花間書齋
成功之門原來虛掩著
《道德情操論》
Part II
Of Merit and Demerit; or, of the Objects of Reward and Punishment
Consisting of Three Parts
Section I
Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
Introduction
第二卷 論優缺點，或獎懲對象
第一篇 論優缺點意識
引言
1．
There is another set of qualities ascribed to the actions and
conduct of mankind, distinct from their propriety or impropriety,
their decency or ungracefulness, and which are the objects of a
distinct species of approbation and disapprobation. These are
Merit and Demerit, the qualities of deserving reward, and of
deserving punishment.
有別於是否得體，是否體麵，源於行為舉止的還有另外一係列品質，即是否成為被認可的對象。亦即值得獎賞還是應該懲罰的優缺點。
2．
It has already been observed, that the sentiment or affection
of the heart, from which any action proceeds, and upon which its
whole virtue or vice depends, may be considered under two
different aspects, or in two different relations: first, in
relation to the cause or object which excites it; and, secondly,
in relation to the end which it proposes, or to the effect which
it tends to produce: that upon the suitableness or
unsuitableness, upon the proportion or disproportion, which the
affection seems to bear to the cause or object which excites it,
depends the propriety or impropriety, the decency or
ungracefulness of the consequent action; and that upon the
beneficial or hurtful effects which the affection proposes or
tends to produce, depends the merit or demerit, the good or ill
desert of the action to which it gives occasion. Wherein consists
our sense of the propriety or impropriety of actions, has been
explained in the former part of this discourse. We come now to
consider, wherein consists that of their good or ill desert.
如前所述，發自內心的情感，即，行為的出發點，以及善惡的決定因素，可以從兩個不同的方麵，或兩種不同的關係加以認識：第一，與激發情感的原因或表達情感的對象之關係；第二，與情感抒發的對象，或說是與情感勢必產生的效果之間的關係：即情感是否合適，是否相稱，亦即是否與產生的原因和抒發的對象相互協調，將決定隨後的行為是否得體，是否體麵；這種情感所具有的或勢必產生的有利或不利效果，將決定激發情感的行為之優缺點，亦即應得好報還是受罰。對行為產生是否得體感的原因，已經在這篇論文的前麵部分解釋過。現在來考察的是關於好報還是懲罰的問題。
Chap. 1
That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude,
appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever
appears to be the proper object of resentment appears to deserve
punishment
第一章 看似值得感謝，似乎就值得報答；同樣，看似令人怨恨，似乎就應該受罰。
1．
To us, therefore, that action must appear to deserve reward,
which appears to be the proper and approved object of that
sentiment, which most immediately and directly prompts us to
reward, or to do good to another. And in the same manner, that
action must appear to deserve punishment, which appears to be the
proper and approved object of that sentiment which most
immediately and directly prompts us to punish, or to inflict evil
upon another.
因此對於我們來講，看起來必須值得報答的行動才是那種情感適當的抒發對象，才能使我們對另外一方采取立即的直接的報答行動，或給予好處。同樣，看起來應該受罰的行動，才是我們情感抒發的適當對象，從而使我們對另一方采取立即的直接的懲罰，或使其遭受打擊。
2．
The sentiment which most immediately and directly prompts us
to reward, is gratitude; that which most immediately and directly
prompts us to punish, is resentment.
那種促使我們立即直接采取報答行動的情感就是感激；而促使我們立即直接采取懲罰行動的情感是怨恨。
3．
To us, therefore, that action must appear to deserve reward,
which appears to be the proper and approved object of gratitude;
as, on the other hand, that action must appear to deserve
punishment, which appears to be the proper and approved object of
resentment.
因此對於我們來說，我們的行動必須表現出與報答相稱，而對感激對象的選擇則必須表現出洽當無誤和令人滿意；正如另一方麵那樣，我們的行動必須表現出與懲罰相稱，而對怨恨對象的選擇也必須表現出恰如其分和無可指摘。
4．
To reward, is to recompense, to remunerate, to return good
for good received. To punish, too, is to recompense, to
remunerate, though in a different manner; it is to return evil
for evil that has been done.
報答就是酬勞、回報、以善報善。而懲罰，雖然形式不同，但也是酬勞、回報；那是以惡報惡。
5．
There are some other passions, besides gratitude and
resentment, which interest us in the happiness or misery of
others; but there are none which so directly excite us to be the
instruments of either. The love and esteem which grow upon
acquaintance and habitual approbation, necessarily lead us to be
pleased with the good fortune of the man who is the object of
such agreeable emotions, and consequently, to be willing to lend
a hand to promote it. Our love, however, is fully satisfied,
though his good fortune should be brought about without our
assistance. All that this passion desires is to see him happy,
without regarding who was the author of his prosperity. But
gratitude is not to be satisfied in this manner. If the person to
whom we owe many obligations, is made happy without our
assistance, though it pleases our love, it does not content our
gratitude. Till we have recompensed him, till we ourselves have
been instrumental in promoting his happiness, we feel ourselves
still loaded with that debt which his past services have laid
upon us.
除感激和怨恨之外，還有其它一些令我們關注他人快樂與痛苦的情感；但其中並沒有任何一種能如此直接激發我們去分享他人的快樂與痛苦。因為相識與慣常的融洽而形成的愛與敬意一定會導致我們對這樣一個人的好運感到高興，此人正是這種令人愉快的情感之抒發對象，從而使我們樂於伸出援手，以使其好運錦上添花。雖然沒有我們的幫助他照樣能交好運，但我們對他的愛依然能夠得到滿足。這種激情所要達到的目的就是看到他快樂，根本不考慮他的幸運究竟源於何人。然而感激之情卻不是通過這種方式得以滿足的。如果一個被我們欠很多人情的人，其快樂無需我們的幫助，這雖然令我們的愛心得以滿足，但我們的感激之情卻並未如願以償。直到我們報答了他，直到我們自己在促進其幸福方麵也發揮了作用，我們才對以往因受惠於他而欠下的人情債如釋重負。
6．
The hatred and dislike, in the same manner, which grow upon
habitual disapprobation, would often lead us to take a malicious
pleasure in the misfortune of the man whose conduct and character
excite so painful a passion. But though dislike and hatred harden
us against all sympathy, and sometimes dispose us even to rejoice
at the distress of another, yet, if there is no resentment in the
case, if neither we nor our friends have received any great
personal provocation, these passions would not naturally lead us
to wish to be instrumental in bringing it about. Though we could
fear no punishment in consequence of our having had some hand in
it, we would rather that it should happen by other means. To one
under the dominion of violent hatred it would be agreeable,
perhaps, to hear, that the person whom he abhorred and detested
was killed by some accident. But if he had the least spark of
justice, which, though this passion is not very favourable to
virtue, he might still have, it would hurt him excessively to
have been himself, even without design, the occasion of this
misfortune. Much more would the very thought of voluntarily
contributing to it shock him beyond all measure. He would reject
with horror even the imagination of so execrable a design; and if
he could imagine himself capable of such an enormity, he would
begin to regard himself in the same odious light in which he had
considered the person who was the object of his dislike. But it
is quite otherwise with resentment: if the person who had done us
some great injury, who had murdered our father or our brother,
for example, should soon afterwards die of a fever, or even be
brought to the scaffold upon account of some other crime, though
it might sooth our hatred, it would not fully gratify our
resentment. Resentment would prompt us to desire, not only that
he should be punished, but that he should be punished by our
means, and upon account of that particular injury which he had
done to us. Resentment cannot be fully gratified, unless the
offender is not only made to grieve in his turn, but to grieve
for that particular wrong which we have suffered from him. He
must be made to repent and be sorry for this very action, that
others, through fear of the like punishment, may be terrified
from being guilty of the like offence. The natural gratification
of this passion tends, of its own accord, to produce all the
political ends of punishment; the correction of the criminal, and
the example to the public.
同樣，如果一個人的行為和性格經常為我們製造痛苦，我們就會因為習以為常的不快而心生仇恨與厭惡，進而對他的痛苦幸災樂禍。不過，雖然厭惡與仇恨妨礙我們產生憐憫之情，有時甚至使我們有意對他人的困苦感到高興，但如果在這種情況下沒有發展到怨恨的地步，如果我們和我們的朋友都沒有受到嚴重的挑釁，這些激情自然不會使我們希望為催生他的痛苦而推波助瀾。雖然我們並不懼怕因染指他人痛苦引起的後果遭懲罰，但我們寧願看到這種情況通過其它方式而發生。對於一個心懷深仇大恨的人來說，聽到他所憎惡與仇恨的人因遭遇不幸而身亡，這也許是件樂事。然而，如果他的公正之心尚未完全泯滅，雖然這種激情並非與美德相行不悖，他本人如果正是造成他痛苦的原因，雖然並無故意，但這也會令他痛心疾首。而如果是故意而為之，對其打擊的程度則會無以複加。如此圖謀不軌，他恐懼得甚至連想都不敢；如果他能夠想象到自己居然可以做出如此傷天害理的事情，那他怎麽看待自己所厭惡的人，就怎麽看待自己。但是怨恨之情則當別論：如果一個人對我們造成極大的傷害，比如說謀殺了我們的父兄，隨後不久竟然死於熱病，或因其它罪名被推上斷頭台，雖然這樣會平撫我們的心頭之恨，但是這並不能完全令人滿意地解除怨恨之情。怨恨會激發我們產生一種欲望，即：他不僅應該受到懲罰，而且因為他對我造成了特殊的傷害而渴望親手處置他。引發怨恨者不僅應該按照輪回的順序而悲痛至極，而且應該是因為我們從他那裏所受到的特殊傷害而致使其悲痛欲絕，否則怨恨之情難以徹底消除。他必須為自己的這一行徑感到悔恨和難過，以使他人會因懼怕同樣的懲罰而害怕因同樣的罪行而獲罪。這種激情的自然滿足，會自動地以政治結局為歸宿；既懲罰罪犯，又儆戒公眾。
7．
Gratitude and resentment, therefore, are the sentiments which
most immediately and directly prompt to reward and to punish. To
us, therefore, he must appear to deserve reward, who appears to
be the proper and approved object of gratitude; and he to deserve
punishment, who appears to be that of resentment.
感激與怨恨因此就是最迅速最直接催生報答與懲罰行動的情感。所以，對於我們來講，誰表現得應該被感激，誰就應該被報答；誰表現得應該遭怨恨，誰就應該遭懲罰。
Chap. II
Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment
第二章 論感激與怨恨的適當對象
To be the proper and approved object either of gratitude or
resentment, can mean nothing but to be the object of that
gratitude, and of that resentment, which naturally seems proper,
and is approved of.
作為感激或者怨恨的適當與公認的對象，這僅僅意味著成為感激或怨恨的一種看上去自然而被公認的對象。
But these, as well as all the other passions of human nature,
seem proper and are approved of, when the heart of every
impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every
indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with
them.
不過和人性中其它激情一樣，隻有當每一位公允不阿的旁觀者都充分同情他時，當每一位不偏不倚的旁觀者完全讚成他的時候，這些激情才顯得適當而被公認。
He, therefore, appears to deserve reward, who, to some person
or persons, is the natural object of a gratitude which every
human heart is disposed to beat time to, and thereby applaud: and
he, on the other hand, appears to deserve punishment, who in the
same manner is to some person or persons the natural object of a
resentment which the breast of every reasonable man is ready to
adopt and sympathize with. To us, surely, that action must appear
to deserve reward, which every body who knows of it would wish to
reward, and therefore delights to see rewarded: and that action
must as surely appear to deserve punishment, which every body who
hears of it is angry with, and upon that account rejoices to see
punished.
因此，如果對於某個人或者某些人來講，一個人是自然而然的感激對象，他顯然就應該得到報答，而這種感激由於引發每個人的共鳴，因此會獲得讚同；反之，如果對某個人或者某些人來講，一個人是自然而然的怨恨對象，他顯然就應該受到懲罰，而這種怨恨之情，是每一個理智的人都會持有的，因此會得以體諒。當然，如果一種行為，每個了解它的人顯然都希望它得到報答，並樂見其成，對於我們來說，這種行為顯然就應該得到報答；反之，如果一種行為，每個人聽到之後都會氣憤填膺，因而樂見其得到懲罰，它在我們看來，顯然就應該得到懲罰。
1. As we sympathize with the joy of our companions when in
prosperity, so we join with them in the complacency and
satisfaction with which they naturally regard whatever is the
cause of their good fortune. We enter into the love and affection
which they conceive for it, and begin to love it too. We should
be sorry for their sakes if it was destroyed, or even if it was
placed at too great a distance from them, and out of the reach of
their care and protection, though they should lose nothing by its
absence except the pleasure of seeing it. If it is man who has
thus been the fortunate instrument of the happiness of his
brethren, this is still more peculiarly the case. When we see one
man assisted, protected, relieved by another, our sympathy with
the joy of the person who receives the benefit serves only to
animate our fellow-feeling with his gratitude towards him who
bestows it. When we look upon the person who is the cause of his
pleasure with the eyes with which we imagine he must look upon
him, his benefactor seems to stand before us in the most engaging
and amiable light. We readily therefore sympathize with the
grateful affection which he conceives for a person to whom he has
been so much obliged; and consequently applaud the returns which
he is disposed to make for the good offices conferred upon him.
As we entirely enter into the affection from which these returns
proceed, they necessarily seem every way proper and suitable to
their object.
1．因為同伴春風得意交好運之際，我們能體會他的快樂，因此，無論他們將交好運歸結於何種原因，我們都能與他們共同分享那種躊躇滿誌，得意洋洋之情感。我們不僅能體會他們因此而感受到的愛與激情，而且就連我們自己也開始感受到愛意融融。如果同伴的好運毀於一旦，抑或離他太遠，或者難以關注及保全的時候，雖然他除了無緣享受那份見到好運的快樂之外別無損失，我們依然會因此不無遺憾。如果他兄弟的幸福源於某人，奇怪的是，情況越發如此。我們看到一個人獲得幫助、保護或安慰時，我們就會體諒到他因受惠他人而高興，而這種體諒的效果，隻是激發我們進一步體會此人對施惠者產生的感激之情。當他的快樂起源於一個人的時候，如果我們用一種受惠者看待施惠者的眼光來看待此人，他的施惠者似乎就會在一種非常迷人的溫馨之光下，赫然站立在我們麵前。於是，我們就會體會到他對一位心懷謝意者的感激之情；從而讚成他為獲得助益而投桃報李。我們完全能體會到作為采取報答行為出發點的那種情感，因此，這些報答對於報答對象而言，就必然顯得恰如其分。
2. In the same manner, as we sympathize with the sorrow of
our fellow-creature whenever we see his distress, so we likewise
enter into his abhorrence and aversion for whatever has given
occasion to it. Our heart, as it adopts and beats time to his
grief, so is it likewise animated with that spirit by which he
endeavours to drive away or destroy the cause of it. The indolent
and passive fellow-feeling, by which we accompany him in his
sufferings, readily gives way to that more vigorous and active
sentiment by which we go along with him in the effort he makes,
either to repel them, or to gratify his aversion to what has
given occasion to them. This is still more peculiarly the case,
when it is man who has caused them. When we see one man oppressed
or injured by another, the sympathy which we feel with the
distress of the sufferer seems to serve only to animate our
fellow-feeling with his resentment against the offender. We are
rejoiced to see him attack his adversary in his turn, and are
eager and ready to assist him whenever he exerts himself for
defence, or even for vengeance within a certain degree. If the
injured should perish in the quarrel, we not only sympathize with
the real resentment of his friends and relations, but with the
imaginary resentment which in fancy we lend to the dead, who is
no longer capable of feeling that or any other human sentiment.
But as we put ourselves in his situation, as we enter, as it
were, into his body, and in our imaginations, in some measure,
animate anew the deformed and mangled carcass of the slain, when
we bring home in this manner his case to our own bosoms, we feel
upon this, as upon many other occasions, an emotion which the
person principally concerned is incapable of feeling, and which
yet we feel by an illusive sympathy with him. The sympathetic
tears which we shed for that immense and irretrievable loss,
which in our fancy he appears to have sustained, seem to be but a
small part of the duty which we owe him. The injury which he has
suffered demands, we think, a principal part of our attention. We
feel that resentment which we imagine he ought to feel, and which
he would feel, if in his cold and lifeless body there remained
any consciousness of what passes upon earth. His blood, we think,
calls aloud for vengeance. The very ashes of the dead seem to be
disturbed at the thought that his injuries are to pass
unrevenged. The horrors which are supposed to haunt the bed of
the murderer, the ghosts which, superstition imagines, rise from
their graves to demand vengeance upon those who brought them to
an untimely end, all take their origin from this natural sympathy
with the imaginary resentment of the slain. And with regard, at
least, to this most dreadful of all crimes, Nature, antecedent to
all reflections upon the utility of punishment, has in this
manner stamped upon the human heart, in the strongest and most
indelible characters, an immediate and instinctive approbation of
the sacred and necessary law of retaliation.
同樣，因為我們看到朋友遭受不幸時我們能體諒他的痛苦，因此我們同樣能體諒他對導致不幸的事情所懷有的憎恨與厭惡之情。因為我們發自內心地同情他的悲傷，因此就會激發一種竭盡全力去鏟除導致不幸根源的精神。朋友遭受不幸時，我們對他懷有的怠惰消極的同情心，很容易讓位於一種更充滿活力的情感，具備這種情感我們就會讚同他為消除痛苦所作的努力，以及對產生痛苦的原因所懷有的憎惡之情。如果導致他遭受痛苦的是人，情況就越發如此。當我們看到一個人遭受他人壓製或傷害時，我們對受害者的同情心，似乎僅僅能夠促使我們去體諒他對壓製者的怨恨之情。我們樂於見到他對自己的敵手發起攻擊，而且渴望並準備在他為自衛做出努力時，即便在一定程度上采取報複手段時，也能提供幫助。如果被傷害者竟然在爭鬥中喪生，我們不僅能體諒其親朋的怨恨之情，而且也能體會到我們自己也因這名已經無法感受怨怒以及人類其他情感的死者而產生的怨恨之情。因為我們將自己置身於他的處境，因為我們自然地與其融於一體，我們就可以通過想象在某種程度上使那具在屠殺中被砍得血肉模糊的殘屍得以複活，當我們以這種方式真心體諒他的情況時，我們就會像對待其他情況那樣，為此感到有一種情感油然而生，雖然我們通過對他抱有的虛幻同情心可以體會到這種情感，但當事者已經無法感受到。我們為這種無法彌補的巨大損失而落下同情之淚，在我們的想象當中他顯然已經體察到我們的這種表現，但這似乎隻是我們對他應付的一小部分責任而已。我們認為，他所遭受的傷害需要我們將自己的關切之情主要集中在他的身上。如果在他那冰冷的了無生機的屍體內部，依然殘留可感知過去究竟發生何事的意識，在我們想象當中他就應該感受到，也會感受到一種怨恨，而這種怨恨，我們已經感覺到。我們認為他的血液在大聲呼喚複仇。死者的骨灰似乎因為想到深仇大恨尚未得報而不得安息。光顧凶手睡床的恐怖，以及迷信中爬出墳墓要對導致他們死於非命的人報仇雪恨的鬼魂，所有這些都起源於對殺戮引發的怨恨所抱有的同情心。對於這種最可怕的罪行，神祗在考慮到懲罰效力之前，就已經以這種方式，將神聖而必要的複仇法則，不可磨滅地、特性鮮明地烙在人們的心上。
Chap. III
That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person
who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the
gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary,
where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who
does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the
resentment of him who suffers it
第三章 對施惠者的行為缺乏讚許的地方，對受惠者感激之情就缺少體會；相反，對作惡者動機缺乏責難的地方，對受害者的怨恨之情就缺乏體諒
（注：本章順序號是原有的，請保留）
It is to be observed, however, that, how beneficial soever on
the one hand, or how hurtful soever on the other, the actions or
intentions of the person who acts may have been to the person who
is, if I may say so, acted upon, yet if in the one case there
appears to have been no propriety in the motives of the agent, if
we cannot enter into the affections which influenced his conduct,
we have little sympathy with the gratitude of the person who
receives the benefit: or if, in the other case, there appears to
have been no impropriety in the motives of the agent, if, on the
contrary, the affections which influenced his conduct are such as
we must necessarily enter into, we can have no sort of sympathy
with the resentment of the person who suffers. Little gratitude
seems due in the one case, and all sort of resentment seems
unjust in the other. The one action seems to merit little reward,
the other to deserve no punishment.
然而，必須加以說明的是，行為者的行動或動機，有益也好，有害也罷，如果我可以這樣說的話，可能已經對他產生作用，即：行為者的動機不當，或如果我們不能體會到影響其行為的情感，我們對受惠者的感激之情就都無法體會；或者換成另外一種情況，行為者的動機並無不當之處，或如果相反，影響其行為的情感已經得到我們當然的體諒，受害者此時此刻的怨恨之情就無法得到我們的體諒。前一種情況，少許感激之情無可指摘，後一種情況，全盤加以怨恨則有失公允。前一種行為似乎應該獲得少許報答，但後一種情況則完全不該遭到懲罰。
1. First, I say, That wherever we cannot sympathize with the
affections of the agent, wherever there seems to be no propriety
in the motives which influenced his conduct, we are less disposed
to enter into the gratitude of the person who received the
benefit of his actions. A very small return seems due to that
foolish and profuse generosity which confers the greatest
benefits from the most trivial motives, and gives an estate to a
man merely because his name and sirname happen to be the same
with those of the giver. Such services do not seem to demand any
proportionable recompense. Our contempt for the folly of the
agent hinders us from thoroughly entering into the gratitude of
the person to whom the good office has been done. His benefactor
seems unworthy of it. As when we place ourselves in the situation
of the person obliged, we feel that we could conceive no great
reverence for such a benefactor, we easily absolve him from a
great deal of that submissive veneration and esteem which we
should think due to a more respectable character; and provided he
always treats his weak friend with kindness and humanity, we are
willing to excuse him from many attentions and regards which we
should demand to a worthier patron. Those Princes, who have
heaped, with the greatest profusion, wealth, power, and honours,
upon their favourites, have seldom excited that degree of
attachment to their persons which has often been experienced by
those who were more frugal of their favours. The well-natured,
but injudicious prodigality of James the First of Great Britain
seems to have attached nobody to his person; and that Prince,
notwithstanding his social and harmless disposition, appears to
have lived and died without a friend. The whole gentry and
nobility of
of his more frugal and distinguishing son, notwithstanding the
coldness and distant severity of his ordinary deportment.
1．首先我要說明，我們對當事者情感無法體諒的地方，影響其行為的動機似乎不當，因而對受惠於其行為者的感激之情也不會加以體諒。把一座房產拱手相送給另一個人，僅僅是因為那人的姓名恰好與自己相同，其動機顯然並沒有好到哪裏去，但卻令人獲益匪淺，對這種愚蠢的慷慨之舉稍加報答顯然恰如其分。這種奉獻似乎並不需要成比例的回報。我們對當事者蠢行的蔑視妨礙我們充分體諒獲益者的感激之情。他這位恩人並不值得感激。我們將自己置身於受惠者的境況時，就會感到根本想象不出會對這樣一位恩人心存任何敬意，我們很容易將其排除在應該獲得至高無上的尊崇者的行列之外，而這種至高無上的尊崇我們認為應該給予一位更值得敬重的人物；隻要他對弱勢朋友以善相待，以仁相處，我們就會出於關愛而樂於原諒他，而這些關愛，我們本應奉獻給更值得尊敬的人。有些君主，雖然慷慨至極，將大量財產、權勢和榮耀堆積在寵兒身上，但卻很少能激發那些人對其產生依附之情，而那些慎於施恩者反而能夠感受到這種依附之情。那位脾氣好，但卻慷慨無度的大不列顛詹姆士一世，似乎就從來沒有吸附任何人；作為堂堂的君主陛下，雖然他善於交際，和藹可親，然而他似乎生前死後皆是孤家寡人。但是為了他那位節儉且傑出的兒子的功業，英國全部的王公貴族絲毫不顧及他那冷漠嚴肅的脾氣，不惜拋財舍命，毫不遲疑。
2. Secondly, I say, That wherever the conduct of the agent
appears to have been entirely directed by motives and affections
which we thoroughly enter into and approve of, we can have no
sort of sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer, how great
soever the mischief which may have been done to him. When two
people quarrel, if we take part with, and entirely adopt the
resentment of one of them, it is impossible that we should enter
into that of the other. Our sympathy with the person whose
motives we go along with, and whom therefore we look upon as in
the right, cannot but harden us against all fellow-feeling with
the other, whom we necessarily regard as in the wrong. Whatever
this last, therefore, may have suffered, while it is no more than
what we ourselves should have wished him to suffer, while it is
no more than what our own sympathetic indignation would have
prompted us to inflict upon him, it cannot either displease or
provoke us. When an inhuman murderer is brought to the scaffold,
though we have some compassion for his misery, we can have no
sort of fellow-feeling with his resentment, if he should be so
absurd as to express any against either his prosecutor or his
judge. The natural tendency of their just indignation against so
vile a criminal is indeed the most fatal and ruinous to him. But
it is impossible that we should be displeased with the tendency
of a sentiment, which, when we bring the case home to ourselves,
we feel that we cannot avoid adopting.
2．其次我要說明，由於當事者的動機和情感得到我們的諒解，因此，無論他們的行動受這種動機和情感所驅使而向哪個方向發展，我們都不會體諒受害者的怨恨之情，不管別人對他做出多麽大的傷害。當兩個人發生爭鬥時，如果我們參與其中，充分體諒其中一方的怨恨之情，我們就不可能再體諒另一方。如果一個人的動機為我們所體諒，我們就會認為他是正確的一方，因而會同情他，而這種同情隻能使認為他是錯誤的一方，因而很難同情他。因此，無論後者可能會受到什麽樣的傷害，也不可能超過我們希望他們所遭受的傷害，更不可能超過我們為自己頗具同情心的義憤所驅使而施加給他的痛苦，這既不可能令我們心生不快，也不能令我們怒火中燒。當一名毫無人性的凶手被推上斷頭台時，雖然我們為他們的痛苦而生惻隱之心，但如果他竟然會荒唐到與原告和法官作對，我們就不會體諒他的怨恨之情。人們對一名如此卑鄙凶惡的罪犯心懷義憤的自然傾向，對他來講的確是最致命的毀滅性打擊。但是，當我們設身處地地思考問題，並因此而不可避免地表現某種情感的傾向時，卻竟然對這種傾向心生不快，這是不可能的。
Chap. IV
Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters
第四章 前章扼要重述
（注：本章順序號是原有的，請保留）
1. We do not, therefore, thoroughly and heartily sympathize
with the gratitude of one man towards another, merely because
this other has been the cause of his good fortune, unless he has
been the cause of it from motives which we entirely go along
with. Our heart must adopt the principles of the agent, and go
along with all the affections which influenced his conduct,
before it can entirely sympathize with, and beat time to, the
gratitude of the person who has been benefited by his actions. If
in the conduct of the benefactor there appears to have been no
propriety, how beneficial soever its effects, it does not seem to
demand, or necessarily to require, any proportionable recompense.
1． 如果一個人交好運是因為另外一個人，這個人就會對他心生感激，但是僅僅因為這一點，我們還無法體諒前者的感激之情，除非後者成為他交好運的原因出於我們能夠完全體諒的動機。我們必須真心地接受施惠者的原則，隻有先體諒影響施惠者行為的所有情感，才能完全體諒從其行為中獲益的受惠者對其產生的感激之情。如果施惠者行為中顯出不妥之處，無論這種行為多麽有益，也似乎並不需要，或者說一定需要任何相應的回報。
But when to the beneficent tendency of the action is joined
the propriety of the affection from which it proceeds, when we
entirely sympathize and go along with the motives of the agent,
the love which we conceive for him upon his own account, enhances
and enlivens our fellow-feeling with the gratitude of those who
owe their prosperity to his good conduct. His actions seem then
to demand, and, if I may say so, to call aloud for aproportionable recompense. We then entirely enter into that gratitude which prompts to bestow it. The benefactor seems then to be the proper object of reward, when we thus entirely sympathize with, and approve of, that sentiment which prompts to reward him. When we approve of, and go along with, the affection from which the action proceeds, we must necessarily approve of the action, and regard the person towards whom it is directed, as
its proper and suitable object.
但是，當作為行為出發點的適當情感與行為的慈善傾向一致的時候，當我們完全體諒和讚同作為動因的施惠者的動機時，我們對他懷有的愛，就會提升和加強對那個將好運歸因於施惠者善行的人的感激之情。如果我可以這樣說的話，他的行為似乎需要為適當的回報而大聲疾呼。當我們完全體諒和讚同那種促成報答行為的情感時，施惠者似乎就成了適當的報答對象。當我們讚同和體諒促成行為的情感時，我們就必然會讚同他的行為，並將這種行為的接受者看成是被恰如其分的感激對象。
2. In the same manner, we cannot at all sympathize with the
resentment of one man against another, merely because this other
has been the cause of his misfortune, unless he has been the
cause of it from motives which we cannot enter into. Before we
can adopt the resentment of the sufferer, we must disapprove of
the motives of the agent, and feel that our heart renounces all
sympathy with the affections which influenced his conduct. If
there appears to have been no impropriety in these, how fatal
soever the tendency of the action which proceeds from them to
those against whom it is directed, it does not seem to deserve
any punishment, or to be the proper object of any resentment.
2．同樣，我們也不能僅僅因為一個人是另一個人不幸的原因，就完全體諒後者對前者的怨恨之情，除非令他遭遇不幸是出於我們所不能體諒的動機。我們能夠理解受害者怨恨之情的前提是，我們必須不讚成作為動因的當事者的行為動機，必須感覺到我們從內心中拒絕對影響他行為的情感表示同情。如果這些情感顯然並無不妥，那麽出於這些情感而對受害者采取的行動無論有多麽致命的傾向，也不應該受到任何懲罰，或者成為發泄怨恨的適當目標。
But when to the hurtfulness of the action is joined the
impropriety of the affection from whence it proceeds, when our
heart rejects with abhorrence all fellow-feeling with the motives
of the agent, we then heartily and entirely sympathize with the
resentment of the sufferer. Such actions seem then to deserve,
and, if I may say so, to call aloud for, a proportionable
punishment; and we entirely enter into, and thereby approve of,
that resentment which prompts to inflict it. The offender
necessarily seems then to be the proper object of punishment,
when we thus entirely sympathize with, and thereby approve of,
that sentiment which prompts to punish. In this case too, when we
approve, and go along with, the affection from which the action
proceeds, we must necessarily approve of the action, and regard
the person against whom it is directed, as its proper and
suitable object.
但是，當不恰當的情感和有害的行為達成一致的時候，當我們對作為動因的當事者的動機從內心厭惡地拒絕表示諒解時，我們就會充分地體諒受害者的怨恨之情。如果我可以這樣說的話，這樣的行動似乎就在為相應的懲罰而大聲疾呼；我們就會充分體諒，進而讚同那種促成懲罰的怨恨。當我們充分體諒，因而讚同促成懲罰行動的那種情感時，罪犯因而就顯然是懲罰的適當對象。也是在這種情況下，當我們讚同，並體諒促成行為的情感時，我們也就必然會讚同其行為，並把那個懲罰行為的接受者看成是懲罰的適當對象。
Chap. V
The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit
第五章 對優缺點感覺的分析
（注：本章順序號是原有的，請保留）
1. As our sense, therefore, of the propriety of conduct
arises from what I shall call a direct sympathy with the
affections and motives of the person who acts, so our sense of
its merit arises from what I shall call an indirect sympathy with
the gratitude of the person who is, if I may say so, acted upon.
1．
因為我們對行為適當性的感覺，起源於我稱之為的一種對行為者情感和動機的直接體諒，因此，如果我可以這樣說的話，我們對其優點的感覺，就起源於被我稱之為的一種對受惠者感激之情所表現的非直接體諒。
As we cannot indeed enter thoroughly into the gratitude of
the person who receives the benefit, unless we beforehand approve
of the motives of the benefactor, so, upon this account, the
sense of merit seems to be a compounded sentiment, and to be made
up of two distinct emotions; a direct sympathy with the
sentiments of the agent, and an indirect sympathy with the
gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions.
因為如果我們事先不能讚同施惠者的動機，我們就的確不能充分體諒受惠者的感激之情。所以正是因為這個原因，對優點的感覺似乎就是一種由兩類獨特情緒構成的複雜情感：對行為者情感的直接體諒，和對受惠者感激之情的非直接體諒。
We may, upon many different occasions, plainly distinguish
those two different emotions combining and uniting together in
our sense of the good desert of a particular character or action.
When we read in history concerning actions of proper and
beneficent greatness of mind, how eagerly do we enter into such
designs? How much are we animated by that high-spirited
generosity which directs them? How keen are we for their success?
How grieved at their disappointment? In imagination we become the
very person whose actions are represented to us: we transport
ourselves in fancy to the scenes of those distant and forgotten
adventures, and imagine ourselves acting the part of a Scipio or
a Camillus, a Timoleon or an Aristides. So far our sentiments are
founded upon the direct sympathy with the person who acts. Nor is
the indirect sympathy with those who receive the benefit of such
actions less sensibly felt. Whenever we place ourselves in the
situation of these last, with what warm and affectionate
fellow-feeling do we enter into their gratitude towards those who
served them so essentially? We embrace, as it were, their
benefactor along with them. Our heart readily sympathizes with
the highest transports of their grateful affection. No honours,
no rewards, we think, can be too great for them to bestow upon
him. When they make this proper return for his services, we
heartily applaud and go along with them; but are shocked beyond
all measure, if by their conduct they appear to have little sense
of the obligations conferred upon them. Our whole sense, in
short, of the merit and good desert of such actions, of the
propriety and fitness of recompensing them, and making the person
who performed them rejoice in his turn, arises from the
sympathetic emotions of gratitude and love, with which, when we
bring home to our own breast the situation of those principally
concerned, we feel ourselves naturally transported towards the
man who could act with such proper and noble beneficence.
我們對一種特定性格或行動的優劣都會有感覺，在許多不同的情況下，我們都能一清二楚地分辨出那兩種與我們這一感覺互相交織融合的情感。當我們閱讀有關仁慈高尚的思想行動史料時，我們是多麽迫切地想理解編纂史料的意圖！而其中那些慷慨至極的高尚美德又是多麽深深地感染我們！對他們的成功我們是多麽渴望！對他們的失望又是多麽地悲傷！在想象中，我們已經成為那個行為完全針對我們的人：在幻想中，我們將自己轉而置身於那些久遠的、已被忘卻的冒險經曆的場景中，想象著我們自己扮演著一位西庇阿或卡米盧斯，一位提莫萊昂或阿裏斯提德思式的人物。我們的情感正是如此這般地建立在直接體諒行為者的基礎上。當然對於受惠於這些行為的人，我們所表現的間接體諒也並非不能敏感地感覺到。每當我們設身處地地思考受惠者的境況時，我們都會以何等的熱情去體會他們對給予施惠者感激之情。我們也都會像他們一樣去擁抱他們的恩人。我們就會由衷地體會到他們那種極其強烈的感激之情。我們認為，他對施惠者無論給予多麽巨大的榮譽，多麽豐厚的回報都不為過。當他們對施惠者的好處給予這種恰當的回報時，我們就會由衷地讚成他們支持他們；然而，如果他們對施惠者缺乏感恩的舉動，我們就會感到震驚不已。簡而言之，我們對這種行為表現出的美德，對施惠者給予適當的報答，對施惠者感到的快樂，對所有這些的感覺，都來自對感激和愛的認同感，有了這種認同，我們就會在設身處地思考當事者的境況時，體會到我們自己對那位樂善好施的人也會油然而激情迸發。
2. In the same manner as our sense of the impropriety of
conduct arises from a want of sympathy, or from a direct
antipathy to the affections and motives of the agent, so our
sense of its demerit arises from what I shall here too call an
indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer.
2．同樣，因為我們感覺某種行為不當，是由於缺乏體諒，或者說由於對當事者的情感和動機缺乏直接反感，所以我們對其缺點的感覺，正如我在這裏要說的，是來源於對受害者怨恨之情的間接體諒。
As we cannot indeed enter into the resentment of the
sufferer, unless our heart beforehand disapproves the motives of
the agent, and renounces all fellow-feeling with them; so upon
this account the sense of demerit, as well as that of merit,
seems to be a compounded sentiment, and to be made up of two
distinct emotions; a direct antipathy to the sentiments of the
agent, and an indirect sympathy with the resentment of the
sufferer.
因為，除非我們從內心中原本就不讚成當事者的動機，並拒絕加以體諒，我們就的確不能體諒受害者的怨恨之情；所以正是由於這個原因，對缺點的感覺，以及對優點的感覺，似乎就是一種複合型的情感，有兩種不同的情感構成：一是對當事者情感的直接反感，二是對受害者怨恨之情的間接體諒。
We may here too, upon many different occasions, plainly
distinguish those two different emotions combining and uniting
together in our sense of the ill desert of a particular character
or action. When we read in history concerning the perfidy and
cruelty of a Borgia or a Nero, our heart rises up against the
detestable sentiments which influenced their conduct, and
renounces with horror and abomination all fellow-feeling with
such execrable motives. So far our sentiments are founded upon
the direct antipathy to the affections of the agent: and the
indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferers is still
more sensibly felt. When we bring home to ourselves the situation
of the persons whom those scourges of mankind insulted, murdered,
or betrayed, what indignation do we not feel against such
insolent and inhuman oppressors of the earth? Our sympathy with
the unavoidable distress of the innocent sufferers is not more
real nor more lively, than our fellow-feeling with their just and
natural resentment: The former sentiment only heightens the
latter, and the idea of their distress serves only to inflame and
blow up our animosity against those who occasioned it. When we
think of the anguish of the sufferers, we take part with them
more earnestly against their oppressors; we enter with more
eagerness into all their schemes of vengeance, and feel ourselves
every moment wreaking, in imagination, upon such violators of the
laws of society, that punishment which our sympathetic
indignation tells us is due to their crimes. Our sense of the
horror and dreadful atrocity of such conduct, the delight which
we take in hearing that it was properly punished, the indignation
which we feel when it escapes this due retaliation, our whole
sense and feeling, in short, of its ill desert, of the propriety
and fitness of inflicting evil upon the person who is guilty of
it, and of making him grieve in his turn, arises from the
sympathetic indignation which naturally boils up in the breast of
the spectator, whenever he thoroughly brings home to himself the
case of the sufferer.(1*)
我們也可以在這裏，針對許多不同的情況，一清二楚地將上述兩種不同的情感加以區分，而那兩種情感則是與我們對某種品質或行為所遭惡報所產生的情感相互交融混雜的。當我們閱讀與博爾吉亞或尼路背信棄義及殘酷暴戾相關的史料時，就會對那些影響他們行為的可惡情感心生厭惡，並因恐懼與憎惡而對這種卑鄙的動機拒不體諒。就此說來，我們的情感就是建立在對當事者情感的直接反感之上：對受害者怨恨的間接體諒會更加明顯地被感覺到。當我們深切地體會到遭惡人汙辱、謀殺或背叛者的境況時，我們對世間這種目空一切、毫無人性的壓迫者還有什麽義憤感覺不到呢？我們對無辜受害者難免的悲傷表示出的同情，與對他們公正自然的怨恨的體諒相比，二者同樣真誠與鮮明：前一種情感隻會加劇後一種情感，想到他們的困境，隻會激起我們對造成這種困境者的憎惡。當我們想到受害者的痛苦時，我們就會更加迫切地想同他們一起反對他們的壓迫者；就會更加熱切的讚同到他們的複仇意願，通過想象，我們感到自己每時每刻都在對這些違背社會法規的人加以懲罰，我們頗具同情心的義憤告訴我們自己，這些懲罰對他們來說是罪有應得。我們對那種可怕的卑鄙行徑的感覺，我們聽到這種行徑遭到應有懲罰時的快樂，以及聽到這種行徑逃避了報複時感到的義憤，簡而言之，我們對其全部罪行的感覺，對罪行遭到恰如其分報複的感覺，對依次輪到他悲傷的感覺，所有這些感覺，都來源於飽含同情的義憤，而這種義憤是在旁觀者認識到受害者具體情況時自然而然地引起的。
好羨慕......
要是我有那樣的中英文綜合才情,該多好......
新年更快樂精彩!