風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
自由國際秩序的興衰注定會失敗
約翰·米爾斯海默 17 of 50
Bound to Fail, The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order
John J. Mearsheimer Sept 11, 2018
到了 2019 年，自由國際秩序顯然陷入了嚴重的麻煩。 支撐它的地殼板塊正在移動，修複和拯救它的努力微乎其微。
事實上，這個秩序從一開始就注定要失敗，因為它包含著自身毀滅的種子。 自由國際秩序的崩潰讓建立這一秩序並在許多方麵從中受益的西方精英感到恐懼。
這些精英堅信，這一秩序過去是、現在仍然是促進全球和平與繁榮的重要力量。 他們中的許多人將其垮台歸咎於唐納德·特朗普總統。 畢竟，他在2016年競選總統時表達了對自由主義秩序的蔑視； 自上任以來，他推行的政策似乎旨在推翻它。 然而，如果認為自由國際秩序僅僅因為特朗普的言論或政策而陷入困境，那就錯了。
事實上，更根本的問題正在發揮作用，這就是特朗普能夠成功挑戰幾乎得到西方外交政策精英普遍支持的秩序的原因。 本文的目的是確定自由主義世界秩序為何陷入大麻煩，並確定將取代它的國際秩序。 我提供三組主要論點。
首先，由於現代世界的國家以多種方式緊密相連，因此秩序對於促進高效、及時的互動至關重要。 國際秩序有多種類型，哪種類型的出現主要取決於全球權力的分配。 但當體係是單極時，唯一一極的政治意識形態也很重要。 自由國際秩序隻能在主導國家是自由民主國家的單極體係中產生。
約翰·J·米爾斯海默 (John J. Mearsheimer) 是芝加哥大學政治學 R. 溫德爾·哈裏森 (R. Wendell Harrison) 傑出服務教授。 作者感謝匿名審稿人 Olafur Bjornsson、Joshua Byun、Michael Desch、Charles Glaser、Nicolas Guilhot、Jack Jacobsen、Robert Keohane、Do Young Lee、Jennifer A. Lind、Nuno Monteiro、Paul Poast、Barry Posen、Burak Tan ，尤其是 Eliza Gheorghe、Mariya Grinberg、Sebastian Rosato 和 Stephen Walt 的深刻評論。 他還感謝許多個人在他在柏林的歐洲外交關係委員會、聖母院國際安全中心和芝加哥大學國際安全政策項目上發表本文的早期版本時提供了富有洞察力的評論。
其次，美國自二戰以來主導了兩種不同的秩序。 冷戰秩序有時被錯誤地稱為“自由國際秩序”，它既不是自由的，也不是國際的。 這是一個主要限於西方的有界秩序，並且在所有關鍵方麵都是現實主義的。 它具有某些也符合自由主義秩序的特征，但這些屬性是基於現實主義邏輯的。 另一方麵，美國領導的冷戰後秩序是自由主義和國際性的，因此與美國在冷戰期間主導的有界秩序有根本的不同。
第三，冷戰後的自由國際秩序注定要崩潰，因為它所依賴的關鍵政策令人深感敬畏。 在全球範圍內傳播自由民主對於建立這樣的秩序至關重要，不僅極其困難，而且常常毒害與其他國家的關係，有時甚至導致災難性的戰爭。 目標國內部的民族主義是推進民主的主要障礙，但均勢政治也是重要的阻礙力量。
此外，自由主義秩序傾向於優先考慮國際機構而不是國內考慮，以及它對漏洞百出的（如果不是開放的）邊界的堅定承諾，在包括美國單極國家在內的主要自由主義國家內部產生了有毒的政治影響。
這些政策在主權和民族認同等關鍵問題上與民族主義發生衝突。 由於民族主義是地球上最強大的政治意識形態，每當兩者發生衝突時，民族主義總是會戰勝自由主義，從而破壞其核心秩序。 此外，試圖最大限度地減少全球貿易和投資壁壘的超全球化導致整個自由世界失業、工資下降和收入不平等加劇。 它還使國際金融體係不穩定，導致金融危機反複發生。 這些麻煩隨後演變成政治問題，進一步削弱了對自由秩序的支持。
超全球化經濟還以另一種方式破壞秩序：它幫助單極以外的國家變得更加強大，這可能會破壞單極並終結自由主義秩序。 這就是隨著中國的崛起而發生的事情，它與俄羅斯力量的複興一起結束了單極時代。 新興的多極世界將由基於現實主義的國際秩序組成，它將在管理世界經濟、處理軍控問題以及處理氣候變化等全球公域問題方麵發揮重要作用。 除了這一新的國際秩序之外，美國和中國還將主導有界秩序，在經濟和軍事領域相互競爭。
本文的其餘部分組織如下。 首先，我解釋“秩序”一詞的含義以及為什麽秩序是國際政治的一個重要特征。 其次，我描述了不同類型的秩序以及自由國際秩序出現的環境。
與此相關的是，我在第三部分研究了國際訂單上升和下降的原因。 在第四部分中，我描述了不同的冷戰秩序。 在接下來的三節中，我將回顧自由國際秩序的曆史。 然後，在接下來的四節中，我解釋了它失敗的原因。
在倒數第二節中，我討論多極化下的新秩序會是什麽樣子。 結論部分簡要總結了我的論點和一些政策建議。 什麽是訂單以及為什麽訂單很重要？ “秩序”是一個有組織的國際機構團體，有助於管理成員國之間的互動。3秩序還可以幫助成員國與非成員打交道，因為秩序不一定包括世界上的每個國家。 此外，命令可以包括具有區域或全球範圍的機構。
大國創造並管理秩序。 國際機構是秩序的基石，實際上是大國製定並同意遵守的規則，因為它們相信遵守這些規則符合它們的利益。 這些規則規定了可接受的行為類型，並禁止了不可接受的行為形式。4毫不奇怪，大國製定這些規則是為了滿足自己的利益。 但當規則不符合主導國家的切身利益時，這些國家要麽忽視它們，要麽重寫它們。 例如，喬治·W·布什總統在2003年伊拉克戰爭前多次強調，即使美國的入侵違反了國際法，“
美國將采取必要措施確保我們國家的安全……我不會等待危險聚集的事態發展。”5 一項命令可以包含不同類型的機構，包括北大西洋公約組織 (NATO)、 《核不擴散條約》（NPT）或《華沙條約》，以及國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）、北美自由貿易協定、經濟合作與發展組織和世界經濟組織等經濟機構 銀行。
它還可以包括處理環境問題的機構，例如應對氣候變化的《巴黎協定》，以及更多層麵的機構，例如歐盟 (EU)、國際聯盟和聯合國 (UN)。 秩序在現代國際體係中不可或缺，原因有二。 首先，它們在高度相互依存的世界中管理國家間關係。6 國家從事大量的經濟活動，這導致它們建立可以規範這些互動並提高其效率的機構和規則。
但這種相互依存不僅限於經濟事務；還包括經濟事務。 它還包括環境和健康問題。 例如，一國的汙染必然會影響鄰國的環境，而全球變暖的影響是普遍的，隻能通過多邊措施來應對。 此外，正如 1918-20 年致命流感大流行所表明的那樣，致命疾病不需要護照就能跨越國際邊界。 各國在軍事領域也相互聯係，這導致它們結成聯盟。 為了給對手帶來強大的威懾力，或者在威懾力失效的情況下進行有效的戰鬥，盟國可以從製定規定每個成員的軍隊如何運作以及如何相互協調的規則中受益。 由於現代軍隊擁有大量武器，但並非所有武器都與其盟友的武器兼容，因此協調的必要性被放大。
考慮一下北約和華沙條約組織軍隊中的武器種類繁多，更不用說協調這些聯盟內各戰鬥部隊行動的困難了。
毫不奇怪，兩個超級大國在冷戰期間維持了高度製度化的聯盟——實際上也是高度製度化的秩序。 其次，秩序在現代國際體係中不可或缺，因為它有助於大國以符合其利益的方式管理弱國的行為。
具體來說，最強大的國家設計機構來限製較弱的國家的行為，然後對它們施加巨大壓力，要求它們加入這些機構並無論如何遵守規則。 然而，這些規則往往有利於體係中較弱的國家。 這種現象的一個很好的例子是超級大國在冷戰期間建立防擴散製度的努力。 為此，蘇聯和美國於 1968 年製定了《不擴散核武器條約》，實際上規定任何沒有核武器的成員國獲取核武器都是非法的。 自然，莫斯科和華盛頓的領導層竭盡全力讓盡可能多的國家加入《不擴散核武器條約》。
超級大國也是 1974 年核供應國集團成立的主要推動力，該集團旨在嚴格限製向不擁有核武器但可能試圖在世界範圍內獲取核武器的國家出售核材料和技術。 市場。 然而，如果強國認為這樣做不符合自己的利益，那麽製定秩序的機構就無法強迫這些國家遵守規則。 換句話說，國際機構沒有自己的生命，因此無權告訴主要國家該做什麽。 它們隻是大國的工具。 盡管如此，規則是任何機構的本質，有助於管理國家行為，而大國在大多數時候都會遵守規則。
最重要的是，在一個多方麵相互依存的世界中，規則體係對於降低交易成本並幫助進行國家之間發生的多種互動是必要的。 太平洋美軍前司令哈裏·哈裏斯上將抓住了這一點，他將自由國際秩序稱為“全球操作係統”。
指令類型 國際體係中的指令之間存在三個重要區別。 第一個區別是國際訂單和限界訂單之間的區別。 一個國際秩序必須包括世界上所有的強國。 理想情況下，它將包含係統中的每個國家。
相比之下，有界訂單由一組成員有限的機構組成。 它們並不包括所有大國，而且通常是區域性的。 在大多數情況下，它們由一個大國主導，盡管兩個或多個大國也有可能形成一個有界的秩序，前提是至少有一個大國處於該秩序之外。 簡而言之，國際秩序和有界秩序是由大國創造和運行的。
國際秩序主要涉及促進國家之間的合作。 具體來說，它們有助於促進體係內大國之間或世界上幾乎所有國家之間的合作。 另一方麵，有界秩序的主要目的是讓敵對大國之間進行安全競爭，而不是促進它們之間的合作。
然而，領導有界秩序的大國努力促進成員國之間的合作，並在必要時對其進行脅迫。 有界秩序內的高水平合作對於與敵對大國開展安全競爭至關重要。 最後，國際秩序是當代國際政治的一個持續特征，而有界秩序則不然。 隻有現實主義的國際秩序才會伴隨有界秩序。 第二個主要區別涉及大國可以組織的不同類型的國際秩序：現實主義的、不可知論的或意識形態的（包括自由主義的）。
哪種秩序主要取決於大國之間的權力分配。 關鍵問題是這個體係是雙極、多極還是單極。 如果是單極國家，主導國家的政治意識形態對於決定所形成的國際秩序類型也很重要。 然而，在兩極和多極中，大國的政治意識形態在很大程度上是無關緊要的。 現實主義秩序 如果體係是兩極或多極的，國際秩序及其組成機構將是現實主義的。
原因很簡單：如果世界上存在兩個或兩個以上的大國，它們別無選擇，隻能按照現實主義的指令行事，相互進行安全競爭。 他們的目標是以犧牲對手為代價來獲得權力，但如果這是不可能的，也要確保權力平衡不會對他們不利。
在這種情況下，意識形態考慮服從於安全考慮。
即使所有大國都是自由國家，情況也是如此。9然而，競爭的大國有時有合作的動機。 畢竟，他們在一個高度相互依賴的世界中運作，他們肯定有一些共同利益。 在現實世界中並行運作的有界秩序和國際秩序有助於敵對大國之間的競爭與合作。 具體而言，大國建立自己的邊界秩序，以幫助彼此進行安全競爭。 相比之下，它們組織國際秩序是為了促進它們之間的合作，並且通常也促進與其他國家的合作。 當大國擁有共同利益時，構成國際秩序的機構非常適合幫助它們達成協議。 盡管存在合作問題，大國仍然是競爭對手，其關係的核心是競爭。
即使大國通過國際機構相互合作，權力平衡的考慮也始終在發揮作用。 特別是，任何大國都不會簽署削弱其實力的協議。 構成這些現實主義秩序的機構——無論是國際性的還是有界的——有時可能具有與自由主義價值觀相一致的特征，但這並不能證明該秩序是自由主義的。 從權力平衡的角度來看，這些功能恰好也有意義。
例如，有界秩序內的關鍵經濟製度可能旨在促進成員國之間的自由貿易，這不是因為自由主義的計算，而是因為經濟開放被認為是在該秩序內產生經濟和軍事力量的最佳方式。
事實上，如果放棄自由貿易並轉向更加封閉的經濟體係具有良好的戰略意義，那麽這將按照現實主義的順序發生。 不可知論和意識形態秩序 如果世界是單極的，國際秩序就不可能是現實主義的。 單極隻有一個大國，因此根據定義，大國之間不存在安全競爭，而這是任何現實主義世界秩序的必要條件。
因此，唯一的極點沒有理由創建有界秩序。 畢竟，有界秩序主要是為了與其他大國進行安全競爭而設計的，這與單極無關。 然而，非現實主義國際秩序中的一些機構可能是區域性的，而另一些機構的成員資格則真正是全球性的。 然而，這些區域機構都不會捆綁在一起形成有界秩序； 相反，它們將與現行國際秩序中的其他機構或鬆散或緊密聯係。 在單極狀態下，國際秩序可以采取兩種形式之一——不可知論或意識形態——取決於主導國家的政治意識形態。 關鍵問題是單極國家是否擁有普世意識形態，即認為其核心價值觀和政治製度應該輸出到其他國家。 如果單極做出這一假設，世界秩序將是意識形態的。
換句話說，唯一的一極將試圖廣泛傳播其意識形態，並按照自己的形象重塑世界。 它將處於有利位置來實現這一使命，因為它沒有必須與之競爭的競爭對手。 當然，自由主義包含強大的普遍主義傾向，這源於它對個人權利重要性的強調。 自由主義的故事以個人主義為核心，認為每個人都擁有一係列不可剝奪的或自然的權利。
因此，自由主義者往往深切關注世界各地人民的權利，無論他們生活在哪個國家。因此，如果單極是一個自由民主國家，那麽幾乎可以肯定的是，他們會試圖建立一個旨在實現以下目標的國際秩序： 按照自己的形象重塑世界。10 自由國際秩序是什麽樣的？ 該體係中的主導國家顯然必須是自由民主國家，並且必須在構成該秩序的關鍵機構中擁有巨大影響力。
此外，該體係中必須存在大量其他自由民主國家，並且世界經濟基本開放。 這些自由民主國家，尤其是領先的自由民主國家的最終目標是在全球範圍內傳播民主，同時促進更廣泛的經濟交流並建立日益強大和有效的國際機構。 從本質上講，其目標是建立一個完全由自由民主國家組成的世界秩序，這些國家在經濟上相互接觸，並通過一套共同規則結合在一起。
基本假設是，這樣的秩序將基本上沒有戰爭，並將為其所有成員國帶來繁榮。 共產主義是另一種普遍主義意識形態，可以作為建立意識形態國際秩序的基礎。 事實上，馬克思主義與自由主義有一些重要的相似之處。 正如約翰·格雷所說，“兩者都是期待普世文明的開明意識形態。”
換句話說，自由主義和共產主義都致力於改變世界。 共產主義的普遍主義維度是基於階級概念，而不是權利。 馬克思及其追隨者認為，社會階級超越民族群體和國界。
最重要的是，他們認為資本主義剝削有助於在不同國家的工人階級之間建立強大的聯係。 因此，如果蘇聯贏得了冷戰，並感受到了1989年美國對自由民主的熱情，那麽蘇聯領導人肯定會試圖建立共產主義國際秩序。 如果單極國家沒有普遍主義意識形態，因此不致力於將其政治價值觀和治理體係強加給其他國家，那麽國際秩序將是不可知的。
主導大國仍將針對挑戰其權威的政權，並將深入參與管理構成國際秩序的機構和塑造世界經濟以使其符合其自身利益。 然而，它不會致力於在全球範圍內塑造地方政治。 相反，唯一的一極在與其他國家打交道時會更加寬容和務實。
如果俄羅斯以其目前的政治體係成為單極國家，那麽國際體係將是不可知論的，因為俄羅斯不受普遍主義意識形態的驅動。 中國也是如此，其政權的主要合法性來源是民族主義，而不是共產主義。 這並不是否認共產主義的某些方麵對中國統治者仍然具有政治重要性，但北京的領導層幾乎沒有表現出共產主義通常伴隨的傳教士熱情。
厚訂單和薄訂單
到目前為止，我已經區分了國際秩序和有界秩序，並將國際秩序分為現實主義秩序、不可知論秩序和意識形態秩序。
對訂單進行分類的第三種方法（無論是國際訂單還是有限訂單）是關注其覆蓋國家活動最重要領域的廣度和深度。 關於廣度，核心問題是命令是否對其成員國的關鍵經濟和軍事活動產生一定影響。
關於深度，主要問題是秩序中的機構是否對其成員國的行動產生重大影響。 換句話說，該秩序是否擁有強大而有效的機構？ 考慮到這兩個維度，我們就可以區分粗訂單和細訂單。
厚重或穩健的秩序包括對經濟和軍事領域的國家行為產生重大影響的製度。 這樣的秩序是廣泛而深刻的。 另一方麵，精簡訂單可以采用三種基本形式。 首先，它可能隻涉及經濟或軍事領域，但不能同時涉及兩者。 即使那個領域有強大的機構，它仍然會被歸類為薄秩序。 其次，一項命令可能涉及一個甚至兩個領域，但包含薄弱的機構。
第三，秩序有可能（但不太可能）涉及經濟和軍事事務，但僅在其中一個領域擁有強大的機構。 簡而言之，薄秩序要麽不廣泛，要麽根本不深入，要麽隻深入兩個關鍵領域之一。 圖 1 總結了本文中使用的不同類別的訂單。
國際秩序的興衰 沒有任何國際秩序能夠永遠存在，這就提出了一個問題：如何解釋現有秩序的消亡和新秩序的興起？ 權力的分配和領導國家的政治意識形態這兩個因素解釋了現行秩序，也解釋了現實主義和不可知論秩序的衰落以及取代它們的秩序類型。 雖然這些因素也有助於解釋意識形態秩序的解體，但另外兩個因素，民族主義和均勢政治，通常在導致意識形態秩序崩潰的過程中發揮著核心作用。 當潛在的權力分配發生根本性變化時，基於兩極或多極的現實主義秩序就會崩潰。
如果國際體係從兩極轉向多極，或者反之亦然，或多極體係中大國的數量減少或增加，所產生的秩序仍然是現實主義的，盡管其結構有所不同。
無論體係中有多少大國，它們仍然必須相互競爭權力和影響力。 但如果兩極或多極讓位於單極，新秩序要麽是不可知論的，要麽是意識形態的，這取決於唯一的一極是否致力於普遍主義意識形態。 現實主義秩序往往具有顯著的持久力，因為力量平衡的重大變化通常是大國之間長期經濟增長差異的結果。 然而，大國戰爭有時會導致全球權力分配的迅速變化，盡管這種事件很少見。 15 例如，二戰後，體係從多極轉向兩極，很大程度上是因為大國的徹底失敗。 德國和日本以及戰爭給英國和法國帶來的可怕代價。
蘇聯和美國成為兩極。 此外，當現實主義秩序發生變化時，它們通常會讓位於新構建的現實主義秩序——就像二戰後發生的那樣——僅僅是因為單極很少見。 不可知論秩序也往往具有強大的持久力，因為單極接受政治和社會生活固有的異質性，並且不會試圖對地球上幾乎每個國家的政治進行微觀管理。 這種務實的行為即使不能增強霸權，也有助於保持其權力。 當單極性讓位於兩極性或多極性時，不可知論秩序可能會走向終結，從而使秩序變得現實； 或者，如果唯一的一極在國內經曆一場革命並采用普遍主義意識形態，這肯定會導致它形成一種意識形態秩序。
相比之下，任何基於普遍主義意識形態的意識形態國際秩序，例如自由主義或共產主義，注定壽命很短，這主要是因為單極國家試圖按照自己的形象重塑世界時會出現國內和全球困難。 。 民族主義和均勢政治破壞了政權更迭國家所必需的社會工程，同時民族主義也在後方給唯一的極點及其意識形態盟友製造了重大問題。 當這些問題出現時，單極國家可能會放棄按照自己的形象重塑世界的努力，實際上放棄將意識形態輸出到國外的努力。 它甚至可能完全放棄這種意識形態。 當這種情況發生時，秩序就不再是意識形態的，而變得不可知論。
Bound to Fail, The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order
John J. Mearsheimer 17 of 50
By 2019, it was clear that the liberal international order was in deep trouble. The tectonic plates that underpin it are shifting, and little can be done to repair and rescue it.
Indeed, that order was destined to fail from the start, as it contained the seeds of its own destruction. The fall of the liberal international order horriªes the Western elites who built it and who have benefited from it in many ways.
These elites fervently believe that this order was and remains an important force for promoting peace and prosperity around the globe. Many of them blame President Donald Trump for its demise. After all, he expressed contempt for the liberal order when campaigning for president in 2016; and since taking ofªce, he has pursued policies that seem designed to tear it down. It would be a mistake, however, to think that the liberal international order is in trouble solely because of Trump’s rhetoric or policies.
In fact, more fundamental problems are at play, which account for why Trump has been able to successfully challenge an order that enjoys almost universal support among the foreign policy elites in the West. The aim of this article is to determine why the liberal world order is in big trouble and to identify the kind of international order that will replace it. I offer three main sets of arguments.
First, because states in the modern world are deeply interconnected in a variety of ways, orders are essential for facilitating efficient and timely interactions. There are different kinds of international orders, and which type emerges depends primarily on the global distribution of power. But when the system is unipolar, the political ideology of the sole pole also matters. Liberal international orders can arise only in unipolar systems where the leading state is a liberal democracy.
John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. The author is grateful to Olafur Bjornsson, Joshua Byun, Michael Desch, Charles Glaser, Nicolas Guilhot, Jack Jacobsen, Robert Keohane, Do Young Lee, Jennifer A. Lind, Nuno Monteiro, Paul Poast, Barry Posen, Burak Tan, an anonymous reviewer, and especially Eliza Gheorghe, Mariya Grinberg, Sebastian Rosato, and Stephen Walt for their incisive comments. He also thanks the many individuals who offered insightful comments when he presented earlier versions of this article at the European Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, the Notre Dame International Security Center, and the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago.
Second, the United States has led two different orders since World War II. The Cold War order, which is sometimes mistakenly referred to as a “liberal international order,” was neither liberal nor international. It was a bounded order that was limited mainly to the West and was realist in all its key dimensions. It had certain features that were also consistent with a liberal order, but those attributes were based on realist logic. The U.S.-led post–Cold War order, on the other hand, is liberal and international, and thus differs in fundamental ways from the bounded order the United States dominated during the Cold War.
Third, the post–Cold War liberal international order was doomed to collapse, because the key policies on which it rested are deeply ºawed. Spreading liberal democracy around the globe, which is of paramount importance for building such an order, not only is extremely difficult, but often poisons relations with other countries and sometimes leads to disastrous wars. Nationalism within the target state is the main obstacle to the promotion of democracy, but balance of power politics also function as an important blocking force.
Furthermore, the liberal order’s tendency to privilege international institutions over domestic considerations, as well as its deep commitment to porous, if not open borders, has had toxic political effects inside the leading liberal states themselves, including the U.S. unipole.
Those policies clash with nationalism over key issues such as sovereignty and national identity. Because nationalism is the most powerful political ideology on the planet, it invariably trumps liberalism whenever the two clash, thus undermining the order at its core. In addition, hyperglobalization, which sought to minimize barriers to global trade and investment, resulted in lost jobs, declining wages, and rising income inequality throughout the liberal world. It also made the international ªnancial system less stable, leading to recurring ªnancial crises. Those troubles then morphed into political problems, further eroding support for the liberal order.
A hyperglobalized economy undermines the order in yet another way: it helps countries other than the unipole grow more powerful, which can undermine unipolarity and bring the liberal order to an end. This is what is happening with the rise of China, which, along with the revival of Russian power, has brought the unipolar era to a close. The emerging multipolar world will consist of a realist-based international order, which will play an important role in managing the world economy, dealing with arms control, and handling problems of the global commons such as climate change. In addition to this new international order, the United States and China will lead bounded orders that will compete with each other in both the economic and military realms.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, I explain what the term “order” means and why orders are an important feature of international politics. Second, I describe the different kinds of orders and the circumstances under which a liberal international order will emerge.
Relatedly, I examine in the third section what accounts for the rise and decline of international orders. In the fourth section, I describe the different Cold War orders. In the next three sections, I recount the history of the liberal international order. Then, in the subsequent four sections, I explain why it failed.
In the penultimate section, I discuss what the new order will look like under multipolarity. The conclusion provides a brief summary of my argument and some policy recommendations. What Is an Order and Why Do Orders Matter? An “order” is an organized group of international institutions that help govern the interactions among the member states.3 Orders can also help member states deal with nonmembers, because an order does not necessarily include every country in the world. Furthermore, orders can comprise institutions that have a regional or a global scope.
Great powers create and manage orders. International institutions, which are the building blocks of orders, are effectively rules that the great powers devise and agree to follow, because they believe that obeying those rules is in their interest. The rules prescribe acceptable kinds of behavior and proscribe unacceptable forms of behavior.4 Unsurprisingly, the great powers write those rules to suit their own interests. But when the rules do not accord with the vital interests of the dominant states, those same states either ignore them or rewrite them. For example, President George W. Bush emphasized on numerous occasions before the 2003 Iraq War that even if a U.S. invasion violated international law, “
America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security...I will not wait on events, while dangers gather.”5 An order can contain different kinds of institutions, including security institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or the Warsaw Pact, as well as economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Bank.
It can also include institutions that deal with the environment, such as the Paris Agreement to tackle climate change, and more multifaceted institutions such as the European Union (EU), the League of Nations, and the United Nations (UN). Orders are indispensable in the modern international system for two reasons. First, they manage interstate relations in a highly interdependent world.6 States engage in enormous amounts of economic activity, which leads them to establish institutions and rules that can regulate those interactions and make them more efficient.
But that interdependence is not restricted to economic affairs; it also includes environmental and health issues. Pollution in one country, for example, invariably affects the environment in neighboring countries, while the effects of global warming are universal and can be dealt with only through multilateral measures. Moreover, deadly diseases do not need passports to cross international boundaries, as the lethal inºuenza pandemic of 1918–20 made clear. States are also interconnected in the military realm, which leads them to form alliances. To present an adversary with a formidable deterrent or to fight effectively should deterrence break down, allies beneªt from having rules that stipulate how each member's military will operate and how they will coordinate with each other. The need for coordination is magniªed because modern militaries possess a vast array of weapons, not all of which are compatible with their allies’ weaponry.
Consider the wide variety of weapons in the militaries that made up NATO and the Warsaw Pact, not to mention the difªculty of coordinating the movements of the various fighting forces inside those alliances. It is unsurprising that both superpowers maintained heavily institutionalized alliances—and indeed heavily institutionalized orders—during the Cold War. Second, orders are indispensable in the modern international system be cause they help the great powers manage the behavior of the weaker states in ways that suit the great powers’ interests.
Specifically, the most powerful states design institutions to constrain the actions of less powerful states and then put signiªcant pressure on them to join those institutions and obey the rules no matter what. Nevertheless, those rules often work to the beneªt of the weaker states in the system. A good example of this phenomenon is the superpowers’ efforts during the Cold War to build a nonproliferation regime. Toward that end, in 1968 the Soviet Union and the United States devised the NPT, which effectively made it illegal for any member state that did not have nuclear weapons to acquire them. Naturally, the leadership in Moscow and Washington went to great lengths to get as many states as possible to join the NPT.
The superpowers were also the main driving force behind the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1974, which aims to place signiªcant limits on the sale of nuclear materials and technologies to countries that do not possess nuclear weapons, but might attempt to acquire them in the market. The institutions that make up an order, however, cannot compel powerful states to obey the rules if those states believe that doing so is not in their interest. International institutions, in other words, do not take on a life of their own, and thus do not have the power to tell the leading states what to do. They are simply tools of the great powers. Still, rules, which are the essence of any institution, help manage the behavior of states, and great powers obey the rules most of the time.
The bottom line is that in a world of multifaceted interdependence, a system of rules is necessary to lower transaction costs and help carry out the multitude of interactions that take place among states. Adm. Harry Harris, a former commander of U.S. military forces in the Paciªc, captures this point when he referred to the liberal international order as the “Global Operating System.”
Types of Orders There are three important distinctions among the orders that populate the international system. The ªrst difference is between international orders and bounded orders. For an order to be international, it must include all of the world’s great powers. Ideally, it would contain every country in the system.
In contrast, bounded orders consist of a set of institutions that have limited mem bership. They do not include all of the great powers, and they are usually regional in scope. In most cases, they are dominated by a single great power, although it is possible for two or more great powers to form a bounded order, provided at least one great power remains outside of it. In short, international and bounded orders are created and run by great powers.
International orders are concerned mainly with facilitating cooperation between states. Speciªcally, they help foster cooperation either among the great powers in the system or among virtually all the countries in the world. Bounded orders, on the other hand, are designed mainly to allow rival great powers to wage security competition with each other, not to advance cooperation between them.
Nevertheless, great powers that lead bounded orders work hard to foster cooperation among the member states, coercing them if necessary. High levels of cooperation within the bounded order are essential for waging security competition with opposing great powers. Lastly, international orders are a constant feature of contemporary international politics, whereas bounded orders are not. Only realist international orders are accompanied by bounded orders. The second major distinction concerns the different kinds of international orders that great powers can organize: realist, agnostic, or ideological (to include liberal).
Which order takes hold depends primarily on the distribution of power among the great powers. The key issue is whether the system is bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar. If it is unipolar, the political ideology of the dominant state also matters for determining the kind of international order that forms. In bipolarity and multipolarity, however, the political ideology of the great powers is largely irrelevant. realist orders The international order—and the institutions that make it up—will be realist if the system is either bipolar or multipolar.
The reason is simple: if there are two or more great powers in the world, they have little choice but to act according to realist dictates and engage in security competition with each other. Their aim is to gain power at the expense of their adversaries, but if that is not possible, to make sure that the balance of power does not shift against them. Ideological considerations are subordinated to security considerations in these circumstances.
That would be true even if all the great powers were liberal states.9 Nevertheless, rival great powers sometimes have an incentive to coop erate. After all, they operate in a highly interdependent world, where they are sure to have some common interests. Bounded and international orders, which operate side by side in a realist world, help opposing great powers compete and cooperate among themselves. Speciªcally, the great powers establish their own bounded orders to help wage security competition with each other. In contrast, they organize international orders to facilitate cooperation between themselves and often with other countries as well. The institutions that make up an international order are well suited for helping great powers reach agreements when those states have common interests. This concern with cooperation notwithstanding, the great powers are still rivals whose relationship is competitive at its core.
Balance of power considerations are always at play, even when great powers work through international institutions to cooperate with each other. In particular, no great power is going to sign an agreement that diminishes its power. The institutions that make up these realist orders—be they international or bounded—might sometimes have features that are consistent with liberal values, but this is not evidence that the order is liberal. Those features just happen to also make sense from a balance of power perspective.
For example, the key economic institutions inside a bounded order might be oriented to facilitate free trade among the member states, not because of liberal calculations, but because economic openness is considered the best way to generate economic and military power inside that order.
Indeed, if abandoning free trade and moving toward a more closed economic system made good strategic sense, that would happen in a realist order. agnostic and ideological orders If the world is unipolar, the international order cannot be realist. Unipolarity has only one great power, and thus by deªnition there can be no security competition between great powers, which is a sine qua non of any realist world order.
Consequently, the sole pole has little reason to create a bounded order. After all, bounded orders are mainly designed for waging security competition with other great powers, which is irrelevant in unipolarity. Nevertheless, some of the institutions in that nonrealist international order might be regional in scope, whereas others will be truly global in terms of their membership. None of those regional institutions, however, would be bundled together to form a bounded order; they would instead be either loosely or tightly linked with the other institutions in the prevailing international order. In unipolarity, an international order can take one of two forms—agnostic or ideological—depending on the political ideology of the leading state. The key issue is whether the unipole has a universalistic ideology, one that assumes that its core values and its political system should be exported to other countries. If the unipole makes this assumption, the world order will be ideological.
The sole pole, in other words, will try to spread its ideology far and wide and remake the world in its own image. It would be well positioned to pursue that mission, because there are no rival great powers with which it must compete. Liberalism, of course, contains within it a powerful universalistic strand, which stems from its emphasis on the importance of individual rights. The liberal story, which is individualistic at its core, maintains that every person has a set of inalienable or natural rights.
As such, liberals tend to be deeply concerned about the rights of people all around the world, regardless of which country they live in. Thus, if the unipole is a liberal democracy, it is almost certain to try to create an international order that aims to reshape the world in its own image.10 What does a liberal international order look like? The dominant state in the system obviously must be a liberal democracy and must have enormous inºuence within the key institutions that populate the order.
Furthermore, there must be a substantial number of other liberal democracies in the system and a largely open world economy. The ultimate goal of these liberal democracies, especially the leading one, is to spread democracy across the globe, while promoting greater economic intercourse and building increasingly powerful and effective international institutions. In essence, the aim is to create a world order consisting exclusively of liberal democracies that are economically engaged with each other and bound together by sets of common rules.
The underlying assumption is that such an order will be largely free of war and will generate prosperity for all of its member states. Communism is another universalistic ideology that could serve as the basis for building an ideological international order. Indeed, Marxism shares some important similarities with liberalism. As John Gray puts it, “Both were enlightened ideologies that look forward to universal civilization.”
Both liberalism and communism, in other words, are bent on transforming the world. Communism’s universalistic dimension is based on the concept of class, not rights. Marx and his followers maintain that social classes transcend national groups and state borders.
Most importantly, they argue that capitalist exploita tion has helped foster a powerful bond among the working classes in different countries. Hence, if the Soviet Union had won the Cold War and had felt the kind of enthusiasm for Marxism in 1989 that the United States felt for liberal democracy, Soviet leaders surely would have tried to build a communist international order. If the unipole does not have a universalistic ideology, and therefore is not committed to imposing its political values and governing system on other countries, the international order would be agnostic.
The dominant power would still target regimes that challenged its authority and would still be deeply involved in both managing the institutions that make up the international order and molding the world economy to ªt with its own interests. It would not, however, be committed to shaping local politics on a global scale. The sole pole would instead be more tolerant and pragmatic in its dealings with other countries.
If Russia, with its present political system, were ever to become a unipole, the international system would be agnostic, as Russia is not driven by a universalistic ideology. The same is true of China, where the regime’s principal source of legitimacy is nationalism, not communism. This is not to deny that some aspects of communism still have political importance for China’s rulers, but the leadership in Beijing displays little of the missionary zeal that usually comes with communism.
thick and thin orders
So far, I have distinguished between international and bounded orders, and I have divided international orders into realist, agnostic, and ideological kinds.
A third way to categorize orders—be they international or bounded—is to focus on the breadth and depth of their coverage of the most important areas of state activity. Regarding breadth, the central question is whether an order has some effect on the key economic and military activities of its member states.
Concerning depth, the main question is whether the institutions in the order exert signiªcant inºuence on the actions of its member states. In other words, does the order have strong and effective institutions? With these two dimensions in mind, one can distinguish between thick or ders and thin orders.
A thick or robust order comprises institutions that have a substantial effect on state behavior in both the economic and military realms. Such an order is broad and deep. A thin order, on the other hand, can take three basic forms. First, it might deal with only the economic or military domain, but not both. Even if that realm contained strong institutions, it would still be categorized as a thin order. Second, an order might deal with one or even both realms, but contain weak institutions.
Third, it is possible, but unlikely, that an order will be involved with economic and military matters, but will have strong institutions in only one of those areas. In short, a thin order is either not broad, not deep at all, or deep in only one of the two crucial realms. Figure 1 summarizes the different categories of orders employed in this article.
The Rise and Decline of International Orders No international order lasts forever, which raises the question: What explains the demise of an existing order and the rise of a new one? The same two factors that account for the prevailing order, the distribution of power and the leading state’s political ideology, explain the fall of realist and agnostic orders as well as the kind of order that replaces them. While those same factors also help explain the dissolution of ideological orders, two other factors, nationalism and balance of power politics, usually play the central role in causing their collapse. Realist orders, which are based on either bipolarity or multipolarity, collapse when the underlying distribution of power changes in fundamental ways.
If the international system shifts from bipolarity to multipolarity or vice versa, or if the number of great powers in a multipolar system decreases or increases, the resulting order remains realist, although different in its conªguration. Regardless of the number of great powers in the system, they still must compete with each other for power and inºuence. But if bipolarity or multipolarity gives way to unipolarity, the new order will be either agnostic or ideological, depending on whether or not the sole pole is committed to a universalistic ideology. Realist orders tend to have signiªcant staying power, because major shifts in the balance of power are usually the result of differential economic growth among the great powers over a long period of time. Great power wars, however, can sometimes lead to a swift change in the global distribution of power, although such events are rare.15 After World War II, for example, the system shifted from multipolar to bipolar, largely because of the total defeat of Germany and Japan and the terrible price the war exacted on Britain and France.
The Soviet Union and the United States emerged as the two poles. Moreover, when realist orders change, they usually give way to newly conªgured realist orders—as happened after World War II—simply because unipolarity is rare. Agnostic orders also tend to have substantial staying power, because the unipole accepts the heterogeneity that is inherent in political and social life and does not try to micromanage the politics of nearly every country on the planet. That kind of pragmatic behavior helps preserve, if not augment, the hegemon’s power. An agnostic order is likely to meet its end when unipolarity gives way to either bipolarity or multipolarity, making the order realist; or if the sole pole experiences a revolution at home and adopts a universalistic ideology, which would surely lead it to forge an ideological order.
By contrast, any ideological international order based on a universalistic ideology, such as liberalism or communism, is destined to have a short life span, mainly because of the domestic and global difªculties that arise when the unipole seeks to remake the world in its own image. Nationalism and balance of power politics work to undermine the requisite social engineering in countries targeted for regime change, while nationalism also creates signiªcant problems on the home front for the sole pole and its ideological allies. When such problems emerge, the unipole is likely to give up trying to remake the world in its own image, in effect abandoning its efforts to export its ideology abroad. It might even forsake that ideology altogether. When that happens, the order stops being ideological and becomes agnostic.
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