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Ukraine Can’t Break Through the Surovikin Lines, While Russia Stalls in Pokrovsk
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine
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Chornivka — Writing from the Ukrainian defensive belt that, near Pokrovsk, holds the rest of Donbas and Ukraine in check, I explained in my latest dispatches from the front how that dense network of kilometers-long tunnels, hundreds of meters deep, now constitutes an impenetrable barrier for the Russian Armed Forces.
It took Moscow nearly two years and about eight hundred thousand men to run aground near Pokrovsk, which remains outside this system and over whose center the yellow-and-blue flag still flies, despite Kremlin propaganda claiming it has fallen for months.
Pokrovsk is located precisely 50 kilometers west of the previous Donbas stronghold: Avdiivka, where Putin’s ‘little green men’ were stopped in 2014. Having overcome that stronghold due to the halt of American supplies imposed by the Republican majority in the last midterm elections, twelve years and over 1.2 million dead and seriously injured later, the Russian army still hasn’t managed to capitalize on that ‘success’.
Just take a look at a map of Russian ‘conquests’ in 2025 to understand the Kremlin’s strategic failure. Calling that minor advance «a success» — which cost 400,000 men in just one year, along with equipment, missiles, ammunition, and vehicles — is nothing short of grotesque. It shows how baseless that and other outbursts from Donald Trump are, especially when compared to the destruction caused to civilian targets throughout Ukraine.
After reading delirious reports and assessments, evidently written from afar, I feel compelled to explain why Ukraine cannot advance beyond the so-called ‘Surovikin Lines’.
First of all, calling them ‘lines’ is inaccurate. They are a multi-layer defense system arranged in bands that extend up to 30 km across Ukrainian territories controlled by the Russian Federation.
The first band features continuous, high-density minefields, with anti-personnel and anti-tank mines laid so densely that an estimated 5 mines per linear meter can be found in the most critical areas. These are remote-controlled, redeployable devices launched with Zemledelie-I systems and repositioned every night by drones that monitor Ukrainian breach attempts. In the same zone are the dragon’s teeth (pyramidal reinforced concrete structures arranged in kilometers-long rows), zigzag trenches, and deep anti-tank ditches. To get a clear idea of this setup, just watch the footage of a similar Ukrainian system I recorded on various fronts of the war.
In the second zone, there are other minefields and trenches connecting numerous concrete bunkers, as well as positions for ATGMs, MGs, observers, and snipers who constantly monitor those first protected lines of communication.
In the third zone, there are semi-permanent artillery emplacements, depots, and internal supply routes, behind which rise artificial heights or elevations designed for observation and the launching of drones, and finally, mortars.
It goes without saying that mines play a crucial role. Moscow has millions, accumulated since the days of the USSR. Ukraine, on the other hand, has few, mostly received from the US after endless back-and-forth, and they are self-deactivating: after a preset period, they deactivate and need to be rearmed manually. This has caused disasters like the ones I mentioned from the Sumy front, when the Russians managed to break into the areas where I lived for a long time.
Furthermore, Ukraine has lost a significant portion of its mine-clearing vehicles, such as the URA-77, MICLIC, and Leopard 2R, making it difficult even to approach the first zone.
Beyond the overwhelming superiority in artillery, counter-battery fire, and missiles that I have repeatedly described, the Russians have continuous detection systems supported by Orlan, Zala, SuperCam, and Lancet drones, which systematically eliminate Ukrainian mine-clearing personnel and armored vehicles.
The new Russian laser-guided KAB glide bombs, now equipped with micro-turbojet engines, also target Ukrainian rear areas, which lack equivalent air-launched capabilities.
The most common mistake among analysts and remote reporters is to consider the Surovikin lines static.
They are dynamic: the Russians set up fortified positions every week, lay new mines immediately after neutralizing Ukrainian saboteurs and raiders, and rebuild any breaches they open in less than 24–48 hours.
This ensures that local successes like the one achieved at Robotyne never become strategic breakthroughs.
However, these defenses were built to resist an army without an air force, as Ukraine's was in 2022–2023. As long as Kyiv’s allies keep limiting their resources to prevent it from gaining air superiority, those defenses will stay unbreakable.
The Ukrainian military and political leaders understand this well. So much so that after many briefings with the General Staff, Volodymyr Zelensky launched a detailed review of the Ukrainian Air Force, ordering the production of hundreds of aircraft, including French Mirage-2000s and Swedish Gripens.
What I’ve written is supported by the material and testimonies I’ve collected in the field. Much of it is visible on La Ragione’s YouTube channel and website, and here on Medium. It’s important to emphasize this because nearly all the ‘experts’ keep discussing it without ever having set foot here.
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在過去三年裏，作為自由撰稿人，我們一直在烏克蘭戰爭的所有前線進行報道，自從大規模……
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烏克蘭無法突破蘇羅維金防線，俄羅斯在波克羅夫斯克陷入停滯
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
烏克蘭前線報道
喬爾尼夫卡——靠近波克羅夫斯克的烏克蘭防禦帶對頓巴斯及烏克蘭其他地區形成了製衡。我就在這個防禦帶中寫作，在最新的前線報導中，我解釋了那密集的、延綿數公裏、深達數百米的隧道網絡如何成為俄羅斯武裝部隊無法穿透的屏障。
（圖：我在寫這篇文章前的一刻，站在頓巴斯的隧道門口——版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
莫斯科花了近兩年時間和約八十萬人的軍事力量，最終在波克羅夫斯克陷入困境，而俄軍仍然沒有滲透這個防禦帶，盡管克裏姆林宮的宣傳聲稱其已經在幾個月前淪陷，但波克羅夫斯克市中心上空仍飄揚著黃藍相間的國旗。
波克羅夫斯克位於前頓巴斯據點阿夫迪伊夫卡以西正好50公裏，普京的“綠人”在2014年曾在此被阻擋。由於在上屆中期選舉中共和黨多數派強製停止了美國的補給，俄軍衝破了這個據點。經曆了十二年戰鬥和超過120萬的死傷後，俄羅斯軍隊仍未能在這一“成功”上取得實質性的戰果。
（圖：綠色顯示阿夫迪伊夫卡。紅色是波克羅夫斯克—OpenStreetMap的開源地圖）
隻需看看2025年俄羅斯“征服”的地圖，就可以理解克裏姆林宮的戰略失敗。將這一小規模的推進稱為“成功”——代價是僅一年就損失了40萬人，以及大量的裝備、導彈、彈藥和車輛——簡直是荒謬至極。這表明唐納德出普的言論和其他類似的狂言多麽麽有依據，尤其是與在烏克蘭各地對平民目標造成的破壞相比。
（圖：俄羅斯在2025年5月至12月期間的 “推進”——地圖來源：Poulet Volant on X）
在閱讀了那些顯然是遠程撰寫的混亂報告和評估後，我感到有必要解釋為什麽烏克蘭無法突破所謂的“蘇羅維金防線”。
首先，將它們稱為“防線”並不準確。它們是一個多層防禦係統，以帶狀形式布置，在俄羅斯聯邦控製的烏克蘭領土上延伸達30公裏。
第一層由連續、高密度的雷區組成，其中反步兵和反坦克地雷鋪設得非常密集，最危險的區域估計每米長的線段就有5個地雷。這些地雷是使用Zemledelie-I係統發射的可遙控、可重新部署的裝置，且每晚通過監控烏克蘭突破嚐試的無人機重新布置。在同一區域內，還設置有“龍牙”（呈金字塔狀的加強混凝土結構，排成數公裏長的行列）、鋸齒形壕溝和深反坦克壕溝。要想清楚了解這種布置，隻需觀看我在戰爭各前線記錄的烏克蘭類似係統的畫麵即可。
在第二層，有其他雷區和壕溝連接著許多混凝土掩體，以及反坦克導彈、機槍、觀察員和狙擊手的陣地，他們會持續監視那些第一條保護通信線。
（圖：Alla在頓巴斯防線附近報道，烏克蘭人在夏季將防線升級，以減緩俄羅斯在頓涅茨克的推進——版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
在第三層，有半永久性的炮兵陣地、彈藥庫和內部補給路線，後麵是用於觀察和發射無人機的人工高地或高處，最後還有迫擊炮。
（圖：幾天前，我在經過頓巴斯的烏克蘭防線拍攝的照片——版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
不言而喻，地雷在這裏發揮著至關重要的作用。自蘇聯時期開始積累，莫斯科現在擁有數百萬枚地雷。而烏克蘭的地雷數量則很少，主要是在經過無休止的反複談判後從美國獲得的，並且它們是自我失效的：在預設的時間段之後，這些地雷會失效，需要手動重新引爆。這導致了如我提到過的在蘇梅前線那樣的災難，當時俄羅斯人成功突入了我長期居住的區域。
（圖：我在庫爾斯克行動期間給Alla拍下這張照片——版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
（圖：Alla和我在庫爾斯克前線的烏克蘭戰情室內——版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
（圖：在接近庫爾斯克前線時，我給Alla拍了這張照片——版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
此外，烏克蘭已經失去了大量的排雷車輛，如URA-77、MICLIC和豹2R，這使得即使接近第一層防線也變得困難重重。
除了我多次描述的火炮、反炮火和導彈的壓倒性優勢外，俄羅斯還擁有由Orlan、Zala、SuperCam和Lancet無人機支持的連續偵測係統，這些無人機係統性地消滅烏克蘭的排雷人員和裝甲車輛。
新型的俄羅斯激光製導KAB滑翔炸彈，現在配備了微渦輪噴氣發動機，也針對缺乏相應空投能力的烏克蘭後方區域展開攻擊。
（圖片來源：Reuters）
（圖片來源：Reuters）
分析師和遠程記者最常犯的錯誤是將蘇羅維金防線視為靜態。
實際上，這些防線是動態的：俄羅斯每周都會設立加固陣地，在消滅烏克蘭破壞和突擊隊後立即鋪設新地雷，並在24到48小時內修複他們打開的任何缺口。
這確保了像在機器人取得的地方性成功永遠不會演變為戰略突破。
然而，這些防禦工事是為抵禦沒有空軍的軍隊而建造的，而烏克蘭在2022年到2023年確實沒有空中優勢。隻要基輔的盟友持續限製資源阻止烏克蘭獲得空中優勢，這些防禦將始終不可突破的。
烏克蘭的軍政領導人對此十分清楚。以至於在與總參謀部多次通報後，弗拉基米爾·澤連斯基啟動了對烏克蘭空軍的詳細審查，命令生產數百架飛機，包括法國的“幻影2000”和瑞典的“猛禽”戰鬥機。
我所寫的內容得到了我在實地收集的材料和證詞的支持。大部分內容可在La Ragione的YouTube頻道和網站上，以及在Medium上均可見。強調這一點很重要，因為幾乎所有的“專家”都在討論這個話題，卻從未親自踏足這裏。
（圖：我在遭受俄羅斯襲擊的前線附近——版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
