Yes, there is strong evidence to suggest that Vladimir Putin was misled by his underlings about Russia’s military capabilities and the likely outcome of a war in Ukraine, which contributed to his decision to invade in February 2022. This miscalculation stemmed from a combination of flawed intelligence, systemic dysfunctions within the Russian government, and a culture of fear and deference within Putin’s inner circle. Here are the key factors:
1. Systemic Overestimation of Russian Military Strength
• Exaggerated Reports: Russian officials and military leaders likely provided overly optimistic assessments of the military’s readiness and capability. A culture of fear within the Kremlin discourages dissent and incentivizes officials to deliver good news rather than realistic assessments.
• Lack of Realistic Combat Testing: Russia’s military performance in conflicts like Syria and Crimea created a false sense of confidence, as these operations faced limited resistance and did not test the military’s ability to sustain a high-intensity, conventional war against a well-prepared adversary.
2. Flawed Intelligence on Ukraine
• Underestimating Ukrainian Resistance: Russian intelligence services (particularly the FSB) reportedly told Putin that Ukraine’s government would collapse quickly and that Ukrainian forces would not mount significant resistance. They believed pro-Russian sentiments in parts of Ukraine would lead to a swift victory.
• Overestimating Pro-Russian Support: Russian intelligence misjudged the level of support for Moscow in eastern and southern Ukraine, expecting locals to welcome Russian troops as liberators. This proved to be a critical miscalculation.
• Poor Understanding of Ukrainian Leadership: Putin appears to have underestimated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, viewing him as weak and incapable of rallying the country. Zelenskyy’s leadership and the resilience of the Ukrainian people took the Kremlin by surprise.
3. Misjudgment of Western Response
• Underestimating NATO Unity: Putin likely believed that NATO and the EU would respond weakly to the invasion, based on previous examples like the 2014 Crimea annexation and divisions within the West over other geopolitical issues.
• Expecting Limited Sanctions: Russian planners seemed to have anticipated minimal economic consequences, failing to foresee the scale and coordination of Western sanctions and military support for Ukraine.
4. Dysfunctional Decision-Making in the Kremlin
• Centralized Power: Putin’s highly centralized leadership style means he relies on a small group of advisors, many of whom lack military or strategic expertise. Their tendency to tell him what he wants to hear likely distorted his perception of reality.
• Isolation During the Pandemic: Reports suggest that Putin became increasingly isolated during the COVID-19 pandemic, relying more heavily on hardline advisors and becoming disconnected from broader assessments.
• Fear of Repercussions: Subordinates in authoritarian regimes often avoid presenting bad news to their leaders. In the Russian system, where failure can lead to severe punishment, officials had little incentive to question optimistic assumptions about the war.
5. Overconfidence in Russia’s Geopolitical Strength
• False Lessons from Past Conflicts: Russia’s previous successes in Crimea (2014) and Syria (2015) may have emboldened Putin, leading him to believe the military could replicate these outcomes in Ukraine.
• Overemphasis on Asymmetrical Advantages: Putin may have overrelied on Russia’s perceived strengths, such as cyberwarfare, hybrid tactics, and energy leverage, while underestimating the importance of conventional military power in this conflict.
6. Miscalculation of the Military Campaign
• Assuming a Blitzkrieg Strategy: The initial plan to seize Kyiv in a matter of days was based on flawed assumptions about Russian military efficiency and Ukrainian resistance. This miscalculation led to logistical breakdowns, poor coordination, and heavy losses.
• Failure to Anticipate Long-Term Challenges: Putin likely did not anticipate a protracted conflict that would drain resources, expose military weaknesses, and isolate Russia internationally.
Evidence of Misleading Reports
• Western intelligence and leaked reports suggest that Russian military leaders and intelligence officials fed Putin overly optimistic scenarios about the war. This includes the FSB’s reports about Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense’s assessments of Russian readiness.
• Post-invasion purges of military and intelligence officials, including FSB officers, suggest that Putin realized he had been misinformed but too late to avoid strategic disaster.
Conclusion
Putin’s decision to start the war was likely influenced by a combination of his own ideological motivations (e.g., viewing Ukraine as historically part of Russia) and a distorted view of Russia’s military capabilities and the geopolitical environment. His inner circle, constrained by a culture of fear and deference, failed to provide an accurate picture, leading to overconfidence in a swift and decisive victory. The miscalculation has resulted in a protracted conflict with far-reaching consequences for Russia and the world.
