陸以正∶美國有人想民進黨複辟？
http://www.chinareviewnews.com 2010-03-29 16:39:00
中評社台北3月29日電／台灣退休外交官陸以正今天在中國時報撰文，提醒馬英九政府留意“美國在台協會（ＡＩＴ）”總部理事卜道維對台灣政壇的觀察和結論。文章如下。
上星期二即三月廿三日，華府著名智庫“戰略及國際研究中心（簡稱ＣＳＩＳ）”設在夏威夷的“太平洋論壇（Pacific Forum）”出版的《太平洋資料網（PacNet）》今年第十三期，刊出一篇文章，內容比自由時報錯誤引用裏昂證券一事，嚴重千百倍；台北卻沒人注意，馬政府更無人出麵反駁。令我甚感詫異。
主持ＣＳＩＳ太平洋論壇的是Ralph A. Cossa。凡注意美、中、台三角關係以及東亞各國政經發展的學者或政府官員，幾乎都認識此人，而且經常會在個人電腦上收到PacNet的研究報告及有關資料。雖然以美國國家利益為前提，內容大體翔實，頗受重視。
今年PacNet第十三期這篇文章的作者，是曾駐台多年，雖從國務院退休，在二○○四到二○○六年間代理華府“美國在台協會（ＡＩＴ）”理事會主席，至今仍為ＡＩＴ總部理事的卜道維（David G. Brown）。他在台北更是交遊廣闊，朝野無人不識。
卜道維現在馬裏蘭州巴爾的摩（Baltimore, Md.）的約翰霍布金斯大學國際關係研究院（School of Advanced International Studies）做兼任教授。美國政學兩棲人物退休後總住在華府附近，以便隨時東山再起；他也在等候旋轉門重新開啟。
這篇文章令我詫異，第一是作者與國務院的深厚淵源。第二是該文公然為民進黨再度執政，不避嫌疑，公開鼓吹的態度。第三則是它雖未明言，卻反映出來的國務院及其周遭人士，觀察台灣政治風向所獲的結論。
什麽結論呢？文章的標題說得一清二楚∶《想到未來的民進黨政府（Thinking About a Future DPP Government）》。換句話說，美國像卜道維這樣的“台灣專家”，眼看馬英九民調支持度直往下掉，已經認定國民黨將再度失去政權；退為在野黨，隻是遲早問題。讀者如有興趣，可上PacNet網站，或向卜氏（dgbrown@jhu.edu）直接索取全文。
卜道維觀察的結論，斬釘截鐵，毫不遮掩躲藏。他直言∶“在台灣民主的正常旋律下，民進黨必定會重新執政。如果二○一二年就發生的話，必須麵對兩岸關係中許多關鍵性的問題；而如何應付這些問題，又必然牽扯到美台關係。”他列舉出“下屆民進黨‘總統’候選人”將麵臨的問題，口氣有點像老師在教導學生如何準備學年末的大考。
他舉出的要點可歸納為三項。首先是下屆民進黨政府應如何看待海協會和海基會做為對口單位的既存關係。卜道維預料，“新的民進黨政府無疑會做出若幹改變”，但隻要大體保持原狀，美國會比較放心。他甚至希望下屆民進黨“總統”候選人，能像陳水扁和馬英九一樣，在就職演說裏能勾劃出兩岸關係的遠景，使華府和北京兩方都可安心。
其次，是如何使兩岸現有對口單位能繼續順暢運作。卜道維了解∶對民進黨而言，最大的障礙是“一個中國”的觀念。他也很清楚蔡英文主席因此反對各說各話的“九二共識”。他認為謝長廷的“憲法一中”觀念，或可做為解套之法。歸根究底，民進黨終須酌量修改“台灣前途決議文”的內容。他並未使用“修正（revise）”這個字，而是巧妙地用update（更新），以衝淡含意，避免招致深綠群眾的反感。
更次，卜道維指出，“十八個月來”，北京對台灣的態度“非常務實”。請注意他盡量避免把兩岸關係改善一事，歸功於馬英九和國民黨政府。但他也不得不承認，如果民進黨再度執政，須考慮大陸對台態度是否仍會如此平和。他含蓄地點出∶民進黨執政後，短程必須顧及美台友誼，長期則須記住中國已非當年可比了。
他說，如果民進黨要等到二○二○年才重新執政，必須了解今日大陸已非陳水扁在二○○○年時的吳下阿蒙了。到那時，中國的ＧＤＰ將高達全球總額百分之十五，軍事力量也將僅次美國。卜道維給民進黨的忠告是∶再度執政後千萬別更改國名、修訂現有“憲法”、或尋求獨立。那樣做隻會使美國國會中支持台灣的議員人數銳減，甚至影響“台灣關係法”。
上星期四即三月廿五日，《天下文化》出版社高希均、王力文主辦的“第七○場遠見人物論壇”邀請ＡＩＴ台北辦事處長司徒文（William A. Stanton）演講。接受被邀來賓提問時，我請教司徒文∶知不知道卜道維有這篇文章？他的回答避重就輕，本報記者仇佩芬已有報導。司徒文很清楚我提問的真實用意，我也不想讓他受窘。但卜道維的文章把台灣實情過份扭曲，不容忽視，馬政府須嚴加駁斥以正視聽。
http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-13-thinking-about-future-dpp-government
Pacific Forum CSIS
Honolulu, Hawaii
1003 Bishop Street, Suite 1150, Honolulu, HI 96813
Tel: (808) 521-6745 Fax: (808) 599-8690
Email: PacificForum@pacforum.org Web Page: www.pacforum.org
Number 13 March 23, 2010
PacNet: Thinking about a Future DPP Government
by David G. Brown
David G. Brown (dgbrown@jhu.edu) is adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Fresh from recent electoral victories and with hopes of more to come, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is beginning to think about the possibility of returning to government. Study groups have been named to consider future policy, and Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen has announced plans for a new party platform. Pragmatists hope to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Chen Shui-bian era that saw escalating tensions with China and severely strained relations with the US. On the other hand, some DPP activists appeal for support by sticking their fingers in the dragon’s eye or by mobilizing protests against visiting mainland representatives. However, future party policy remains unclear.
Given the normal rhythm of Taiwan’s democratic politics, it seems certain that sooner or later the DPP will return to power. If the party returns in the short-term, meaning 2012, it would face key decisions on cross-Strait relations that would, in turn, set the tone for US-Taiwan relations. Since the key to maintaining good US-Taiwan relations is for Taipei to be seen as pursuing stable cross-Strait relations, there are signs the US would be looking for in DPP policy. Some decisions should be easy for the next DPP presidential candidate; others harder.
One key decision would be whether a future DPP government would maintain the newly institutionalized arrangements that have been negotiated between Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) ˉ that is the SEF-ARATS agreements and the pattern of regular day-to-day contacts between the two sides that take place under those agreements. A DPP administration would undoubtedly want to change some details, but it would be reassuring to Washington if the existing arrangements were maintained. Another relatively easy decision would be for the DPP presidential candidate to provide reassurance to Washington and Beijing on the parameters within which cross-Strait policy will be pursued ˉ as both Chen and Ma Ying-jeou did in their first inaugural address. These parameters will be set by the DPP candidate in the course of the campaign.
The more difficult challenge for the DPP would be to keep the SEF-ARATS negotiating channels open. To do this, Taipei and Beijing would need to work out a political basis for talks. Inevitably, this will require the DPP to face up to the “one China” issue. The Chen administration, which included current DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, rejected the “1992 consensus,” which has allowed Beijing and the Ma administration to conduct talks without reaching agreement on the meaning of “one China.” It will not be easy for a future DPP candidate to accept the “1992 consensus,” but finding a way to do so would be very significant for Beijing and Washington. Alternatively, some in the DPP have considered possible approaches to the “one China” issue. Frank Hsieh has talked of a “constitutional one China,” based on the party’s acceptance that the Republic of China constitution assumes “one China.” Coming to grips with this issue would be facilitated if the DPP were to update the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future to reflect the changed circumstances in cross-Strait relations and reformulating the old resolution’s explicit rejection of “one China.” Party leaders are understandably reluctant to reopen the issues in the 1999 resolution, but doing this would appear necessary to establish a basis for continuing cross-Strait talks.
Finding an acceptable basis for SEF-ARATS talks would also require China to be flexible. Beijing has been remarkably pragmatic in dealing with Taipei over the past 18 months. Whether it would continue to do so with a future DPP government is uncertain. It is possible that China’s risk-averse leaders will look for a way to respond if the DPP moves away from the outright rejection of “one China” and away from its advocacy of de jure independence. Regardless of Beijing’s response, if Taipei is seen in Washington as pursuing moderate cross-Strait policies, that would help ensure good US-Taiwan relations. However, if DPP cross-Strait policies cause a rise in tensions, a widening gap between US and Taiwan interests and relations would be inevitable.
The DPP’s challenge can also be seen in a longer-term perspective. If the party’s return to office does not to occur until 2020, Taipei would be dealing with a very different China than the one Chen Shui-bian faced in 2000. By 2020, it is likely that China’s economy will have doubled in size to account for about 15 percent of world GDP, the modernization of the PLA will have made it the second most powerful military, and China will have become the second country to land a man on the moon. Equally important, the Chinese government and people will likely assume that this increased power will lead others to accommodate China’s “core interests.” A greater assertiveness is already evident in some government actions, and a nationalistic public opinion will become a factor that Beijing increasingly will have to take into account in framing policy.
That prospect warrants a fundamental reassessment of long-term goals by the DPP. Is the DPP the party of de jure independence or is it a party committed to preserving Taiwan’s de facto independence by opposing closer integration with China? The latter would mean leaving to other groups the pursuit of the fundamentalists’ dream of an internationally recognized independent Taiwan that has explicitly state-to-state relations with China. Continued pursuit of de jure independence would set the party on a collision course with a risen China. That the DPP would continue to assert that Taiwan is sovereign and independent is understood. However, steps such as changing Taiwan’s name, altering the sovereignty aspects of the current constitution, or seeking membership in UN organizations under the name “Taiwan” would provoke renewed confrontation with a more powerful China. Americans would likely see such DPP actions as quixotic, dangerously provocative, and contrary to broader US interests as they would threaten to embroil the US in a conflict with China. Assuming otherwise stable US-China relations, the then US administration would likely distance itself from a DPP candidate espousing domestic or international actions to achieve de jure independence. This could include the US adopting a policy of explicitly opposing (rather than not supporting) independence. To ensure that US power and prestige were not associated with such steps, Washington would also likely suspend both arms sales and the quiet consultation on defense issues that it now conducts with Taipei. Support for Taiwan in the US Congress declined markedly during the Chen Shui-bian era. Actions by a future DPP government to achieve de jure independence would likely further undermine support for the Taiwan Relations Act.
The DPP is wise to consider now the policies of a future government. As democratic leaders, they have the right and responsibility to adopt whatever policies they believe will best advance Taiwan’s interests. The litmus test ultimately will be what Taiwan voters will support and relations with the US are but one factor. If the review process moves away from Chen’s past pursuit of de jure independence that would be welcome. However, if the party remains wedded to pursuing policies to achieve de jure independence, it should understand that Taiwan and US interests would increasingly diverge and that Taipei would likely not enjoy continuing support from a future US administration or Congress.
http://www.chinareviewnews.com 2010-03-29 16:39:00
中評社台北3月29日電／台灣退休外交官陸以正今天在中國時報撰文，提醒馬英九政府留意“美國在台協會（ＡＩＴ）”總部理事卜道維對台灣政壇的觀察和結論。文章如下。
上星期二即三月廿三日，華府著名智庫“戰略及國際研究中心（簡稱ＣＳＩＳ）”設在夏威夷的“太平洋論壇（Pacific Forum）”出版的《太平洋資料網（PacNet）》今年第十三期，刊出一篇文章，內容比自由時報錯誤引用裏昂證券一事，嚴重千百倍；台北卻沒人注意，馬政府更無人出麵反駁。令我甚感詫異。
主持ＣＳＩＳ太平洋論壇的是Ralph A. Cossa。凡注意美、中、台三角關係以及東亞各國政經發展的學者或政府官員，幾乎都認識此人，而且經常會在個人電腦上收到PacNet的研究報告及有關資料。雖然以美國國家利益為前提，內容大體翔實，頗受重視。
今年PacNet第十三期這篇文章的作者，是曾駐台多年，雖從國務院退休，在二○○四到二○○六年間代理華府“美國在台協會（ＡＩＴ）”理事會主席，至今仍為ＡＩＴ總部理事的卜道維（David G. Brown）。他在台北更是交遊廣闊，朝野無人不識。
卜道維現在馬裏蘭州巴爾的摩（Baltimore, Md.）的約翰霍布金斯大學國際關係研究院（School of Advanced International Studies）做兼任教授。美國政學兩棲人物退休後總住在華府附近，以便隨時東山再起；他也在等候旋轉門重新開啟。
這篇文章令我詫異，第一是作者與國務院的深厚淵源。第二是該文公然為民進黨再度執政，不避嫌疑，公開鼓吹的態度。第三則是它雖未明言，卻反映出來的國務院及其周遭人士，觀察台灣政治風向所獲的結論。
什麽結論呢？文章的標題說得一清二楚∶《想到未來的民進黨政府（Thinking About a Future DPP Government）》。換句話說，美國像卜道維這樣的“台灣專家”，眼看馬英九民調支持度直往下掉，已經認定國民黨將再度失去政權；退為在野黨，隻是遲早問題。讀者如有興趣，可上PacNet網站，或向卜氏（dgbrown@jhu.edu）直接索取全文。
卜道維觀察的結論，斬釘截鐵，毫不遮掩躲藏。他直言∶“在台灣民主的正常旋律下，民進黨必定會重新執政。如果二○一二年就發生的話，必須麵對兩岸關係中許多關鍵性的問題；而如何應付這些問題，又必然牽扯到美台關係。”他列舉出“下屆民進黨‘總統’候選人”將麵臨的問題，口氣有點像老師在教導學生如何準備學年末的大考。
他舉出的要點可歸納為三項。首先是下屆民進黨政府應如何看待海協會和海基會做為對口單位的既存關係。卜道維預料，“新的民進黨政府無疑會做出若幹改變”，但隻要大體保持原狀，美國會比較放心。他甚至希望下屆民進黨“總統”候選人，能像陳水扁和馬英九一樣，在就職演說裏能勾劃出兩岸關係的遠景，使華府和北京兩方都可安心。
其次，是如何使兩岸現有對口單位能繼續順暢運作。卜道維了解∶對民進黨而言，最大的障礙是“一個中國”的觀念。他也很清楚蔡英文主席因此反對各說各話的“九二共識”。他認為謝長廷的“憲法一中”觀念，或可做為解套之法。歸根究底，民進黨終須酌量修改“台灣前途決議文”的內容。他並未使用“修正（revise）”這個字，而是巧妙地用update（更新），以衝淡含意，避免招致深綠群眾的反感。
更次，卜道維指出，“十八個月來”，北京對台灣的態度“非常務實”。請注意他盡量避免把兩岸關係改善一事，歸功於馬英九和國民黨政府。但他也不得不承認，如果民進黨再度執政，須考慮大陸對台態度是否仍會如此平和。他含蓄地點出∶民進黨執政後，短程必須顧及美台友誼，長期則須記住中國已非當年可比了。
他說，如果民進黨要等到二○二○年才重新執政，必須了解今日大陸已非陳水扁在二○○○年時的吳下阿蒙了。到那時，中國的ＧＤＰ將高達全球總額百分之十五，軍事力量也將僅次美國。卜道維給民進黨的忠告是∶再度執政後千萬別更改國名、修訂現有“憲法”、或尋求獨立。那樣做隻會使美國國會中支持台灣的議員人數銳減，甚至影響“台灣關係法”。
上星期四即三月廿五日，《天下文化》出版社高希均、王力文主辦的“第七○場遠見人物論壇”邀請ＡＩＴ台北辦事處長司徒文（William A. Stanton）演講。接受被邀來賓提問時，我請教司徒文∶知不知道卜道維有這篇文章？他的回答避重就輕，本報記者仇佩芬已有報導。司徒文很清楚我提問的真實用意，我也不想讓他受窘。但卜道維的文章把台灣實情過份扭曲，不容忽視，馬政府須嚴加駁斥以正視聽。
http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-13-thinking-about-future-dpp-government
Pacific Forum CSIS
Honolulu, Hawaii
1003 Bishop Street, Suite 1150, Honolulu, HI 96813
Tel: (808) 521-6745 Fax: (808) 599-8690
Email: PacificForum@pacforum.org Web Page: www.pacforum.org
Number 13 March 23, 2010
PacNet: Thinking about a Future DPP Government
by David G. Brown
David G. Brown (dgbrown@jhu.edu) is adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Fresh from recent electoral victories and with hopes of more to come, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is beginning to think about the possibility of returning to government. Study groups have been named to consider future policy, and Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen has announced plans for a new party platform. Pragmatists hope to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Chen Shui-bian era that saw escalating tensions with China and severely strained relations with the US. On the other hand, some DPP activists appeal for support by sticking their fingers in the dragon’s eye or by mobilizing protests against visiting mainland representatives. However, future party policy remains unclear.
Given the normal rhythm of Taiwan’s democratic politics, it seems certain that sooner or later the DPP will return to power. If the party returns in the short-term, meaning 2012, it would face key decisions on cross-Strait relations that would, in turn, set the tone for US-Taiwan relations. Since the key to maintaining good US-Taiwan relations is for Taipei to be seen as pursuing stable cross-Strait relations, there are signs the US would be looking for in DPP policy. Some decisions should be easy for the next DPP presidential candidate; others harder.
One key decision would be whether a future DPP government would maintain the newly institutionalized arrangements that have been negotiated between Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) ˉ that is the SEF-ARATS agreements and the pattern of regular day-to-day contacts between the two sides that take place under those agreements. A DPP administration would undoubtedly want to change some details, but it would be reassuring to Washington if the existing arrangements were maintained. Another relatively easy decision would be for the DPP presidential candidate to provide reassurance to Washington and Beijing on the parameters within which cross-Strait policy will be pursued ˉ as both Chen and Ma Ying-jeou did in their first inaugural address. These parameters will be set by the DPP candidate in the course of the campaign.
The more difficult challenge for the DPP would be to keep the SEF-ARATS negotiating channels open. To do this, Taipei and Beijing would need to work out a political basis for talks. Inevitably, this will require the DPP to face up to the “one China” issue. The Chen administration, which included current DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen, rejected the “1992 consensus,” which has allowed Beijing and the Ma administration to conduct talks without reaching agreement on the meaning of “one China.” It will not be easy for a future DPP candidate to accept the “1992 consensus,” but finding a way to do so would be very significant for Beijing and Washington. Alternatively, some in the DPP have considered possible approaches to the “one China” issue. Frank Hsieh has talked of a “constitutional one China,” based on the party’s acceptance that the Republic of China constitution assumes “one China.” Coming to grips with this issue would be facilitated if the DPP were to update the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future to reflect the changed circumstances in cross-Strait relations and reformulating the old resolution’s explicit rejection of “one China.” Party leaders are understandably reluctant to reopen the issues in the 1999 resolution, but doing this would appear necessary to establish a basis for continuing cross-Strait talks.
Finding an acceptable basis for SEF-ARATS talks would also require China to be flexible. Beijing has been remarkably pragmatic in dealing with Taipei over the past 18 months. Whether it would continue to do so with a future DPP government is uncertain. It is possible that China’s risk-averse leaders will look for a way to respond if the DPP moves away from the outright rejection of “one China” and away from its advocacy of de jure independence. Regardless of Beijing’s response, if Taipei is seen in Washington as pursuing moderate cross-Strait policies, that would help ensure good US-Taiwan relations. However, if DPP cross-Strait policies cause a rise in tensions, a widening gap between US and Taiwan interests and relations would be inevitable.
The DPP’s challenge can also be seen in a longer-term perspective. If the party’s return to office does not to occur until 2020, Taipei would be dealing with a very different China than the one Chen Shui-bian faced in 2000. By 2020, it is likely that China’s economy will have doubled in size to account for about 15 percent of world GDP, the modernization of the PLA will have made it the second most powerful military, and China will have become the second country to land a man on the moon. Equally important, the Chinese government and people will likely assume that this increased power will lead others to accommodate China’s “core interests.” A greater assertiveness is already evident in some government actions, and a nationalistic public opinion will become a factor that Beijing increasingly will have to take into account in framing policy.
That prospect warrants a fundamental reassessment of long-term goals by the DPP. Is the DPP the party of de jure independence or is it a party committed to preserving Taiwan’s de facto independence by opposing closer integration with China? The latter would mean leaving to other groups the pursuit of the fundamentalists’ dream of an internationally recognized independent Taiwan that has explicitly state-to-state relations with China. Continued pursuit of de jure independence would set the party on a collision course with a risen China. That the DPP would continue to assert that Taiwan is sovereign and independent is understood. However, steps such as changing Taiwan’s name, altering the sovereignty aspects of the current constitution, or seeking membership in UN organizations under the name “Taiwan” would provoke renewed confrontation with a more powerful China. Americans would likely see such DPP actions as quixotic, dangerously provocative, and contrary to broader US interests as they would threaten to embroil the US in a conflict with China. Assuming otherwise stable US-China relations, the then US administration would likely distance itself from a DPP candidate espousing domestic or international actions to achieve de jure independence. This could include the US adopting a policy of explicitly opposing (rather than not supporting) independence. To ensure that US power and prestige were not associated with such steps, Washington would also likely suspend both arms sales and the quiet consultation on defense issues that it now conducts with Taipei. Support for Taiwan in the US Congress declined markedly during the Chen Shui-bian era. Actions by a future DPP government to achieve de jure independence would likely further undermine support for the Taiwan Relations Act.
The DPP is wise to consider now the policies of a future government. As democratic leaders, they have the right and responsibility to adopt whatever policies they believe will best advance Taiwan’s interests. The litmus test ultimately will be what Taiwan voters will support and relations with the US are but one factor. If the review process moves away from Chen’s past pursuit of de jure independence that would be welcome. However, if the party remains wedded to pursuing policies to achieve de jure independence, it should understand that Taiwan and US interests would increasingly diverge and that Taipei would likely not enjoy continuing support from a future US administration or Congress.
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