Ukrainians Want Their Nukes Back
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine
THANKS TO THOSE WHO SUPPORT OUR FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN????
Ternopil’ – We’ve asked every Ukrainian we’ve met over the past 1,400 days the same question: what security guarantees do you consider most reliable for your country?
From the front lines to the bombed cities, the answer has always been unequivocal: we want our nukes back.
We collected the last testimony moments before writing this article. Mrs. Miroslava and her husband, both survivors of the Russian attack on Ternopil a month ago that caused over 120 civilian casualties, unambiguously expressed their refusal to continue depending on third parties for Ukraine’s security:
«Call me Mira. I lived in Italy for a long time. Thirty years ago, we had around three thousand atomic bombs, and no one would have ever dreamed of invading us. No one gave them to us. We built them with our own labor, resources, and ingenuity. They convinced us to give them away for others’ safety. We were betrayed. No agreement based on that fraud will work».
It’s impossible to disagree with Mrs. Mira – and with the thousands of people who have responded in kind over the years.
Ukraine’s strategic defeat began not on February 24, 2022, but in 1994, with the signing of the Budapest Memorandum. A non-binding political declaration that persuaded Kyiv to give up approximately 3,000 nuclear warheads – the world’s third-largest arsenal – in exchange for promises that proved empty.
The imperialist war unleashed by Moscow has demonstrated even more brutal truths: promises are valid until they are broken, and nuclear deterrence remains the only deterrent the world truly fears.
Because it lacked enforcement mechanisms, automatic intervention obligations, or sanctions for violations, the Budapest Memorandum was not an international treaty under the 1969 Vienna Convention. The ‘security assurances’ provided in that context by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation were unilateral political declarations, not legally binding commitments. This is evident in the absence of concrete consequences following Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
Ukraine joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state. However, Article X of the treaty unequivocally establishes the right to withdraw if extraordinary events have compromised the signatory state’s supreme interests.
The Russian full-scale military invasion, territorial occupation, war crimes, existential threat to the Ukrainian state, and repeated nuclear intimidation fully satisfy this requirement in the most serious sense of the term.
Consequently, Ukraine is legally fully entitled to denounce the NPT. The political responsibility for exercising this right would fall entirely on those who destroyed the security conditions that justified disarmament.
For decades, the West sold Ukraine the narrative of an «open door» to NATO, without setting deadlines, binding roadmaps, or real protections. At the decisive moment, the Allies feared a nuclear aggressor more than the destruction of a sovereign state.
A devastating paradox has arisen: those who possess nuclear weapons can invade, while those who do not must submit. The military aid provided to Ukraine is not even remotely comparable to the deterrent it was forced to give up.
The narrative that Ukraine ‘inherited’ the Soviet arsenal is historically and technically false.
It was the industrial heartland and the jewel in the crown of Soviet engineering. It housed facilities for nuclear warhead production, assembly, and maintenance; produced key components for the USSR’s strategic missile industry; had access to first-rate raw materials and scientific expertise; and employed personnel directly involved in warhead development.
As Mrs. Mira recalls, those weapons were not a gift but the result of the work of Ukrainian industry during the Soviet era.
Renouncing them meant voluntarily destroying the national strategic capacity of one of the four founding countries of the USSR, to the benefit of a state born after its dissolution. Ukraine has always had its own legal identity, both as a constituent Soviet republic – with its own governing bodies – and as an independent state recognized after 1991. Today’s Russian Federation, however, is a post-Soviet state that unilaterally and deceitfullyassumed ownership of many of the former USSR’s international positions, despite being neither older nor more legitimate than its successor states.
The Lisbon Protocol and the Budapest Memorandum are legally linked by a single cause: security in exchange for nuclear renunciation. The Russian Federation was a party to both agreements in Lisbon and Budapest and subsequently became the aggressor. It is legally untenable to bind Ukraine to a nuclear-free future, as purportedly enshrined in point 11 of the 20 points of the so-called ‘peace plan’.
Basing its future security guarantees on the most serious strategic error of the past is profoundly incorrect and dangerous.
The NPT is not irrevocable, and Article X takes precedence over political memoranda and implementing protocols. There are no subordination clauses or external veto rights.
In the Ukrainian case, the Treaty’s legal threshold has been exceeded in its most serious form. The nuclear rearmament project could and should have been launched immediately, and today it would constitute the best guarantee of security for the country.
This is why soldiers at the front and civilians in the cities demand it.
Nuclear deterrence is not prohibited by international law: it is regulated. As long as it does not violate jus in bello and its indiscriminate use is not threatened, it is fully compatible with the international legal order.
Ukraine had – and still has – the right and the technical and engineering capabilities to reconstitute its legitimate nuclear arsenal.
Which is the only truly credible security guarantee it needs.
Experience teaches that even legally binding agreements depend on the will to respect them. Starting with NATO’s Article 5, which is often used as an example, misinterpreting its meaning because it does not mandate direct military intervention at all. Neither legally nor operationally. As several analysts have already observed, including
here on Medium, in the event of a classic Russian false flag attack, the Americans would not even intervene to defend Ukraine. The Willing have already made it clear that any European deterrent forces would only be effective in peacetime.
Given this, writing down in black and white that Ukraine confirms its non-nuclear status, agrees to limit its armed forces, and chooses to rely on external security guarantees means going back to square one after losing men, resources, and territory.
THANKS TO ALL WHO BACK US IN THESE HARD TIMES ????
感謝那些支持我們籌款活動的人????
致所有相信我們工作並想支持它的人
在過去三年裏，作為自由撰稿人，我們一直在烏克蘭戰爭的所有前線進行報道，自從大規模……
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烏克蘭人希望拿回他們的核武器
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
烏克蘭前線報道
特爾諾波爾——在過去的1400天裏，我們問過每一位遇到的烏克蘭人同樣的問題：您認為對您的國家最可靠的安全保障是什麽？
從前線到被轟炸的城市，答案始終明確：我們希望拿回我們的核武器。
我們在撰寫本文之前收集了最新的民意證詞。米羅斯拉夫婦都是一個月前俄羅斯襲擊特爾諾波爾的幸存者，那次襲擊造成了超過120名平民傷亡，他們明確表達了拒絕繼續依賴第三方來保障烏克蘭安全的立場：
“叫我米拉。我在意大利生活了很長時間。三十年前，我們擁有大約三千枚核彈，任何人敢想要入侵我們。那些武器不是別人給我們的。是我們靠自己的勞動、資源和智慧建造的。他們說服我們放棄，以換取他人的安全。我們被背叛了。任何基於這種欺詐的協議都不會有效。”
米拉女士的觀點讓人無法反駁——她的觀點與多年來數千人的回答相同。
（圖：我在特爾諾波爾撰寫本文之前拍下了這張照片。這片居民區遭到俄羅斯聯邦的襲擊，導致超過40名平民遇難，120多人受傷——版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
烏克蘭的戰略失敗並不是在2022年2月24日開始的，而是始於1994年布達佩斯備忘錄的簽署。這一不具約束力的政治聲明迫使基輔放棄了大約3000枚核彈頭——世界第三大核武庫——以換取證明空洞的承諾。
莫斯科發起的帝國主義戰爭暴露了更加殘酷的真相：承諾在被打破前是有效的，而核威懾仍然是世界真正畏懼的唯一威懾手段。
因為缺乏強製執行機製、自動幹預義務或對違約行為的製裁，布達佩斯備忘錄並不是1969年維也納公約下的國際條約。美國、英國和俄羅斯聯邦在這一背景下提供的“安全保證”是單方麵的政治聲明，而不是具有法律約束力的承諾。這一點在俄羅斯吞並克裏米亞後沒有具體後果的情況下尤為明顯。
烏克蘭作為無核國家加入了核不擴散條約（NPT）。然而，該條約的第十條明確規定，如果重大事件妨礙簽署國的根本利益，該國則有權退出。
俄羅斯全麵的軍事入侵、領土占領、戰爭罪行、對烏克蘭國家的生存威脅以及反複的核恐嚇在最嚴肅的意義上都充分滿足了這一要求。
因此，烏克蘭在法律上完全有權宣布退出核不擴散條約。行使這一權利的政治責任將完全在於那些破壞了為裁軍提供保障的安全條件的人。
（圖：我在特爾諾波爾撰寫本文前拍下了這張照片，身後的居民點的基礎設施被俄羅斯聯邦摧毀——版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
幾十年來，西方向烏克蘭出售了“北約開放大門”的敘事，但並沒有設定截止日期、強製路線圖或真正的保護措施。在關鍵時刻，盟國對核侵略者的恐懼超過了對一個主權國家被毀滅擔憂。
由此產生了一個毀滅性的悖論：擁有核武器的人可以入侵（他國），而沒有核武器的國家則必須屈服。提供給烏克蘭的軍事援助甚至無法與它被迫放棄的威懾力量相提並論。
（圖：我在烏克蘭戰略核武器地點報道時為Alla拍下了這張照片——版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
關於烏克蘭“繼承”蘇聯核武庫的說法在曆史和技術上都是錯誤的。
烏克蘭曾是蘇聯工業的心髒，地位如王冠上的明珠。它擁有核彈頭的生產、組裝和維護設施；為蘇聯的戰略導彈工業生產關鍵組件；擁有一流的原材料和科學家；並雇傭直接參與彈頭開發的人員。
正如米拉女士所回憶的，那些武器並不是贈禮，而是蘇聯時代烏克蘭工業的自主產出。
放棄它們意味著自願摧毀烏克蘭作為蘇聯四個創始國之一的國家戰略能力，以利於一個在蘇聯解體後誕生的國家。烏克蘭一直擁有自己的法律身份，無論是作為一個擁有自己治理機構的蘇聯加盟共和國，還是作為一個在1991年之後被承認的獨立國家。然後，今天的俄羅斯聯邦是一個後蘇聯國家，它單方麵且欺騙性地宣稱了許多前蘇聯的國際地位，盡管它的曆史既不悠久也不合法。
（圖：Alla在烏克蘭一個戰略核武器地點報道——版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
裏斯本議定書和布達佩斯備忘錄在法律上由一個共同原因聯係在一起：以核放棄換取安全。俄羅斯聯邦是這兩個協議的簽署方，隨後成為了侵略者。將烏克蘭約束於一個無核未來在法律上是站不住腳的，正如據稱被寫入所謂“和平計劃”20條中的第11點所宣稱的。
將未來安全保障建立在過去最嚴重的戰略錯誤上是極其錯誤和危險的。
核不擴散條約（NPT）不是不可撤銷，第十條優於政治備忘錄和實施協議。條約中沒有從屬條款或外部否決權。
烏克蘭的情況已經被超越了該條約最嚴重的形式上的法律門檻。核武器重新武裝項目可以並且應該立即啟動，今天它將構成該國安全的最佳保障。
這也是前線的士兵和城市中的平民為何要求這一點。
核威懾並不被國際法禁止，而是受到監管的。隻要不違反國際人道法（jus in bello）並且其無限製使用不受到威脅，它就與國際法律秩序完全兼容。
烏克蘭曾經擁有——並且仍然擁有——重建其合法核武庫的權利以及技術和工程能力。
這正是烏克蘭所需要的唯一真正可信的安全保障。
（圖：阿拉手裏拿著蘇聯時代發起核打擊所需的鑰匙——版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
經驗教訓表明，即使是具有法律約束力的協議，也依賴於各方遵守它們的意願。拿北約第五條作為例子，其含義常被誤解，因為該條款根本不要求進行直接軍事幹預，無論是法律上還是操作上。如多位分析人士，包括在Medium上的Dylan Combellick在內，所指出的，在經典的俄羅斯假旗攻擊發生時，美國人甚至不會出手保護烏克蘭。誌願者聯盟已經明確表示，任何歐洲威懾力量僅在和平時期才有效。
鑒於此，黑紙白字地寫下烏克蘭確認其無核地位，同意限製其武裝力量，並選擇依賴外部安全保障，意味著在失去人手、資源和領土之後又重新回到起點。
（圖：我與米拉的丈夫米哈伊爾合影——版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
感謝所有在這段艱難時期支持我們的人????
致所有相信我們工作並想支持它的人
在過去三年裏，作為自由撰稿人，我們一直在烏克蘭戰爭的所有前線進行報道，自從大規模……
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