東印度公司
譯者注：1、東印度公司向中國販賣鴉片，導致了中英第一次鴉片戰爭爆發。
2、這篇原文暗示中國在搞新殖民主義，請讀者鑒別。
3、本譯者翻譯這篇文章是為了學習英語。
The East India Company
東印度公司
The Company that ruled the waves
統治大洋的公司
As state-backed firms once again become forces in global business, we ask what they can learn from the greatest of them all
現在，國有控股公司成為了全球貿易的主力軍，但我們不禁要問，我們能從東印度公司這家偉大的公司學到什麽。
A POPULAR parlour game among historians is debating when the modern world began. Was it when Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing press, in 1440? Or when Christopher Columbus discovered America, in 1492? Or when Martin Luther published his 95 theses, in 1517? All popular choices. But there is a strong case to be made for a less conventional answer: the modern world began on a freezing New Year’s Eve, in 1600, when Elizabeth I granted a company of 218 merchants a monopoly of trade to the east of the Cape of Good Hope.
曆史學家對世界現代史何時開始一直爭論不休。世界現代史是要從1440年約翰·顧登堡發明印刷機開始算起？是從1492年克裏斯多弗·哥倫布發現美洲算起？還是從1517年馬丁·路德發表了95篇論文算起？這些重要事件發生的年份都能作為世界現代史開始的年份。1600年，英國伊麗莎白女王授予由218名商人合作成立的東印度公司獨享東好望角地區貿易權；現在，人們將這個年份作為世界現代史的開端，沒有多少人提出異議。
The East India Company foreshadowed the modern world in all sorts of striking ways. It was one of the first companies to offer limited liability to its shareholders. It laid the foundations of the British empire. It spawned Company Man. And—particularly relevant at the moment—it was the first state-backed company to make its mark on the world.
東印度公司的運作製度驚人地預示了現代世界運行的各種特征，這真讓人吃驚。東印度公司是世界曆史上第一家對股東承擔有限責任的公司。眾所周知，正是有限責任公司製度奠定了大英帝國的經濟基礎，也導致了公司人的出現。此外，東印度公司是世界上第一家獲得政府扶持並因此揚名於世界的公司，這與現在的國有控股公司的情況極為相似。
Twenty years ago, as the state abandoned the commanding heights of the economy in the name of privatisation and deregulation, it looked as if these public-private hybrids were doomed. Today they are flourishing in the emerging world’s dynamic economies and striding out onto the global stage.
在東印度公司成立前二十年，英國政府就不再依靠私有化和撤銷管製來促進經濟發展；在那時，人們覺得公私混合的經濟組織模式似乎已經走到了盡頭。現在，新興國家的公私混合的經濟組織成為了世界上最具活力的經濟組織，他們正大踏步地走向全球市場。
State-controlled companies account for 80% of the market capitalisation of the Chinese stockmarket, more than 60% of Russia’s, and 35% of Brazil’s. They make up 19 of the world’s 100 biggest multinational companies and 28 of the top 100 among emerging markets. World-class state companies can be found in almost every industry. China Mobile serves 600m customers. Saudi Arabia’s SABIC is one of the world’s most profitable chemical companies. Emirates airlines is growing at 20% a year. Thirteen of the world’s biggest oil companies are state-controlled. So is the world’s biggest natural-gas company, Gazprom.
在中國、俄羅斯和巴西，國有控股企業的市值分別占到其所在國股市的80%、60%多和35%。在世界的前一百強跨國公司中，來自這三個新型國家的國有控股公司就占了19個席位，在三個新興國家的前一百強公司中，有二十八家公司屬於國有控股企業。幾乎在所有行業都有自己的世界級國有控股企業：中國移動公司擁有六億用戶，沙特阿拉伯的沙特基礎工業公司是世界上最賺錢的化工公司，阿聯酋航空公司的業務量以每年百分之二十的速度遞增，世界最大規模的前十三家石油公司都是國有控股企業，世界規模最大的天然氣公司——俄羅斯天然氣工業股份公司，也國有控股企業。
State-owned companies will continue to thrive. The emerging markets that they prosper in are expected to grow at 5.5% a year compared with the rich world’s 1.6%, and the model is increasingly popular. The Chinese and Russian governments are leading a fashion for using the state’s power to produce national champions in a growing range of “strategic” industries.
人們有理由相信，國有企業將會繼續煥發勃勃生機。依靠國有控股企業的發展，新興市場國家經濟增長率是一年百分之五點五，而發達國家的經濟增長率是一年百分之一點八，國有控股企業這種企業組織形式越來越受到人們的歡迎。中國和俄羅斯都采取了利用政府權力來扶持戰略工業內的國家級大型國有控股企業發展，而且所謂的戰略工業的數量也在不斷上升；中國和俄羅斯在這方麵開創了先河。
The parallels between the East India Company and today’s state-owned firms are not exact, to be sure. The East India Company controlled a standing army of some 200,000 men, more than most European states. None of today’s state-owned companies has yet gone this far, though the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has employed former People’s Liberation Army troops to protect oil wells in Sudan. The British government did not own shares in the Company (though prominent courtiers and politicians certainly did). Today’s state-capitalist governments hold huge blocks of shares in their favourite companies.
應當指出，東印度公司和現在國有企業在很些方麵不盡相同。東印度公司控製了一支二十萬人的軍隊，比當時大部分歐洲國家的軍隊人數還多。雖然中國海洋石油總公司在蘇丹聘請了中國人民解放軍的退役軍人來負責保衛油井的工作，但現在沒有幾家國有控股企業能夠擁有軍隊了。英國政府沒有在東印度公司持有股份，（雖然不少英國大臣和政治家卻是東印度公司的股東），而現在的國家資本主義政府卻持有他們所扶持企業的股份。
Otherwise the similarities are striking. Both the Company and its modern descendants serve two masters, keeping one eye on their share price and the other on their political patrons. Many of today’s state-owned companies are monopolies or quasi-monopolies: Brazil’s Petrobras, China Mobile, China State Construction Engineering Corporation and Mexico’s Federal Electricity Commission, to name but a few of the mongrel giants that bestride the business world these days. Many are enthusiastic globalisers, venturing abroad partly as moneymaking organisations and partly as quasi-official agents of their home governments. Many are keen not only on getting their government to provide them with soft loans and diplomatic muscle but also on building infrastructure—roads, hospitals and schools—in return for guaranteed access to raw materials. Although the East India Company flourished a very long time ago, in a very different world, its growth, longevity and demise have lessons for those who run today’s state companies and debate their future, lessons about the benefits of linking a company’s interests to a nation’s and the dangers of doing so.
除此之外，現在的國有控股公司很多方麵與東印度公司有著驚人的相似之處。不論是曆史上的東印度公司還是現在的國有控股企業都要注意兩個方麵，他們一方麵要注意他們股份的價格，另一方麵要揣摩擔任政府要職的各個股東的想法。現在很多的國有控股企業是壟斷企業或準壟斷企業；如巴西石油、中國移動、中國建築工程總公司和墨西哥聯邦電力都是壟斷性質的企業，能夠達到世界級企業規模而不屬於政府控股的企業是少之又少。很多國有控股企業現在都熱衷於走全球化經營路線，紛紛到外國進行投資；造成這種現象的一個原因是全球化經營的確讓企業賺到了錢，另一個原因是他們扮演了他們國家政府的非正式代言人的角色。這些國有控股企業不僅熱衷於獲取政府的資金和外交政策的支持，還熱衷於在資本輸入國家建設公路、醫院和學校這樣的基礎設施，他們這樣做就是為了更加容易地獲取工業原料。盡管東印度公司已經湮滅在了曆史的長河裏，現在的世界也與東印度公司所處時期的世界大不相同，但東印度公司的發展曆程、在曆史曾長期生存的事實和他的大規模管理體係都對現在的大型國有控股公司管理人思考他們公司的未來發展有參考價值，並對與這些企業有著緊密聯係的國家政府權衡對外投資的利弊有著借鑒作用。
The gifts of government
政府的賦予的權利
One of the benefits the Company derived from its relations with the state was limited liability. Before the rise of state-backed companies, businesses had imposed unlimited liability on their investors. If things went wrong, creditors could come after them for everything they possessed, down to their cufflinks, and have them imprisoned if they failed to pay. Some firms had already been granted limited liability, and the Company’s officers persuaded Queen Elizabeth that it should be given this handy status too.
東印度公司從英國政府那裏得到的第一個好處就是有限責任製度。在被政府扶持的公司出現之前，生意人對其投資人承擔無限經濟責任；一旦這些生意人經營不善，他們的債主有權利拿走他們的一切，如果這樣他們還不能償還所欠款項，他們將被被關進監獄。在東印度公司成立之前，一些公司已經被賦予了承擔有限責任的權利，東印度公司因此勸說伊麗莎白女王也給予東印度公司享受承擔有限責任的權利。
A second benefit of state backing was monopoly. In the 17th century, round-the-world voyages were rather like space missions today. They involved huge upfront costs and huge risks. Monopoly provided at least a modicum of security. The third benefit was military might. The Company’s Dutch and Portuguese competitors could all call on the power of their respective navies. The English needed to do likewise in order to unlock investors’ purses.
英國政府給予東印度公司的第二個好處就是壟斷經營權。在十七世紀，環球航行的難度和現在的航天任務的相差無幾，環球航行需要耗費大量的金錢和承擔高風險。壟斷經營為當時的環球航行提供了極其有限的經濟保障。第三個好處就是給予了東印度公司組建軍隊的權利；這是因為當時荷蘭和葡萄牙的公司是東印度公司的直接競爭者，他們能得到本國海軍的庇護；為了維護英國投資人的利益，英國政府隻能采取讓公司組建軍隊的措施。
Still, getting into bed with the government was risky for the Company. It meant getting close to courtiers who wanted to extract revenue from it and exposing itself to politicians who wanted to rewrite its charter. The Whig revolutionaries who deposed James II in 1688 briefly promoted a competing outfit that the Company first fought and eventually absorbed. Rival merchants lobbied courtiers to undermine its monopoly. But for the most part it dealt with these political problems brilliantly. Indeed its most valuable skill—its “core competence” in the phrase beloved of management theorists—was less its ability to arrange long-distance voyages to India and beyond than its ability to manage the politicians back home.
雖然如此，東印度公司與英國政府走得太近，讓其自身也處在了危險的境地——那些英國大臣滿腦子想的是如何對東印度公司收稅，而那些政客卻是想著如何改寫東印度公司的章程。1688年爆發的輝格黨革命廢黜了詹姆斯二世國王，讓一些和東印度公司有利益衝突的機構隨之公開與東印度公司作對，但東印度公司最終吞並了這些機構。與東印度公司有商業衝突的商人也跑到各個英國大臣那裏遊說，試圖逐漸撤銷掉東印度公司的壟斷經營權利。在大多數時候，東印度公司能夠成功地應對這樣的政治變動。實際上，東印度公司掌握的最有價值的技巧（也是他的“核心競爭力”）就是公司管理製度理論，正是得益於這種理論，東印度公司駕馭政治人物的能力要強過組織前往印度遠洋航行的能力。
The Company created a powerful East India lobby in Parliament, a caucus of MPs who had either directly or indirectly profited from its business and who constituted, in Edmund Burke’s opinion, one of the most united and formidable forces in British politics. It also made regular gifts to the Court: “All who could help or hurt at Court,” wrote Lord Macaulay, “ministers, mistresses, priests, were kept in good humour by presents of shawls and silks, birds’ nests and attar of roses, bulses of diamonds and bags of guineas.” It also made timely gifts to the Treasury whenever the state faced bankruptcy. In short, it acted as what George Dempster, a stockholder, called a “great money engine of state”.
東印度公司在英國國會組建了一個東印度遊說團隊，該遊說團隊與東印度公司的業務或創建人有著直接或間接的聯係；在艾德蒙·伯克眼裏，這個遊說團隊是英國最有影響力的政治遊說團體。麥考利勳爵如此寫道：“隻要是能在國會幫助或詆損東印度公司的人，不論是閣僚、情婦還是牧師，東印度公司利用披肩、絲綢、鳥巢、玫瑰花油、鑽石甚至裝滿金幣的錢包作為禮物送給他們，為的就是與他們保持良好的關係。”每當英國政府麵臨財政危機時，東印度公司總能及時地向英國財政部提供資助。喬治·丹普斯特是東印度公司的股東之一，他對此用一句話描述道：“東印度公司是英國政府的造幣機器。”
The Company was just as adept at playing politics abroad. It distributed bribes liberally: the merchants offered to provide an English virgin for the Sultan of Achin’s harem, for example, before James I intervened. And where it could not bribe it bullied, using soldiers paid for by Indian taxes to duff up recalcitrant rulers. Yet it recognised that its most powerful bargaining chip, both home and abroad, was its ability to provide temporarily embarrassed rulers with the money they needed to pay their bills. In an era when governments lacked the resources of the modern tax-and-spend state, the state-backed company was a backstop against bankruptcy.
東印度公司在英國之外也是與政客打交道的好手，他們的商業人員擅長行賄；例如，東印度公司的商業人員為蘇丹的各個酋長都進貢了一名英國處女，要不是詹姆斯一世國王對此事進行幹預，這種事情會一直進行下去。如果賄賂手段在國外不起作用，東印度公司就采取武力來解決問題——東印度公司利用印度的稅收養活了一支軍隊，其目的就是為了教訓不聽話的外國統治者。其實，東印度公司也發現對付令人討厭的統治者的有效武器就是金錢，在英國如此，在國外也是如此。在一段時期裏，每當英國政府缺少稅收來源，東印度公司成為了防止英國政府破產的最後的保障。
State-backed monopolies are apt to run to fat and lose their animal spirits. The Company was a model of economy and austerity that modern managers would do well to emulate. For the first 20 years of its life it operated out of the home of its governor, Sir Thomas Smythe. Even when it had become the world’s greatest commercial operation it remained remarkably lean. It ruled millions of people from a tiny headquarters, staffed by 159 in 1785 and 241 in 1813. Its managers reiterated the importance of frugality, economy and simplicity with a metronomic frequency, and imposed periodic bouts of austerity: in 1816, for example, they turned Saturday from a half to a full working day and abolished the staff’s annual turtle feast.
占據壟斷地位的國有控股企業的規模會變得越來越大，而企業的競爭意識卻會逐漸喪失。公司是一種典型的經濟組織形式，現代的公司管理人無一不遵循節儉辦企業這一原則。在東印度公司成立之初的頭二十年，托馬斯·塞密爾先生這位東印度公司的主管人並沒有管理東印度公司的經營活動。在東印度公司成為世界上最大的經濟組織時，其管理組織仍然保持了較小的規模。東印度公司英國總部的人數在1785年是159人，而到1813年也不過是241人，而東印度公司在發展高峰時期的員工人數達到了數百萬人。東印度公司的曆屆經理人都強調節儉的重要性，東印度公司的曆屆領導人都注重經濟活動的節儉和管理程序的簡化，並且東印度公司有周期性的精簡開支活動；例如，在1816年，東印度公司總部就將星期六的半天班轉變成了全天班，而且還撤銷了一年一度的龜肉宴。
The Company’s success in preserving its animal spirits owed more to necessity than to cunning. In a world in which letters could take two years to travel to and fro and in which the minions knew infinitely more about what was going on than did their masters, efforts at micromanagement were largely futile.
東印度公司成功地保持了企業的競爭意識不是因為其領導人的英明，而是出於是公司生存的必要。在當時，向國外發送的一封信件並要得到回信這一過程要耗費兩年的時間，東印度公司在國外的工作人員對國外實際情況的了解比呆在英國總部的高管要好得多，在這種情況下，東印度公司英國總部維持一個小機構的模式，其工作效率反而要好很多。
The Company improvised a version of what Tom Peters, a management guru, has dubbed “tight-loose management”. It forced its employees to post a large bond in case they went off the rails, and bombarded them with detailed instructions about things like the precise stiffness of packaging. But it also leavened control with freedom. Employees were allowed not only to choose how to fulfil their orders, but also to trade on their own account. This ensured that the Company was not one but two organisations: a hierarchy with its centre of gravity in London and a franchise of independent entrepreneurs with innumerable centres of gravity scattered across the east. Many Company men did extremely well out of this “tight-loose” arrangement, turning themselves into nabobs, as the new rich of the era were called, and scattering McMansions across rural England.
東印度公司還創作了一種被管理大師湯姆·彼得成為“張弛有度的管理模式”。一方麵東印度公司讓自己的員工與自己緊密聯係在一起，以防止他們工作出軌，東印度公司教會自己的員工各種業務技能，連如何將貨物捆綁結實這樣的技巧都地教給員工；另一方麵，東印度公司通過向員工下放經營權來提高管控水平，東印度公司的每個員工都有權以自己的方式執行自己的訂單，而且還可以用自己的賬戶支付或收取貨款。這些措施讓東印度公司成為了事實上的兩種組織結構：一個以在英國倫敦總部為中心的公司，另一種是遍布東半球，以各個地區主管為中心的營銷網絡。很多公司人在這種管理體製中過得如魚得水，他們成功地讓自己成為了富翁，在那個被稱為“富裕年代”的時期，東印度公司員工購買的豪宅在英國鄉村隨處可見。
Money and meritocracy
金錢和精英教育
The Company repaid the state not just in taxes and tariffs, but also in ideas. It was one of the 18th and 19th centuries’ great innovators in the art of governing—more innovative by some way than the British government, not to mention its continental rivals, and outgunned only by the former colonies of America. The Company pioneered the art of government by writing and government by record, to paraphrase Burke. Its dispatches to and from India for the 15 years after 1814 fill 12,414 leather-bound volumes. It created Britain’s largest cadre of civil servants, a term it invented.
東印度公司回報給英國政府的不僅僅是上繳的稅金和關稅，還有新的管理理念。在十八世紀和十九世紀，東印度公司堪稱是管理藝術的創新團體，在某些管理方麵，東印度公司的創新比英國政府還要多，歐洲其他國家的管理係統還比不上比英國政府，隻有英國的前北美殖民地在管理創新方麵超過了東印度公司。伯克評價道：東印度公司的對管理製度進行創新，英國政府對這些新製度進行推廣。
State-backed enterprises risk getting stuffed with powerful politicians’ half-witted nephews. The Company not only avoided this but also, in an age when power and money were both largely inherited, it pioneered appointment by merit. It offered positions to all-comers on the basis of exam performance. It recruited some of the country’s leading intellectuals, such as Edward Strachey, Thomas Love Peacock and both James and John Stuart Mill—the latter starting, at the age of 17, in the department that corresponded with the central administration in India, and rising, as his father had, to head it, on the eve of the Company’s extinction.
如果一家企業與政府有著緊密聯係，該企業不少員工將是能力平庸的官二代。而東印度公司盡力避免讓這些官二代進入公司；在東印度公司的規模和效益達到頂峰時，東印度公司首先采取任人唯賢的用人措施——東印度公司對員工職務的安排都是以員工的工作業績為依據；此外，東印度公司還招聘了英國一流的知識分子，這些人包括愛德華·斯雷奇、托馬斯·勒夫·皮科克、詹姆斯·斯圖亞特·米爾和約翰·斯圖亞特·米爾。約翰·斯圖亞特·米爾在十七歲時就接受了相當於當時印度中央政府的東印度公司管理部門，就如同他的父親所作的那樣，約翰·斯圖亞特·米爾成功地開展了管理工作，一直到東印度公司被撤銷。
The Company also established a feeder college—Haileybury—so that it could recruit bright schoolboys and train them to flourish in, and run, India. These high-minded civil servants both prolonged the Company’s life when Victorian opinion was turning ever more strongly against it and also provided a model for the Indian and domestic civil service.
此外，東印度公司還建起了自己的對口大學——凱雷伯利學院，凱雷伯利學院為東印度公司招募並培養聰明的英國高中男孩，這些男孩最後都進入了東印度公司，並成為該公司管理印度的中堅力量。當維多利亞女王對東印度公司的態度發生轉變，進而強烈反感東印度公司這一階段，由這些高素質凱雷伯利學院畢業生組成的公務員設法延長了東印度公司的生存時間並且為後來的印度政府設立一個公務製度的樣板。
The Company liked to think of itself as having the best of both private and public worlds—the excitement and rewards of commercial life, on the one hand, and the dignity and security of an arm of the state on the other. But the best of both worlds can easily turn into the worst.
東印度公司一直認為自己為私人和公眾提供了一個最好的環境——一方麵，東印度公司讓英國的商業繁榮，另一方麵，東印度公司的軍隊保障英國政府的安全和尊嚴。然而，在當時的條件下，最好的環境會在一夜之間轉變為最差的環境。
The perils of imperialisation
國有化的危險
In the end, it was not rapacious politicians who killed the Company, but the greed and power of its managers and shareholders. In 1757 Sir Robert Clive won the battle of Plassey and delivered the government of Bengal to the Company. This produced a guaranteed income from Bengal’s taxpayers, but it also dragged the Company ever deeper into the business of government. The Company continued to flourish as a commercial enterprise in China and the Far East. But its overall character was increasingly determined by its administrative obligations in India. Revenue replaced commerce as the Company’s first concern. Tax rolls replaced business ledgers. Arsenals replaced warehouses. C.N. Parkinson summarised how far it had strayed, by 1800, from its commercial purpose: “How was the East India Company controlled? By the government. What was its object? To collect taxes. How was its object attained? By means of a standing army. What were its employees? Soldiers, mostly; the rest, Civil Servants.”
最後，導致東印度公司走向滅亡的不是貪婪的英國大臣，而是東印度公司經理人和股東的貪婪和權力欲望。羅伯特·克萊芙爵士的領導下，東印度公司打贏了1757年的普拉西戰役，東印度公司由此得到了孟加拉的統治權，自然也獲得了孟加拉稅收征管的權利，但東印度公司隨之將自己進一步卷入對政府事務的管理工作之中。雖然作為一家商業組織，東印度公司在中國和遠東的業務開展得紅紅火火，但東印度公司最主要的角色是印度的統治人——在印度，東印度公司最關注不是商業利潤而是稅收情況。為此，東印度公司用稅收清單代替了帳薄，軍火庫代替了倉庫。1800年，東印度公司已經偏離了自己的商業運作的目的，C.N.帕金斯對此進行了評價：“東印度公司怎樣控製印度？答案是自己組建政府。東印度公司的目標是什麽？答案是收稅。東印度公司如何達到自己的目標？答案是使用軍隊。東印度公司的雇員是些什麽人？答案是絕大部分是軍人，其餘的都是公務員。”
The Company’s growing involvement in politics infuriated its mighty army of critics still further. How could it justify having a monopoly of trade as well as the right to tax the citizens of India? And how could a commercial organisation justify ruling 90m Indians, controlling 70m acres (243,000 square kilometres) of land, issuing its own coins, complete with the Company crest, and supporting an army of 200,000 men, all of which the East India Company did by 1800? Adam Smith denounced the Company as a bloodstained monopoly: “burdensome”, “useless” and responsible for grotesque massacres in Bengal. Anti-Company opinion hardened further in 1770 when a famine wiped out a third of the population of Bengal, reducing local productivity, depressing the Company’s business and eventually forcing it to go cap in hand to the British government to avoid bankruptcy.
東印度公司在印度不斷地掌控政府事務，這讓數量眾多的英國批評人士極其不滿：一個已經享有壟斷經營權當公司怎麽還有權在印度收稅？一個商業組織怎麽可以統治人口九千萬，麵積七千萬英畝（二十四萬三千平方公裏）的印度？一個商業組織怎麽可以在印度發行自己的貨幣？一個商業組織怎麽可以擁有一支人數最多時達到二十萬的軍隊？以及東印度公司在1880年所作的其他種種事情。亞當·史密斯譴責東印度公司是一個滿身血汙的壟斷企業：東印度公司讓人討厭，對英國毫無好處，並且對孟加拉大屠殺負有直接責任。在1770年，孟加拉爆發饑荒，這場饑荒餓死了孟加拉的三分之一的人口，降低了孟加拉的生產能力，東印度公司也因此遭受嚴重虧損，不得不向英國政府尋求破產保護；也就是在這一時期，反對東印度公司的聲音一浪高過一浪。
The government subjected the Company to ever-tighter supervision, partly because it resented bailing it out, partly because it was troubled by the argument that a company had no business in running a continent. Supervision inexorably led to regulation and regulation to nationalisation (or imperialisation). In 1784 the government established a board to direct the Company’s directors. In 1813 it removed its monopoly of trade with India. In 1833 it removed its monopoly of trade with China and banned it from trading in India entirely. In 1858, the year after the Indian mutiny vindicated the Company’s critics, the government took over all administrative duties in India. The Company’s headquarters in London, East India House, was demolished in 1862. It paid its last dividend in 1873 and was finally put out of its misery in 1874. Thus an organisation that had been given life by the state was eventually extinguished by it.
英國政府對東印度公司采取了更加嚴格的監管措施，一方是因為英國政府不願意出手援助東印度公司，另一方麵是反對的東印度公司統治印度的人太多了。對東印度公司的監管導致了英國政府對東印度公司的直接管理，直接管理有導致了英國政府對東印度公司采取國有化改製的結果——1784年，英國政府在東印度公司成立了監事會，對東印度公司董事會的決策進行指導；1813年，英國政府收回了東印度公司對印度的壟斷經營權；1833年，英國政府收回了東印度公司對中國貿易的壟斷權利，並在同年禁止東印度公司在印度進行貿易活動；1858年，印度爆發的兵變印證了英國批評人士對東印度公司的指責，英國政府接管了印度的統治權；1862年，東印度公司設在倫敦總部的房子（“東印度住宅”）被拆除；1873年，東印度公司進行了最後一次分紅；1874年，東印度公司被正式結束。東印度公司這家被英國政府設立的公司，最終也被英國政府結束掉。
A dangerous connection
危險的聯係
Ever since its ignominious collapse the Company has been treated as an historical curiosity—an “anomaly without a parallel in the history of the world”, as one commentator put it in 1858, a push-me pull-you the like of which the world would never see again. But these days similarly strange creatures are popping up everywhere. The East India Company is being transformed from an historical curiosity into a highly relevant case study.
就在東印度公司開始走下坡路的時候，人們也將東印度公司視為一個曆史奇跡，一名評論員在1858年如此評價道：“世界上找不出一家能與東印度公司媲美的經濟組織了。”這樣的吹捧，是人們從未見過的。現在，與東印度公司類似的國有控股企業不斷出現，東印度公司現在從一個曆史事件變成為了一個學術界研究課題。
The Company’s history shows that liberals may be far too pessimistic (if that is the right word) about the ability of state monopolies to remain healthy. The Company lasted for far longer than most private companies precisely because it had two patrons to choose from—prospering from trade in good times and turning to the government for help in bad ones. It also showed that it is quite possible to rely on the government for support while at the same time remaining relatively lean and inventive.
東印度公司的曆史說明，自由貿易主義者對國家控股壟斷公司保持健康成長的能力過於悲觀。東印度公司生存的時間比任何私有企業都長，這是因為東印度公司能夠從兩方麵獲得支持：在經濟環境好的時候，通過貿易來賺錢；在經濟環境差的時候，向政府尋求幫助。東印度公司還向人們展示了其可以在得到政府支持的同時保持企業的創新能力。
But the Company’s history also shows that mercantilists may be far too optimistic about state companies’ ability to avoid being corrupted by politics. The merchants who ran the East India Company repeatedly emphasised that they had no intention of ruling India. They were men of business who only dabbled in politics out of necessity. Nevertheless, as rival state companies tried to muscle in on their business and local princelings turned out to be either incompetent or recalcitrant, they ended up taking huge swathes of the emerging world under their direct control, all in the name of commerce.
但東印度公司的曆史也表明重商主義者關於國家控股企業避免被卷入管理政府事務的能力方麵過於樂觀。管理東印度公司的商人一再強調自己是商人，沒有統治印度目的，他們管理印度的政府事務是不得已而為之。雖然他們這樣說，當其他的英國國有控股企業試圖進入印度開展業務，或者他們發現印度的地方統治者是能力不行或者試圖反抗，他們將索性以進行商業活動的名義直接對印度進行管理。
The Chinese state-owned companies that are causing such a stir everywhere from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (where they account for some of the biggest recent flotations) to the dodgiest parts of Sudan (where they are some of the few business organisations brave enough to tread) are no different from their East Indian forebears. They say that they are only in business for the sake of business. They dismiss their political connections as a mere bagatelle. The history of the East India Company suggests that it won’t work out that way.
從香港股市（最近被的幾個大莊家搞得一塌糊塗）到最不穩定的蘇丹（除了中國企業外，沒有企業敢進入該地區了），中國國有控股企業都能搞點事情出來，這與東印度公司的做法如出一轍。這些中國國有控股企業聲稱他們隻是在做生意，但他們與中國政府沒有多少聯係。東印度公司的曆史表明他們的這種做法行不通。
