“A favorable conventional military balance remains an essential component of
strategic competition. There is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan, partly because of
Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production, but mostly because Taiwan
provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and
Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters. Given that one-third of global shipping
passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the
U.S. economy. Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving
military overmatch, is a priority. We will also maintain our longstanding
declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any
unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island
Chain. But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone.
Our allies must step up and spend—and more importantly do—much more for
collective defense. America’s diplomatic efforts should focus on pressing our First
Island Chain allies and partners to allow the U.S. military greater access to their
ports and other facilities, to spend more on their own defense, and most
importantly to invest in capabilities aimed at deterring aggression. This will
interlink maritime security issues along the First Island Chain while reinforcing
U.S. and allies’ capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan or achieve a balance
of forces so unfavorable to us as to make defending that island impossible.”
