《航空周刊》關於J20的文章（附在後麵）在最後說到：
“自從（中國的）軍事現代化開始以來，新武器越來越有創意。雖然還不能排除以色列人提供了技術援助，J-10與任何其它戰鬥機都不同，J-10B更是這樣。在其它領域，像022導彈快艇一樣的係統是獨一無二的（也許正因為此，美國才會讓ONR/DARPA立項，快速開發一種遠程反艦導彈LRASM？）”
查一下LRASM就知道，這是美國的“下一代導彈”，其目的是“對抗預估的來自中國岸基或海基彈道導彈對美國航母群從數百公裏外產生的威脅。”此項目從2008開始，顯然是在得知中國對航母有“高速、遠程打擊”能力之後。
美國對“遠程反艦導彈”投下的初步研發費用大約為一億六千萬美元（哪兒夠啊）。對其基本要求是：使用現有的垂發係統VLS-41或空中發射，能夠低空、遠距、超音速巡航。其最重要的特點，也許要算這兩點：首先此導彈完全自我導航，不再依賴GPS之類係統；其次此導彈有“緊急規避”能力，以突破各種空防係統。
另外一種在研的未來導彈ArcLight（弧光）則更為先進。他會用助推火箭加速到多倍音速，然後高速滑行，從而可以在30分鍾內攻擊到2000海裏距離的目標。這種導彈可以使得普通軍艦也成為遠程打擊力量的一部分。一個很有意思的特點是它的“機翼”。滑行時需要機翼，發射時不能有，因此機翼或者要能“變形”，或者可以由軟變硬最後成形。
中國的軍工隊伍也許早有同樣甚至更好的構想，尚未可知。
AviationWeek 12/30：
How Not To Think About The J-20
Posted by Bill Sweetman at 12/30/2010 10:50 AM CST
Now that the last few skeptics have been converted to the idea that the J-20 is a real airplane, and not the product of a network of Chinese teenage boys armed with Photoshop, the internetz are rife with speculation about the project's schedule, technology and capabilities.
Much of it is both premature and misguided, the result of several basic errors in analysis, politics and prejudice.
The first mistake is "mirror imaging". The Tu-22M Backfire was not a B-1, but the USAF wanted it to be one, because they desperately wanted to resurrect the B-1. The MiG-25 looked like the air-superiority fighters that the USAF was sketching in the late 1960s, but it was nothing of the sort. And just because the front end of the J-20 looks like an F-22 does not mean that it is an F-22 clone.
One problem with mirror-imaging is the unspoken assumption that the other guys face the same challenges that you do. But to take a couple of examples, the Russians in the Cold War never had to worry about a dense, layered surface-to-air missile threat and the US does not face an adversary with a significant carrier force.
A related source of error is an attempt to exploit the appearance of a new Chinese or Russian system to support a pre-existing belief system. That's why people who want more defense spending will upsell the threat, and predict that the new whatever-it-is will be operational next week and in production at a rate of 100 per year, and those on the other side will point to the adversary's primitive technology level, and argue that the new aircraft is merely an X-plane. The right answer usually lies between those points, but more importantly, it won't be found that way.
There's a healthy dose of cultural prejudice behind both errors. Mirror-imaging, in the Cold War and today, is supported by the idea that Communists are unimaginative bureaucrats who can't innovate their way out of a wet paper bag. We found out this wasn't true, on a massive scale, after 1991: for instance, the combination of helmet-mounted sights and high off-boresight missiles sent the US scrambling to develop the AIM-9X, and US spy satellites fly on Energomash RD-180 engines.
China's military engineers and planners have unintentionally reinforced this image over the decades, preferring to upgrade Soviet-era systems rather than developing new platforms. But that tends to obscure the fact that (to take one example) the latest version of the HQ-2 surface-to-air missile bears only an external resemblance to the Soviet V-750.
Since the current military modernization started, new weapons havev been increasingly innovative. The question of Israeli technical assistance notwithstanding, the J-10 does not resemble any other fighter, and the J-10B less so. In other domains, systems like the Type 022 fast missile boat resemble nothing anywhere else (and could that be one reason for the fast-paced ONR/DARPA LRASM program?).
Next question: what does the J-20 look like from a Chinese perspective? Watch this space.
