我想對西方軍事專家領域關於俄羅斯戰術及其假定的“演變”以及對衝突未來的展望的最尖銳有趣的發布進行綜述。I wanted to do a roundup of the most trenchantly interesting releases from the Western military pundit-sphere regarding Russian tactics and their putative ‘evolution’, as well as outlooks on the conflict’s future.
第一個引起轟動的大人物來自The first big one making waves is from RUSIRUSI（皇家聯合軍種研究所），這是一個軍事智囊團，自稱是 (Royal United Services Institute), a military thinktank which calls itself the ““oldest世界上最古老的國防和安全智囊團”，由惠靈頓公爵於 1831 年創立。 defense and security think tank in the world,” having been founded by the Duke of Wellington in 1831.
他們最新的Their latest “特別報告”“special report”提供了烏克蘭反攻的經過深思熟慮的最新情況。他們首先承認烏克蘭正遭受“嚴重的裝備損失”，但是…… “國際合作夥伴提供的裝甲戰車的設計阻止了這種情況轉化為大量陣亡人員。” gives a considered update on Ukraine’s counteroffensive. They start off with the admission that Ukraine is suffering “from heavy rates of equipment loss” but… “the design of armored fighting vehicles supplied by its international partners is preventing this from converting inot a high number of killed personnel.”
這是西方為提振 AFU 士氣而采用的最新口號。您會注意到，在挑戰者 2 號前幾天首次失事後，新任命的英國國防部長的“應對措施”是，至少機組人員幸存下來。This is the latest throughline adopted by the West as an attempt to buoy morale in the AFU. You’ll notice that after the Challenger 2’s first ever kill the other day, the “cope” from the newly appointed British defense minister is that, well, at least the crew survived.
雖然這是一個題外話，但讓我解釋一下為什麽我相信他在撒謊，因為它觸及了主題的核心。Though it is a digression, let me explain why I believe he’s lying, because it gets to the heart of the topic.
挑戰者號被擊落的實際鏡頭已被發布，據稱是由短號反坦克導彈完成的，造成了巨大的爆炸：The footage of the actual Challenger kill was released, and was purportedly done by a Kornet ATGM, which created a large explosion:
人們指出的重要一點是，如果你看一下被擊毀的坦克的照片，你會發現炮塔實際上已經完全與車體分離，並且以一種不應該的方式坐在側麵的邊緣。是：The important thing that people have pointed out, is if you look at the photos of the killed tank, it appears that the turret has actually been completely detached from the hull and is sitting on the edge of the side in a way it’s not supposed to be:
請注意，當坦克轉動時，炮塔的前部如何與坦克的側麵大致齊平，而Note how the front of the turret sits roughly flush with the side of the tank when it’s turned, and the 裝有彈藥的炮塔後部則懸掛rear在正確安裝的坦克上的另一側。但在破壞鏡頭中，我們看到炮塔的前部實際上懸在側麵，後部齊平。如果沒有畫線的話，你可以更清楚地看到它： of the turret which houses the ammo hangs over the other side, on a properly fitted tank. But in the destruction footage, we see that the front of the turret is actually hanging over the side and the rear is flush. You can see it more clearly without the drawn on lines:
關鍵是，如果炮塔以這種方式與車體災難性地分離，就意味著一場可能無人幸存的爆炸。更不用說指揮官艙門應該所在的地方似乎有一個巨大的洞，這也表明爆炸與生命不相容。The point is that for a turret to catastrophically separate from the hull in such a way would mean an explosion of a sort that likely no one survived. Not to mention there appears to be a huge hole where the commander’s hatch should be, which also points to a detonation incompatible with life.
最近，俄羅斯首屈一指的步兵戰車製造商 Kurganmashzavod 的俄羅斯工程師研究了被俘獲的布拉德利，並發布了這份報告：Recently, Russian engineers at Kurganmashzavod—Russia’s premier IFV manufacturer—who studied a captured Bradley released this report:
但是，等到您看到布拉德利的真正抵抗力時，它會在本文後麵的內容中證實這一點。But wait until you see the real piece de resistance on the Bradley which clinches this point later on in the article.
事實是，西方的武器並不像廣告上說的那麽好。因此，盡管係統在火雞射擊中不斷被破壞，但機組人員“幸存”並不是一個很好的認可。The fact is, Western weapons aren’t as good as the advertising. So to say that the crew “survived” despite the systems being continually picked off in a turkey shoot is not a great endorsement.
RUSI報告繼續指出，“任何進攻行動的先決條件是火力（炮兵）優勢。這是通過削弱俄羅斯火炮的反電池能力以及精確遠程火炮係統的可用性來實現的。通過為整合的炮兵公園適當地分配彈藥生產和備件資源，確保這一優勢的可持續性至關重要。”The RUSI report continues by stating that “The prerequisite condition for any offensive action is fires (artillery) dominance. This has been achieved through blinding the counterbattery capability of Russian guns and the availability of precise and long-range artillery systems. Ensuring the sustainability of this advantage by properly resourcing ammunition production and spares for a consolidated artillery park is critical.”
讓我們看看一位在這條戰線上作戰的俄羅斯炮兵師的實際指揮官對此有何評論：Let’s see what an actual commander of a Russian artillery division fighting on this front has to say about this:
首先，他是一個名為“Kaskad”的 DPR 小組的指揮官，不完全是俄羅斯軍隊，但他的話仍然很有趣。他描述了最近在烏羅紮伊內地區發生的炮擊行動，該地區就在舊馬約爾斯克附近，位於韋利卡諾沃西爾卡以南著名的“Vremevske 壁架”上。So firstly, he’s a commander of a DPR group called “Kaskad”, not quite of the Russian army proper, but his words are still very interesting. He describes the artillery action in the Urozhayne sector recently, right near Staromayorsk on the famed “Vremevske ledge” south of Velyka Novosilka.
總結要點：Summarized points:
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僅從他的部隊中，他們每小時就能發射 450 發炮彈Just from his unit they fire 450 shells an hour
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AFU 發射更多，每天多達 2800 枚“盒式”（集束彈藥）型炮彈AFU fires more, up to 2800 “cassette” (cluster munitions) type shells per day
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根據無線電截獲，僅在 AFU 的一小片定居點內，就有 3000 多人傷亡。這還不包括拉博蒂諾附近整個更加活躍的西線，估計那裏有多達 10-20k 的人員According to radio intercepts, the AFU had 3,000+ casualties only in their small area of settlements. This doesn’t count the entire even much more active western front near Rabotino where they’ve had as many as 10-20k estimated
我之前發布過對同一地區俄羅斯指揮官的采訪，其中指出與 AFU 相比，他們的損失很小。那麽，RUSI認為烏克蘭擁有炮兵“優勢”來對抗俄羅斯，這是否有道理呢？根據他所在區域的這位指揮官的說法，他們確實發射了更多子彈——這可能是因為當你進行進攻時，你必須分配大量彈藥，並期望你I’ve posted previous interviews with Russian commanders in this same sector which state that their losses are tiny compared to the AFU. So, does RUSI have a point that Ukraine has brought artillery “superiority” to bear on Russia? According to this commander in his sector they do fire more rounds—this is likely due to the fact that when you conduct an offensive, you have to allot a large portion of ammunition with the expectation that you 應該should超越你的對手。其理論是，對手處於防禦狀態，因此處於防禦地位，這意味著必須發射更多的子彈才能達到相同的效果或傷亡率。另一方麵，防禦者可以發射更少的子彈，並對你造成更大的傷害，因為進攻部隊暴露在“露天”，並且與深入地下的防禦者相比，在穿過田野時更容易被擊中。戰壕。 be outfiring your opponent. The theory is that the opponent is on defense and therefore entrenched, which means far more shots have to be fired to achieve the same effect or casualty rate. The defender, on the other hand, can fire far less shots and do more damage to you because the offensive force is exposed “out in the open” and are far easier to hit as they cross the fields compared to an entrenched defender dug into underground trenches.
RUSI 在下一節中證實了上述一些內容，其中指出烏克蘭長期以來一直在為反攻保留彈藥，現在正在更加自由地消耗彈藥： RUSI confirms some of the above with the next section, which states that Ukraine had been conserving ammo for the counteroffensive for a long time and is now expending it more liberally:
不斷有宣傳稱美國提供的 M777 具有更遠的射程。為了什麽？俄羅斯擁有的火炮係統類型比所有北約國家的總和還多。其中有 D-20、D-30、2A29、2A36、2A61、2A65、2S1、2S3、2S5、2S7、2S19 和 2S19M2，更不用說據報道即將交付部隊的新 2S43“馬爾瓦”，以及無盡的上麵未包括的多管火箭炮係統，其範圍幾乎超過了所有係統。其中許多的射程小於美國 M777，其中一些射程更大，即 2S7M，但也有 2A36、2S19M2，甚至 2A65，具體取決於彈藥類型，特別是如果它們使用最長射程的There’s the continued propaganda line that the American-supplied M777s have superior range. To what? Russia has more types of artillery systems than all of NATO combined. There’s D-20, D-30, 2A29, 2A36, 2A61, 2A65, 2S1, 2S3, 2S5, 2S7, 2S19 and 2S19M2, not to mention the new 2S43 ‘Malva’ reportedly being shipped to troops soon, as well as the endless MLRS systems not included above, which outrange pretty much everything. Many of these have less range than American M777s, and a few of them have greater range, namely the 2S7M, but also the 2A36, 2S19M2, and even 2A65 depending on the type of round, particularly if they’re using the longest range RAPRAP而 M777 則不然。 and the M777 isn’t.
我想一勞永逸地解決這場西方消息來源繼續以虛假借口傳播的爭論。烏克蘭使用的標準型美國陸軍主力炮彈是 M795。I want to settle this debate once and for all, which Western sources continue to propagate under false pretenses. The standard issue U.S. army workhorse shell being used by Ukraine is the M795. You can see on the official 您可以在M777M777 page官方頁麵上看到，使用M795炮彈的榴彈炮列出的射程：, the listed range for the howitzer with the M795 shell:
我們有 23.5 公裏，記住這一點。We have 23.5km, keep that in mind.
現在讓我們列出俄羅斯火炮係統的射程。我們將僅使用等效的 152mm 係統，而不是 122mm。您可以在其官方 wiki 頁麵上自行驗證以下所有內容。Now let’s list the ranges of the Russian artillery systems. We’ll use only equivalent 152mm systems rather than 122mm. You can verify all the below yourself on their official wiki pages.
俄羅斯最古老的D-20榴彈炮的最小射程為Russia’s oldest D-20 howitzer has the smallest range at 17.4公裏17.4km，2S3 Akatsiya約為, the 2S3 Akatsiya about 18.5公裏18.5km。.
下一個：Next:
Russia’s standard OF45 round fired from a 2A652A65和 and 2S192S19發射的俄羅斯標準 OF45 子彈射程為 gets 24.7 公裏24.7km，高於 M777 的標準 23.5 公裏。, which is higher than the M777’s standard 23.5km.
2S5 The Hyacinth-S2S5 Hyacinth-S使用標準彈藥可射程為 28 公裏，而怪物 gets 28km from standard ammo and the monster 2S7M2S7M雖然發射 203 毫米，但在無輔助彈藥的情況下可射程 37.5 公裏，使用輔助彈藥可射程近 50 公裏。, though it fires 203mm, gets 37.5km unassisted with nearly 50km with assisted ammo.
正如您所看到的，其中兩個俄羅斯係統的射程較差，兩個係統的射程略好或幾乎持平，而另外兩個係統的射程要高得多。As you can see, 2 of the Russian systems have poorer range, a couple have slightly better or almost even range, and another couple have much higher range.
當然，西方媒體會“挑選”來自規模較小的誌願軍或裝備較差的 DPR 部隊的報道，這些部隊可能使用“格沃茲迪卡”、“阿卡提亞”、D-20 等。但忽略了使用 2A36、2S19、2S5 等的俄羅斯部隊， 2S7s等，射程都可以超過M777。Of course Western media “picks and chooses” the reports from smaller volunteer groups or not-as-well armed DPR units which may be using Gvozdikas, Akatsiyas, D-20s, etc. But ignore the Russian units using 2A36s, 2S19s, 2S5s, 2S7s etc., which can all outrange the M777.
是的，烏克蘭也有其他係統，如德國 PhZ2000 和法國凱撒係統，據報道它們的標準彈藥射程更高，但它們的數量也少得多，而俄羅斯已經消耗了很多（如果不是大多數的話），更不用說他們的與 2S7M 相比，範圍仍然相形見絀。至於波蘭 Krab 和英國 As-90，同樣的情況，隻是它們一開始就沒有更高的射程。Yes, Ukraine also has other systems like German PhZ2000 and French Caesar that reportedly have higher ranges with standard ammo, but they’re also far fewer in number, and Russia has already attrited a lot if not most of them, not to mention that their ranges still pale in comparison to 2S7Ms. As for Polish Krab and British As-90, same thing, except they don’t even have a higher range to begin with.
事實是，俄羅斯方麵對損失的容忍度要低得多。因此，當他們通過反電池火力消滅一兩個單位時，警報就會響起，他們在報告中的語氣也更加重要。但烏克蘭可能會損失 10 門火炮，可以說，這對他們來說將是“美好的一天”。人們注意到俄羅斯語氣更加緊迫，並從中得出俄羅斯正在遭受更嚴重損失的暗示，因此烏克蘭的火炮一定在某些方麵具有優勢。事情並不完全是這樣的。The truth is that the Russian side simply has a far lower tolerance to losses. So when they get 1 or 2 units taken out via counterbattery fire an alarm goes off, and their tone in reports is much more consequential. But Ukraine can lose 10 artillery pieces and that will be a “good day” for them, so to speak. People pick up on the more urgent Russian tone and derive from that the implication that Russia is taking heavier losses therefore Ukraine’s artillery must be superior in some way. That’s not quite how it works.
事實上，最近烏克蘭對俄羅斯火炮的唯一有效消耗是通過射程為 90 公裏的 HIMAR 導彈。你認為他們為什麽如此依賴海馬來對抗俄羅斯炮兵連？In fact, in recent times the only real attrition to Russia’s artillery that Ukraine has effectively carried out is by way of HIMARs, which has 90km range. Why do you think they’re leaning on HIMARs so heavily to counter-snipe Russian artillery batteries?
為什麽西方最先進的兩種自行火炮——法國凱撒和英國AS-90在這幾天都遭遇了災難性的死亡：Why did 2 of the West’s most advanced artillery SPGs, the French Caesar and British AS-90 both just suffer catastrophic deaths in the past few days:
此外，烏克蘭的槍管磨損要嚴重得多，因為出於明顯的後勤原因，他們無法像俄羅斯那樣奢侈地更換槍管。這意味著他們的係統失去了準確性和範圍。大多數剩餘的 M777 的實際射程可能是 15 公裏左右，因為這是你從磨損的槍管中所能得到的最大射程，而且 M777 的槍管一開始就很挑剔。Furthermore, Ukraine suffers from far greater barrel wear as they don’t have the luxury to swap barrels as Russia does, for obvious logistical reasons. That means their systems lose accuracy and range. The actual operative range of most of their remaining M777s is probably 15km give or take, as that’s the most you’ll get out of a worn barrel—and the M777 barrels are finicky to begin with.
另一方麵，俄羅斯可以證明一直在前線交換槍管，正如許多視頻所證明的那樣：Russia on the other hand provably swaps barrels on the front all the time, as numerous videos attest:
總而言之，烏克蘭所謂的火炮“射程”優勢並不真實，隻有從對一支特定部隊的精心挑選的描述來看，該部隊恰好沒有配備像 D-30 這樣的舊裝備。毫無疑問，這樣的單位有In conclusion, there’s no truth to Ukraine’s purported artillery ‘range’ superiority, only when taken from the hand-picked account of one particular unit which happens to be under-equipped with old gear like D-30s. There 很多are，但也有很多擁有更好的平台。請記住，烏克蘭總共隻接收了大約 150 多架 M777，俄羅斯隻有 760 架高級 2S19，這還不包括數千種其他槍管類型。 many such units, make no mistake, but there are also many with the better platforms. Remember, Ukraine took delivery of only around ~150+ give or take M777s total, Russia has 760 just of superior 2S19s, not counting the thousands of other barrel types.
接下來，RUSI 的文章描述了 6 月初反攻的一開始的進攻。有兩個有趣的承認：第一個，MaxxPro MRAP“陷入泥沼”——證明了我們聽到的關於它們在烏克蘭地形中能力不足的傳言。第二個Moving on, the RUSI article describes the very opening foray of the early June counteroffensive. There are two interesting admissions: the first, that the MaxxPro MRAPs got “bogged down” in the mud—proving the rumors we heard of their inadequacy in Ukrainian terrain. The second even 更more 有趣的是：仔細閱讀突出顯示的部分：interesting is as follows; read the highlighted portion very carefully:
回想一下，我們知道這次反攻中的第一個突破是使用 Leopard 2A6 進行的。在這裏，RUSI選擇提出異議，不承認嚴酷的現實，寧願含糊地稱它們為“坦克”。Recall that we know the very first breaches conducted on this counteroffensive were with Leopard 2A6s. Here RUSI chooses to demur and not admit of the harsh reality, preferring to vaguely call them “tanks.”
多年來我們一直被告知，西方坦克，尤其是 Leopard 2A6 變種，是世界上最先進的坦克，由於其先進的光學係統、火控係統 (FCS)、槍管精度、彈藥射程和彈道、火炮穩定性等。We were told for years that Western tanks, particularly the Leopard 2A6 variants, were the most advanced things in the world and would easily destroy Russian tanks in a head-to-head duel due to their superior optics, fire control systems (FCS), barrel accuracies, ammunition range and ballistics, gun stabilization, etc.
但令人驚訝的是，自詡為世界上最權威、最古老的智庫之一指出，俄羅斯坦克開始與烏克蘭“坦克”領導的縱隊交戰，並且——你瞧——痛苦地承認：“縱隊中的車輛是連續被淘汰。”But astonishingly, one of the self-proclaimed most authoritative and oldest thinktanks in the world states that Russian tanks began to engage the column led by Ukrainian “tanks”, and—lo and behold—the painful admission: “The vehicles in the column were knocked out in succession.”
所有那些卓越的光學器件、穩定性以及介於兩者之間的一切都發生了什麽？What happened to all those superior optics, stabilizations, and everything in between?
現在臭名昭著的 Rob Lee 和 Michael Kofman 在 WarOnTheRocks 上發表的一篇新A new 文章WarOnTheRocks article也揭示了這個備受討論的開局階段。他們證實了一些調查結果，不僅指出烏克蘭由於擔心損失而很少一次使用超過幾輛坦克，而且一個旅中隻有幾個排做好了攻擊準備： from the now infamous Rob Lee and Michael Kofman also sheds light on this much-discussed opening phase. They corroborate some of the findings, not only stating that Ukraine rarely uses more than a couple tanks at a time due to fear of losses, but that only a few platoons in a brigade are assault ready:
例如，在巴赫穆特周圍，烏克蘭的許多機械化襲擊都是由一到兩個小隊在兩輛坦克的支持下進行。根據我們的實地研究，烏克蘭坦克部隊很少在連級進行集結，因為存在一次性失去太多坦克的風險。坦克戰很少見。坦克大部分時間都花在支援步兵和提供間接火力上。他們通常成對或成排行動，支援步兵攻擊。這次進攻的主要特點Around Bakhmut, for example, many of Ukraine’s mechanized assaults feature one to two squads backed by two tanks. Ukrainian tank units, according to our field research, rarely mass at the company level because of the risk of losing too many tanks at once. Tank battles are rare. Tanks spend much of their time supporting infantry and providing indirect fires. They generally operate in pairs, or in platoons, supporting infantry attacks. This offensive has largely been characterized 是排級步兵突擊by platoon-level infantry assaults，從林線到林線進行戰鬥。盡管旅的規模很大，但進行突擊訓練的排和連的數量往往有限，限製了可用於執行此類任務的部隊。, fighting tree line to tree line. Despite their size, brigades often have a limited number of platoons and companies that have assault training, constraining the forces available for such tasks.
他們不溫不火的文章中另一個重要的承認是，俄羅斯實際上是在故意用空間換取消耗，這一事實對於任何中層分析師來說都是清楚的，但仍然一再被渴望宣傳的西方拉拉隊所忽視：The other big admission in their tepid piece is that Russia is in fact deliberately trading space for attrition, a fact clear to any even mid-level analyst but still repeatedly ignored by propaganda-boost-hungry Western cheerleaders:
回到 RUSI 部分，本節的其餘部分涵蓋了一些術後 BDA 內容，因此我們進入下一個有趣的部分，稱為“俄語課程和適應”。Getting back to the RUSI piece, the rest of the section covers some post-op BDA stuff so we move onto the next interesting section called “Russian Lessons and Adaptation.”
首先是另一個重大讓步：It starts off with another big concession:
新達裏夫卡和裏夫諾波爾周圍的戰術行動在很大程度上被視為俄羅斯軍隊的成功，因為他們在早期階段造成了足夠的裝備損失，從而削弱了烏克蘭機動部隊的射程，假設俄羅斯防禦陣地縱深的損失率保持一致。The tactical actions around Novodarivka and Rivnopil were largely seen as successes by Russian forces insofar as they inflicted sufficient equipment losses in the early phases so as to degrade the reach of Ukrainian manoeuvre units assuming a consistent rate of loss through the depth of Russia’s defensive positions.
他們承認，盡管烏克蘭最終占領了這兩個小型定居點，但這基本上是俄羅斯的成功，因為 AFU 造成了巨大且不可持續的傷亡。這些是來自一個致力於盡可能推廣“經過淨化”的戰爭版本的研究所的相當直白的坦白。They are admitting that even though Ukraine eventually took those two small settlements, it was basically a Russian success because of the outsize and unsustainable casualties the AFU took. These are fairly stark confessions from an institute bent on promoting as ‘sanitized’ a version of the war as possible.
還有另一個：And another:
當烏克蘭軍隊因裝甲側翼進攻而陷入困境時，俄羅斯軍方還決定在戰術上利用機會來摧毀烏克蘭的係統。值得注意的是，俄羅斯經常損失用於這些反擊的坦克，但由於地雷限製了烏克蘭車輛的機動或反應能力，它們造成了不成比例的損失。這種反擊的意願和保護前鋒的決定The Russian military has also determined to tactically exploit opportunities when Ukrainian forces have become bogged down by aggressive flanking with armour to knock out Ukrainian systems. It is worth noting that Russia often loses the tanks used for these counterattacks but they inflict disproportionate damage because the mines constrain Ukrainian vehicles in their ability to manoeuvre or respond. This willingness to counterattack and a decision to defend forwards 凸顯了對俄羅斯坦克乘員和其他專業的訓練如何繼續發揮作用，與阻礙俄羅斯步兵的集體訓練中斷相比，培養了具有一定戰術能力的新乘員。highlight how training for Russian tank crews and other specialisms has continued to function, generating new crews with some tactical competence compared with the disruption in collective training that has hampered Russian infantry.
據他們稱，俄羅斯在電子戰方麵顯示出巨大進步，創新了新用途，例如使用 Pole-21 等更小、更輕的移動係統作為更大、更強大係統的“天線”發射器。這使得移動裝置能夠發出電子戰信號，從而使較大的主機安全且隱藏，從而實現更廣泛的戰場覆蓋。According to them, Russia is showing vast improvement in EW warfare, innovating new usages such as using smaller, lighter, mobile systems like Pole-21 to act as the “antenna” transmitter to larger more powerful systems. This allows the mobile unit to give off the EW signal leaving the larger mainframe safe and hidden, enabling wider battlefield coverage.
他們指出的最後也是最重要的進步是著名的俄羅斯偵察火力綜合體（RFC）每天都在不斷改進。他們指出，俄羅斯傾向於優先考慮“克拉斯諾波爾”這樣的製導彈藥，並加強了其進行精確打擊的情監偵能力，這使得他們能夠以比舊的蘇聯網格式炮擊理論少得多的彈藥消耗來摧毀目標。The final and most important advancement they note, is that the famed Russian Reconnaissance-Fire-Complex (RFC) has been continually improving every day. They note that Russia has favored prioritizing guided munitions like the Krasnopol and has tightened its ISR capabilities in carrying out accurate strikes that allows them to destroy targets with far less ammo expenditures than old Soviet grid-style gunlaying doctrines.
這是一個令人擔憂的趨勢，因為隨著時間的推移，它可能會顯著改進俄羅斯的火炮This is a concerning trend, as over time it will likely significantly improve Russian artillery。俄羅斯無人機的複雜性、多樣性和密度的增長令人擔憂。Lancet-3 和 Lancet-3M 之間的彈頭效果和設計經濟性方麵的進步表明俄羅斯正在積極改進其部署裝備。為了降低 Shahed-136 的噪音並加強導航而對徘徊彈藥進行的修改也值得注意。. The growth in the complexity, diversity and density of Russian UAVs is concerning. The gains in both effect of the warhead and the economy of its design between Lancet-3 and Lancet-3M demonstrate how the Russians are actively improving their fielded equipment. Modifications to loitering munitions to achieve noise reduction on Shahed-136 and to harden navigation are also notable.
我認為最重要的一點是偵察火力綜合體權威/殺傷鏈通信的改進。這是極其重要的，並提到了我長期以來反複強調的一些內容：The most important point in my view revolves around the improvements in the communications of the Recon-Fire-Complex authority/kill chains. This is of utmost importance and mentions something I’ve long harped on:
啟用 RFC 取決於通信。俄羅斯軍隊在這方麵也取得了重要進展。在全麵入侵之初，俄羅斯軍隊嚴重依賴定製軍用無線電。在去年年底的設備爭奪戰中，使用了多種民用係統。然而，從概念上講，俄羅斯人現在似乎已經繼續前進，越來越依賴軍事承載網絡，而不是基於應用程序的服務來編碼和訪問數據。結果是像Enabling the RFC depends on communications. Here too, the Russian military is making important progress. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russian forces depended heavily on bespoke military radios. In the scramble for equipment late last year, a wide array of civilian systems was employed. Conceptually, however, the Russians now appear to have moved on, increasingly relying on military bearer networks but app-based services for encoding and accessing data. The result is that a system such as Strelets這樣的係統Strelets可以為民用用戶直觀操作應用程序的多個設備提供 3G 連接。這種承載和服務的分離才剛剛出現，所測試係統的安全性和穩健性必須受到懷疑。盡管如此，這種方法減少的訓練負擔以及已經實現的火力方向改進意味著 AFRF 可能會繼續朝這個方向推進，並圍繞這些方法日益係統化其通信架構。 can provide a 3G connection to multiple devices operating applications that are intuitive for civilian users. This separation of bearers and services is nascent and the security and robustness of the systems being tested must be doubted. Nevertheless, the reduced training burden of this approach and the improvements in fire direction already achieved mean that the AFRF are likely to continue to push in this direction and increasingly systematise their communications architecture around these methods.
他們提到了我在這裏寫到的 Strelets 係統：They mention the Strelets system of which I wrote about here:
這很重要，因為俄羅斯國防頻道幾天前剛剛發布了這段視頻，再次展示了其中一個已經部署到炮兵部隊的係統。該視頻演示了 Planshet-M 係統，該係統允許指揮官/偵察單位、ISR/無人機小組和實際炮組指揮官之間進行更大程度的協調，在單位之間無縫發送目標和坐標數據，以減少 RFC 循環時間：This is important because Russia’s defense channel just released this video days ago, again showcasing precisely one of these systems which is already being rolled out to the artillery forces. The video demonstrates the Planshet-M system which allows much greater coordination between commander/scout units, ISR/drone teams, and the actual battery commanders, seamlessly sending target and coordinate data between the units for a reduced RFC loop time:
其中大部分內容在另一篇《外交事務》中得到了呼應——順便說一句，這是外交關係委員會的官方雜誌——文章宣稱俄羅斯令人不安地在許多方麵正在進步：Much of this is echoed by another Foreign Affairs—which, by the way, is the official magazine of the Council on Foreign Relations—piece which declares that Russia, troublingly, is improving in many ways:
《商業內幕》同意Business Insider concurs with 他們的新文章their new piece：:
他們寫：They write:
俄羅斯幹擾烏克蘭無人機的能力隻會變得更好，迫使無人機操作員靠近前線，並在烏克蘭反攻的過程中使這些高價值部隊麵臨更大的危險。Russia's ability to jam Ukraine's drones has only gotten better, forcing drone operators to move closer to the front lines and putting those highly valuable troops in more danger as Ukraine's counteroffensive churns on.
我們將跳過其餘部分，因為它涵蓋了前麵的要點。We’ll skip the rest since it covers previous points.
RUSI 文章最後還有其他一些重要的要點，我將在接下來的時間內重點介紹。他們指出，烏克蘭指揮官優先考慮The RUSI piece finishes up with a few other important points I’ll highlight in quicker succession. They note that Ukrainian commanders prioritize 不not施放煙霧，因為他們更喜歡用無人機“天空之眼”來觀察戰場，而不是讓俄羅斯方麵失明，也讓他們自己失明： laying down smoke because they prefer to see the battlefield with drone “eyes in the sky”, rather than blinding the Russian side but also themselves:
指揮官們始終將維持自己對戰場的了解放在首位，而不是撒下煙霧和隱藏人員的行動。鑒於快速使用火炮支援行動的重要性，這種優先順序是可以理解的，Commanders persistently prioritise maintaining their own understanding of the battlefield over laying down smoke and concealing their personnel’s movements. Given the criticality of rapid application of artillery to support movement, this prioritisation is understandable, 但它也反映出旅信任戰術指揮官在沒有具有更強態勢感知能力的高層指揮下執行行動的能力的局限性。but it also reflects limitations in the ability of the brigade to trust tactical commanders to execute actions when not directed by high headquarters with greater situational awareness.鑒於由此導致的總部飽和，培訓初級領導者 Given the saturation of the headquarters that results, 並結合擴大員工能力至關重要。it is vital to train junior leaders, in combination with expanding staff capacity.
這裏最大的收獲是，這反映了The big takeaway here is that this reflects on the “旅信任戰術指揮官在沒有高層指揮的情況下執行行動的能力的限製”。“limitations in the ability of the brigade to trust tactical commanders to execute actions when not directed by high HQ.”
這聽起來像什麽？What does that sound like?
他們承認，“受過北約訓練”的中士和大肆吹噓的初級士官實際上無法勝任這項任務，“後方”的指揮官不相信他們能夠真正自行做出任何明智的戰術決策，更喜歡從無人機上觀察戰場，並像所謂的[誤稱]“蘇聯體係”一樣“集中”做出所有戰術決策。They are admitting that the “NATO-trained” sergeants and much-vaunted junior-NCOs are in fact not up to the task, and that commanders “in the rear” don’t trust them to actually make any sound tactical decisions on their own, preferring to watch the battlefield from drones and make all the tactical decisions “centrally” like the so-called [misnomered] “Soviet system.”
在大肆宣揚北約和“西方式訓練”的優越性之後，他們現在承認這都是廢話。After all that time talking up the superiority of NATO and ‘Wester-style training’, they now admit that it’s all bunk.
他們接著描述了北約國家的訓練實際上是不夠的，因為訓練是在與實際戰場不現實的條件下進行的。They go on to describe how training in NATO countries is in fact inadequate because it’s done under conditions that are not realistic to the actual battlefield.
Collective training outside Ukraine is hampered by the fact that 由於北約的安全文化，烏克蘭軍隊無法邊戰鬥邊訓練，這because of the safety culture in NATO, Ukrainian troops cannot train as they fight.阻礙了烏克蘭境外的集體訓練。此外， Moreover, 許多北約戰術要麽需要一定程度的培訓，而這在可用的時間範圍內是不可行的，要麽在現代威脅環境中沒有得到驗證。many NATO tactics either require a level of training that is not feasible within the timeframe available, or are not validated in the modern threat environment.
再讀一遍：北約的戰術“在現代威脅環境中並未得到驗證”。這是一個怪物般的承認。有趣的是，這份報告背後的首席“軍事專家”、英國皇家三軍研究所陸戰高級研究員傑克·沃特林博士此前曾於 7 月份為《衛報》撰寫過一篇文章，其中Read that again: NATO tactics “are not validated in the modern threat environment.” That’s a monster of an admission. Interestingly, the chief “military expert” behind this report, Dr. Jack Watling—Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute—had previously written an 說道article for The Guardian： in July where he said the following:
在俄羅斯全麵入侵烏克蘭的幾個月前，我躺在山頂上，看著一個美國機械化營轟然衝下山穀，其任務是衝破一係列障礙。A couple of months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, I was lying on a hilltop watching a US mechanised battalion thundering down a valley, tasked with breaching a set of obstacles. 演習中的障礙沒有烏克蘭那麽可怕，演習中的敵人隻有一個連，並有有限的火炮支援。然而，美軍卻把事情搞砸了。The obstacles were less formidable than those in Ukraine, and the enemy in the exercise comprised a single company backed by limited artillery. Nevertheless, the US troops made a mess of things.他們的偵察部隊未能對車輛進行掩護，他們在敵人視線範圍內靜止不動，受到了嚴厲的懲罰。 Their reconnaissance troops failed to screen their vehicles, they went static in sight of the enemy and they were severely punished.
訓練有素的美軍在更有利的情況下難以進行聯合兵種突破，這一事實凸顯了其難度。而且，我觀察到的美軍可能表現不佳，但他們在訓練中確實如此。如果他們必須真正做到這一點，他們將有反複學習和改進的機會。烏克蘭軍隊卻沒有這樣的奢侈。The fact that well-trained US troops struggle to conduct combined-arms obstacle breaching under more favourable circumstances underscores how difficult it is. Moreover, the US troops I was observing may have performed poorly, but they did so in training. If ever they have to do it for real, they will have had repeated opportunities to learn and improve. Ukrainian troops have not had that luxury.
這是什麽？我們因懷疑美國所吹噓的“聯合兵種”能力的至高無上性而受到了數月的嚴厲批評。看來一切並不像我們想象的那樣。What’s this? We were chastized for months for doubting the supremacy of U.S.’s vaunted “combined arms” capabilities. It seems not all was as we thought.
但 RUSI 報告繼續說道：But the RUSI report goes on:
這種部隊組建方法意味著This approach to force generation means that 大多數烏克蘭營正在組建大約兩個排的部隊，這些部隊被認為完全有能力領導突擊most Ukrainian battalions are generating approximately two platoons of troops which are considered fully capable of leading assault行動。雖然該營的其他部隊提供增援和堅守陣地的能力，但編隊進行進攻行動的規模卻受到嚴重限製。 actions. While the rest of the battalion provides reinforcement, and the ability to hold ground, the size at which formations can conduct offensive action is severely constrained.
因此，由於各種限製，每個營隻能產生半個連的真正戰鬥人員，而其餘的則隻是觀看和提供飼料以補充每分鍾損失的人員。這就解釋了為什麽我們每次隻看到每個自詡的“旅”最多有一兩個連出擊。So, due to these various limitations, each battalion can only generate half a company’s worth of real fighting men, while the rest merely watches and provides fodder to replace those lost by the minute. This explains why we only see a company or two at most from each vaunted “brigade” strike out at a time.
順便說一句，在《衛報》之前的文章中，沃特林承認，烏克蘭甚至派軍隊到國外訓練的唯一原因是，除了在烏克蘭本土進行單兵訓練之外，他們無法做任何事情，因為訓練場是成熟的目標俄羅斯罷工。這意味著對於連級及以上部隊的訓練，除了英國、德國等國家之外，不可能做到這一點。如果沒有這樣的訓練，較大的部隊根本無法形成領導適當攻擊所需的凝聚力。這就是烏克蘭麵臨的巨大難題。By the way—in the previous Guardian article, Watling admitted that the only reason Ukraine even sends their troops to foreign countries to train is because they’re unable to do anything beyond solo soldier training in Ukraine proper due to training grounds being ripe targets for Russian strikes. That means for training of company level units and up, it’s impossible to do this apart from in UK, Germany, etc. And without such training, larger units simply can’t form the cohesion necessary for leading proper assaults. This is the huge conundrum Ukraine is in.
最後，RUSI 報告得出結論：Finally, the RUSI report concludes:
同樣重要的是要認識到，俄羅斯軍隊在防禦方麵的戰鬥能力更強，並且具有合理的頑強性。盡管俄羅斯軍隊正在節節敗退，但他們基本上正在有序地從陣地撤退，並有效地放慢了速度，從而控製了烏克蘭的前進，同時增加了相當大的裝備成本It is also important to recognise that Russian forces are fighting more competently and with reasonable tenacity in the defence. Although they are losing ground, Russian forces are largely conducting orderly withdrawals from positions and are effectively slowing down and thereby managing Ukrainian advances while imposing a considerable cost in equipment
嗯，那是一件大事。俄羅斯不僅戰鬥能力強，而且有序撤軍，同時Well that’s a big one. Not only is Russia fighting competently but they conducting orderly withdrawals while imposing 給阿聯部隊造成了相當大的損失。considerable幾個月來我們一直被告知，AFU 勇敢地衝破了他們的隊伍，屠殺了所有人，並在每個占領的陣地上俘虜了俘虜。現實似乎與向西方公眾提供的情況有些不同。 costs on the AFU. We were told for months that AFU valiantly breaches through their ranks, slaughtering everyone and taking prisoners on each captured position. It seems reality is a little different than the slop fed to Western publics.
這份 RUSI 報告引發了一波頭條新聞，強調了主要論點：烏克蘭應該“停止北約戰術訓練”，因為這隻會傷害他們，事實上，回到他們最了解的地方：This RUSI report has spawned a wave of headlines highlighting the main thesis: that Ukraine should “stop training in NATO tactics,” as it’s only harming them, and in fact go back to what they know best:
上述The 報道above report甚至引用了沃特林在《每日電訊報》新采訪中的說法： even quotes Watling from a new Telegraph interview where he states:
“我們可能會犯嚴重的錯誤。“We could get that horribly wrong.
“我們可以這樣做——我們將教你如何成為一名北約參謀……我們有課程，我們有一本書告訴我們這意味著什麽。“We could do it whereby we’re like – we’re going to teach you how to be a Nato staff officer … we have courses and we have a book that tells us what that means.
“但問題是，如果你把那個已經學會了所有這些北約程序的人帶回烏克蘭，那裏的他們有不同的工具，而且他們的同事都不懂北約的任何術語，那麽他們就會回到原來的樣子。他們的同事都理解。”“But the problem is that if you take that person who has learned all these Nato procedures and you put them back in Ukraine, where they have different tools and where none of their colleagues understand any of the Nato terminology, then they will revert to what their colleagues understand.”
文章還轉述了德國聯邦國防軍的一份新報告，該報告指出，AFU 在內部已經開始拋棄無用的“受過北約訓練”的軍官，轉而青睞有實戰經驗的人，因為他們意識到，他們比受過北約訓練的人懂得更多，更有用。神聖的“北約主義”：The article also relays a new German Bundeswehr report which states that the AFU has internally begun abandoning the useless “NATO-trained” officers in favor of people with actual combat experience, realizing that they know far more and are much more useful than those trained on sacred “NATO doctrine”:
最近泄露的德國情報報告稱，基輔的進展陷入停滯，因為其軍隊沒有實施從西方接受的訓練。A recently leaked German intelligence report said Kyiv’s advances had faltered because its army is not implementing the training it has received from the West.
德國聯邦國防軍的評估稱，烏克蘭軍方更傾向於提拔具有戰鬥經驗的士兵，而不是那些接受過北約標準指導的士兵，這導致了“領導力的嚴重缺陷”和“錯誤和危險的決定”。The Bundeswehr assessment said the Ukrainian military favoured promoting soldiers with combat experience over those who had received Nato-standard instruction, which had led to “considerable deficiencies in leadership” and “wrong and dangerous decisions”.
Because it dovetails so aptly with 因為它與我剛剛寫的關於北約/俄羅斯軍士係統的文章the article I just wrote非常吻合，所以我也想分享下一篇文章，其中指出烏克蘭正在經曆如此嚴重的軍士消耗，以至於他們有上校計劃單獨的建築突襲： about the NATO/Russian NCO systems, I wanted to share this next bit as well, which states that Ukraine is experiencing such NCO attrition that they’ve got colonels planning individual building raids:
戰場上的大量傷亡隻會加劇缺乏具有前線經驗的潛在初級領導人的情況。The high number of casualties sustained on the battlefield has only exacerbated the lack of potential junior leaders with experience on the front lines.
沃特林博士和他的合著者尼克·雷諾茲寫道：“這限製了各旅聯合兵種的規模，特別是在計劃時間被壓縮的進攻行動中。”“This limits the scale at which brigades can combine arms, especially during offensive operations where planning times are compressed,” Dr Watling and his co-author Nick Reynolds wrote.
通常，高級領導人，例如負責前線長達 10 英裏的上校，會被請來計劃對建築物的分區攻擊。Often senior leaders, such as colonels in charge of stretches of up to 10 miles on the front line, are brought in to plan section attacks on buildings.
培訓新的初級軍官將使經驗更豐富的領導人能夠計劃和協調大規模的攻擊，從而加速烏克蘭向俄羅斯占領領土的推進。Training up a new class of junior officers would enable the more-experienced leaders to plan and coordinate wide scale attacks that could speed up Ukraine’s advances into Russian-occupied territory.
隨之而來的是，我們在Springing off of that, we have a 《經濟學人》雜誌上發表了一篇新文章new Economist article，介紹了美國國防情報局的一位主任： featuring a director from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency:
這裏的一個重要結論是，美國情報機構承認他們低估了俄羅斯的防禦能力。但令人震驚的是，俄羅斯的大部分儲備仍然留在第三線，烏克蘭甚至還沒有到達： The one important takeaway here is that U.S. intel agencies admit they underestimated Russian defenses. But the breathtaking admission that’s made is that the bulk of Russian reserves still remains on the 3rd line, which Ukraine hasn’t even reached yet:
也就是說，AFU的兩個軍團的大部分在與一小部分俄羅斯軍隊的戰鬥中就被徹底摧毀，傷亡高達5萬人，而後方的大部分俄羅斯防禦者仍然沒有投入戰鬥。想象一下，實現這一點將是多麽令人沮喪。That’s to say, the vast bulk of two entire army corps of the AFU were utterly destroyed with up to 50k casualties just fighting a fraction of Russia’s forces, while the bulk of Russian defenders still remains uncommitted in the rear. Imagine how demoralizing that must be to realize.
他們承認烏克蘭已經用掉了大部分儲備，最近挑戰者2號被毀就證明了這一點，這意味著——正如其他人所說——烏克蘭已經在“耗盡”其最後的能力，以應對未來的挑戰。進攻。但 DIA 表示，不用擔心，烏克蘭可以在冬天休息一下，並在 2024 年春天進行新的嚐試。They admit that Ukraine has spent most of its reserves, a fact attested to by the destruction of the Challenger 2 recently, which means—as someone else put it—Ukraine is already “scraping the bottom of the barrel” of its last capabilities for the offensive. But don’t worry, says the DIA, Ukraine can rest over the winter and have a fresh try in spring 2024.
這讓我們進入Mick Ryan 的That segues us into 這篇文章this article，關注未來的前景： from Mick Ryan, concerned with the future outlook:
他是西方專家中對這場戰爭更為頭腦清醒、明智的專家之一，他承認現在經常困擾西方報道的許多同樣的缺點。西方誤判了，並且不知道如何打一場我們在烏克蘭看到的戰爭。他呼籲開展一個新的“曼哈頓項目”，旨在清除地雷，為烏克蘭或未來的任何人找到新的方法來清除俄羅斯正在建造的雷場類型。He’s one of the more clear-headed and sensible of Western pundits on this war and admits many of the same shortcomings that now regularly plague reports from the West. That the West miscalculated, and had little idea how to fight such a war as we’re seeing in Ukraine. He calls for a new ‘Manhattan Project’ aimed at mine clearing to find new ways for Ukraine—or anyone in the future for that matter—to clear the types of minefields Russia is constructing.
這篇文章圍繞著現在席卷西方報告文學的同一個主題：對 2023 年的希望喪失，隨後將重點放在“維持”到 2024 年。上一篇《WarOnTheRocks》文章所強調的情緒基本上是，任何事情都不再有希望。 F-16 等“神奇”武器或新型巡航導彈。這一希望The article revolves around the same theme du jour now sweeping Western reportage: the loss of hope for 2023 and subsequent focus on “sustainment” through 2024. The mood, underlined by the previous WarOnTheRocks article, is basically that there is no further hope in any ‘wunderwaffe’ weapons like F-16s or new types of cruise missiles. The hope can 隻能only 寄托在前線日常使用的主力武器係統的總體保障上：從夜視鏡到悍馬車和防地雷反伏擊車，再到炮彈。重點不僅要從試圖將 AFU 變成某種新奇的北約私生子，還要轉變為讓他們做他們知道如何做得最好的事情。rest on general blanket sustainment of the workhorse weapons systems used daily on the front: from nightvision goggles to Humvees and MRAPs, to artillery shells. The focus must switch not only from trying to turn the AFU into some newfangled NATO lovechild, but rather to letting them do what they know how to do best.
這一戰略的問題在於，它的前提是，隻要你能夠繼續向烏克蘭提供最低維持水平的基本武器，他們就會繼續用卡車運送過去，並承受他們所遭受的過度損失。當你悲觀地審視前線部隊的實際言論時，你就會發現這種“現狀”是不可持續的。The problem with this strategy is that it presupposes that as long as you can keep pumping a minimum sustainment level of basic arms to Ukraine, they will continue trucking through and sucking up the inordinate losses they’re suffering. When you take a gloomy look at what the actual frontline troops themselves are saying, it becomes clear that this ‘status quo’ is not sustainable.
例如，看一下Take a look, for instance, at this 《基輔獨立報》的這篇新文章new article from the Kyiv Independent ，其中采訪了新組建的第 32 旅的部隊，該旅正在庫皮揚斯克方向防禦俄羅斯的進攻。沒有比《基輔獨立報》更大的宣傳來源了，但即使是他們也被迫印出這些發人深省的文字，也許是向讚助商發出警報：which interviews troops of the newly and hastily formed 32nd brigade defending against Russia’s onslaught in the Kupyansk direction. There’s no greater propaganda source than Kyiv Independent, and yet even they’re forced to print these sobering words, perhaps as an alarm signal to their sponsors:
烏克蘭軍隊在談到在德國進行的“北約”訓練時是這樣說的： Speaking on their “NATO” training in Germany, the Ukrainian troops had this to say:
然而，接受《基輔獨立報》采訪的這些士兵However, the same soldiers who spoke to the Kyiv Independent 並沒有掩飾didn't hide their scorn他們對訓練如何為烏克蘭不存在的戰爭做好準備的蔑視。他們說北約官員不了解當地的現實。 about how the training prepared them for a war that doesn't exist in Ukraine. They said the NATO officers don't understand the reality on the ground.
伊霍爾說：“北約步兵知道他得到了支持，並且可以滿懷信心地前進，因為他很可能不會被殺或致殘。”"A NATO infantryman knows he's supported and can advance with the confidence that there's a high likelihood that he won't be killed or maimed," Ihor said.
他補充說，北約的戰爭方式要求在派遣步兵之前進行大規模的準備性空襲、炮擊和排雷。The NATO way of war calls for massive preparatory airstrikes and artillery barrages and demining before the infantry is sent in, he added.
但在烏克蘭，這種情況通常行不通。It usually doesn't work that way in Ukraine.
很久以前我寫過一篇關於北約如何隻擅長教授COIN（反叛亂）戰術的文章。上麵的文章肯定了這一點，指出北約教官隻教授烏克蘭士兵城市戰式戰術：Long ago I wrote about how NATO is only proficient in teaching COIN (Counter-insurgency) tactics. The article above affirms this by stating that NATO instructors only taught Ukrainian soldiers urban warfare-style tactics:
茲古列茨表示，德國的教官非常重視城市戰鬥的教學。但如何將敵人從戰壕中熏出、如何建立突擊群以及如何與火炮和無人機支援協調，這些技能都缺乏。Zgurets said that the instructors in Germany put a lot of emphasis on teaching urban combat. But the skills of how to smoke an enemy out from a trench, how to build an assault group, and coordinate it with artillery and drone support were lacking.
烏克蘭鄉村的戰鬥風格融合了第一次世界大戰的塹壕戰和21世紀的技術和戰術，隻有在烏克蘭才能看到——它們不在北約的控製範圍內。The style of battle in the Ukrainian countryside, blending World War I trench combat and 21st-century tech and tactics, are only seen in Ukraine — they are outside NATO's wheelhouse.
回想一下，我在上一份報告中談到了烏克蘭的肉類攻擊戰術，因為他們的實際裝甲已經磨損到了這樣的程度，他們被迫步行奔向俄羅斯陣地。《基輔郵報》的文章不僅在開頭指出哈爾科夫方向的部隊根本缺乏太多裝備，因為“所有最好的東西都被派往紮波羅熱攻勢”，而且這裏的描述證實了我所強調的事情類型:Recall in my last report I spoke about Ukrainian meat-assault tactics because their actual armor has attritioned to such a point they’re forced to literally run towards Russian positions on foot. Not only does the Kyiv Post article state in the opening that the troops in the Kharkov direction lack much equipment at all because “all the best stuff was sent down to the Zaporozhye offensive” but here’s a description that confirms the type of things I was highlighting:
不僅如此，還請回想一下渦輪/精神分裂愛國者或徹頭徹尾的擔憂巨魔的一再抱怨，俄羅斯軍隊的每件有價值的裝備都很少，通常來自單個誌願部隊的一份斷章取義的報告，或類似的東西。文章明確了這一點，至少在這個方向上：Not only that, but recall the repeated complaints from turbo/schizopatriots or outright concern-trolls that Russian troops are low on every piece of valuable kit, typically taken from one out of context report from a single volunteer unit, or something of the sort. The article makes this point clear, at least in this direction:
“他們擁有夜視無人機、Orlans 和其他技術；他們能看到一切，”弗拉基米爾說。其中許多無人機都配備了可投擲彈藥，它們是在 2022 年向烏克蘭人學習使用這種技術的。"They have night vision drones, Orlans, and other tech; they see everything," Volodymyr said. Many of these drones are equipped with droppable munitions, having learned from the Ukrainians using this technique in 2022.
不斷被監視和瞄準的感覺讓烏克蘭軍隊士氣極度低落。The feeling of constantly being watched and targeted is hugely demoralizing for the Ukrainian troops.
“它把你鎖起來，你想要采取某些行動，但你不能，因為索倫的眼睛一直在注視著，”伊霍爾說，他指的是《指環王》中獸人部落的惡棍和主人。"It locks you up, you want to take certain actions, but you can't because the eye of Sauron is always watching," Ihor said, referencing the villain and master of the orcish horde from the Lord of the Rings.
它進一步描述了俄羅斯信號情報戰爭的先進程度：It further describes how advanced Russian SIGINT warfare is:
但他們也有自己令人討厭的意外需要擔心。一位名叫弗拉迪斯拉夫（Vladyslav）的坦克排指揮官回憶起烏克蘭人第一次嚐試使用坦克無線電時，俄羅斯人立即瞄準它並將其埋在大炮中。從那時起，他們學會了永遠不要使用比手持設備更強大的通信設備。敵軍處於有利位置，無法懲罰任何失誤。But they have their own nasty surprises to worry about. A tank platoon commander named Vladyslav recalls how the first time a Ukrainian tried to use a tank radio, the Russians immediately zeroed in on it and buried it in artillery. Since then, they learned never to use communications devices more powerful than a hand-held. Enemy troops are too-well positioned to punish any slip-ups.
文章最後承認“俄羅斯在全國範圍內擁有巨大的炮兵優勢”，再次強調了我對紮波羅熱方向鼓舞士氣的誇大其詞的觀點，這些說法一再聲稱烏克蘭在那裏擁有某種“炮兵優勢”，但這隻是為了至少給他們The article ends on the admission that “Russia has a massive artillery advantage throughout the country,” once more underscoring my point about the morale-boosting exaggerations in the Zaporozhye direction, which repeatedly claim Ukraine has some sort of ‘artillery advantage’ there merely to give them at least 一件one值得寫下來的事情。 thing to write home about.
And a 英國《泰晤士報》的new article from UK’s The Times 一篇新文章對本周烏克蘭戰壕中普遍存在的心態給出了最後的嚴峻看法：gives this week’s final grim view of the mindset pervading Ukrainian trenches:
這篇文章轉述了這樣的、現在已經乏味的統計數據：The article relays such, now blasé, statistics:
事實上，這篇文章對 AFU 所遭受的恐怖進行了最可怕的審視。例如，另一段摘錄證實了“肉類突擊”士兵如何被迫步行奔向敵人陣地，因為容易被摧毀的裝甲已被證明太稀缺和寶貴，不能在正麵攻擊中“浪費”：In fact, this article gives the grisliest of all looks at the horror being suffered by the AFU. For instance, another excerpt confirms how “meat assault” soldiers are forced to run on foot toward enemy positions because easily-destroyed armor has proven too scarce and valuable to be ‘wasted’ in frontal assaults:
“精銳”第 47 旅的醫務人員繼續承認，他們的傷亡人數已達到四位數：Medics of the ‘elite’ 47th brigade go on to admit that their casualties have run into four figures:
對此進行數學計算。據說烏克蘭一個旅原則上有4000人，但據報道，許多甚至Do the math on that. A Ukrainian brigade is said to be 4,000 men in principle, but many or even 大多數most人隻有2000至3000人。四位數的傷亡意味著該旅一半以上或更多的人員被徹底消滅，遺憾的是，我之前提交的泄露文件已經證實了這一事實。 of them reportedly have only 2k - 3k. Four figure casualties means upwards of half of the brigade or more is being completely wiped out, a fact sadly already corroborated by leaked documents I’ve previously presented.
但情況變得更糟。回想一下西方專家的主要安慰，特別是最近挑戰者號的襲擊，是至少穿著西方裝甲的人員在被But it gets worse. Recall how Western pundits’ chief consolation, particularly on the recent Challenger hit, is that at least crews in Western armor 擊中後幸存下??來，這與他們聲稱的俄羅斯製造的裝甲的人員不同。survive其中包括布拉德利坦克，據說與俄羅斯步兵戰車相比，它更符合人體工程學、更安全、更耐用。 after getting hit, unlike—they claim—those of Russian-made armor. This includes Bradleys, which are said to be infinitely more ergonomic, safer, and more survivable compared to Russian BMPs.
好吧，我會讓你用最後一個可怕的部分來決定：Well, I’ll let you decide with this final, horrific doozy of a section:
名副其實的生存能力典範。The veritable paragon of survivability.
現在已經變得非常清楚了，幾十年來西方的宣傳是如何用欺詐性的、不勞而獲的榮譽和榮譽來打造他們的裝備的。現在，在對真正敵人的第一次真正考驗中，所有謊言都被粉碎了。It becomes so clear now how decades of Western propaganda had built up their equipment with fraudulent, unearned accolades and distinctions. Now, in the first true test against a real foe, the lies all come crashing down.
當然，AFU 內部每周發生的叛亂凸顯了上述恐怖事件。僅在過去兩天，我們就發布了兩段新視頻，其中一段來自 AFU 第 46 空中機動旅在紮波羅熱防線的戰鬥：Of course, such horrors as the above are underscored by the weekly mutinies taking place within the AFU ranks. Just in the past two days alone we’ve had two new videos, one from the 46th Airmobile Brigade of the AFU fighting on the Zaporozhye line:
另一個來自赫爾鬆前線右岸的一個部隊：The other from a unit on the right-bank of the Kherson front:
兩者都抱怨問題和士氣低落，除了一些頑固的民族主義核心單位之外，這在整個 AFU 隊伍中相當普遍。Both complain of problems and low morale, which is fairly universal throughout the AFU ranks apart from some core diehard nationalist units.
您是否玩過一款實時策略遊戲，其中每個單位存活的時間越長，就會積累“經驗值”，使其變得更強，造成更多傷害，等等？這是對明年的一個相當恰當的類比。俄羅斯部隊承受的損失要少得多，因此正在積累大量經驗，使他們變得更強大、更頑強、更準確、更足智多謀等等。另一方麵，烏克蘭則不斷地補充更新、更不適合的庫存——包括病人、老年病患者、現在的女性等。Have you ever played one of those Real Time Strategy games where each unit accrues ‘experience points’ the longer it stays alive, making it stronger, deal more damage, etc.? It’s a fairly apt analogy to how next year will look. Russia’s units are taking far less losses, and thus are accumulating heaps of experience, making them stronger, hardier, more accurate and resourceful, etc. Ukraine on the other hand is constantly being replenished with ever-newer and ever-less-fit stock—including invalids, geriatrics, now women, etc.
這意味著到明年，大多數俄羅斯軍隊的 XP 等級將相當於三星級，而 AFU 的 XP 等級將是新的 0 星。最終結果將是 AFU 的損失將呈現出越來越小的“線性”差異，並將開始變成拋物線。無論目前的殺傷率是多少，到明年，情況隻會變得更糟，因為經驗豐富的俄羅斯軍隊會肆意與未經訓練的強征入伍的新兵進行對抗。That means by next year, a majority of Russian troops will have the equivalent of a three-star XP rating above their heads, while those of the AFU will be fresh 0 star ones. The end result will be that losses for the AFU will take on an ever-less ‘linear’ disparity, and will begin to turn parabolic. Whatever the kill ratio is presently, it will only get worse by next year as seasoned Russian troops are wantonly pitted against untrained press-ganged conscripts.
這些報告的最大收獲是盲目希望西方能夠以某種方式“堅持到底”並繼續滿足烏克蘭明年的需求。但我們已經看到，不僅預計資金會大幅削減，而且沒有多少頂級設備可以發送，這就是為什麽他們已經用舊的 Leopard 1 等東西來彌補失去的 2 台。係列。The biggest takeaway from these reports is a blind hope that the West will somehow ‘stay the course’ and continue filling Ukraine’s needs through next year. But we’ve already seen that not only are severe cutbacks in funding expected, but there’s not much top equipment left to send, which is why they’re already scraping the bottom of the barrel with things like old Leopard 1s to replace the lost 2 series.
此外，歐洲/西方武器製造團結的大部分希望並未實現。大規模提振製造業的空洞承諾是在新成立的財團可以共同合作開設新工廠並生產大量貝殼的假設下做出的。但這些都沒有發生，因為公司反而猶豫不決並爭取時間，過於謹慎而不敢投資可疑的提議。例如，這個新的說明性“挫折”：Furthermore, much of the hoped-for European/Western arms manufacturing solidarity has not come to pass. The hollow promises of massive manufacturing boosts were made under the presumption of newly formed consortiums which can work together to open new factories and pump out huge quantities of shells. But none of that has happened, as companies instead balked and played for time, too chary to invest in a dubious proposition. For instance, this new illustrative ‘setback’:
另一方麵，俄羅斯了解戰爭的經濟方麵。Russia on the other hand understands the economic aspect of the war. In fact Andrei Martyanov recently sounded off on this in his 事實上，安德烈·馬爾蒂亞諾夫最近在他關於亞曆山大·斯維欽的新視頻new video中對此進行了回應，亞曆山大·斯維欽被認為是俄羅斯最重要的軍事理論家之一——“俄羅斯克勞塞維茨”。馬爾蒂亞諾夫從斯韋欽的著作中指出，俄羅斯的學說對戰爭的經濟考慮是多麽深入： on Alexander Svechin, considered one of Russia’s foremost military theorists—the ‘Russian Clausewitz’. From Svechin’s writings, Martyanov points out how deeply steeped Russian doctrine is in the economic considerations of warfare:
正如馬爾蒂亞諾夫所說，格拉西莫夫是斯維欽的忠實擁護者，因此我們可以推斷俄羅斯非常了解經濟層麵。And since, as Martyanov states, Gerasimov is a big devotee of Svechin, we can deduce that Russia is well aware of the economic dimensions.
視頻中的更多內容：More from the video:
這總結了展望。我相信，盡管俄羅斯有時This summarizes the outlook. I believe that Russia, despite its at times 顯得seeming猶豫不決，或者普京對嚴格界定衝突目標持不置可否的態度，但實際上它確實有一個具體的計劃，大致就是上述計劃。該計劃以軍事和工業之間的協同作用為基礎，該計劃正在努力實現穩定增長的產出，旨在將烏克蘭推向消耗赤字深淵。歸根結底，這隻是一場簡單的數字遊戲，俄羅斯的學說和軍事理論早已確立了如何通過象棋大師對初學者對手應用敷衍開局理論的係統性和實踐性應用來取得這樣的勝利的所有設定參數。 vacillations or Putin’s noncommittal attitude toward strictly defining conflict objectives, does in fact have a concrete plan, which is roughly that of the above. The plan is underpinned by a synergy between military and industry, which is working toward delivering the type of steadily increasing outputs aimed at driving Ukraine into an attrition deficit abyss. In the end it’s a simple numbers game, and Russian doctrines and military theory have long established all the set parameters in how to grind out such a victory with the same systematic, practiced application of a chessmaster applying perfunctory opening theory against a beginner opponent.
由於缺乏實現真正戰略突破或戰場勝利的能力，烏克蘭今後唯一的任務就是繼續創造一係列感知管理“令牌”，用於推動公眾情緒和信念，足以達到下一個這樣的“令牌”。Lacking any ability to achieve real strategic breakthroughs or battlefield victories, Ukraine’s only task henceforth is to continue creating a string of perception-management ‘tokens’ which can be used to drive public sentiment and belief just enough to reach the next such ‘token’.
例如，F-16 感知令牌還很遙遠——從現在到那時，都是絕望的失落深淵。為了避免公眾信任和西方國家支持的崩潰，烏克蘭必須獲得一個新的閃亮玩具來彌合差距並短暫管理公眾的看法，直到可以安排 F-16 戰鬥機。截至撰寫本文時，現在看起來新的、立即感知的代幣將是 ATACMS 導彈，因為拜登政府的新暗示已經泄露，這意味著他們非常接近為下一個奇跡開綠燈。For instance, the F-16 perception-token is still far away—a yawning abyss of hopeless loss lies from now to then. In order to stave off the collapse of public trust and Western nation support, Ukraine will have to gain a new shiny toy to bridge the gap and briefly manage public perception up until the F-16s can be arranged. As of this writing, it’s now looking like the new, immediate perception-token will be the ATACMS missile, as new hints from the Biden administration have leaked that imply they are very close to greenlighting this next wunderwaffe.
如果交付的話，ATACMS 將在頓巴斯的某個地方（很可能是不受 AD 保護的平民區）引起轟動，主流媒體將一如既往地對其進行粗暴包裝和出售，將其視為“毀滅性打擊”到假定的俄羅斯“關鍵 C2/C3 節點”或後勤後方。這將重新啟動烏克蘭“勝利”的希望循環，這種循環將繼續下去，但回報卻不斷遞減，每一個新的“奇跡”不僅影響力越來越小，而且壽命也越來越短。雖然很難想象它能比 Storm Shadow 或 JDAM 長達一周的熄火時間短多少，但這並不意味著他們不會嚐試擴大其重要性。Should it be delivered, the ATACMS will be used to make a couple big splashes somewhere—most likely a civilian area unprotected by AD—in Donbass, which will be crudely packaged and sold, as ever, by mainstream press as a “devastating blow” to a putative Russian “critical C2/C3 node” or logistics rear. That will restart the cycle of driving hope in some Ukrainian ‘victory’, which will continue on with ever-diminishing returns, each new ‘wunderwaffe’ not only having less and less impact, but an ever-shorter lifespan. Though it’s hard to imagine how much shorter it can get than the week-long flameouts of the Storm Shadow or JDAM, but it doesn’t mean they won’t try to stretch its significance.
明年肯定會是一個極其多事的時期，事情將隨著美國大選周期的高潮而達到高潮。有趣的是，看看執政機構是否最終會被迫切斷聯係並將烏克蘭拋在公車之下，或者他們是否敢於在至關重要的曆史性選舉前夕冒黑天鵝升級的風險。目前，烏克蘭將繼續為觀眾流血，而俄羅斯戰爭機器則平靜地穿上盔甲，準備致命一擊。Next year will certainly be an extremely eventful time where things are set to culminate with the heights of the American election cycle. It will be interesting to see whether the ruling establishment will finally be forced to cut the cord and throw Ukraine under the bus or whether they will dare risk some black swan escalation on the eve of the all-important and historic election. For now, Ukraine will continue to bleed for the gallery while the Russian war machine finishes calmly strapping on its armor in preparation for the killing blow.
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