風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
Kissinger calls US, China main threat to world, humanity existence
18.05.2023 Region:World News
https://news.am/eng/news/760544.html
Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, in an interview ( https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/05/17/henry-kissinger-explains-how-to-avoid-world-war-three ) with The Economist, called the US and China the main threat to the existence of the world and humanity because they are pursuing a policy of conflict against each other.
Kissinger expressed hope that if the leaders of the US and China meet, rather than listing all their grievances, the American president would say to his Chinese counterpart, “Mr. President, the two greatest dangers to peace right now are us two. In the sense that we have the capacity to destroy humanity.” China and America, without formally announcing anything, would aim to practice restraint.
In his opinion, the current situation of relations between Washington and Beijing is extremely dangerous and reminds of the situation before the First World War, “where neither side has much margin of political concession and in which any disturbance of the equilibrium can lead to catastrophic consequences.”
According to him, as a result of a possible military conflict over Taiwan, both the island and the world economy will be eliminated, which will be deprived of sources of supply of microprocessors.
“Both sides have convinced themselves that the other represents a strategic danger,” Kissinger says. “We are on the path to great-power confrontation.”
He advised both sides to try to defuse tensions over Taiwan through more cautious rhetoric and the creation of advisory groups.
Kissinger emphasized that the US is obligated to check whether the current Chinese authorities are more radical than the previous ones, and continue to keep the balance in the world.
The White House should start a dialogue with Beijing, but this approach may fail, the US diplomat warned. Therefore, according to him, the US, at least, should be strong enough militarily to overcome the consequences of failure, Kissinger noted.
基辛格稱美國和中國是世界和人類生存的主要威脅，因為它們奉行相互衝突的政策。
基辛格表示希望，如果美中領導人會麵，美國總統不會羅列他們所有的不滿，而是對中國領導人說：“先生。 總統先生，目前和平麵臨的兩個最大威脅是我們兩個。 從某種意義上說，我們有能力毀滅人類。” 中國和美國在沒有正式宣布任何事情的情況下，將力求保持克製。
在他看來，華盛頓與北京目前的關係形勢極其危險，讓人想起第一次世界大戰前的情況，“雙方都沒有太多的政治讓步餘地，任何對平衡的破壞都可能導致災難性後果 ”
據他介紹，由於台灣可能發生軍事衝突，台灣和世界經濟都將被淘汰，微處理器的供應來源將被剝奪。
“雙方都相信對方代表著戰略危險，”基辛格說。 “我們正走在大國對抗的道路上。”
他建議雙方通過更謹慎的言辭和成立谘詢小組來緩和台灣問題上的緊張局勢。
基辛格強調，美國有義務製衡當前的中國當局是否比以往更激進，並繼續保持世界平衡。
這位美國外交官警告說，白宮應該與北京展開對話，但這種做法可能會失敗。 因此，基辛格指出，據他說，美國至少應該在軍事上足夠強大以克服失敗的後果。
基辛格&經濟學人：美國不應一門心思搞垮中國，必須承認中國也要維護自身利益
【導讀】 5月17日，經濟學人網站刊發基辛格專訪長文，題為“基辛格詳解如何避免第三次世界大戰”。
基於中美競爭、俄烏戰爭等國際政治現狀，基辛格認為，中國作為當今世界上最重要的兩個大國，各自確信對方是戰略意義上的威脅，正逐步走向對抗。而在他看來，人類的命運恰恰取決於中美兩國能否和睦相處；隨著人工智能等科技的快速發展，留給中美雙方尋找相處之道的時間窗口不到十年。
為此，基辛格向有誌於解決這一問題的領導人提出了若幹重要建議。他提出，建立一個以規則為基礎，且歐洲、中國和印度都能參與的世界秩序是可能的。這或許可以取得一個好的結果，至少不是災難性結局。這是當今超級大國領導人的職責。
觀察者網編譯此文，僅供參考。
【訪談/經濟學人&基辛格，翻譯/觀察者網 楊晗軼】
基辛格先生將於5月27日迎來百歲誕辰。目前在世的人，沒有誰比他更有國際事務方麵的經驗。他最初是一名學者，研究19世紀的外交；後來擔任美國國家安全顧問和國務卿；在卸任後的46年裏，又屢屢給各個國家的君主、總統和首相擔任顧問和特使。基辛格先生憂心忡忡地說：“（中美）雙方都確信對方是戰略意義上的威脅，我們正在走向大國對抗。”
4月底，《經濟學人》與基辛格先生長談八個多小時，討論如何防止中美從角逐滑向戰爭。如今的基辛格身形佝僂、步履蹣跚，但頭腦依然敏銳如針。他構思著接下來的兩本書——一本關於人工智能（編者注：中文版《人工智能時代與人類未來》將由中信出版社出版發行。），一本關於聯盟的本質——比起梳理過去，他對展望未來更有興趣。
中美兩國圍繞科技和經濟領先地位的競爭日益激烈，這令基辛格先生感到憂慮。在俄羅斯墜入中國影響力軌道、戰爭烏雲籠罩歐洲東線的同時，他還擔心人工智能即將極大程度地加劇中美對立。在世界範圍內，勢力均衡和戰爭的科技基礎正在如此快速地發生變化，以至於各國在很多方麵找不到任何既定原則去建構秩序。在這樣的情況下，它們就可能訴諸武力。他說：“我們麵臨第一次世界大戰前的經典局勢，在政治上雙方都沒有多少讓步的餘地，均衡一旦被打破，都可能導致災難性的後果。”
基辛格：如何避免第三次世界大戰；截圖來自經濟學人
因為在越南戰爭中扮演的角色，基辛格先生被許多人斥為戰爭販子，但他認為自己一生工作的重點恰恰在於避免大國衝突。在目睹納粹德國血腥屠戮，導致自己13名近親慘死之後，基辛格堅信，防止毀滅性衝突的唯一方法是冷靜務實的外交，最好能得到共同價值觀的鞏固。
他說：“這是必須解決的問題，可以說我這一生都在努力嚐試這樣做。”在他看來，人類的命運取決於中美兩國能否和睦相處。而隨著人工智能的快速發展，留給雙方尋找相處之道的時間，隻剩下未來五到十年。
基辛格先生給有誌（於解決這個問題）的領導人提出了一些開放性建議：“冷酷地認清你所處的位置。”本著這種態度，避免戰爭首先要分析中國為什麽越來越躁動。盡管基辛格以對華和解的立場著稱，但他也注意到，中國的許多思想家認為美國正在走下坡路，“因此，作為曆史演變的結果，他們最終將取代我們。”
他認為中國領導層對西方政策製定者所說的基於規則的全球秩序懷有怨氣，覺得這實際上是美國的規則、美國的秩序。中國領導層認為受到了侮辱，（這種秩序）是西方居高臨下的交易，如果中國表現得好，就賜給中國一些優待——中國當然認為自己作為一個崛起的大國，有權獲得優待。事實上，中國一些人認為指望美國平等相待是愚蠢的，永遠不可能。
然而，基辛格先生也警告美國不要曲解中國的誌向。在華盛頓，“人們說中國想要主宰世界……但中國其實隻是想變得強大，並沒有希特勒那種主宰世界的傾向，不論現在還是過去，這都不是中國人對世界秩序的想法。”
基辛格說，納粹德國發動戰爭是無可避免的，因為希特勒需要戰爭，但中國不同。他跟從毛澤東以來的許多位中國領導人打過交道，對他們意識形態的堅定毫不懷疑，但認為這與他們對國家利益和國家能力的敏銳感知始終密不可分。
在基辛格先生眼裏，中國的體製更偏向儒家而不是馬克思主義。這讓中國領導人在國家能力範圍內最大程度地積蓄力量，然後取得成就，贏得尊重。中國領導人希望在國際體係中擁有對自身利益的最終裁決權，並獲得外界承認。“如果中國取得了優勢、真正可以利用的優勢，會把它推向極致，把中國文化強加於他人嗎？”他問。“我不知道。我的直覺是不會……但我相信我們有能力，通過外交和武力手段相結合，防止出現這種情況。”
麵對中國的雄心，美國的自然反應一種是探究這種挑戰，來尋求維持兩個大國之間的均衡，另一種是在兩國之間建立長期對話機製。中國“正在努力扮演全球性角色。我們必須處處評估雙方對戰略角色的構想是否兼容。”如果不兼容，那麽是否動用武力就會成為一個問題。“中國和美國有沒有可能避免全麵戰爭的威脅，實現共存？我以前乃至現在，都認為有。”但他承認，雙方不一定能和平共處。他說：“這條路也可能走不通，因此，我們的軍事實力必須足夠強，來承受共存的失敗。”
當前緊迫的考驗，是中美兩國在台灣問題上的表現。基辛格回憶1972年尼克鬆首次訪華時，隻有毛澤東有權就台灣問題進行談判。“尼克鬆每次提出某個具體話題時，毛澤東都會說，‘這些問題應該讓周總理跟基辛格去討論，我討論哲學問題。’……但在談到台灣時，他非常明確。他說：‘他們（台灣）是一批反革命分子……我們可以暫時不要台灣，再過一百年再去管它。’我們總有一天會解決這件事情，但距離很遠。”
基辛格先生認為，尼克鬆和毛澤東之間就台灣問題達成的諒解本來是以百年為期，但隻過了五十年，就被特朗普推翻了。他想在貿易問題上迫使中國讓步，來誇大自己的強硬形象。拜登政府在政策上延續了特朗普的做法，隻不過措辭更強調自由主義。
在台灣問題上，基辛格先生不希望選擇這條（通往衝突的）道路，因為一場烏克蘭式的戰爭會毀滅台灣，徹底破壞世界經濟。戰爭還可能導致中國遭遇內部挫折，而國內動蕩正是其領導人的心頭大患。
和平的希望源於人們對戰爭的恐懼。麻煩的是雙方都沒有太多讓步的餘地。每位中國領導人都宣稱台灣和中國（大陸）有不可分割的聯係。但與此同時，“事情發展到這個地步，美國要在保全自己其他地區地位的情況下放棄台灣，並不是件簡單的事情。”
基辛格先生根據自己在任期間的經驗，提出了擺脫當前僵局的辦法：先降溫，然後逐步建立信心和工作關係。美國總統與其向中方羅列自己的不滿，不如說：“主席先生，現在我們對和平構成了最大的威脅。從某種意義上說，我們有能力毀滅人類。”中國和美國可以在對外不做任何宣布的情況下，力求保持克製。
在決策方麵，向來不喜歡官僚主義的基辛格先生希望看到中美成立顧問小組，保持通氣，默契協作。雙方都不會從根本上改變在台灣問題上的立場，但美國可以更謹慎地部署軍事力量，盡量打消關於對其支持台灣獨立的疑慮。
基辛格先生給有誌於（維護中美和平）的領導者的第二條建議是：“製定可以獲得人們支持的目標，並找到可描述的、能實現這些目標的辦法。”中美兩個超級大國需要通過“求同”來促進全球穩定，這樣的領域有若幹個，台灣隻是第一個。
美國財政部長珍妮特·耶倫在近期一次演講中建議，此類領域應該包括氣候變化和經濟。基辛格先生對兩者都持懷疑態度。盡管他“完全讚成”在氣候問題上采取行動，但他懷疑這對建立信心或幫助兩個超級大國達成平衡沒有太大作用。至於經濟方麵，危險在於貿易議程已經被對華鷹派劫持，他們不願給中國任何發展的空間。
這種一竿子到底的態度，非常不利於總體上尋求改善關係。如果美國想找到與中國共存之道，就不應該以政權更迭為目標。在基辛格先生的思想中，有個從早年貫穿至今的主題。他說：“任何穩定的外交，都必須有一點19世紀的元素。而19世紀的世界建立在這樣一個命題的基礎上，那就是國家之間盡管彼此競爭，但它們的存在本身並無爭議。”
一些美國人認為，中國隻要被擊敗，就會變得民主、和平。然而，盡管基辛格也更願意看到中國實行民主體製，但他仍然認為，這種期待是沒有曆史先例證明的一廂情願。共產主義政權一旦垮台，更可能出現的情況是中國爆發內戰，惡化為意識形態衝突，然後加劇全球不穩定局麵。他說：“迫使中國解體不符合我們的利益。”
美國不應該一門心思搞垮中國，而是必須承認中國也需要維護自身利益。烏克蘭就是一個好例子。
中國國家主席習近平不久前與烏克蘭總統澤連斯基通電話，這是自去年2月俄烏戰爭爆發以來雙方的首次直接聯係。許多觀察人士認為這通電話隻是空洞的姿態，旨在安撫歐洲人的情緒，他們抱怨中國與俄羅斯過於親近。但基辛格先生認為，此舉顯示了中國嚴肅的意圖，將使圍繞戰爭的外交複雜化，但也許這恰恰是超級大國之間建立互信的機會。
基辛格在分析俄烏問題之前，先譴責了俄羅斯總統普京。他說：“最終來看，這肯定是普京的一個災難性判斷錯誤，”但西方並非沒有責任。“我認為對烏克蘭開放北約成員資格的決定非常錯誤。”這樣做會破壞穩定，把北約提供安全保護的承諾懸掛在烏克蘭麵前，卻又沒有計劃去落實，導致烏克蘭防禦薄弱，而又必然激怒普京和俄羅斯人。
5月16日至17日，中國政府歐亞事務特別代表李輝訪問烏克蘭，同烏外交部長庫列巴舉行會談。圖自美聯社
當前的任務是結束戰爭，不要為下一輪衝突留下隱患。基辛格表示，他希望俄羅斯盡可能地放棄它2014年征服的領土，但現實情況是，在任何停火協議中，俄羅斯恐怕至少會保留塞瓦斯托波爾（克裏米亞最大的城市，也是俄羅斯主要的黑海海軍基地）。這樣的解決方案會讓俄羅斯吐出一部分利益，但也保留一部分，最終結果是俄羅斯和烏克蘭都不滿意。
在基辛格看來，這樣的方案給未來的對抗埋下了種子。他說：“在我看來，歐洲人現在的說法非常危險，因為他們說‘我們不希望他們（烏克蘭）加入北約，太冒險了。因此，我們要把他們武裝起來，給他們最先進的武器。’”他的結論十分直白：“我們現在已經把烏克蘭武裝到了一定地步，它將有歐洲最好的武裝，以及最缺乏戰略經驗的領導人。”
西方要在歐洲實現長久的和平，需要兩次想象力的跳躍。首先是讓烏克蘭加入北約，通過北約來約束和保護它。其次是歐洲與俄羅斯尋求和解，來穩定東部邊界。
麵對這兩個目標，許多西方國家都會畏手畏腳，這是可以理解的。如果中國牽涉進來，它作為俄羅斯的朋友和北約的對手，會使歐洲感到更加棘手。中國的首要利益是看到俄羅斯完好無損地從烏克蘭戰爭中脫身。不僅因為中俄之間有“無上限”的合作夥伴關係，更是因為莫斯科一旦垮台，中國會陷入麻煩，因為中亞會產生權力真空，填補它的可能是一場“敘利亞式的內戰”。
在中烏領導人通話之後，基辛格認為中國可能將自己定位為俄烏之間的調解人。作為美國聯中抗蘇政策的設計者之一，他對中國和俄羅斯能否很好地合作保持懷疑。誠然，它們都對美國抱有戒心，但它們彼此也有一種本能的不信任。
基辛格表示，中國人已通過圍繞烏克蘭的外交來表達其國家利益。盡管他們不會支持摧毀俄羅斯，但他們承認烏克蘭應該保持獨立，並且警告不要使用核武器。他們甚至可能接受烏克蘭加入北約的願望。他說：“中國這樣做的部分原因是，他們不想與美國發生衝突，他們在盡可能地構建自己的世界秩序。”
中美第二個需要對話的領域是人工智能。他說：“我們正處於一個初級階段，未來機器可能帶來全球瘟疫或其他大流行病，給人類造成毀滅的不僅有核問題，任何領域都可能。”
他表示，即使是人工智能專家也不知道它的力量究竟有多大（從這次訪問來看，給基辛格濃重、沙啞的德國口音進行錄音轉寫仍然超出了人工智能的能力）。但基辛格認為，人工智能將在五年內成為安全領域的關鍵因素，其顛覆性潛力堪比活字印刷術，而正是後者傳播思想引發了16、17世紀的一係列毀滅性戰爭。
“我們生活在一個破壞性空前的世界中”，基辛格警告道。盡管原則上人類要介入機器學習的反饋循環，但人工智能還是可能成為全自動的、不可阻擋的武器。“縱觀軍事曆史，由於地理和精確度的限製，過去一直做不到消滅所有對手。（而今）這些限製不存在了。每個敵手都100%暴露在攻擊下。”
人工智能不能被廢除。因此，中美兩國需要在一定程度上對其潛力進行軍事利用，將其轉化為一股威懾力量。但反過來，它們也可以限製人工智能構成的威脅，就像通過軍備控製談判限製核威脅一樣。他說：“我認為我們必須就技術對彼此的衝擊展開交流，必須開始朝軍備控製一點點邁進，雙方都向另一方展示有關（人工智能）能力的可控材料。”
他認為，談判本身就有助於建立互信，使兩個超級大國有信心保持克製。要訣在於領導人有足夠的定力和智慧，能理解為什麽不能把人工智能推向極致。“如果你完全靠通過實力達成目的，你很可能會毀滅世界。”
基辛格給領導人的第三條建議是“不管你內政目標是什麽，都應將其與所有這些聯係起來”。至於美國領導人，要去學習如何更加務實，提高領導力素質，以及最重要的，革新政治文化。
在基辛格眼裏，印度是實用主義思維的典範。他記得一位印度前高官在某次活動中解釋說，外交政策的基礎應該是以解決具體問題為導向的非永久性聯盟，而不是將國家固定捆綁在大型多邊結構中。
美國不習慣這種交易式外交理念。一個主題貫穿了基辛格的國際關係史著作《大外交》，即美國堅持將其所有重大的對外幹預行為描繪成“昭昭天命”的表達，按照自我形象去將世界塑造為自由、民主、資本主義的社會。
基辛格認為這種堅持必然導致一個問題，即道德原則通常淩駕於利益之上，哪怕它產生的結果不令人滿意。他承認人權很重要，但不同意將其置於政策的核心位置。區別在於一種是把道德原則強加於他人，一種是說它會對（外交）關係造成影響，但對方怎麽做，決定權還是在自己手上。
他說：“我們試過（把道德原則）強加於蘇丹，看看現在的蘇丹吧。”確實，膝跳反應式地堅持做正確的事，可能為不計後果的政策帶來借口。基辛格認為，盡管人們覺得現實主義會主動使用武力，但那些想用權力改變世界的人，往往是理想主義者，現實主義者隻是本能地加入其中。
隨著中國實力日益增長，印度被認為是一股重要的製衡力量。可是印度自己的問題也越來越嚴重，宗教寬容度下降，司法偏見加深，媒體被噤聲。雖然基辛格沒有直接這麽說，但如何對待印度，將考驗美國外交到底能有多務實。另一個考驗來自日本。如果基辛格的預測變成現實，即日本在五年內成為擁核國家，美日關係將充滿危機。研究19世紀外交的基辛格知道，是均勢外交維持了歐洲的大體和平，他希望美國能汲取英法的經驗，從戰略上思考亞洲的力量平衡。
領導力也很重要。長期以來，基辛格一直相信個人的力量。比如高瞻遠矚的富蘭克林·羅斯福，他讓長期奉行孤立主義的美國為一場在他看來不可避免的戰爭做好準備。比如讓法國相信未來的夏爾·戴高樂，激勵了一代人的約翰·肯尼迪；又比如德國統一的總設計師奧托·馮·俾斯麥，他的統治靈活而克製——可惜在他被逐出政壇後，德國陷入了戰爭狂熱。
基辛格承認，在新聞和社交媒體不眠不休的今天，很難再按他的風格開展外交。他說：“今天沒有哪個總統會給特使像我當年那麽大的權力。”但他認為，我們不應該為前方是否有出路而苦惱。“我敬重的那些領導人，從來不問這樣做難不難。他們問的是‘有沒有必要？’”
他回憶起尼克鬆時期的助理溫斯頓·洛德。“那時我們出兵幹預柬埔寨，他想辭職。我跟他說，‘你可以走，去舉個標語在這兒遊行。你也可以留下來幫我們解決越南戰爭。’他最後決定留下來……我們需要的是做出這種決定的人，那些生活在這個時代，想為這個時代做點什麽的人，而不是顧影自憐的人。”
領導力反映了一個國家的政治文化。與許多共和黨人一樣，基辛格也擔心美國的教育過於關注美國曆史上的黑暗時刻。他說：“要有戰略眼光，就要對你的國家有信仰。”如今，人們已不再對美國的價值抱有共識。
基辛格還抱怨媒體缺乏分寸和判斷力。當他在任時，新聞媒體對他懷有敵意，但仍可以跟他進行對話。他說：“他們把我逼瘋了，但那是他們的分內工作……並沒有對我不公平。”相比之下，今天的媒體缺乏反思的動力。“我的意思是報道需要平衡適度，並從製度上保證這一點。這應該是媒體的目標。”
洛杉磯時報：還有什麽是民主黨人和共和黨人不爭鬥的？
然而，墮落得最厲害的，是政治本身。基辛格進入華盛頓政界時，兩黨政要經常一起用餐。他跟民主黨總統候選人喬治·麥戈文關係友好。但今天，一黨的候選人跟另一黨的國安顧問交好，已經不太可能。尼克鬆下台後，接替他的福特總統是那種不會對政敵玩陰招的人。但今天，任何手段都被認為是可以接受的。
基辛格說：“我認為特朗普和現在的拜登把（敵意）推到了最高點。”他擔心一旦出現類似水門事件的情況，會導致大規模的暴力，而美國又缺少優秀的領導人。他感歎道：“我看不出拜登有鼓舞人心的力量……希望共和黨能推出更好的人選。這不是偉大的曆史時刻，”他說。“這不是曆史上的偉大時刻，但（不迎難而上）另一條路就是（美國）徹底退位。”
基辛格認為，美國迫切需要長期的戰略思考。“這是我們必須解決的重大挑戰。如果我們不這樣做，就真的會應驗失敗的預言。”
5月20日，G7廣島峰會場邊會，拜登被記者問及美債問題，對澳大利亞記者發怒：“閉嘴好嗎？”
既然一方麵時間緊迫，另一方麵美國缺乏領導力，那麽中美和平相處的前景如何？
“我們都得承認，我們身處一個新世界，”基辛格說，“因為無論我們怎麽做，都可能出錯。沒有現成的道路可循。”但即便如此，他表示仍然心懷希望。“看我這一生，那麽多困難都過來了，有理由（對未來）保持樂觀。困難是挑戰，別老把它看作障礙。”
他強調，人類已經取得了長足的進步。雖然這種進步往往發生在可怕的衝突之後——例如三十年戰爭、拿破侖戰爭和第二次世界大戰，但中美競爭可能有所不同。曆史表明，當兩個這種類型的大國相遇時，一般都以爆發軍事衝突告終。“但現在的情況並不一般，”基辛格說，“因為相互保證毀滅和人工智能的存在。”
“我認為建立一個以規則為基礎，且歐洲、中國和印度都能夠參與的世界秩序是可能的。這已經涵蓋了相當大一部分人類……所以從實際的角度出發，它可以取得好的結果——至少可以不導致災難性後果。”
這是當今超級大國領導人的職責。基辛格解釋道：“康德說過，實現和平要麽靠人類相互理解，要麽通過災難吸取教訓。他認為和平可以靠理性，但沒法保證這一點。這或多或少也是我的想法。”
因此，世界領導人們肩負著沉重的責任。他們需要現實主義來麵對前方的危險；需要遠見去認識到，解決方案在於各國力量達到平衡；需要克製以避免最大限度地使用進攻力量。基辛格說：“這是前所未有的挑戰和巨大的機遇。”
人類未來的命運取決於能否做到這幾點。在基辛格百歲壽辰到來的前幾周，當我們對談進行了四個多鍾頭時，他招牌式地眨了眨眼補充道：“無論做不做得到，我都看不到了。”
Henry Kissinger explains how to avoid world war three
America and China must learn to live together. They have less than ten years
In beijing they have concluded that America will do anything to keep China down. In Washington they are adamant that China is scheming to supplant the United States as the world’s leading power. For a sobering analysis of this growing antagonism—and a plan to prevent it causing a superpower war—visit the 33rd floor of an Art Deco building in midtown Manhattan, the office of Henry Kissinger.
On May 27th Mr Kissinger will turn 100. Nobody alive has more experience of international affairs, first as a scholar of 19th-century diplomacy, later as America’s national security adviser and secretary of state, and for the past 46 years as a consultant and emissary to monarchs, presidents and prime ministers. Mr Kissinger is worried. “Both sides have convinced themselves that the other represents a strategic danger,” he says. “We are on the path to great-power confrontation.”
At the end of April The Economist spoke to Mr Kissinger for over eight hours about how to prevent the contest between China and America from descending into war. These days he is stooped and walks with difficulty, but his mind is needle-sharp. As he contemplates his next two books, on artificial intelligence (ai) and the nature of alliances, he remains more interested in looking forward than raking over the past.
Mr Kissinger is alarmed by China’s and America’s intensifying competition for technological and economic pre-eminence. Even as Russia tumbles into China’s orbit and war overshadows Europe’s eastern flank, he fears that ai is about to supercharge the Sino-American rivalry. Around the world, the balance of power and the technological basis of warfare are shifting so fast and in so many ways that countries lack any settled principle on which they can establish order. If they cannot find one, they may resort to force. “We’re in the classic pre-world war one situation,” he says, “where neither side has much margin of political concession and in which any disturbance of the equilibrium can lead to catastrophic consequences.”
Study war some more
Mr Kissinger is reviled by many as a warmonger for his part in the Vietnam war, but he considers the avoidance of conflict between great powers as the focus of his life’s work. After witnessing the carnage caused by Nazi Germany and suffering the murder of 13 close relatives in the Holocaust, he became convinced that the only way to prevent ruinous conflict is hard-headed diplomacy, ideally fortified by shared values. “This is the problem that has to be solved,” he says. “And I believe I’ve spent my life trying to deal with it.” In his view, the fate of humanity depends on whether America and China can get along. He believes the rapid progress of ai, in particular, leaves them only five-to-ten years to find a way.
Mr Kissinger has some opening advice to aspiring leaders: “Identify where you are. Pitilessly.” In that spirit, the starting-point for avoiding war is to analyse China’s growing restlessness. Despite a reputation for being conciliatory towards the government in Beijing, he acknowledges that many Chinese thinkers believe America is on a downward slope and that, “therefore, as a result of an historic evolution, they will eventually supplant us.”
However, Mr Kissinger also warns against misinterpreting China’s ambitions. In Washington, “They say China wants world domination…The answer is that they [in China] want to be powerful,” he says. “They’re not heading for world domination in a Hitlerian sense,” he says. “That is not how they think or have ever thought of world order.”
In Nazi Germany war was inevitable because Adolf Hitler needed it, Mr Kissinger says, but China is different. He has met many Chinese leaders, starting with Mao Zedong. He did not doubt their ideological commitment, but this has always been welded onto a keen sense of their country’s interests and capabilities.
Mr Kissinger sees the Chinese system as more Confucian than Marxist. That teaches Chinese leaders to attain the maximum strength of which their country is capable and to seek to be respected for their accomplishments. Chinese leaders want to be recognised as the international system’s final judges of their own interests. “If they achieved superiority that can genuinely be used, would they drive it to the point of imposing Chinese culture?” he asks. “I don’t know. My instinct is No…[But] I believe it is in our capacity to prevent that situation from arising by a combination of diplomacy and force.”
One natural American response to the challenge of China’s ambition is to probe it, as a way to identify how to sustain the equilibrium between the two powers. Another is to establish a permanent dialogue between China and America. China “is trying to play a global role. We have to assess at each point if the conceptions of a strategic role are compatible.” If they are not, then the question of force will arise. “Is it possible for China and the United States to coexist without the threat of all-out war with each other? I thought and still think that it [is].” But he acknowledges success is not guaranteed. “It may fail,” he says. “And therefore, we have to be militarily strong enough to sustain the failure.”
The urgent test is how China and America behave over Taiwan. Mr Kissinger recalls how, on Richard Nixon’s first visit to China in 1972, only Mao had the authority to negotiate over the island. “Whenever Nixon raised a concrete subject, Mao said, ‘I’m a philosopher. I don’t deal with these subjects. Let Zhou [Enlai] and Kissinger discuss this.’…But when it came to Taiwan, he was very explicit. He said, ‘They are a bunch of counter-revolutionaries. We don’t need them now. We can wait 100 years. Someday we will ask for them. But it’s a long distance away.’”
Mr Kissinger believes that the understanding forged between Nixon and Mao was overturned after only 50 of those 100 years by Donald Trump. He wanted to inflate his tough image by wringing concessions out of China over trade. In policy the Biden administration has followed Mr Trump’s lead, but with liberal rhetoric.
Mr Kissinger would not have chosen this path with respect to Taiwan, because a Ukrainian-style war there would destroy the island and devastate the world economy. War could also set back China domestically, and its leaders’ greatest fear remains upheaval at home.
“It is not a simple matter for the United States to abandon Taiwan without undermining its position elsewhere”
The fear of war creates grounds for hope. The trouble is that neither side has much room to make concessions. Every Chinese leader has asserted his country’s connection to Taiwan. At the same time, however, “the way things have evolved now, it is not a simple matter for the United States to abandon Taiwan without undermining its position elsewhere.”
Mr Kissinger’s way out of this impasse draws on his experience in office. He would start by lowering the temperature, and then gradually build confidence and a working relationship. Rather than listing all their grievances, the American president would say to his Chinese counterpart, “Mr President, the two greatest dangers to peace right now are us two. In the sense that we have the capacity to destroy humanity.” China and America, without formally announcing anything, would aim to practise restraint.
Never a fan of policymaking bureaucracies, Mr Kissinger would like to see a small group of advisers, with easy access to each other, working together tacitly. Neither side would fundamentally change its position on Taiwan, but America would take care over how it deploys its forces and try not to feed the suspicion that it supports the island’s independence.
Mr Kissinger’s second piece of advice to aspiring leaders is: “Define objectives that can enlist people. Find means, describable means, of achieving these objectives.” Taiwan would be just the first of several areas where the superpowers could find common ground and so foster global stability.
In a recent speech Janet Yellen, America’s treasury secretary, suggested that these should include climate change and the economy. Mr Kissinger is sceptical about both. Although he is “all for” action on the climate, he doubts it can do much to create confidence or help establish a balance between the two superpowers. On the economy, the danger is that the trade agenda is hijacked by hawks who are unwilling to give China any room to develop at all.
That all-or-nothing attitude is a threat to the broader search for detente. If America wants to find a way to live with China, it should not be aiming for regime change. Mr Kissinger draws on a theme present in his thought from the very beginning. “In any diplomacy of stability, there has to be some element of the 19th-century world,” he says. “And the 19th-century world was based on the proposition that the existence of the states contesting it was not at issue.”
Some Americans believe that a defeated China would become democratic and peaceful. Yet, however much Mr Kissinger would prefer China to be a democracy, he sees no precedent for that outcome. More likely, a collapse of the communist regime would lead to a civil war that hardened into ideological conflict and only added to global instability. “It’s not in our interest to drive China to dissolution,” he says.
Rather than digging in, America will have to acknowledge China has interests. A good example is Ukraine.
China’s president, Xi Jinping, only recently contacted Volodymyr Zelensky, his Ukrainian counterpart, for the first time since Russia invaded Ukraine in February last year. Many observers have dismissed Mr Xi’s call as an empty gesture designed to placate Europeans, who complain that China is too close to Russia. By contrast, Mr Kissinger sees it as a declaration of serious intent that will complicate the diplomacy surrounding the war, but which may also create precisely the sort of opportunity to build the superpowers’ mutual trust.
Mr Kissinger begins his analysis by condemning Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. “It was certainly a catastrophic mistake of judgment by Putin at the end,” he says. But the West is not without blame. “I thought that the decision to…leave open the membership of Ukraine in nato was very wrong.” That was destabilising, because dangling the promise of nato protection without a plan to bring it about left Ukraine poorly defended even as it was guaranteed to enrage not only Mr Putin, but also many of his compatriots.
The task now is to bring the war to an end, without setting the stage for the next round of conflict. Mr Kissinger says that he wants Russia to give up as much as possible of the territory that it conquered in 2014, but the reality is that in any ceasefire Russia is likely to keep Sevastopol (the biggest city in Crimea and Russia’s main naval base on the Black Sea), at the very least. Such a settlement, in which Russia loses some gains but retains others, could leave both a dissatisfied Russia and a dissatisfied Ukraine.
In his view, that is a recipe for future confrontation. “What the Europeans are now saying is, in my view, madly dangerous,” he says. “Because the Europeans are saying: ‘We don’t want them in nato, because they’re too risky. And therefore, we’ll arm the hell out of them and give them the most advanced weapons.’” His conclusion is stark: “We have now armed Ukraine to a point where it will be the best-armed country and with the least strategically experienced leadership in Europe.”
To establish a lasting peace in Europe requires the West to take two leaps of imagination. The first is for Ukraine to join nato, as a means of restraining it, as well as protecting it. The second is for Europe to engineer a rapprochement with Russia, as a way to create a stable eastern border.
Plenty of Western countries would understandably balk at one or other of those aims. With China involved, as an ally of Russia’s and an opponent of nato, the task will become even harder. China has an overriding interest to see Russia emerge intact from the war in Ukraine. Not only does Mr Xi have a “no-limits” partnership with Mr Putin to honour, but a collapse in Moscow would trouble China by creating a power vacuum in Central Asia that risks being filled by a “Syrian-type civil war”.
Following Mr Xi’s call to Mr Zelensky, Mr Kissinger believes that China may be positioning itself to mediate between Russia and Ukraine. As one of the architects of the policy that pitted America and China against the Soviet Union, he doubts that China and Russia can work together well. True, they share a suspicion of the United States, but he also believes that they have an instinctive distrust of one another. “I have never met a Russian leader who said anything good about China,” he says. “And I’ve never met a Chinese leader who said anything good about Russia.” They are not natural allies.
The Chinese have entered diplomacy over Ukraine as an expression of their national interest, Mr Kissinger says. Although they refuse to countenance the destruction of Russia, they do recognise that Ukraine should remain an independent country and they have cautioned against the use of nuclear weapons. They may even accept Ukraine’s desire to join nato. “China does this, in part, because they do not want to clash with the United States,” he says. “They are creating their own world order, in so far as they can.”
The second area where China and America need to talk is ai. “We are at the very beginning of a capability where machines could impose global pestilence or other pandemics,” he says, “not just nuclear but any field of human destruction.”
He acknowledges that even experts in ai do not know what its powers will be (going by the evidence of our discussions, transcribing a thick, gravelly German accent is still beyond its capabilities). But Mr Kissinger believes that ai will become a key factor in security within five years. He compares its disruptive potential to the invention of printing, which spread ideas that played a part in causing the devastating wars of the 16th and 17th centuries.
“There are no limitations. Every adversary is 100% vulnerable…[We live] in a world of unprecedented destructiveness”
“[We live] in a world of unprecedented destructiveness,” Mr Kissinger warns. Despite the doctrine that a human should be in the loop, automatic and unstoppable weapons may be created. “If you look at military history, you can say, it has never been possible to destroy all your opponents, because of limitations of geography and of accuracy. [Now] there are no limitations. Every adversary is 100% vulnerable.”
ai cannot be abolished. China and America will therefore need to harness its power militarily to a degree, as a deterrent. But they can also limit the threat it poses, in the way that arms-control talks limited the threat of nuclear weapons. “I think we have to begin exchanges on the impact of technology on each other,” he says. “We have to take baby steps towards arms control, in which each side presents the other with controllable material about capabilities.” Indeed, he believes that the negotiations themselves could help build mutual trust and the confidence that enables the superpowers to practise restraint. The secret is leaders strong and wise enough to understand that ai must not be pushed to its limits. “And if you then rely entirely on what you can achieve through power, you’re likely to destroy the world.”
Mr Kissinger’s third piece of advice for aspiring leaders is to “link all of these to your domestic objectives, whatever they are.” For America, that involves learning how to be more pragmatic, focusing on the qualities of leadership and, most of all, renewing the country’s political culture.
Mr Kissinger’s model for pragmatic thinking is India. He recalls a function at which a former senior Indian administrator explained that foreign policy should be based on non-permanent alliances geared to the issues, rather than tying up a country in big multilateral structures.
Such a transactional approach will not come naturally to America. The theme running through Mr Kissinger’s epic history of international relations, “Diplomacy”, is that the United States insists on depicting all its main foreign interventions as expressions of its manifest destiny to remake the world in its own image as a free, democratic, capitalist society.
The problem for Mr Kissinger is the corollary, which is that moral principles too often override interests—even when they will not produce desirable change. He acknowledges that human rights matter, but disagrees with putting them at the heart of your policy. The difference is between imposing them, or saying that it will affect relations, but the decision is theirs.
“We tried [imposing them] in Sudan,” he notes. “Look at Sudan now.” Indeed, the knee-jerk insistence on doing the right thing can become an excuse for failing to think through the consequences of policy, he says. The people who want to use power to change the world, Mr Kissinger argues, are often idealists, even though realists are more typically seen as willing to use force.
India is an essential counterweight to China’s growing power. Yet it also has a worsening record of religious intolerance, judicial bias and a muzzled press. One implication—though Mr Kissinger did not directly comment—is that India will therefore be a test of whether America can be pragmatic. Japan will be another. Relations will be fraught if, as Mr Kissinger predicts, Japan takes moves to secure nuclear weapons within five years. With one eye on the diplomatic manoeuvres that more or less kept the peace in the 19th century, he looks to Britain and France to help the United States think strategically about the balance of power in Asia.
Big-shoe-fillers wanted
Leadership will matter, too. Mr Kissinger has long been a believer in the power of individuals. Franklin D. Roosevelt was far-sighted enough to prepare an isolationist America for what he saw as an inevitable war against the Axis powers. Charles de Gaulle gave France a belief in the future. John F. Kennedy inspired a generation. Otto von Bismarck engineered German unification, and governed with dexterity and restraint—only for his country to succumb to war-fever after he was ousted.
Mr Kissinger acknowledges that 24-hour news and social media make his style of diplomacy harder. “I don’t think a president today could send an envoy with the powers that I had,” he says. But he argues that to agonise about whether a way ahead is even possible would be a mistake. “If you look at the leaders whom I’ve respected, they didn’t ask that question. They asked, ‘Is it necessary?’”
He recalls the example of Winston Lord, a member of his staff in the Nixon administration. “When we intervened in Cambodia, he wanted to quit. And I told him, ‘You can quit and march around this place carrying a placard. Or you can help us solve the Vietnam war.’ And he decided to stay… What we need [is] people who make that decision—that they’re living in this time, and they want to do something about it, other than feel sorry for themselves.”
Leadership reflects a country’s political culture. Mr Kissinger, like many Republicans, worries that American education dwells on America’s darkest moments. “In order to get a strategic view you need faith in your country,” he says. The shared perception of America’s worth has been lost.
He also complains that the media lack a sense of proportion and judgment. When he was in office the press were hostile, but he still had a dialogue with them. “They drove me nuts,” he says. “But that was part of the game…they weren’t unfair.” Today, in contrast, he says that the media have no incentive to be reflective. “My theme is the need for balance and moderation. Institutionalise that. That’s the aim.”
Worst of all, though, is politics itself. When Mr Kissinger came to Washington, politicians from the two parties would routinely dine together. He was on friendly terms with George McGovern, a Democratic presidential candidate. For a national security adviser from the other side that would be unlikely today, he believes. Gerald Ford, who took over after Nixon resigned, was the sort of person whose opponents could rely on him to act decently. Today, any means are considered acceptable.
“I think Trump and now Biden have driven [animosity] over the top,” Mr Kissinger says. He fears that a situation like Watergate could lead to violence and that America lacks leadership. “I don’t think Biden can supply the inspiration and…I’m hoping that Republicans can come up with somebody better,” he says. “It’s not a great moment in history,” he laments, “but the alternative is total abdication.”
America desperately needs long-term strategic thinking, he believes. “That’s our big challenge which we must solve. If we don’t, the predictions of failure will be proved true.”
If time is short and leadership lacking, where does that leave the prospects for China and the United States finding a way to live together in peace?
“We all have to admit we’re in a new world,” Mr Kissinger says, “for whatever we do can go wrong. And there is no guaranteed course.” Even so he professes to feel hope. “Look, my life has been difficult, but it gives ground for optimism. And difficulty—it’s also a challenge. It shouldn’t always be an obstacle.”
He stresses that humanity has taken enormous strides. True, that progress has often occurred in the aftermath of terrible conflict—after the Thirty Years War, the Napoleonic wars and the second world war, for example, but the rivalry between China and America could be different. History suggests that, when two powers of this type encounter each other, the normal outcome is military conflict. “But this is not a normal circumstance,” Mr Kissinger argues, “because of mutually assured destruction and artificial intelligence.”
“I think it’s possible that you can create a world order on the basis of rules that Europe, China and India could join, and that’s already a good slice of humanity. So if you look at the practicality of it, it can end well—or at least it can end without catastrophe and we can make progress.”
That is the task for the leaders of today’s superpowers. “Immanuel Kant said peace would either occur through human understanding or some disaster,” Mr Kissinger explains. “He thought that it would occur through reason, but he could not guarantee it. That is more or less what I think.”
World leaders therefore bear a heavy responsibility. They require the realism to face up to the dangers ahead, the vision to see that a solution lies in achieving a balance between their countries’ forces, and the restraint to refrain from using their offensive powers to the maximum. “It is an unprecedented challenge and great opportunity,” Mr Kissinger says.
The future of humanity depends on getting it right. Well into the fourth hour of the day’s conversation, and just weeks before his birthday celebrations, Mr Kissinger adds with a characteristic twinkle, “I won’t be around to see it either way.” ■
This article appeared in the Briefing section of the print edition under the headline "How to prevent a third world war"
