海闊天高
海外的生活大體上是充實的，有時候卻也難免寂寞。雖然接受了他國的教育和文化，可是骨子裏卻依然是中國人。讓我們彼此交流，攜手相伴。
中國自我的一代
來自於《時代周刊》網站，網址：http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1647228-1,00.html
Six friends out on a friday evening, the seafood plentiful, the conversation flowing. Maria Zhang — big hoop earrings, tight velvet jacket and a good deal of meticulously applied makeup — starts to describe an island that everyone is talking about off the east coast of Thailand. It has great diving, she says, and lots of Chinese there so you don't have to worry about language. Her friend Vicky Yang is hunched over a borrowed laptop, downloading an e-mail from a pesky client on her cell phone. An actuary at a consulting firm, Vicky needs to close a project tonight. While she phones a colleague, the dinner-table conversation moves on to snowboarding ("I must have fallen a hundred times") to the relative merits of various iPods ("Shuffle is no good") and the sudden onrush of credit cards in China. Silence Chen, an account executive with advertising giant Ogilvy & Mather in Beijing, tells the group he recently received six different cards in the mail. "Each one has a credit limit of 10,000," he says, laughing. "So suddenly I'm 60,000 yuan richer!" The talk turns to China's online shopping business, before that is interrupted by the arrival of razor clams, chili squid and deep-fried grouper.
六位朋友周五晚上外出就餐，桌上海鮮豐盛，桌下談笑風生。瑪麗亞·張——一個帶著大圈耳環，穿著天鵝絨緊身夾克，畫著精致妝容的時髦女孩開始給在座的朋友描繪泰國東海岸附近的一個島嶼：“在那潛水真是不錯，中國人很多，根本不用提心語言不通”。而她的朋友薇姬·楊正全神貫注地擺弄借來的筆記本電腦，忙著下載一名惱人的客戶發來的E-mail，作為保險公司的統計員，今晚她還得完成一個項目。就在她給同事打電話的時候，飯桌上的談論話題先是從滑雪（“我一定摔了100多跤”），變成了不同型號iPod的優劣（“iPod Shuffle太爛了”），最後又轉到了信用卡一下子湧入了中國人生活的問題。一直沉默寡言的陳先生是北京廣告巨頭Ogilvy & Mather公司的執行總監，他告訴眾人他最近郵件裏收到了六張不同的信用卡。“每張信用卡的信用額度是10000，”他笑著說，“所以我一下子就賺了6萬元”。接著話題轉到了中國的網上購物，談話不時被端上來的牡蠣、色拉和油炸海鮮所打斷。
The one subject that doesn't come up — and almost never does when this tight-knit group of friends gets together — is politics. That sets them apart from previous generations of Chinese élites, whose lives were defined by the epic events that shaped China's past half-century: the Cultural Revolution, the opening to the West, the student protests in Tiananmen Square and their subsequent suppression. The conversation at Gang Ji Restaurant suggests today's twentysomethings are tuning all that out. "There's nothing we can do about politics," says Chen. "So there's no point in talking about it or getting involved."
但在他們 的談話中，有一個話題始終沒有出現，而且在這個團結的小圈子的聚會中也幾乎從未出現過，那就是政治。這就將他們與那些經曆過文化大革命、改革開放和“六四事件”等影響中國半個世紀重大事件的老一輩中國精英區分開來。剛記海鮮酒樓裏的談話表明，如今20多歲的年輕人對這類事情一概閉口不談。這個小圈子裏一員賽倫斯·陳說：“對於政治，我們無能為力，所以談論或是參與政治都沒有什麽意義。”
There are roughly 300 million adults in China under age 30, a demographic cohort that serves as a bridge between the closed, xenophobic China of the Mao years and the globalized economic powerhouse that it is becoming. Young Chinese are the drivers and chief beneficiaries of the country's current boom: according to a recent survey by Credit Suisse First Boston, the incomes of 20- to 29-year-olds grew 34% in the past three years, by far the biggest of any age group. And because of their self-interested, apolitical pragmatism, they could turn out to be the salvation of the ruling Communist Party — so long as it keeps delivering the economic goods. Survey young, urban Chinese today, and you will find them drinking Starbucks, wearing Nikes and blogging obsessively. But you will detect little interest in demanding voting rights, let alone overthrowing the country's communist rulers. "On their wish list," says Hong Huang, a publisher of several lifestyle magazines, "a Nintendo Wii comes way ahead of democracy."
如今的中國，30歲以下的成年人大約有3億，這個人口大軍是承上啟下的一代，是連接毛澤東時期的中國與正在形成的全球化經濟強國的中國的橋梁。中國的年輕人既是中國繁榮的推動者，又是主要受益者：瑞士信貸第一波士頓銀行最近所做的一項調查顯示，過去3年間，20-29歲年輕人的收入增長了34%，是收入增長最快的年齡層。這些年輕人注重自身利益、不關心政治而注重實際，他們可能成為當政的共產黨的拯救者--隻要他們能夠繼續幫助共產黨創造經濟利益。對現在中國城市裏的年輕人作統計調查，就會發現他們喝星巴克咖啡，穿耐克服裝，沉迷於寫博客，卻沒有幾個有興趣參與政治投票，更不用說推翻共產黨的統治者了。一位時尚雜誌的發行人說：“如果問他們想要什麽，那麽任天堂遊戲機肯定比民主排名靠前得多。”
The rise of China's Me generation has implications for the foreign policies of other nations. Sinologists in the West have long predicted that economic growth would eventually bring democracy to China. As James Mann points out in his new book, The China Fantasy, the idea that China will evolve into a democracy as its middle class grows continues to underlie the U.S.'s China policy, providing the central rationale for maintaining close ties with what is, after all, an unapologetically authoritarian regime. But China's Me generation could shatter such long-held assumptions. As the chief beneficiaries of China's economic success, young professionals have more and more tied up in preserving the status quo. The last thing they want is a populist politician winning over the country's hundreds of millions of have-nots on a rural-reform, stick-it-to-the-cities agenda.
中國自我一代的崛起會影響到他國的對華政策。一直以來，西方的漢學家就預言經濟增長將會給中國帶來民主。詹姆斯·曼在他的新書《中國幻想》中寫到，隨著中產階級的擴大，中國將發展成民主國家的這個觀點一直是美國對華政策的基礎，是美國與一個她不以為然的獨裁政權保持密切關係的主要原因。然而，中國的自我一代可能會讓這個長期以來的設想徹底破滅。作為中國經濟成功的主要受益者，這些年輕白領在維持現狀方麵越來越齊心。他們最不想看到的就是有政客通過農村改革等方式為廣大窮人階層謀福利。
All of which means democracy isn't likely to come to China anytime soon. And that poses challenges for Western policymakers as they try to engage China without condoning the Communist Party's record of political repression and its failures to improve the lives of the country's rural poor. China watchers say the Me generation's reluctance to agitate for reform is driven in part by a reluctance to tarnish China's moment in the sun. "They are proud of what China has accomplished, and very positive about the government," says P.T. Black, who conducts extensive marketing research for a Shanghai-based company called Jigsaw International. The political passivity of China's new élite makes sense while the good times roll. The question is what will happen to the Me generation — and to China — when they end.
所有這些都說明，中國不可能馬上實現民主。這就給西方決策者提出了挑戰，因為他們一方麵要與中國接觸，一方麵又指責共產黨進行政治鎮壓，並在改善農村貧困人群生活水平方麵工作不力。中國觀察者說，自我的一代之所以不願意進行改革，部分原因是他們不願意破壞如今“陽光燦爛”的大好形勢。“這些年輕人對中國取得的成就感到自豪，對中國政府相當有信心”，布萊克說（布萊克正在為一個以上海為基地的被稱為國際電鋸（？）的公司進行深入的市場調查。）但問題是，中國年輕精英們的這種政治被動性若是遇到好光景還行，若是好光景結束了，自我的一代和中國又將何去何從呢?
For anyone who visited the workers' paradise when it was still the land of Mao suits and communes, trying to reconcile that China to the one that young élites live in today is disorienting. When I first visited China in 1981, I went to the People's Park in Shanghai with two traveling companions. Our obligatory Foreign Ministry "guide" ushered us through a special gate reserved for "foreign friends." A knot of young Chinese had gathered outside. As we passed, a few made loud comments about the unfairness of having parts of the People's Park reserved only for foreigners. One of my companions, a Mandarin speaker, agreed volubly in Chinese. Immediately a group of young Chinese men and women surrounded us and peppered us with questions that mixed naiveté and aspiration: Are there still slaves in America? Where did you learn to speak Chinese? Do all American families really have three cars? Can you help me go to America?
毛澤東統治的時代是工人的天堂。對於訪問過那時中國的人來說，試圖調和那時的中國和今天的年輕精英生活的中國是有誤導性的。當我1981年首次訪問中國的時候，我和兩位遊伴一起來到上海的人民廣場。我們的義務“導遊”引領我們通過一個專門為“國外友人”預定的門口。那時已經有很多中國的年輕人聚集在門外麵。當我們通過的時候，有幾個年輕人大聲抱怨說把部分人民廣場專門為外國人開放是不公平的。我的一位說普通話的同伴，用漢語大聲地表示同意。馬上有很多中國的男女青年圍上我們，並且問我們各種各樣的問題：美國還有黑人奴隸嗎？你們從哪裏學中文的？真的是所有的美國家庭都有三輛車嗎？你們能幫我去美國嗎？
That discussion took place 25 years ago, the span usually allotted to a single generation. The naive, wary Chinese I met that day could be the parents of the group gathered for the seafood feast in Beijing. But there is almost nothing about the appearance, attitudes, life experience, education or dreams for the future that those young people in the Shanghai People's Park share with the likes of Vicky and her friends.
那次談話發生在25年前，而25年的時間通常可以稱為一代人。當時我遇到的那些謹慎稚氣的中國人可能是現在聚在北京進行海鮮派對的那些年輕人的父母。但是在外形、態度、生活經曆、教育程度、未來理想等方麵，當年在上海的年輕人和北京派對的薇姬和她的朋友之間卻幾乎沒有任何共同之處。
The most obvious change is demographic. Because of China's one-child policy, instituted in 1978, this is the first generation in the world's history in which a majority are single children, a group whose solipsistic tendencies have been further encouraged by a growing obsession with consumerism, the Internet and video games. At the same time, today's young Chinese are better educated and more worldly than their predecessors. Whereas the so-called Lost Generation that grew up in the Cultural Revolution often struggled to finish high school, today around a quarter of Chinese in their 20s have attended college. The country's opening to the West has allowed many more of its citizens to satisfy their curiosity about the world: some 37 million will travel overseas in 2007. In the next decade, there will be more Chinese tourists traveling the globe than the combined total of those originating in the U.S. and Europe. Rather than fueling restlessness among the Me generation, however, the ease of travel seems to provide more evidence that the benefits of globalization can be had without radical change.
這中間最明顯的變化是人口上麵的。由於中國1978年開始實行的計劃生育政策，現在的年輕人是世界曆史上絕大多數人是獨生子女的第一代人。而這個群體的傾向性更被刺激去沉溺於消費、互聯網和視頻遊戲。同時，比起過去一代人，如今的中國年輕人受到的教育多，眼界開闊。過去在文化大革命時期成長起來的、所謂的垮掉的一代要混張中學文憑都很難，而如今20多歲的年輕人中40%的人都上了大學。中國的改革開放滿足了國人對外界的好奇：2007年出境旅遊的人數約為3700萬人。此後10年間，中國出境遊的人數將超過美國和歐洲的總人口之和。出境遊的便利並不會激起自我一代進行變革的決心，而是會讓他們感到，即使沒有激烈的變革，自己也能享受到全球化所帶來的好處。
There's another reason for the lack of political ferment: it's exhausting. Like anyone else, members of the Me generation are shaped by their experiences and those of their families. When their parents talk about the Great Leap Forward (a disastrous Mao campaign in the late 1950s that left 20 million to 30 million dead of starvation) and the subsequent chaos of the Cultural Revolution, they mostly tell horror stories that would put anyone off politics forever. That chapter in Chinese history, which officially ended with Mao's death in 1976, is ancient history to today's young élites. They have known little but peace and an ever increasing economic boom. "We have so much bigger a desire for everything than [our parents]," says Maria Zhang, 27. "And the more we eat, the more we taste and see, the more we want."
政治熱情的缺乏還有另外一個原因：政治讓人精疲力竭。和其他人一樣，中國自我的一代年輕人受他們自身經曆和其家庭成員的經曆的影響很深。當他們的父母談到“大躍進”（一場二十世紀五十年代毛澤東發動的災難性的運動，導致兩三千萬人餓死）和隨後文革的混亂年代時，他們通常會講起一些可怕的故事，而這些故事足以讓任何人永遠遠離政治。中國曆史上的悲慘的時期，在1976年毛澤東死後被正式停止，而這段時期對於現在的年輕人而言仿佛是史前故事。他們僅僅知道和平和持續的經濟增長。“我們對於任何東西的期望都比我們的父母高得多，”27歲的瑪麗亞.張說，“而且我們吃的越多，我們的品位就越高，見識的就越多，因而我們想要得就更多。”
One event that the Me generation does remember is the crackdown on student activists in Tiananmen Square in 1989. But to young Chinese like Maria and Vicky, the Tiananmen protests are less a source of inspiration than an admonishment. Were popular uprisings like Tiananmen allowed to continue, Vicky believes, they would have provoked a counterreaction by conservative forces and led to a return to fortress China: no more iPods, overseas shopping trips or snowboarding weekends. "I think that the students meant well," says Vicky, who was 11 at the time and has only vague memories of what happened. But the crackdown that ended the demonstrations "certainly was needed."
中國自我的一代年輕人的確記得的事件是1989年天安門廣場上學生運動的鎮壓。但是對於瑪麗亞和維克這樣的中國年輕人來說，天安門示威遊行更是一個告誡，而不是政治熱情的激勵。維克相信，就算當時當局同意繼續天安門這樣大規模的運動，這些運動也終究會被導致保守勢力的反擊而回到閉關鎖國的中國，而那時將不會有iPod播放器、海外旅遊購物和周末滑雪。維克當年隻有11歲，對當時發生的事情隻有非常模糊的印象，他說，“我相信那些學生的意願是好的”，但是終止示威遊行的鎮壓“一定是必需的“。
Vicky embodies the shift in the priorities of young Chinese. She's a purposeful, 29-year-old actuary who rarely smiles but loves nothing better than a party. She and her friends meet so regularly for dinner and at bars that she says she never eats at home anymore. As the pictures on her blog attest, they also throw regular theme parties to mark holidays like Halloween and Christmas, and last year took a holiday to Egypt.
維克身上代表了中國年輕人興趣的轉移。維克是一個29歲的保險公司的統計員，她做事很有目的性，不苟言笑，最喜歡派對。她和她的朋友們外出就餐和參加酒吧是如此頻繁，以至於她說她再也不在家裏吃飯了。象她的博克上的圖片顯示的那樣，她們也組織主題派對來紀念像萬聖節和聖誕節這樣的西方節日，而且去年她們去埃及休假。
Encouraged by her new boyfriend Wang Ning, a keen snowboarder, Vicky decided earlier this year to take up the sport as well. To prime for it, she went to a mall in south Beijing that specializes in pricey, imported skiing gear. She chose a gleaming new snowboard made by the Colorado company Never Summer, emblazoned with colorful, psychedelic paintings of butterflies. Along with gloves, goggles and other paraphernalia, the new gear set her back about $700. When asked about the wisdom of spending a small fortune on equipment for a sport she may never take to, she says, "I believe you have to be fully prepared and equipped before you decide to start a new hobby." Besides, she adds, "even if I don't like skiing, think how nice [the gear] will look in the hallway of my apartment. Guests won't know that I don't use it." Vicky smiles to signal she's joking. But she's dead serious when she explains, over coffee at Starbucks, her lack of interest in politics. "It's because our life is pretty good. I care about my rights when it comes to the quality of a waitress in a restaurant or a product I buy. When it comes to democracy and all that, well ..." She shrugs expressively and takes a sip of her latte. "That doesn't play a role in my life."
受她的新男友-一個狂熱的滑雪者-王寧的鼓勵，維克決定今年早些時候也去參加了這項運動。為了能滑的出眾，她先去逛了一個位於北京南部的商場，這個商場專賣昂貴的進口滑雪器具。她挑了一個美國科羅拉多公司生產的光亮的新滑雪板。和手套等其他東西一起，她總共花了大約700美元。
People like Vicky and her friends represent the leading edge, the trailblazers for a huge mass of young, eagerly aspirant consumers. All over China, young professionals like these banter about blogging, travel and work-life balance. ("Work hard, play harder," says Vicky several times, repeating it in case she isn't heard.) If they can't afford to blow $700 on skiing gear, they want to be able to soon.
象維克和她的朋友們代表了時代潮流，他們是大多數年輕狂熱消費者的領路人。遍觀中國，象他們這樣的年輕白領們都熱衷於博克、旅遊以及保持工作和生活的平衡。
And so for China's leaders, placating the Me generation is seen as critical to ensuring the Communist Party's survival. By 2015, the number of Chinese adults under 30 is expected to swell 61%, to 500 million, equivalent to the entire population of the European Union. From issues of grave consequence to trivialities, the government has made clear that it will do whatever it takes to keep the swelling middle class happy. In Beijing, for example, newly prosperous residents are snapping up automobiles at a rate of 1,000 a day. The number of vehicles on the capital's sclerotic roads has doubled in the past five years, to 3 million. (By comparison, there are about 2 million vehicles registered in all of New York City.) But despite a grim pollution problem (Beijing air quality is among the world's worst) that could embarrass China during next summer's Olympic Games, the central government has made no move to curb vehicle purchases through regulation or taxes. And that, in turn, has made it harder for governments in the developed world to make progress in getting Beijing to do more to fight climate change.
That's just one example of the long-term impact of the government's focus on the Me generation. In an article in the official mouthpiece People's Daily published in February, Premier Wen Jiabao stressed that economic growth should take precedence over democratic reforms for the foreseeable future, a period that he appeared to indicate could stretch to 100 years. And yet for all its machinery of control, the party is vulnerable. Senior cadres from Wen on down have acknowledged in public that growing unrest in the provinces, as farmers clash with police over expropriated land or official corruption, could threaten the party's grip on power.
As a result, China's rulers face a dilemma: the very policies that cater to the urban middle class come at the expense of the rural poor. So far the government is erring on the side of the rich. In March the government pledged to address problems plaguing the country's peasants, such as access to medical treatment and schooling, health insurance and the disparity between urban and rural incomes. And yet a relatively small portion of the budget was set aside to address the concerns of the peasantry, with the bulk of spending still concentrated on stoking the booming economy.
Even more telling was the passage of what was widely viewed as one of the most important pieces of legislation to be put forward in several decades of reform: the revised law on property ownership. Pushed through despite objections from old-line conservatives, the law for the first time gave equal weight to both state- and private-ownership rights. But a look at the fine print shows that the law only protects things dear to the rising middle class: real estate, cars, stock-market assets. Farmers, on the other hand, will still be unable to purchase their land and instead will be forced to lease plots from the government.
If left unchanged, such policies could exacerbate China's rich-poor divide and create conditions for tumultuous social upheaval. The test for China — as the Me generation grows bigger, richer and more powerful — will be whether it begins to push for the social and political reforms that are necessary to ensure China's long-term prosperity and stability. How likely is that? Though they're not exactly clamoring for free elections, members of the new middle class have shown a willingness to stand up to authority when their interests are threatened. Last October police in Beijing attempted to enforce rules limiting each household to a single, registered animal no taller than 14 in. (35 cm). The drive sparked a rare public demonstration by hundreds of well-heeled Chinese, mostly young dog owners. Within a month, according to Hong Kong's South China Morning Post, President Hu Jintao had intervened, ordering the Beijing authorities to back off. It was the first time most Beijingers could remember a public protest drawing a direct intervention by China's top leader.
It was hardly Tiananmen, but a small triumph for free expression nonetheless. And if the West hopes to see China become democratic as well as prosperous, it will have to find ways to encourage modest breakthroughs like these, rather than expect sweeping change. At the Gang Ji Restaurant, where the dishes have been cleared and fresh fruit and more tea brought in, the mood is reflective. "We are lucky compared to our parents," says Maria Zhang, who works as a membership manager in one of the capital's most exclusive clubs. "My parents had nothing themselves. They lived for me." Wang Ning, the snowboarder who runs his own successful advertising company, agrees. "We are more self-centered. We live for ourselves, and that's good. We need to have the strength to contribute to the economy. That's our power. The power to contribute. That's how our generation is going to help the country." China's future will be defined by whether they realize that democracy can help China, too.
70年代出生的這批人,在我個人看來(主要是長期接觸後所產生的感覺):自以為是(前麵還應加個"太")；而且，相當的功利主義！從心理學的角度來歸納，這叫"心智不全"。
包括本人自己...嗬嗬！