當今世界專業哲學之low在這次24屆世界哲學大會之後專哲們對民哲的調侃之不得要領中暴露無遺。所有的調侃都集中於大會期間一些民哲文章的可笑之處，而最“寬容”的也不過隻是指出了曆史上（應該是康德以前，亞裏士多德之後）的所有哲學大師們都是民哲，而沒有表現出半點有關今天之民哲對於處於衰亡中的主流哲學之價值的最基本的認識。
要想了解今天的民哲對於處於衰亡中的主流哲學之價值，我們需要先對今天的民哲之短處與長處有一個最基本的了解。其實，今天的民哲之基本的短處恰是其最基本的長處，那就是今天的民哲不需要按照專哲所設計好的套路來把握了解哲學曆史。
它之所以是一個短處或缺點是因為過去數百年裏這個世界為建立專哲們現有的體係注入了億萬資金，因此不按照專哲們所設計好的套路來了解哲學曆史意味著不能享用那億萬資金投資的成果，因而很多時候在知識的積累上就會出現事倍功半的囧況。
但是，由於今天的專業哲學界與今天的專業科學界的一個根本不同，民哲們的上述短處或缺點又成為了他們的一個長處，那就是他們不需要被迫接受專哲們對於哲學曆史的錯誤的結論，更不用認同專哲們對待哲學的錯誤態度。
民哲們的上述長處之難能可貴一方麵在於那是今天經過了專哲係統按照他們的文化嚴苛地篩選出來的人根本不可能具有的，另一方麵在於今天的專哲們對於哲學曆史的錯誤結論太多了。
當麵臨一件有著正反兩方麵效果的事情時，就是小學生也知道要衡量一下那件事到底是利多還是弊多。現在的弊是不利於掌握專哲們長期發展累積起來的哲學曆史知識，而利是不必被迫接受那些知識中的錯誤。如果那些知識中的錯誤如滄海一粟，那麽顯然是弊大於利，但如果那些知識中的錯誤可以隨手撚來，那麽就是利大於弊了。
當然，這裏對於利與弊的判定一定要是從對於世界哲學的發展的影響來看，而不是針對個人的光環或可笑之處來評判。而這次哲學大會之後的專哲們對於民哲們的嘲笑本身表明他們根本不具備從對哲學整體發展的影響的角度來看問題的能力，這也是專業哲學這個學科內的文化選擇所造就的結果，他們所接受的教育使得他們隻會認同權威而嘲笑異類，因而缺乏基本的審美與價值判斷能力，那是因為他們的權威並不完全是建立在真理的基礎之上而更是建立在名望和權勢之上的。下麵給出一個例子讓大家見識一下今天的專哲可以如何憑借他們的權威來隨心所欲地下論斷的。
前天我在具有權威性的哲學網站（Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy）看到一篇文章“Hegel's Dialectics”（https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel-dialectics/ last time accessed 2018-8-29），其中有這樣一段話（原文在後麵）：
這裏黑格爾拒絕了傳統的歸謬法，也就是說當一個論證的前提導致矛盾是，這個前提必須被拋棄，沒有結果。如黑格爾在現象學中所說，這樣的論點
隻是懷疑主義，它隻在結果中看到純無且從隻從事實中抽象出這樣的結論：這裏的無是從前提的無中所得來的(PhG §79)。
雖然該文作者用的是肯定的語氣，但是對我來說，“拒絕歸謬法”是對黑格爾的一個極為嚴重的指責，這與在很多其它的場合人們所說的黑格爾試圖用辯證邏輯取代形式邏輯是同出一轍的，因為如果黑格爾真的因為辨證法而拒絕歸謬法，那麽就坐實了對他用辯證法取代形式邏輯的指控。
所以，我專門去查了他所給出的那個參考文獻（PhG§79）,因為黑格爾現象學的英文譯本有很多，我必須用他給出的那一版。我從那裏的§79中找到他所引用的那句話，但不論是那句話本身還是上下文都根本看不出黑格爾有拒絕歸謬法的意思，連那個意思的邊都沾不上。因為上述的斯坦福文章的那段文字之前還提到了另一處參考文獻(EL §§79, 82)，那是黑格爾的百科全書中的兩段，我又專門找出他所給出的那個譯本中的那兩段，也連拒絕歸謬法的意思的邊都找不到。
這裏涉及到有與無的一個基本哲學：如果我看到有人說“黑色的火焰”，那麽我隻要把那句話的出處指出來就可以作為有人說過“黑色的火焰”這句話的證據；但是如果我從沒看過任何人說過“黑色的火焰”，那麽我也根本無法“證明”從未有人說過“黑色的火焰”這句話。
在本文後麵，我先給出上述的斯坦福文章的原文，然後給出那（PhG§79）和(EL §§79, 82)。因為這不是翻譯的問題，而是理解的問題，即便我把它們譯成中文，還是得讀者自己去看是否它們能表明黑格爾拒絕了傳統的歸謬法，因此我就不對（PhG§79）和(EL §§79, 82)進行翻譯了，隻是將原文列出。
附錄。斯坦福文選原文，及相關的黑格爾文章英譯版：
1）斯坦福文章原文：
Here, Hegel rejects the traditional, reductio ad absurdum argument, which says that when the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, then the premises must be discarded altogether, leaving nothing. As Hegel suggests in the Phenomenology, such an argument
is just the skepticism which only ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is specifically the nothingness of that from which it results. (PhG §79)
…………
- [EL] The Encyclopedia Logic: Part 1 of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences [Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I], translated by T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991.
- [PhG], Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie des Geistes], translated by A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
2）(PhG §79)：
79. The necessary progression and interconnection of the forms of the unreal consciousness will by itself bring to pass the completion of the series. To make this more intelligible, it may be remarked, in a preliminary and general way, that the exposition of the untrue consciousness in its untruth is not a merely negative procedure. The natural consciousness itself normally takes this one-sided view of it; and a knowledge which makes this one-sidedness its very essence is itself one of the patterns of incomplete consciousness which occurs on the road itself, and will manifest itself in due course. This is just the skepticism which only ever sees pure nothingness in its result and abstracts from the fact that this nothingness is specifically the nothingness of that from which it results. For it is only when it is taken as the result of that from which it emerges, that it is, in fact, the true result; in that case it is itself a determinate nothingness, one which has a content. The scepticism that ends up with the bare abstraction of nothingness or emptiness cannot get any further from there, but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in order to throw it too into the same empty abyss. But when, on the other hand, the result is conceived as it is in truth, namely, as a determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen, and in the negation the transition is made through which the progress through the complete series of forms comes about of itself.
3）(EL §§79, 82)：
§ 79
With regard to its form, the logical has three sides: (a) the side of abstraction or of the understanding, (13) the dialectical or negatively rational side, [and] ('Y) the speculative or positively rational one.
These three sides do not constitute three parts of the Logic, but are moments of everything logically real; i.e., of every concept or of everything true in general. All of them together can be put under the first moment, that of the understanding; and in this way they can be kept separate from each other, but then they are not considered in their truth.-Like the division itself, the remarks made here concerning the determinations of the logical are only descriptive anticipations at this point.
§ 82
('Y) The speculative or positively rational apprehends the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the affirmative that is contained in their dissolution and in their transition.
(1) The dialectic has a positive result, because it has a determinate content, or because its result is truly not empty, abstract nothing, but the negation of certain determinations, which are contained in the result precisely because it is not an immediate nothing, but a result.
(2) Hence this rational [result}, although it is something-thought and something-abstract, is at the same time something-concrete, because it is not simple, formal unity, but a unity of distinct determinations. For this reason philosophy does not deal with mere abstractions or formal thoughts at all, but only with concrete thoughts.
(3) The mere logic of the understanding is contained in the speculative
Logic and can easily be made out of the latter; nothing more is needed for this than the omission of the dialectical and the rational; in this way it becomes what is usually called logic, a descriptive collection of determinations of thought put together in various ways, which in their finitude count for something infinite.
Addition . In respect of its content, what is rational is so far from being just the property of philosophy that we must rather say that it is there for all people, whatever level of culture and spiritual development they possess. That is the sense in which, from time immemorial, man has been called, quite correctly, a rational essence. The empirically universal way of knowing about what is rational is that of prejudgment and presupposition; and, as we explained earlier (§ 45), the general character of what is rational consists in being something unconditioned which therefore contains its determinacy within itself. In this sense, we know about the rational above all, because we know about God, and we know him as [the one] who is utterly self-determined. But also, the knowledge of a citizen about his country and its laws is a knowledge about what is rational, inasmuch as these things count for him as something unconditioned, and at the same time as a universal, to which he must subject his individual will; and in the same sense, even the knowing and willing of a child is already rational, when it knows its parents' will, and wills that.
To continue then, the speculative is in general nothing but the rational (and indeed the positively rational), inasmuch as it is something thought. The term "speculation" tends to be used in ordinary life in a very vague, and at the same time, secondary sense--as, for instance, when people talk about a matrimonial or commercial speculation. All that it is taken to mean here is that, on the one hand, what is immediately present must be transcended, and, on the other, that whatever the content of these speculations may be, although it is initially only something subjective, it ought not to remain so, but is to be realised or translated into objectivity.
The comment made earlier about the Idea holds for this ordinary linguistic usage in respect of "speculations," too. And this connects with the further remark that very often those who rank themselves among the more cultivated also speak of "speculation" in the express sense of something merely subjective. What they say is that a certain interpretation of natural or spiritual states of affairs or situations may certainly be quite right and proper, if taken in a merely "speculative" way, but that experience does not agree with it, and nothing of the sort is admissible in actuality.
Against these views, what must be said is that, with respect to its true significance, the speculative is, neither provisionally nor in the end either, something merely subjective; instead, it expressly contains the very antitheses at which the understanding stops short (including therefore that of the subjective and objective, too), sublated within itself; and precisely for this reason it proves to be concrete and a totality. For this reason, too, a speculative content cannot be expressed in an onesided proposition. If, for example, we say that "the Absolute is the unity of the subjective and the objective," that is certainly correct; but it is still one-sided, in that it expresses only the aspect of unity and puts the emphasis on that, whereas in fact, of course, the subjective and the objective are not only identical but also distinct.
a. eine Historie
It should also be mentioned here that the meaning of the speculative is to be understood as being the same as what used in earlier times to be called "mystical", especially with regard to the religious consciousness and its content. When we speak of the "mystical" nowadays, it is taken as a rule to be synonymous with what is mysterious and incomprehensible; and, depending on the ways their culture and mentality vary in other respects, some people treat the mysterious and incomprehensible as what is authentic and genuine, whilst others regard it as belonging to the domain of superstition and deception. About this we must remark first that "the mystical" is certainly something mysterious, but only for the understanding, and then only because abstract identity is the principle of the understanding.
But when it is regarded as synonymous with the speculative, the mystical is the concrete unity of just those determinations that count as true for the understanding only in their separation and opposition. So if those who recognise the mystical as what is genuine say that it is something utterly mysterious, and just leave it at that, they are only declaring that for them, too, thinking has only the Significance of an abstract positing of identity, and that in order to attain the truth we must renounce thinking, or, as they frequently put it, that we must "take reason captive." As we have seen, however, the abstract thinking of the understanding is so far from being something firm and ultimate that it proves itself, on the contrary, to be a constant sublating of itself and an overturning into its opposite, whereas the rational as such is rational precisely because it contains both of the opposites as ideal moments within itself. Thus, everything rational can equally be called "mystical"; but this only amounts to saying that it transcends the understanding. It does not at all imply that what is so spoken of must be considered inaccessible to thinking and incomprehensible.
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