牛津教授出書形容中國「完美獨裁」 

來源: 歡顏展卷林中坐 2016-11-04 09:14:45 [] [博客] [舊帖] [給我悄悄話] 本文已被閱讀: 次 (20112 bytes)
來自挪威的英國牛津大學社會學與社會政策係榮譽教授斯坦.林根(Stein Ringen),近日出了一本名為《完美的獨裁:21世紀下的中國》(The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century)的新書。他形容中國是一個完美的獨裁政府,因為世上沒有一個專製國家做得比中國更好,又說出書後自己不會再去中國。 他在接受BBC專訪時表示,用專製(Autocracy)等字眼去形容中國的體製是太過溫和,所以創建了一個新字──「管控專製」(Controlocracy)。他解釋,在「管控專製」下,人民不需要被命令去做某些事情,反而是人民自發地自我控製、自我審查,不會去做一些「不應該做」的事情。這會予人「中國並非那麼獨裁」的錯覺。但事實上,中國有自己一套的管控方式去監視人民,投放大量資源在實質監控部門,例如約有200萬人專門監視互聯網。對於中國國家主席習近平近日確立「習核心」的地位,林根認為習是要求所有人要服從自己為「核心」,採取了毛澤東式的強人專製管治方式,在這種「一人治國」之下,即使他推出對社會不利的政策,也無人能夠阻止。

林根又指出,近年中國鼓吹民族主義、大國主義等意識形態,這趨勢十分危險」,因為這種意識形態可以強大到連領導人都會成為意識形態的俘虜,推行激進政策。而在這種意識形態下的強勢的領導人,對百姓來說十分具吸引力。

http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1d4tz8w

The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century

  1. Introduction: A Good Regime? (pp. xi-xiv)

    In a retrospective on the Spanish Civil War, George Orwell, master wordsmith, and a volunteer in a faction on the republican side, said that what had been at stake, as he saw it, was ‘the cause of the common people’. My question in this book is whether the reformed Chinese state is doing the common people’s work. It should be: It calls itself a people’s republic and the leaders boast that they are. But is it and are they?

    It is not impossible that the Chinese state is on its way to becoming a good regime of its own kind...

  2.  Chapter 1 Leaders (pp. 1-44)

    The Chinese state is not just a state; it is a party-state. That sets it apart. It is not a democracy, obviously, but nor is it a bog-standard dictatorship in which typically a military junta holds power with force on behalf of itself or, say, a class of landowners.

    A party-state is more than a one-party dictatorship. It is a system with two overpowering bureaucracies, side by side and intertwined. The state controls society, and the party controls the state. There is a double system of control. Control is this state’s nature. If it were not for a determination to..

  3.  Chapter 2 What They Say (pp. 45-59)

    All human activity is guided by ideas that make sense of choices and actions. We create ideas to give ourselves meaning and reassurance, and once ideas take hold they work back on us to shape our thinkings and doings. In collective activities, such as in governance, shared ideas, often referred to as ‘political culture’, condition collaborative action. The force of ideas is strong. ‘Both when they are right and when they are wrong,’ said the economist John Maynard Keynes, ‘ideas are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little less.’¹ When we ask of what..

  4.  Chapter 3 What They Do (pp. 60-115)

    Today’s rulers have two main strategies of self-preservation. With one hand they purchase legitimacy in the eyes of the ruled; with the other hand they keep down anything that can threaten their hold on power. The way the regime deals with society is through an intricate good-cop, bad-cop act.

    The means of control are hard, brutal, and ruthless. China is a police state with omnipresent overt and secret security forces. The military is an internal as well as an external force. The judiciary is under party control. Persecution, intimidation, imprisonment (often arbitrary and often unlawful), torture, beatings—these are rampant...

  5.  Chapter 4 What They Produce (pp. 116-134)

    In Chapter 2, I have explored state intentions. The benevolent hypothesis is that the People’s Republic is remaking itself into a state dedicated to the good of the common people, albeit in its own and convoluted way. In Chapter 3, I have explored the state’s capacity and concluded that it has the administrative ability to get done, at least in broad terms, what it wants done. If the intention is a welfare state, we should by now be seeing the footprints of that kind of state in current public policy.

    A welfare state is known by the services it provides...


       
  6.  Chapter 5 Who They Are (pp. 135-168)

    A recent conversation between two China watchers ran like this, condensed:

    Professor A: China is a dictatorship.

    Professor B: 500 million people have been lifted out of poverty.

    Silence.

    This exchange and stalemate neatly captures the dilemma for anyone trying to understand China’s political economy. Both professors are right. We might leave it at that. We might quibble about what matters most. Although there is much that is unpleasant about government in China, it delivers. Or, it is a dictatorship and it cannot buy itself free from condemnation with improvements in material conditions. Your opinion is as good as mine...

  7.  Postscript: A Better Regime? (pp. 169-178)

    As the Chinese leaders are haunted by ghosts from their past, so are some China watchers, myself included. My ghost is the sometimes inability of outsiders to recognise totalitarian regimes for what they were until too late. Even Nazi Germany was widely respected until it took Europe and the world to war. We do not like to remember it today, but this respect was strongly present in all the countries that subsequently fought Germany, including among intellectuals. That admiration survived astonishing odds: the ever more vile, brutal, and racist dictatorship, the ranting madness of Hitler whenever he spoke. Many observers...

  ' target='_blank'>https://hk.thenewslens.com/article/53224 來自挪威的英國牛津大學社會學與社會政策係榮譽教授斯坦.林根(Stein Ringen),近日出了一本名為《完美的獨裁:21世紀下的中國》(The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century)的新書。他形容中國是一個完美的獨裁政府,因為世上沒有一個專製國家做得比中國更好,又說出書後自己不會再去中國。 他在接受BBC專訪時表示,用專製(Autocracy)等字眼去形容中國的體製是太過溫和,所以創建了一個新字──「管控專製」(Controlocracy)。他解釋,在「管控專製」下,人民不需要被命令去做某些事情,反而是人民自發地自我控製、自我審查,不會去做一些「不應該做」的事情。這會予人「中國並非那麼獨裁」的錯覺。但事實上,中國有自己一套的管控方式去監視人民,投放大量資源在實質監控部門,例如約有200萬人專門監視互聯網。對於中國國家主席習近平近日確立「習核心」的地位,林根認為習是要求所有人要服從自己為「核心」,採取了毛澤東式的強人專製管治方式,在這種「一人治國」之下,即使他推出對社會不利的政策,也無人能夠阻止。

林根又指出,近年中國鼓吹民族主義、大國主義等意識形態,這趨勢十分危險」,因為這種意識形態可以強大到連領導人都會成為意識形態的俘虜,推行激進政策。而在這種意識形態下的強勢的領導人,對百姓來說十分具吸引力。

http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1d4tz8w

The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century

  1. Introduction: A Good Regime? (pp. xi-xiv)

    In a retrospective on the Spanish Civil War, George Orwell, master wordsmith, and a volunteer in a faction on the republican side, said that what had been at stake, as he saw it, was ‘the cause of the common people’. My question in this book is whether the reformed Chinese state is doing the common people’s work. It should be: It calls itself a people’s republic and the leaders boast that they are. But is it and are they?

    It is not impossible that the Chinese state is on its way to becoming a good regime of its own kind...

  2.  Chapter 1 Leaders (pp. 1-44)

    The Chinese state is not just a state; it is a party-state. That sets it apart. It is not a democracy, obviously, but nor is it a bog-standard dictatorship in which typically a military junta holds power with force on behalf of itself or, say, a class of landowners.

    A party-state is more than a one-party dictatorship. It is a system with two overpowering bureaucracies, side by side and intertwined. The state controls society, and the party controls the state. There is a double system of control. Control is this state’s nature. If it were not for a determination to..

  3.  Chapter 2 What They Say (pp. 45-59)

    All human activity is guided by ideas that make sense of choices and actions. We create ideas to give ourselves meaning and reassurance, and once ideas take hold they work back on us to shape our thinkings and doings. In collective activities, such as in governance, shared ideas, often referred to as ‘political culture’, condition collaborative action. The force of ideas is strong. ‘Both when they are right and when they are wrong,’ said the economist John Maynard Keynes, ‘ideas are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little less.’¹ When we ask of what..

  4.  Chapter 3 What They Do (pp. 60-115)

    Today’s rulers have two main strategies of self-preservation. With one hand they purchase legitimacy in the eyes of the ruled; with the other hand they keep down anything that can threaten their hold on power. The way the regime deals with society is through an intricate good-cop, bad-cop act.

    The means of control are hard, brutal, and ruthless. China is a police state with omnipresent overt and secret security forces. The military is an internal as well as an external force. The judiciary is under party control. Persecution, intimidation, imprisonment (often arbitrary and often unlawful), torture, beatings—these are rampant...

  5.  Chapter 4 What They Produce (pp. 116-134)

    In Chapter 2, I have explored state intentions. The benevolent hypothesis is that the People’s Republic is remaking itself into a state dedicated to the good of the common people, albeit in its own and convoluted way. In Chapter 3, I have explored the state’s capacity and concluded that it has the administrative ability to get done, at least in broad terms, what it wants done. If the intention is a welfare state, we should by now be seeing the footprints of that kind of state in current public policy.

    A welfare state is known by the services it provides...


       
  6.  Chapter 5 Who They Are (pp. 135-168)

    A recent conversation between two China watchers ran like this, condensed:

    Professor A: China is a dictatorship.

    Professor B: 500 million people have been lifted out of poverty.

    Silence.

    This exchange and stalemate neatly captures the dilemma for anyone trying to understand China’s political economy. Both professors are right. We might leave it at that. We might quibble about what matters most. Although there is much that is unpleasant about government in China, it delivers. Or, it is a dictatorship and it cannot buy itself free from condemnation with improvements in material conditions. Your opinion is as good as mine...

  7.  Postscript: A Better Regime? (pp. 169-178)

    As the Chinese leaders are haunted by ghosts from their past, so are some China watchers, myself included. My ghost is the sometimes inability of outsiders to recognise totalitarian regimes for what they were until too late. Even Nazi Germany was widely respected until it took Europe and the world to war. We do not like to remember it today, but this respect was strongly present in all the countries that subsequently fought Germany, including among intellectuals. That admiration survived astonishing odds: the ever more vile, brutal, and racist dictatorship, the ranting madness of Hitler whenever he spoke. Many observers...

 

所有跟帖: 

以我在西方生活30年的感受,西方對社會的管控遠甚於中國。隻是手段不同。中國的行政手段多一些,西方的經濟手段多一些。 -547788- 給 547788 發送悄悄話 547788 的博客首頁 (0 bytes) () 11/04/2016 postreply 10:32:21

政府行政手段具有強製性(如抓、關、罰款)與獨佔性,經濟手段無此性質。 -歡顏展卷林中坐- 給 歡顏展卷林中坐 發送悄悄話 歡顏展卷林中坐 的博客首頁 (0 bytes) () 11/04/2016 postreply 10:48:16

伊拉克,烏克蘭,阿富汗的”完美民主“ -我不信邪- 給 我不信邪 發送悄悄話 (0 bytes) () 11/04/2016 postreply 12:03:05

以中國現在的教育水平,法治水平,我看中國現在存在的就是合理的 -547788- 給 547788 發送悄悄話 547788 的博客首頁 (0 bytes) () 11/04/2016 postreply 21:03:37

台灣議會男人女人也打,打完還得意洋洋的以英雄自居的”完美民主“。衝擊議會,街頭政治,跪票的”完美民主“,不知羞恥的”完美民主“。 -我不信邪- 給 我不信邪 發送悄悄話 (0 bytes) () 11/04/2016 postreply 13:49:29

怎麽就看不見,伊拉克,烏克蘭,阿富汗的國無寧日,民不聊生的血腥”完美民主“, -我不信邪- 給 我不信邪 發送悄悄話 (0 bytes) () 11/04/2016 postreply 13:53:24

中國近幾十年的經濟成就,不得不讓西方人重新思考中國的製度。民主不能當飯吃。應該承認,中國已經比以前自由多了,私下基本上什麽話都可 -LinMu- 給 LinMu 發送悄悄話 LinMu 的博客首頁 (110 bytes) () 11/04/2016 postreply 14:59:09

別來虛的,西方國家政府承認中國人能以“獨裁迫害“為由申請難民身份嗎? -山中農夫- 給 山中農夫 發送悄悄話 (0 bytes) () 11/04/2016 postreply 15:04:25

為何西方國家承認並接受數百萬“享受民主生活”的人為難民,而不接受在中共專製獨裁統治下的中國人為難民?種族歧視? -山中農夫- 給 山中農夫 發送悄悄話 (0 bytes) () 11/04/2016 postreply 15:41:37

一個從貪官汙吏到平頭百姓人人想往外跑,自己跑不動就設法讓孩子跑的國度,跑出來再愛黨媽媽不遲。比如上麵幾位。 -Yale555- 給 Yale555 發送悄悄話 (0 bytes) () 11/05/2016 postreply 06:09:42

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