當前經濟政策分析
這兩天看到又有人漫天造謠，說什麽4萬億又要來了，我下麵來分析現實的局勢和發布這樣的言論（說4萬億又來了）的背後動機。
我國現在的經濟情況不容樂觀，整體來說美國的經濟情況相對還可以，中國其次，歐元區日本印度巴西等等經濟體已經相當差，俄羅斯相對來說比較獨立情況較好（但是油價快速下跌的話情況就會發生逆轉，這個就是美國一定要打壓油價的原因）。
從前麵4個月的我國的經濟數據來看，麵臨幾個問題，一個就是從外匯占款來看快速減少，也就是外資撤離，針對這個問題極左勢力用了查三非的手段來惡化這個問題；另外一個是經濟增長乏力，企業稅負大，針對這個問題，溫家寶和李克強最近提出來了給企業減稅和把下半年的投資提前到6月份進行，實質並沒有增加投資，隻是計劃提前，針對這個問題極左勢力造謠說又要來4萬億了，目的是綁住現政府的手腳，讓經濟在十八大之前硬著陸；還有就是經濟結構性問題，就是外向型經濟衰退但是自發性的高科技行業還沒有成形，這個問題就需要中美交割完成高科技技術的轉移，針對這個問題極左勢力極力阻撓中美的交割。等等還有其他一些因素，今天就不過多詳細講。
我們再來看，中國經濟整體的軟著陸和持續性發展，是一個過程，在變成新的模式的過程中會有一個青黃不接的過程，那麽這個過程如何渡過是一個嚴峻的問題。
那麽我們再來看，我國前麵10年是貨幣拉動型的經濟體，是一個外貿型的經濟體，問題已經在那邊了，這個問題是極右造成的，後麵他們必然也會承擔責任，但是現在需要這股力量來完成經濟的軟著陸。我國前麵10年，經濟問題是極右在搞鬼，社會問題是極左在搞鬼，大家看一下武警的調動權收歸軍委後，當政法委無法調動武警的情況下，大家最近幾個月看到頻繁發生強拆事件了嗎？是否強拆的事情發生的頻度快速下降。這個就是我最近一直要說極左的原因。
那麽我們再來看在這個青黃不接的過程中，如何處理投資、M2貨幣手段、減稅等等因素。我們要製定一個M2的長期下降規劃，同時要製定一個投資拉動經濟模式慢慢退出的規劃，但是不能馬上立馬下來，假如烈度過大會造成經濟崩盤。因此投資還是要的，M2的一定幅度的增長還是要的，關鍵是一個下降趨勢，比如製定5年內M2的年增長速度下降到9%－10%左右，那麽2012年比較合適的位置就是12%－14%之間看經濟情況來調節。同時投資也是，原來假如投資占GDP的比重在45%，那麽我們就要製定一個5年內把投資比重降到25%左右，那麽2012年比較合適的是把這個比重降到35%－40%之間，而不是一下子降的很低。另外我國未進入發達國家之前（也就是快速工業化的過程中），投資占比不宜過低。
根據這個局麵，我們再來看現在溫家寶和李克強出來的政策和現在經濟下滑的局麵的對應關係，我可以說是正確的。一個是並沒有貨幣大量放水，一個是現在確實是保增長最重要（因為通脹問題在美元指數快速拉升的過程中已經被消化）。
但是我又要說了，發改委的那位說現在要降息，這個思路是錯誤的，降息是一個成本型工具，並且是一個趨勢性工具，現在比較適合的是用降準的這個數量型工具來對衝外匯占款的減少。關於短期內不能降息的分析我前麵就專門寫過一篇文章的。
總結：所以我的建議是：現在可以通過降準(降低存款準備金率)的模式緩解外匯占款減少帶來的資金層麵的問題，但是不能動利率，另外可以把下半年的一些投資項目提前，但是不能大量增加投資，另外這些投資可以傾向於民生工程和農業工程，另外要打破一些行業的壟斷，讓民營資本進來，給民營資本更多的空間解決就業問題，還有就是要給企業減稅，同時減稅造成的財政收入減少用減少三公經費等等模式來填補這個窟窿，另外對於房地產要控製，要讓房地產價格緩慢下跌。要支撐股市，不能讓股市暴跌。
現在的國際形勢是：現在誰先倒下，那麽別人就是踩在你的屍體上麵前行，你手上的籌碼瞬間消失。現在全世界都在扛著，包括印度、巴西、歐盟，就俄羅斯逍遙一點（但是油價跌到80美元以下他就會感受到壓力了）。
美國能印票子，不是有奴才買單麽？
美國的物價是很低的，天朝的物價？
But if it’s simple, it’s not easy: the problem is persuading Germany, the zone’s dominant economic power, to accept it.
And if Germans have learned one lesson from their tumultuous economic path over the past century, it’s that this solution – inflation in Germany – is a deadly danger to be avoided at all costs.
Yet any lasting solution to the eurozone’s torment will almost have to include some extra German inflation.
That’s the least painful way to begin equalizing its very high competitiveness with lower levels in countries like Spain, Italy and even France.
That psychological sticking point is why, despite temporary upticks in European markets and the euro’s value, this crisis is likely to drag on and worsen before it is resolved.
Peter Berezin, a former International Monetary Fund economist, lays out his vision for the resolution of this continent-wide financial catastrophe in the latest issue of Montreal’s Bank Credit Analyst investment publication, which he edits,
The European Central Bank eventually “will end the turmoil through one simple action,” he says.
That would be by setting a limit on borrowing costs for eurozone governments – maybe six per cent for a 10-year-bond – and defending it by pledging to buy enough government bonds to keep their interest rate from rising above this level.
This would immediately improve the financial situation of countries like Spain, where borrowing costs have already exceeded this level and could well be headed higher.
Of course, it would also spark primal German fears about currency debasement through the monetizing of government debt. Monetizing is just another way to say that the eurozone would print as many euros as needed in order to buy up its own members’ bonds, creating the spectre of serious inflation.
Germany’s aversion to inflation isn’t arbitrary.
The country’s hyperinflation of the 1920s destroyed savings, caused terrible suffering and is widely believed to have contributed to the rise of the Nazi party.
But even virtue can be carried too far. Countries that have monetized some of their own debt, like the U.S. and the U.K., are in far better financial shape than most of the eurozone’s members today.
What’s more, their borrowing costs remain low, suggesting that investors aren’t worried about being inflated into big losses.
That’s because their economies are still sluggish, with far too little consumer demand and far too much surplus labour to support harmful levels of inflation.
Monetization can’t be carried too far or continued forever, but when a country is in this condition, the real danger is deflation and depression, not inflation.
This is very clear in the eurozone. The whole region is slipping back into recession under the burden of a harsh German-inspired austerity regime that has forced countries to slash spending even as their economies desperately needed support.
The next step, observers like Berezin believe, will be the default of Greece under its crushing debt load, either forcing it out of the eurozone or into a shadow area where it subsists on a combination of euros and locally issued currency.
About this time, Berezin guesses, Germany’s leaders will finally realize that it’s better to bend their principles than to undergo a complete eurozone collapse.
In a collapse, after all, German banks might never be repaid the euro loans they had made in Spain and Italy. Instead, they’d be lucky to get devalued pesetas and liras. At the same time, euro deposits held by German banks would now be denominated in expensive deutschmarks.
“A recipe for bank failure, if ever there was one,” Berezin says.
That’s not all. Germany’s export-driven economy depends heavily on selling to eurozone partners. But these exports would be devastated if they were produced in an expensive currency for sale to countries with cheap currencies. Exporters could be bankrupted.
So under pressure from business leaders, Germany’s political class, which is already having second thoughts about austerity, would swallow hard and approve of easy money, perhaps late this year. This would bring precious relief to Europe’s weaker economies, but at least a few years of higher inflation in Germany, whose vigorous economy would be overstimulated.
But the result over the coming decade could be a resurgent European economy, with big gains for investors who now hold the region’s securities. At least that’s the likely outcome. Berezin admits that people don’t always do what’s in their best interest, so there’s maybe a 25-per-cent chance that the euro really does crumble.
jbryan@montrealgazette.com
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