金融時報：中國能“和平”崛起嗎

來源: 思想者蹲著於 2010-11-30 17:36:57 [檔案] [舊帖] [給我悄悄話] 本文已被閱讀：次 (30000 bytes)

中國能“和平”崛起嗎？

我正在中國古都西安撰寫此文。這裏是著名的兵馬俑的發現之地，他們默默地見證著古代中國之規模、資源和組織力量。西安地處中國中部，有800萬人口。從機場到市區，沿途滿是在建的高樓大廈，體現著近年來西安工程建設的繁榮。經濟轉變是切實可見的——在這個幅員遼闊的國家處處都是如此。

中國是個新興的超級大國。根據大企業聯合會(Conference Board)發布的一個令人驚歎的數據庫，按購買力平價計算，中國2009年的國內生產總值(GDP)為美國的80%。在1978年，中國人均GDP僅為美國的3%；到2009年，這一比例已接近20%。

按照當前兩國的相對增長速度，以購買力平價計算，到2014年，中國經濟的絕對規模將超過美國，成為世界第一大國。就算按市場價格計算，中國的GDP在本十年內似乎也幾乎肯定會超過美國——部分是因為中國經濟的快速增長，部分是因為人民幣升值勢在必行。

總之，不管以什麽方法衡量，中國不久都將取代美國成為世界第一大經濟體。從大約1890年以來，美國就一直把持著這個位置。就此看來，這一轉變的速度之快，甚至超過了高盛(Goldman Sachs)在其著名的首份“金磚四國”（BRIC，包括巴西、俄羅斯、印度和中國）報告中所做的預測。

此外，中國已經是世界最大的商品出口國（按總量計算），大概也是世界最大的淨債權國，盡管相關資產幾乎全都投資於低收益率的發達國家政府債務，尤其是美國國債。

我在此想要探討的問題是，這一劃時代的轉變對世界將意味著什麽？

先來說說不會意味著什麽。在相當長時期內，中國仍將是中等收入國家，平均生產率遠低於美國及其它領先的高收入國家。

美國在今後幾十年也必將保持世界科技領先地位，盡管由於其現行的教育、科技和移民等政策，這種優勢的持久性已無法保障。另一方麵，像中國這樣容不得個人言論自由的國家，在科技領域最終能否趕上美國，仍然值得商榷。假如自由的印度在這方麵最終領先於中國，我不會感到驚訝。

由於技術差距等因素，中國的軍力（就全球勢力範圍和技術能力而言）在未來幾十年內仍將落後於美國。至於這是否會成為中國的一大障礙，有些人可能看法不同，但我的個人觀點是：美國當前大量的軍事開支不僅僅是浪費資源，也會誘人幹蠢事。

此外，中國今後在政治、知識和文化方麵所能施加的影響力，似乎不太可能趕上過去60年的美國。美國的流行文化仍具有非凡的吸引力。而且，盡管反美情緒在世界各地普遍存在，但不論是現在還是今後，美國自由、民主和法治的理想對全世界人民的吸引力，都是對本國人民采取壓製態度的中國共產黨的集權治理模式所不可匹敵的。

我仍然相信這一點，盡管我承認美國在現實中的做法與其理想經常相去甚遠。“酷刑總統”小布什(George W. Bush)在任期內對美國的影響力和聲望造成“大規模破壞”時，我就是這麽想的。金融危機更有甚之。美國過去享有至少知道如何管理現代資本主義的聲譽。如今這份聲譽已隨著2008年吹過華爾街的寒流而逝去。但我是個樂觀主義者，所以希望美國總有一天會走出當前的政治和經濟泥潭。

簡言之，至少在未來幾十年內，中國不會成為美國那樣占據著絕對主導地位的強國。

盡管如此，我們仍然必須認清中國崛起的明顯意義。

首先，我們不僅正在目睹美國自詡為“唯一超級大國”的短暫時期的結束，從更廣泛的意義上說，我們也正目睹延續多個世紀的西方主導地位的終結。印度崛起成為全球最大的民主國家，加強了這一轉變，盡管印度和西方較為親近。今後幾十年內，相對衰落的西方將不得不與世界其它地區合作。這是好事，但也將帶來許多重大挑戰。

其次，中國不僅是“非西方”的，也具有截然不同的曆史、文化和政治體製。後者或許是最重要的一點。和一個政府不信任本國人民的國家維持信任關係是很困難的，和一個不能接受法治基本原則的政府達成具有約束力的協議同樣困難——根據法治的基本原則，人民對政府，具有和政府對人民一樣的約束。

第三，我們必須認識到，權力更替總會引起重大摩擦。老牌大國試圖維護它們所認為的“自然”秩序，而新興大國則不滿它們不斷上升的實力和地位總是遲遲得不到承認。

但我們也必須理解，當前正在進行的轉變的潛在好處。全世界人民——在運氣好並且具備遠見卓識的情況下——可以共享繁榮，為構建一個更美好的共同未來獻策獻力。

照此下去，結局會怎樣呢？我設想了三種可能的結果：

第一，“正和”觀點勝出。假如各方意識到，相互之間並不存在任何深刻的意識形態衝突，彼此經濟上互為依賴，大家必須共同麵對這個星球的命運，在核時代不可能爆發戰爭，那麽就有望促成可觀的全球合作。要實現這種局麵，各方也必須作出深刻的合作承諾。但近期在氣候變化、全球失衡等領域看不到這種勢頭。

第二，“負和”觀點得勝。權力是相對的。老牌大國和新興大國競逐主導地位。資源同樣是有限的。在這個世界上，經濟混亂和對稀缺資源的爭奪將導致全球化倒退，而均勢政治將主導國際關係。或許會出現一個以製衡中國為宗旨的聯盟，成員至少包括美國、歐洲、印度和日本，其它國家也有可能加入。

第三，我們姑且設想一種混合了上述兩種情景的結局：全球化和一定程度的全球合作“幸存下來”，但隨著中國對自身在國際體係中的地位變得更加自信，典型的均勢政治將變得更加重要。這大體上就是第一次世界大戰前的局勢——可不是一個鼓舞人心的先例。

這些不過是關於我們這個時代必將麵臨的一個根本挑戰的初步想法。我們如何應對所有其它挑戰，都將取決於這個根本挑戰。

在應對上述大轉變的過程中可能發生什麽，應該怎麽做，諸位讀者有何看法？

英文對照

Will China’s rise be peaceful?

I am writing this in Xi’an, ancient capital of the Chinese empire. This is where the famous terracotta warriors were found, mute witnesses to the scale, resources and organising capacity of the ancient Chinese state. Xi’an is a city of 8m, in the middle of the country. The road from the airport is surrounded with half-finished buildings, a sign of the construction boom of recent years. The economic changes are palpable, as they are elsewhere in this vast country.

China is a nascent superpower. According to the wonderful database published by the Conference Board, its gross domestic product, at purchasing power parity, was 80 per cent of that of the US in 2009. Its GDP per head has risen from a mere 3 per cent of US levels in 1978 to close to 20 per cent in 2009.

By 2014, at current rates of relative growth, China’s economy will pass the US, in absolute size, to be the biggest in the world, at PPP. Its GDP also seems almost certain to surpass that of the US at market prices before the end of this decade, partly because of its rapid growth and partly because of the inevitable appreciation of the renminbi.

In short, however measured, China will shortly displace the US from the position it has held as the world’s biggest economy since approximately 1890. To put this in context, this transition is occurring even faster than Goldman Sachs predicted in its celebrated initial report on the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, Indian and China) economies in the early part of the last decade.

Moreover, China is already the world’s largest exporter of goods (in gross terms) and is probably the world’s largest net creditor nation, though almost all of these assets are invested in the low-yielding government debt of the advanced countries, especially the US.

The question I want to explore this week is what this epoch-making transition is going to mean for the world?

Let me start by suggesting what it will not mean. China will remain a middle-income country for quite a while longer, with average productivity far below that of the US and other leading high-income countries.

The US will also surely remain the world’s technological leader for many decades, though the durability of this advantage is no longer guaranteed, given its current policies towards education, science and immigration. At the same time, whether a country as inimical to free individual expression as China can catch up with the US scientifically and technologically, even in the long run, is open to question. I would not be surprised if free-wheeling India ended up doing better than China, in this regard.

Partly as a result of the technological gap, the Chinese military will also remain behind that of the US, in terms of global reach and technological capacity for quite a few decades. On whether this will prove a serious handicap for China, one might differ: my own view is that much of current US military spending is not only a waste of resources, but a temptation to folly.

Furthermore, it seems unlikely that China will be able to exert the political, intellectual and cultural influence that the US has done over the past six decades. US popular culture remains extraordinarily attractive. Moreover, even though anti-Americanism is widespread, the appeal of American ideals of freedom, democracy and the rule of law to the people of the world is, and will remain, greater than the centralised communist party-state of China, with its oppressive attitudes towards its own population.

I still believe this even though I recognise how short the US has frequently come of its ideals. What I think of as the “torture presidency” of George W. Bush inflicted massive damage on US influence and prestige. So, even more, has the financial crisis. The US had the reputation of knowing at least how to manage modern capitalism. That has gone with the winds that whistled down Wall Street in 2008. Yet I am an optimist and so hope that the US will yet recover from its current political and economic mire.

China, in short, will not become the predominant power that the US has been, at least over the next few decades.

Nevertheless, we have to recognise what the rise of China does obviously mean.

First, we are seeing the end not only of the brief period of the US vision of itself as the “sole superpower”, but, more broadly, of centuries of western domination. The rise of India, though closer the west, as the world’s largest democracy, reinforces this transition. Over the next few decades a west in relative decline will be forced to co-operate with the rest of the world. This is a good thing. But it will create huge challenges.

Second, China is not only non-Western, but has a distinct history, culture and political system. The latter may be the most important point. It is hard to sustain trusting relations with a country whose government mistrusts its own people. It is no less difficult to enter into binding agreements with a government that cannot accept the fundamental principle of the rule of law - that the law binds the state to the people as much as the people to the state.

Third, we have to recognise that transitions of power always create huge frictions, with the incumbents trying to protect what they see as the “natural” order of things and the insurgents resentful of always delayed recognition of their rising power and status.

Yet we also need to understand the potential advantages of the transformation now under way. The population of the world could, with luck and judgement, share in prosperity and contribute its ideas and energy to securing a better future for everybody.

So how might this end? I envisage three possible outcomes.

First, the “positive sum” view wins out. Awareness of the absence of any deep ideological conflict, of mutual economic dependence, of a shared planetary destiny and of the impossibility of war in a nuclear age force adequate levels of global co-operation. For this to happen there must also be a profound commitment to co-operation, not much evident recently in such areas as climate change or global imbalances.

Second, the “negative sum” view wins out. Power is relative. The incumbent and the rising powers compete for dominance. Resources, similarly, are finite. In this world, economic disarray and the struggle for scarce resources lead to a retreat from globalisation, while balance of power politics dominate international relations. We may see the emergence of a balancing coalition against China, consisting, at the least, of the US, Europe, India and Japan, possibly joined by other powers.

Third, we muddle through, with a mixture of the above two approaches: globalisation and a degree of economic co-operation survive, but classic balance of power politics become more significant, as China, in turn, becomes more assertive of its rank in the world system. This, roughly speaking, was the world before the first world war - not an encouraging precedent.

These are just preliminary thoughts on what is surely the fundamental challenge of our era and the one on which solution of all other challenges depends.

What do readers think will and should happen to manage this great transition?