭情報局在2025年中期估計，俄羅斯聯邦約有2,000枚伊斯坎德爾、卡利布爾、Kh-101、金雕和其他類型的導彈。根據瑞典斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究所（SIPRI）的數據，俄羅斯年度導彈生產超過了這些估計數量，占國內生產總值的7%至7.2%（在2025年超過15.5萬億盧布）。烏克蘭軍事情報局（GRU）也證實了這一滑翔炸彈生產的趨勢：預計到2025年，年產120,000枚，這一數字比目前的庫存高出很多。
這些裝置在戰前甚至都不存在，因為如果沒有最近生產的UMPK套件，舊的FAB滑翔炸彈無法變成智能的KAB炸彈。除了新生產的設備外，俄羅斯還可以依靠回收蘇聯的庫存。
戰略與國際研究中心（CSIS）證實，俄羅斯的沙赫德/傑蘭型無人機的生產也有所增加，從每周約200架增加到約1,000架，其增長趨勢與今年發射的55,000架一致。這些數據與烏克蘭情報局發布的數據相符，後者還考慮到了來自伊朗等國進口的型號。關於FPV無人機，東部研究中心（OSW）估計，單支俄羅斯旅需要超過2,500架。考慮到至少有60架在戰爭最激烈的前線作戰，可以合理推測在北京的幫助下莫斯科的數量早已超過推測的50萬架。
因此，俄羅斯的生產量超過了其發射量。
通過犧牲經濟增長和社會福利，俄羅斯將大量能源出口轉化為軍火。高盛和國際能源署（IEA）證實，製裁正在產生顯著效果，俄羅斯的石油收入在GDP中的占比下降了一半。然而，烏克蘭人所稱的有效製裁在其中發揮了重要作用：作為深度打擊行動的一部分，深海打擊已將俄羅斯的名義煉油能力削減了至少20%。
俄羅斯2025年的軍費開支是戰爭前水平的四倍，並將繼續上升。
此外，莫斯科還加強了與其他被證明是可靠合作夥伴的專製政權之間的重要聯盟。根據路透社和開源中心的報道，俄羅斯僅從北朝鮮就收到了400萬發炮彈，經過至少64次海運和鐵路運輸。這一持續的供給還包括KN-23和華鬆-11等短程彈道導彈、多管火箭發射器以及數萬名士兵。除了生產這些武器的許可和技術外，俄羅斯政權還從伊朗政權那裏取得了價值近20億美元的數千架沙赫德無人機。
每年，中國向俄羅斯聯邦提供約價值約50億美元的雙重用途商品。早在兩年前的12月，卡內基國際和平基金會就曾估計高優先級商品的月峰值達6億美元。
沒有它們，莫斯科將無法將舊的FAB炸彈轉化為KAB炸彈，也無法大量生產傑蘭無人機。
此外，俄羅斯聯邦還在超過128個國家招募炮灰。
其他國家，包括一些歐洲國家，繼續為俄羅斯戰爭機器提供資金；隻需提及第19個歐盟製裁方案中對俄羅斯碳氫化合物進口的禁令，僅僅是在18個月後才生效。
那麽烏克蘭呢？
在2024年，歐盟向烏克蘭交付的炮彈不到100萬枚，盡管有捷克倡議，到年底計劃交付的數量甚至會更少。在延誤和執行問題的背景下，歐盟計劃未來向烏克蘭交付200萬發炮彈，而這隻是需求的一半。
正如最近的報道指出的，美國已停止對基輔的支持，並正在減緩PURL（北約的烏克蘭優先要求清單）等計劃。
烏克蘭應對俄羅斯在火炮上的壓倒性優勢的方式是用無人機飽和空域：到2025年預計達到450萬架，戰略工業部已宣布在獲得充足資金的情況下可以翻倍。對於2026年，政府和各部委公開談論理論上可達到的2000萬架無人機的能力。
但這需要資金。
在導彈和製導炸彈方麵，俄羅斯的優勢巨大：烏克蘭幾乎從零開始，國家導彈計劃今年目標是生產3000枚導彈和30000架遠程無人機，但美國援助的凍結和對丹麥模式的支持缺乏，使得烏克蘭的遠程打擊能力依賴於西方導彈，如暴風影/Scalp和ATACMS。
在滑翔炸彈領域，烏克蘭沒有與俄羅斯相比較的產量：它通過無人機、精確火炮和空中防禦進行反擊，但缺乏類似的大量空投武器。
這就是俄羅斯的消耗優勢，正如唐納德川普昨日所說的那樣，這種局麵是俄美勾結造成的。
（圖：幾天前，我在經過頓巴斯的烏克蘭防線時拍下的照片版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
