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http://www.phil-commune.org/phpbb/viewtopic.php?t=1119
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https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind
Philosophy of mind
心靈哲學
Philosophy of mind is the philosophical study of the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, and consciousness, and of the nature of their relationship with the physical body: the so-called "mind–body problem".[1]
心靈哲學是對心靈的本性、精神事件、精神功能、精神性質和認知、以及它們和物理身體的關係的本性（這被稱為“心身問題”）的哲學性研究。
Dualism and monism are two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve the mind–body problem. Dualism asserts the separate existence of mind and body, and can be traced back to Plato[2] and Aristotle[3][4][5] in the West and the sankhya school of Hindu philosophy in the East[6] and was most precisely formulated in modern terms by René Descartes in the 17th century.[7] Monism, first proposed in the West by Parmenides and in modern times by Baruch Spinoza, maintains that there is only one substance; in the East, rough parallels might be the Hindu concept of Brahman or the Tao of Lao Tzu.[8]
二元論和一元論是兩個主要的嚐試解決心身問題的思想流派。二元論主張心靈和身體的分立存在，在西方可以追溯到柏拉圖（Plato）和亞裏斯多德（Aristotle），在東方可以追溯到印度哲學的數論派，在17世紀由笛卡兒（René Descartes）用現代的語言最為精確地表述了出來。一元論，在西方首次由巴門尼德（Parmenides）提出，現代有斯賓諾莎（Baruch Spinoza）提出，主張隻有一種實體；在東方與此大致平行的觀點是印度教的梵天概念和老子（Lao Tzu）的道。
Substance dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, while property dualists maintain that the mind is a jumble of independent properties that emerge from the brain and cannot be reduced to it, but that it is not a distinct substance.[9] Physicalists argue that only the brain actually exists, idealists maintain that the mind is all that actually exists, and neutral monists adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. The most common monisms in the 20th and 21st centuries have all been variations of materialism (or physicalism), including behaviorism, the identity theory, and functionalism.[10]
實體二元論主張心靈是獨立存在的實體，而屬性二元論持有心靈是從大腦中顯現出來的獨立屬性的混雜，它們不能被還原到大腦，但也不是獨立的另一種實體。物理主義者主張隻有大腦是真實存在的，理念主義者持有心靈是全部的真實存在，中立一元論主張有另一種中立實體，物質和心靈都是這種未知實體的屬性。在20和21世紀最常見的一元論是各種的唯物主義（或者物理主義），包含行為主義，同一理論和功能主義。
Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive or non-reductive physicalist position, maintaining in their different ways that only the brain exists.[10] Reductivists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by neuroscientific accounts of brain processes and states.[11], [12], [13] Non-reductionists argue that though the brain is all there is, the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable and cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science.[14], [15] Continued neuroscientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues, but they are far from having been resolved, and modern philosophers of mind continue to ask, "How can the subjective qualities and the intentionality (aboutness) of mental states and properties be explained in naturalistic terms?"[16], [17]
最現代的心靈哲學家接受還原或者非還原的物理主義，在這兩條不同道路上都持有隻有大腦是存在的觀點。還原主義者主張所有的精神狀態和屬性將最終由大腦處理和狀態的神經理由來解釋。非還原主義者主張雖然大腦是所有，用於描述和解釋心靈的謂語和詞匯是獨立的並且不能被還原到語言或更低地還原到物理科學的層次。持續的神經科學的發展已經幫助澄清了這些問題中的一部分，但離解決還很遠，現代心靈哲學家繼續在問，“如何能夠把精神狀態和屬性的主觀品質和意向性（關於性）用自然主義的詞匯來解釋？”
Contents [hide]
1 The mind–body problem
2 Dualist solutions to the mind–body problem
2.1 Arguments for dualism
2.2 Interaction dualism
2.3 Other forms of dualism
3 Monist solutions to the mind–body problem
3.1 Behaviorism
3.2 Identity theory
3.3 Functionalism
3.4 Nonreductive physicalism
3.5 Eliminative materialism
4 Linguistic criticism of the mind–body problem
5 Naturalism and its problems
5.1 Qualia
5.2 Intentionality
6 Philosophy of mind and science
6.1 Neurobiology
6.2 Computer science
6.3 Psychology
7 Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition
8 Consequences of philosophy of mind
8.1 Free will
8.2 The self
9 See also
10 Notes and references
11 Further reading
12 External links
目錄
1 心身問題
2 心身問題的二元論解決方案。
2.1 二元論的爭議
2.2 相互作用的二元論
2.3 其它形式的二元論
3 心身問題的一元論解決方案
3.1 行為主義
3.2 同一理論
3.3 功能主義
3.4 非還原的物理主義
3.5 取消的物理主義
4 心身問題的語言學批判
5 自然主義及其問題
5.1 感受性質
5.2 意向性
6 心靈哲學和科學
6.1 神經生物學
6.2 計算機科學
6.3 心理學
7 大陸傳統下的心靈哲學
8 心靈哲學的推論
8.1 自由意誌
8.2 自我
9 參見
10 參考和注釋
11 擴展閱讀
12 外部鏈接
The mind–body problem
The mind–body problem is essentially the problem of explaining the relationship between minds, or mental processes, and bodily states or processes.[1] Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli which arrive at our various sensory organs from the external world and that these stimuli cause changes in the states of our brain, ultimately causing us to feel a sensation which may be pleasant or unpleasant. Someone's desire for a slice of pizza will tend to cause that person to move their body in a certain manner in a certain direction in an effort to obtain what they want. But how is it possible that conscious experiences can arise out of an inert lump of gray matter endowed with electrochemical properties?[10] How does someone's desire cause that individual's neurons to fire and his muscles to contract in exactly the right manner? These are some of the essential puzzles that have confronted philosophers of mind at least from the time of René Descartes.[7]
心身問題
心身問題是解釋心靈、精神過程和身體狀態、過程之間關係的本質性問題。我們的知覺經驗依賴於從外界到達我們各種感覺器官的各種刺激，並且這些刺激導致了我們大腦狀態的變化，最終導致我們感受到了一個讓我們高興或不高興的感覺。某個人對一片比薩的渴望將導致這個人向一個特定的方向以特定的方式移動他的身體來力圖得到他所想要的東西。但現在感覺經驗是如何能夠從一個被賦予了電化學屬性的無生命的灰白物質中產生呢？而某人的願望又是如何導致了某個神經細胞的激發並且他的肌肉精確以正確的方式收縮？一些本質性的謎題至少從勒奈·笛卡兒時代開始就擺在了心靈哲學家的麵前了。
Dualist solutions to the mind–body problem
Dualism is a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, which begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical.[9]
二元論者對心身問題的解決方案
二元論是一係列的關於心靈和物質關係的觀點，這些觀點從宣稱精神現象在一定角度上不是物理性的開始。
One of the earliest known formulations of mind-body dualism existed in the eastern sankhya school of Hindu philosophy (c. 650 BCE) which divided the world into purusha (mind/spirit) and prakrti (material substance).[6] In the Western philosophical tradition, we first encounter similar ideas with the writings of Plato and Aristotle, who maintained, for different reasons, that man's "intelligence" (a faculty of the mind or soul) could not be identified with, or explained in terms of, his physical body.[2], [3]
最早被人們知道的明確表達出來的心身二元論存在於早期的印度哲學的數論學派（公元前650年），他們把世界劃分成原人（心靈/靈魂）和原質（物質實體）。在西方哲學傳統中，我們首先在柏拉圖和亞裏斯多德的作品中遇到相似的想法，他們出於不同的理由也持有人們的“智能”（心靈或靈魂的一種功能）不與物理身體同一以及不能由物理身體來解釋的觀點。
However, the best-known version of dualism is due to René Descartes (1641), and holds that the mind is a non-physical substance.[7] Descartes was the first to clearly identify the mind with consciousness and self-awareness and to distinguish this from the brain, which was the seat of intelligence. Hence, he was the first to formulate the mind–body problem in the form in which it still exists today.[7]
然而，最為著名的二元論當算勒奈·笛卡爾，說的是心靈是一種非物質的實體。笛卡爾是首次清晰地用知覺和自我意識來確定出心靈和並將其與大腦的區分開來，心靈是智能的所在地。因此，是他第一個把心身問題用現在依然在用的方式清晰地表達出來。
Arguments for dualism
The main argument in favour of dualism is simply that it appeals to the common-sense intuition of the vast majority of non-philosophically-trained people. If asked what the mind is, the average person will usually respond by identifying it with their self, their personality, their soul, or some other such entity, and they will almost certainly deny that the mind simply is the brain or vice-versa, finding the idea that there is just one ontological entity at play to be too mechanistic or simply unintelligible.[9] The majority of modern philosophers of mind reject dualism, suggesting that these intuitions, like many others, are probably misleading. We should use our critical faculties, as well as empirical evidence from the sciences, to examine these assumptions and determine if there is any real basis to them.[9]
二元論的爭議
支持二元論的說法簡單說來就是它投合大量的沒有哲學訓練的人們的常識直覺。如果問心靈是什麽，正常人將通常以對他們自己、他們的個性、他們的靈魂或者其他這樣的對象的確認作為回答。並且他們也幾乎都將拒絕心靈簡單地隻是大腦或者反過來（大腦隻是心靈）的說法，覺得那種舞台上隻有一種存在論的對象的狀況是太機械了或者僅是太讓人莫名其妙了。現代心靈哲學的主流拒絕二元論，說這些直覺，和其他的許多直覺一樣，很容易令人誤解。我們要使用我們批判的能力，還有科學裏的經驗證實，來檢驗這些假設並決定是否有什麽東西真的是基於它們的。
Another very important, more modern, argument in favor of dualism consists is the idea that the mental and the physical seem to have quite different and perhaps irreconcilable properties.[18] Mental events have a certain subjective quality to them, whereas physical events obviously do not. For example, what does a burned finger feel like? What does blue sky look like? What does nice music sound like? Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events qualia (or raw feels).[18] There is something that it is like to feel pain, to see a familiar shade of blue, and so on; there are qualia involved in these mental events. And the claim is that qualia seem particularly difficult to reduce to anything physical.[19]
另一個非常重要的，更現代的，支持二元論的想法是精神的和物質好像有著非常不同也許是互相矛盾的屬性。精神事件有著相當主觀性的品質，而物理事件明顯不是如此。比如， 一個燒過的手指的感覺是什麽樣的？藍天看起來是什麽樣的？美好的音樂聽起來如何？心靈哲學家稱精神事件的主觀方麵為感受性質（或生感覺）。存在著一些東西似乎可以感到疼，看到一點點地藍色，等等；在這些精神事件中包含著感覺性質。用斷言來說是感受性質似乎特別難以還原到如何物質的東西上去。
Interaction dualism
Interactionist dualism, or simply interactionism, is the particular form of dualism first espoused by Descartes in the Meditations.[7] In the 20th century, its major defenders have been Karl Popper and John Carew Eccles.[20] It is the view that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, causally interact with physical states.[9] Descartes' famous argument for this position can be summarized as follows: Fred has a clear and distinct idea of his mind as a thinking thing which has no spatial extension (i.e., it cannot be measured in terms of length, weight, height, and so on) and he also has a clear and distinct idea of his body as something that is spatially extended, subject to quantification and not able to think. It follows that mind and body are not identical because they have radically different properties, according to Descartes.[7]
相互作用的二元論
相互作用的二元論，或者隻是相互作用論，是二元論的某種特定形式，首先由笛卡爾在沉思錄中提出的。在20世紀，它的主要擁護者有卡爾·波普爾和John Carew Eccles。它是如此的觀點：精神狀態，比如信仰和願望，有原因地地和物理狀態相互作用。笛卡爾的最著名的關於這一點的論據可以被總結如下：佛瑞德有一個清晰和獨特的關於他的心靈的觀點，作為一個思想著的沒有空間廣延性（比如，他不能用長度，重量，高度等等來測量）的東西，並且他也有關於他的身體的清晰和獨特的觀點，他的身體是有用空間廣延性的，可以用量衡量的，不能思考的。隨之而來的想法就是：按笛卡爾的說法，心靈和身體是不一樣的，由於他們有著根本上不同的屬性。
At the same time, however, it is clear that Fred's mental states (desires, beliefs, etc.) have causal effects on his body and vice-versa: a child touches a hot stove (physical event) which causes pain (mental event) and makes him yell (physical event) which provokes a sense of fear and protectiveness in the mother (mental event) and so on.
同時，然而，顯然佛瑞德的精神狀態（願望，信仰等等）因果性地影響他的身體，反之亦然：一個小孩碰到一個燙火爐（物理事件）導致了疼痛（精神事件）使得他大叫（物理事件），這激發了她媽媽的恐懼感和保護欲（精神事件）等等。
Descartes' argument obviously depends on the crucial premise that what Fred believes to be "clear and distinct" ideas in his mind are necessarily true. Most modern philosophers doubt the validity of such an assumption, since it has been shown in modern times by Freud (a third-person psychologically-trained observer can understand a person's unconscious motivations better than he does), by Duhem (a third-person philosopher of science can know a person's methods of discovery better than he does), by Malinowski (an anthropologist can know a person's customs and habits better than he does), and by theorists of perception (experiments can make one see things that are not there and scientists can describe a person's perceptions better than he can), that such an idea of privileged and perfect access to one's own ideas is dubious at best.[21]
笛卡爾的論據明顯地依賴於關鍵的前提：佛瑞德相信他心靈中“清晰和獨特”的觀點不可避免地是真的。大多數現代哲學家懷疑這一個假定，由於現代的人們已經看到的許多新的成果。弗洛伊德的第三人稱的受過心理訓練的觀察者能夠理解比某人自己更好地理解他的無意識的動機，Duhem的一個第三人稱的科學哲學家能夠比某人更好地知道他的探索時使用的方法，Malinowski的一個人類學家能夠比某人自己更好地知道他的傳統和習慣，還有感知理論說明實驗可以使得某人看見不在那裏的東西，科學家可以比某人自己能夠的更好地描述他的感覺）。這樣的認為一個人對自己的觀念有優先的和完美的訪問性的想法受到人們最多的懷疑。
Other forms of dualism
Other important forms of dualism which arose as reactions to, or attempts to salvage, the Cartesian version are:
其它形式的二元論
其它重要的二元論形式還有如下，它們作為對笛卡爾版本的反響或挽救嚐試而出現。
1) Psycho-physical parallelism, or simply parallelism, is the view that mind and body, while having distinct ontological statuses, do not causally influence one another, but run along parallel paths (mind events causally interact with mind events and brain events causally interact with brain events) and only seem to influence each other.[22] This view was most prominently defended by Gottfried Leibniz. Although Leibniz was actually an ontological monist who believed that only one fundamental substance, monads, exists in the universe and everything else is reducible to it, he nonetheless maintained that there was an important distinction between "the mental" and "the physical" in terms of causation. He held that God had arranged things in advance so that minds and bodies would be in harmony with each other. This is known as the doctrine of pre-established harmony.[23]
1）身心平行論，或者簡單稱為平行論，是這樣一種觀點：有著不同的存在論狀態的心靈和身體並不在因果性上互相影響，但以平行的方式一起運行（心靈事件和心理事件間有因果交互作用，大腦和大腦事件間有因果交互作用），看起來像是互相影響著。這個觀點主要的支持者有哥特弗裏德·萊布尼茲。雖然萊布尼茲實際上是一個存在論上的一元論者，他相信隻有一種基礎實體——單子——存在於宇宙中，以及其它的所有東西都可以還原成它，但是他還是持有在精神和物質之間從因果關係上看有明顯的不同的觀點。他堅持上帝事先安排了事物，這樣心靈和身體就可以相互的協調一致。這被稱為先定的和諧。
2) Occasionalism is the view espoused by Nicholas Malebranche which asserts that all supposedly causal relations between physical events or between physical and mental events are not really causal at all. While body and mind are still different substances on this view, causes (whether mental or physical) are related to their effects by an act of God's intervention on each specific occasion.[24]
2）偶因論是馬勒伯朗士支持的觀點，這個觀點斷言所有的物理事件之間或者物理事件和精神事件之間的因果關係並非因果性的。雖然在這個觀點中身體和心靈依然是不同的實體，原因（無論精神的還是物理的）通過上帝在各個具體場合的幹預行為而關聯於它們的效果。
3) Epiphenomenalism is a doctrine first formulated by Thomas Henry Huxley.[25] Fundamentally, it consists in the view that mental phenomena are causally inefficacious. Physical events can cause other physical events and physical events can cause mental events, but mental events cannot cause anything, since they are just causally inert by-products (i.e. epiphenomena) of the physical world.[22] The view has been defended most strongly in recent times by Frank Jackson.[26]
3）副現象論是一種首先由赫胥黎清晰提出的學說。根本地說它堅持精神現象在因果上是無效用的。物理事件能夠導致其它的物理事件並且物理事件可以導致精神事件，但精神事件不能導致任何事情，這是由於它們隻是以物理世界為原因的惰性的副產品（比如副現象）。這個觀點近期有Frank Jackson進行了有力地辯護。
4) Property dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e. in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge. Hence, it is a sub-branch of emergent materialism.[9] These emergent properties have an independent ontological status and cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the physical substrate from which they emerge. This position is espoused by David Chalmers and has undergone something of a renaissance in recent years.[27]
4）屬性二元論提出但物質以恰當的方式組織（比如以活著的人體的方式組織），精神現象就會湧現。因此，它是湧現唯物主義的子分支。這些湧現的屬性有一個獨立的存在論狀態並且不能還原到或者解釋到它們所從出的物理基底上。這個陣營有David Chalmers支持，在近幾年正在複興。
Monist solutions to the mind–body problem
In contrast to dualism, monism states that there is only one fundamental substance. Today the most common forms of monism in Western philosophy are physicalistic.[10] Physicalistic monism asserts that the only existing substance is physical, in some sense of that term to be clarified by our best science.[28] However, a variety of formulations are possible (see below). Another form of monism is that which states that the only existing substance is mental. Such idealistic monism is currently somewhat uncommon in the West.[10]
心身問題的一元論解決方案
與二元論正相反，一元論宣稱隻有一種基本物質。今天在西方哲學最普遍的一元論形式是物理主義。物理主義的一元論斷言唯一存在的物質是物理性的，這點在某種意義上被我們最好的科學所澄清。關於此有許多種可能的表達方式（見下）。另一個可能的一元論形式說的是那唯一存在的實體是精神。這樣的唯心主義的一元論現在在西方不很常見。
Phenomenalism, the theory that all that exists are the representations (or sense data) of external objects in our minds and not the objects themselves, was adopted by Bertrand Russell and many of the logical positivists during the early 20th century.[29] It lasted for only a very brief period of time. A third possibility is to accept the existence of a basic substance which is neither physical nor mental. The mental and physical would both be properties of this neutral substance. Such a position was adopted by Baruch Spinoza[8] and popularized by Ernst Mach[30] in the 19th century. This neutral monism, as it is called, resembles property dualism. In the following discussion, only physicalistic monisms are considered. (See also: idealism.)
現象主義，這個理論說所有存在著的是外部對象在我們心靈中的表象（或者感覺資料），而不是那些對象自身。這個理論被羅素和20世紀的許多邏輯實證主義者所采納。它持續了很短的一段時間。第三種的可能性是接受基本實體的存在，這種基本實體既不是物質的也不是心靈的。心靈和物質都是這種中立實體的屬性。這樣的觀點在19世紀被斯賓諾莎所采用，並由馬赫推廣。這種中立的一元論，就如它的名字一樣，類似於性質二元論。在下麵的討論中，隻有物理主義一元論被考慮在內。（參見唯心主義）
Behaviorism
Main article: Behaviorism
Behaviorism dominated philosophy of mind for much of the 20th century, especially the first half.[10] In psychology, behaviorism developed as a reaction to the inadequacies of introspectionism.[28] Introspective reports on one's own interior mental life are not subject to careful examination for accuracy and are not generalizable. Without generalizability and the possibility of third-person examination, the behaviorists argued, science is simply not possible.[28] The way out for psychology was to eliminate the idea of an interior mental life (and hence an ontologically independent mind) altogether and focus instead on the description of observable behavior.[31]
行為主義
參見主體文章：行為主義
在20世紀的大部分時間裏，特別是前半個世紀，行為主義支配了心靈哲學。在心理學領域，行為主義作為對內省主義的不充分性的反應而發展了起來。一個人自己的內部精神生活的內省性的報告不會為了精確性而受製於精心的檢測，而且也是不可歸納的。行為主義爭辯說，沒有了可概括性和第三人稱實驗的可能性，那很簡單地科學在此也就沒有了可能性。心理學可取的道路就隻是去除內部精神生活的觀念（因此也就是去除一種存在論的獨立心靈）並把注意力放在可觀察行為的描述上。
Parallel to these developments in psychology, a philosophical behaviorism (sometimes called logical behaviorism) was developed.[28] This is characterized by a strong verificationism, which generally considers unverifiable statements about interior mental life senseless. But what are mental states if they are not interior states on which one can make introspective reports? The answer of the behaviorist is that mental states do not exist but are actually just descriptions of behavior and/or dispositions to behave made by external third parties in order to explain and predict others' behavior.[32]
和這些心理學的發展並行的，一個哲學上的行為主義（有時被叫做邏輯行為主義）發展了起來。它以強烈的實證主義為特征，這種想法一般把關於內部精神生活的不可驗證的陳述當作無意義的。但如果沒有個人能夠進行內省報告的內部狀態，那什麽是精神狀態呢？行為主義的回答是精神狀態並不存在，它實際上就是由外部的第三人為了解釋或預見他人行為而做出的行為與/或行為傾向的描述。
Philosophical behaviorism is considered by most modern philosophers of mind to be outdated.[1] Apart from other problems, behaviorism implausibly maintains, for example, that someone is talking about behavior if she reports that she has a wracking headache.
哲學性的行為主義被大多數的現代心靈哲學家認為是過時了的。行為主義持有的這樣的看法：如果她某人報告說她頭痛得厲害，那麽他隻是在談論她的行為。先不管其它問題，單是這就讓人難以置信。
Identity theory
Main article: Type physicalism
Type physicalism (or type-identity theory) was developed by John Smart[13] and Ullin Place[33] as a direct reaction to the failure of behaviorism. These philosophers reasoned that, if mental states are something material, but not behavior, then mental states are probably identical to internal states of the brain. In very simplified terms: a mental state M is nothing other than brain state B. The mental state "desire for a cup of coffee" would thus be nothing more than the "firing of certain neurons in certain brain regions".[13]
同一理論
參見主體文章：類型物理主義
類型物理主義（或稱為類型同一理論）是由John Smart和Ullin Place作為對行為主義的缺點的直接響應而發展起來的。這些哲學家如此推理：如果精神狀態是一些物質性的東西，而不是行為，那麽精神狀態就可能和大腦的內部狀態是同一的。簡單地說：一個精神狀態M隻是大腦的狀態B。精神狀態“想要一杯咖啡”也從而隻是“在大腦特定區域的特定神經的激發”。
Despite a certain initial plausibility, the identity theory faces at least one heavy challenge in the form of the thesis of multiple realizability, which was first formulated by Hilary Putnam.[15] It seems clear that not only humans, but also amphibians, for example, can experience pain. On the other hand, it seems very improbable that all of these diverse organisms with the same pain are in the same identical brain state. If this is not the case however, then pain cannot be identical to a certain brain state. Thus the identity theory is empirically unfounded.[15]
雖然一開始看起來似乎有道理，同一理論也至少在其采用的多重真實理論方式上麵臨著一個嚴重的挑戰，這由Hilary Putnam首次明確提出。似乎很清楚的是不隻是人類，比如兩棲類，也能夠體驗到疼痛。另一方麵，各種不同的有相同的痛感的生物體都處於同一的大腦狀態，這似乎也不大可能。這樣同一理論就經驗看來沒有依據。
But even if this is the case, it does not follow that identity theories of all types must be abandoned. According to token identity theories, the fact that a certain brain state is connected with only one "mental" state of a person does not have to mean that there is an absolute correlation between types of mental states and types of brain state. The type-token distinction can be illustrated by a simple example: the word "green" contains four types of letters (g, r,e, n) with two tokens (occurrences) of the letter e along with one each of the others. The idea of token identity is that only particular occurrences of mental events are identical with particular occurrences or tokenings of physical events.[34] Anomalous monism (see below) and most other non-reductive physicalisms are token-identity theories.[35] Despite the problems faced by the type identity theory, however, there is a renewed interest in it these days, primarily due to the influence of Jaegwon Kim.[13]
但即使情況是如此，這並不導致說各種類型的同一理論必須被拋棄。按照標記同一理論，一個特定的大腦狀態一定關聯於人的唯一的“精神”狀態是一個事實，但這並不必須意味著在精神狀態的類型和大腦狀態的類型之間一定要有一個完全的對應關係。類型和標記之間的差別可以用簡單的例子演示出來：詞“green”包含了四種類型的字母（g，r，e，n），其中字母e出現了兩次（兩個標記，兩次發生），一個跟著另一個。記號同一的觀點說的是隻有精神狀態的特定發生是和特定物理事件的發生、標記是同一的。反常的一元論（見下）和大多數其它的非還原論的物理主義是標記同一理論。不管類型同一理論麵臨的問題，最近由於Jaegwon Kim的影響，又獲得了人們的興趣。
Functionalism
Main article: Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
Functionalism was formulated by Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor as a reaction to the inadequacies of the identity theory.[15] Putnam and Fodor saw mental states in terms of an empirical computational theory of the mind.[36] At about the same time or slightly after, D.M. Armstrong and David Kellogg Lewis formulated a version of functionalism which analyzed the mental concepts of folk psychology in terms of functional roles.[37] Finally, Wittgenstein's idea of meaning as use led to a version of functionalism as a theory of meaning, further developed by Wilfrid Sellars and Gilbert Harman.
功能主義
參見主體文章：功能主義（心靈哲學）
功能主義是由Hilary Putnam和Jerry Fodor作為對同一理論的不充分性的響應而提出來的。Putnam和Fodor從一個經驗的計算性的心靈理論角度看待精神狀態。幾乎在同一時間或者稍後一些，D.M. Armstrong和David Kellogg Lewis提出了一個版本的功能主義，其中把民族心理學中的精神概念用功能角色來分析。最後，維特根斯坦的意義即使用的觀點導致了一種版本的作為意義理論的功能主義，這個方向由Wilfrid Sellars和Gilbert Harman進一步推進。
What all these different varieties of functionalism share in common is the thesis that mental states are essentially characterized by their causal relations with other mental states and with sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. That is, functionalism quantifies over, or abstracts away from, the details of the physical implementation of a mental state by characterizing it in terms of non-mental functional properties. For example, a kidney is characterized scientifically by its functional role in filtering blood and maintaining certain chemical balances. From this point of view, it does not really matter whether the kidney be made up of organic tissue, plastic nanotubes or silicon chips: it is the role that it plays and its relations to other organs that define it as a kidney.[36]
所有這些不同的功能主義共享的理論是：精神狀態本質地以其和其它精神狀態、感覺輸入、行為輸出的因果關係為特點。這也就是說，功能主義是從一個精神狀態的物理實現細節中，通過使用非精神性的功能屬性來刻畫，從而量化或者說是抽象出來的。比如，一個腎按科學的方法來刻畫其特點就在於它在過濾血液和維持一定的化學平衡上的功能性角色。從這個觀點看，腎是否是由器官組織還是由塑料納米管、矽芯片組成的並不重要：是它所扮演的角色和它和其它器官之間的關係界定了它是一個腎。
Nonreductive physicalism
Many philosophers hold firmly to two essential convictions with regard to mind–body relations:
1. Physicalism is true and mental states must be physical states.
2. All reductionist proposals are unsatisfactory: mental states cannot be reduced to behavior, brain states or functional states.[28]
非還原性的物理主義
許多哲學家對於心身關係堅定地持有兩個本質性的信念：
1.物理主義是對的並且精神狀態必須是物理狀態。
2.所有的還原主義者的提議都是不能令人滿意的：精神狀態不能被還原到行為、大腦狀態或者功能狀態上。
Hence, the question arises whether there can still be a non-reductive physicalism. Donald Davidson's anomalous monism[14] is an attempt to formulate such a physicalism.
因此，問題就來了，是否可以有非還原性的物理主義。Donald Davidson的反常的一元論就是一次想要闡明這樣一種物理主義的嚐試。
The idea is often formulated in terms of the thesis of supervenience: mental states supervene on physical states, but are not reducible to them. "Supervenience" therefore describes a functional dependence: there can be no change in the mental without some change in the physical.[38]
這個觀點通常用隨附理論的方式描述：精神狀態隨附在物理狀態上，但又不能還原到物理狀態。隨附性描述了一種功能的依賴：可以在精神上有（原文是沒但看起來像應是有？）變化而在物質上沒有變化。
Eliminative materialism
Main article: Eliminative materialism
If one is a materialist but believes that all reductive efforts have failed and that a non-reductive materialism is incoherent, then one can adopt a final, more radical position: eliminative materialism. Eliminative materialists maintain that mental states are fictitious entities introduced by everyday "folk psychology".[11] Should "folk psychology", which eliminativists view as a quasi-scientific theory, be proven wrong in the course of scientific development, then we must also abolish all of the entities postulated by it.
取消的物理主義
參見主體文章：取消的物理主義
如果一個人是唯物主義者但相信所有還原的努力都已經失敗了，以及一個非還原的唯物主義是條理不通的，那麽一個人接受一個最終的、更激進的立場是：取消的唯物主義。取消的唯物主義持有的觀點是：精神狀態是由“民族心理學”介紹進來的假想的實體。“民族心理學”被取消主義者看成是一種準科學的理論，它應該在科學的發展過程中被證明是錯誤的嗎？而後我們就必須廢除所有由它假定的實體。
Eliminativists such as Patricia and Paul Churchland often invoke the fate of other, erroneous popular theories and ontologies which have arisen in the course of history.[11], [12] For example, the belief in witchcraft as a cause of people's problems turned out to be wrong and the consequence is that most people no longer believe in the existence of witches. Witchcraft is not explained in terms of some other phenomenon, but rather eliminated from the discourse.[12]
取消主義者，比如Patricia和Paul Churchland經常那些引用其它的、錯誤地廣受歡迎的在曆史中湧現出來的理論和存在論。比如，魔法中作為人們遇到的各種問題原因的信念，現在被當成錯誤的而被排除出去了，其後果是大多數人們不再相信女巫的存在了。魔法並不被解釋成其它的現象，而是從人們的談話中被取消了。
Linguistic criticism of the mind–body problem
Each attempt to answer the mind–body problem encounters substantial problems. Some philosophers argue that this is because there is an underlying conceptual confusion.[39] Such philosophers reject the mind–body problem as an illusory problem. Such a position is represented in analytic philosophy these days, for the most part, by the followers of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Wittgensteinian tradition of linguistic criticism.[40] The exponents of this position explain that it is an error to ask how mental and biological states fit together. Rather it should simply be accepted that humans can be described in different ways - for instance, in a mental and in a biological vocabulary. Illusory problems arise if one tries to describe the one in terms of the other's vocabulary or if the mental vocabulary is used in the wrong contexts.[40] This is the case for instance, if one searches for mental states of the brain. The brain is simply the wrong context for the use of mental vocabulary - the search for mental states of the brain is therefore a category error or a pure conceptual confusion.[40]
對心身問題的語言學上的批判
每種回答心身問題的努力都麵臨不小的問題。一些哲學家說這是由於這個問題中有一些底層的概念混淆。這樣的哲學家把心身問題看成是一個幻想出來的問題而加以拒絕。現在在很大程度上，分析哲學通過由維特根斯坦的追隨者和維特根斯坦的語言批判傳統代表了這個立場。這個立場的代表者解釋說：問精神和生物狀態之間如何相互結合是錯誤的。他們寧可更簡單地接受人可以在不同的方式上被描述的觀點，比如，可以以精神的方式或以生物學詞匯的方式。如果一個人嚐試用其中另一方的詞匯來描述某方，或者精神性的詞匯被用在了錯誤的上下文中，這都會導致幻想性的心身問題的出現。舉個例子，比如一個人在大腦中去搜尋精神狀態。簡要說來，大腦對精神性詞匯來說是一個錯誤的上下文、用詞環境，也由此這個對精神狀態的搜尋就是一個範疇錯誤或者說是一個純粹的概念混淆。
Today, such a position is often adopted by interpreters of Wittgenstein such as Peter Hacker.[39] However, Hilary Putnam, the inventor of functionalism, has also adopted the position that the mind–body problem is an illusory problem which should be dissolved according to the manner of Wittgenstein.[41]
今天，這樣的立場經常被維特根斯坦的解釋者所采納，比如Peter Hacker。然而，普特南（Hilary Putnam），功能主義的發明者，也采用這個立場：心身問題是一個幻想出來的問題，要按維特根斯坦的方式被解決掉。
Naturalism and its problems
The thesis of physicalism is that the mind is part of the material (or physical) world. Such a position faces the fundamental problem that the mind has certain properties that no material thing possesses. Physicalism must therefore explain how it is possible that these properties can emerge from a material thing nevertheless. The project of providing such an explanation is often referred to as the "naturalization of the mental."[28] What are the crucial problems that this project must attempt to resolve? The most well-known are probably the following two:[28]
自然主義及其問題
物理主義的基礎是心靈是物質（或物理）世界的一部分。這樣的立場麵臨的基本問題是：心靈有著物質的物體所不具有的特定的性質。由此物理主義必須解釋這些性質如何能夠從一個物質的東西中湧現出來的。提供這樣一個解釋的方案經常借助於“精神的植入”。什麽是這些方案必須嚐試去解決的至關重要的問題呢？最廣為人知的可能就是如下的兩個：
Qualia
Main article: Qualia
Many mental states have the property of being experienced subjectively in different ways by different individuals.[19] For example, it is obviously characteristic of the mental state of pain that it hurts. Moreover, your sensation of pain may not be identical with mine, since we have no way of measuring how much something hurts or describing exactly how it feels to hurt. Where does such an experience (quale) come from? Nothing indicates that a neural or functional state can be accompanied by such a pain experience. Often the point is formulated as follows: the existence of cerebral events, in and of themselves, cannot explain why they are accompanied by these corresponding qualitative experiences. Why do many cerebral processes occur with an accompanying experiential aspect in consciousness? It seems impossible to explain.[18]
感受性質
參見主體文章：感受性質
許多精神狀態有著被不同個人以不同方式主觀性地體驗著的性質。比如，受傷時有著明顯個性化的關於疼痛的精神狀態。此外，你的疼痛的體驗不會和我的相同一，由於我們沒有一個方式可以來衡量一個東西被傷害得如何厲害，或者精確地描述他對傷害的感覺。這的一個經驗（感受性質）從何而來？沒有什麽能夠指定那樣的一個神經或功能狀態會伴隨著這樣的一個疼痛經驗。這個觀點經常被表述如下：他們的或者他們身體中的大腦事件的存在不能解釋為何他們伴隨有這些對應的感受性質的經驗。 為何許多大腦過程的發生都有一個伴隨的意識中的經驗性方麵？這看來不可能被解釋。
Yet it also seems to many that science will eventually have to explain such experiences.[28] This follows from the logic of reductive explanations. If I try to explain a phenomenon reductively (e.g., water), I also have to explain why the phenomenon has all of the properties that it has (e.g., fluidity, transparency).[28]In the case of mental states, this means that there needs to be an explanation of why they have the property of being experienced in a certain way.
雖然在許多人看起來似乎科學最終將不得不解釋這樣的經驗。這源於還原性解釋的邏輯。如果我嚐試還原性的解釋一個現象（比如，水），我也不得不解釋為何這個現象有它所有的那些性質（比如：流動性、透明性）。對於精神狀態，這意味著需要一個解釋，以一定的方式來解釋為何他們有被解釋的那些性質。
Intentionality
Intentionality is the capacity of mental states to be directed towards (about) or be in relation with something in the external world.[17] This property of mental states entails that they have contents and semantic referents and can therefore be assigned truth values. When one tries to reduce these states to natural processes there arises a problem: natural processes are not true or false, they simply happen.[42] It would not make any sense to say that a natural process is true or false. But mental ideas or judgments are true or false, so how then can mental states (ideas or judgments) be natural processes? The possibility of assigning semantic value to ideas must mean that such ideas are about facts. Thus, for example, the idea that Herodotus was a historian refers to Herodotus and to the fact that he was an historian. If the fact is true, then the idea is true; otherwise, it is false. But where does this relation come from? In the brain, there are only electrochemical processes and these seem not to have anything to do with Herodotus.[16]
意向性
意向性是精神狀態具有的直接朝向（關於）和外部世界或者和外部世界處於關係中的能力。這個精神狀態的性質使得他們具有了內容和語義上的指稱物，並從而能被賦予真值。當人們想要把這些狀態還原成自然過程的時候，出現了一個問題：自然過程並不是真的或假的，它們隻是發生了。說一個自然過程是真的還是假的這沒有意義。但精神觀念或者判斷是真的或者假的，那麽精神狀態（觀念或判斷）如何的是自然過程呢？把一個語義值分配給一個觀點的可能性意味著這樣的觀念必須要是關於事實的。這樣，比如，希羅多德是一個曆史學家的觀念提到了希羅多德以及他是一個曆史學家的事實。如果這個事實是真的，那麽這個觀念是真的；否則，它是假的。但是這樣的關係從何而來？在大腦裏，那裏隻有電化學的過程並且那裏好像和希羅多德沒有任何關係。
Philosophy of mind and science
Humans are corporeal beings and, as such, they are subject to examination and description by the natural sciences. Since mental processes are not independent of bodily processes, the descriptions that the natural sciences furnish of human beings play an important role in the philosophy of mind.[1] There are many scientific disciplines that study processes related to the mental. The list of such sciences includes: biology, computer science, cognitive science, cybernetics, linguistics, medicine, pharmacology, psychology, etc.[43]
心靈哲學和科學哲學
人類是物質的存在物，同樣地，他們適用於自然科學的檢驗和描述。由於精神過程不是獨立於身體過程的，自然科學提供的關於人類的描述在心靈哲學中也占有重要的地位。有許多科學學科研究與精神相關的過程。這樣的科學包括：生物學，計算機科學，認知科學，控製論，語言學，醫學，藥理學，心理學，等等。
Neurobiology
The theoretical background of biology, as is the case with modern natural sciences in general, is fundamentally materialistic. The objects of study are, in the first place, physical processes, which are considered to be the foundations of mental activity and behavior.[44] The increasing success of biology in the explanation of mental phenomena can be seen by the absence of any empirical refutation of its fundamental presupposition: "there can be no change in the mental states of a person without a change in brain states."[43]
神經生物學
生物學的理論背景，和現代自然科學大體上說來一樣，在基礎上是唯物主義的。研究的對象首先是物理過程，物理過程被看成是精神活動和行為的基礎。由於缺乏任何經驗主義的駁斥它的基礎假設：“一個人沒有大腦狀態的改變就沒有精神狀態的改變。”，生物學在解釋精神現象上不斷取得成功。
Within the field of neurobiology, there are many subdisciplines which are concerned with the relations between mental and physical states and processes:[44]
Sensory neurophysiology investigates the relation between the processes of perception and stimulation.[45]
Cognitive neuroscience studies the correlations between mental processes and neural processes.[45]
Neuropsychology describes the dependence of mental faculties on specific anatomical regions of the brain.[45]
Lastly, evolutionary biology studies the origins and development of the human nervous system and, in as much as this is the basis of the mind, also describes the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of mental phenomena beginning from their most primitive stages.[43]
在精神生物學的領域內，有許多分支學科是涉及到精神和物理狀態、過程之間的關係的：
感覺神經生理學研究感覺過程和刺激之間的關係。
認知神經科學研究精神過程和神經過程之間的關係。
神經心理學描述精神本能對特定大腦解剖組織的依賴關係。
最後，進化生物學研究人類神經係統的起源和發展，由於這是心靈的基礎。也描述精神現象從它最原始階段開始的個體發育和係統發育。
The methodological breakthroughs of the neurosciences, in particular the introduction of high-tech neuroimaging procedures, has propelled scientists toward the elaboration of increasingly ambitious research programs: one of the main goals is to describe and comprehend the neural processes which correspond to mental functions (see: neural correlate).[44] A very small number of neurobiologists, such as Emil du Bois-Reymond and John Eccles have denied the possibility of a "reduction" of mental phenomena to cerebral processes, partly for religious reasons.[20] However, the contemporary neurobiologist and philosopher Gerhard Roth continues to defend a form of "non-reductive materialism."[46]
神經科學的方法上的突破，特別是高科技的神經成像程序的引入，推動著科學家營建雄心勃勃的研究計劃：一個主要的目標是描述和理解對應於那些精神功能（參見：“神經關係”）的神經過程。一個非常少的神經生物學家，比如Emil du Bois-Reymond和John Eccles已經拒絕了從精神現象到大腦過程的“還原”的可能性，這部分地是出於宗教的原因。然而，現代神經生物學家和哲學家Gerhard Roth在不斷地為一種“非還原的唯物主義”辯護。
Computer science
Computer science concerns itself with the automatic processing of information (or at least with physical systems of symbols to which information is assigned) by means of such things as computers.[47] From the beginning, computer programmers have been able to develop programs which permit computers to carry out tasks for which organic beings need a mind. A simple example is multiplication. But it is clear that computers do not use a mind to multiply. Could they, someday, come to have what we call a mind? This question has been propelled into the forefront of much philosophical debate because of investigations in the field of artificial intelligence ("AI").
計算機科學
計算機科學關心的是信息的自動處理過程（或至少被賦予信息的物理符號係統），並依靠這樣的過程而成其為計算機。從一開始，計算機程序員就能夠開發出讓計算機執行任務的程序，這樣的任務對一個有機存在者來說是需要擁有心靈才能完成的。一個簡單的例子是乘法運算。但很顯然計算機並不使用心靈來做乘法。他們是否會在某一天擁有我們稱為心靈的東西？由於對人工智能的研究，這個問題已經被提到了許多哲學討論的議題中。
Within AI, it is common to distinguish between a modest research program and a more ambitious one: this distinction was coined by John Searle in terms of a weak AI and a strong AI. The exclusive objective of "weak AI", according to Searle, is the successful simulation of mental states, with no attempt to make computers become conscious or aware, etc. The objective of strong AI, on the contrary, is a computer with consciousness similar to that of human beings.[48] The program of strong AI goes back to one of the pioneers of computation Alan Turing. As an answer to the question "Can computers think?", he formulated the famous Turing test.[49] Turing believed that a computer could be said to "think" when, if placed in a room by itself next to another room which contained a human being and with the same questions being asked of both the computer and the human being by a third party human being, the computer's responses turned out be to indistinguishable from those of the human. Essentially, Turing's view of machine intelligence followed the behaviourist model of the mind - intelligence is as intelligence does. The Turing test has received many criticisms, among which the most famous is probably the Chinese room thought experiment formulated by Searle.[48]
在人工智能中，在一種謙虛的探索和一個更雄心勃勃的探索之間通常有一個分界：John Searle將這個分界的兩方分別稱為弱人工智能和強人工智能。按Searle的看法，成功模擬精神狀態被排除在“弱人工智能”的目標之外，不去嚐試將計算機變得有意識和感知等。關於強人工智能的目標可以回溯到一個計算機領域的先驅圖靈（Alan Turing）。作為對“計算機能思考嗎？”問題的一個回答，他提出了著名的圖靈測試。圖靈相信一個計算機能夠被稱得上“思考”如果他通過如下的測試：把它放在一個房間裏，而在隔壁的房間裏有一個人，有第三個人對這台計算機和這個人提一樣的問題，計算機的響應測試後被認為是無法和人的響應區分開來。本質上來說，圖靈關於機器智能的觀點是取行為主義者的心靈模型的——智能就是智能所做的。圖靈測試受到了許多批評，在其中最有名的可能是由Searle表述出來的中文屋思考實驗了。
The question about the possible sensitivity (qualia) of computers or robots still remains open. Some computer scientists believe that the specialty of AI can still make new contributions to the resolution of the "mind body problem". They suggest that based on the reciprocal influences between software and hardware that takes place in all computers, it is possible that someday theories can be discovered that help us to understand the reciprocal influences between the human mind and the brain (wetware).[50]
關於計算機或者機器人的感受能力（感受性質）的可能性的問題還處在討論中。一些計算機科學家相信人工智能專業還能對“心身問題”的解答做出新的貢獻。他們提出基於所有計算機中軟件和硬件的相互影響，可能有天能夠發現有助於我們理解人類心靈和大腦（濕件）之間相互影響的理論。
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Psychology
Psychology is the science that investigates mental states directly. It uses generally empirical methods to investigate concrete mental states like joy, fear or obsessions. Psychology investigates the laws that bind these mental states to each other or with inputs and outputs to the human organism.[51]
心理學
心理學是直接考察精神狀態的科學。它一般使用經驗主義的方法來考察具體的精神狀態，像快樂，害怕或者困擾。心理學考察把這些精神狀態間以及他們和有機體的輸入、輸出之間互相約束的規律，
An example of this is the psychology of perception. Scientists working in this field have discovered general principles of the perception of forms. A law of the psychology of forms says that objects that move in the same direction are perceived as related to each other.[43] This law describes a relation between visual input and mental perceptual states. However, it does not suggest anything about the nature of perceptual states. The laws discovered by psychology are compatible with all the answers to the mind–body problem already described.
對此的一個例子是感知心理學。這個領域中的科學家發現了形式感知普遍規律。形式心理學的一條規律是：在相同方向上運動的物體會被感到是關聯在一起的。這個規律描述了視覺輸入和精神感覺狀態之間的關係。然而，它沒有對關於感覺狀態的本性提出什麽看法。心理學家發現的規律可以和所有已經描述的對心身問題的回答相兼容。
Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition
Most of the discussion in this article has focused on the predominant school (or style) of philosophy in modern Western culture, usually called analytic philosophy (sometimes also inaccurately described as Anglo-American philosophy).[52] Other schools of thought exist, however, which are sometimes (also misleadingly) subsumed under the broad label of continental philosophy.[52] In any case, the various schools that fall under this label (phenomenology, existentialism, etc.) tend to differ from the analytic school in that they focus less on language and logical analysis and more on directly understanding human existence and experience. With reference specifically to the discussion of the mind, this tends to translate into attempts to grasp the concepts of thought and perceptual experience in some direct sense that does not involve the analysis of linguistic forms.[52]
大陸傳統下的心理哲學
這篇文章中的大部分討論是關注在現代西方文化中有支配性的哲學學派（或樣式），他們通常被稱為分析哲學（有時也不嚴格地被叫為英美哲學）。還存在著其他的學派，然而，它們有時（也是令人誤解的）被包括在大陸哲學的大標簽下。無論如何，在這個標簽下的各個學派（現象學，存在主義，等等）和分析哲學的取向不同在前者更少地關注語言和邏輯分析，而更多地關注對人類存在和經驗的直接理解。在關於心靈的討論中，它們傾向於嚐試抓住的思想和感覺經驗的概念，采用一種直接的方式而不涉及語言形式的分析。
In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel discusses three distinct types of mind: the subjective mind, the mind of an individual; the objective mind, the mind of society and of the State; and the Absolute mind, a unity of all concepts. See also Hegel's Philosophy of Mind from his Encyclopedia.[53]
在黑格爾（Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel）的《精神現象學》中，黑格爾討論了三種不同的心靈類型：主體性的心靈，一個個體的心靈；客體性的心靈，社會和國家的心靈；絕對的心靈，一個各種概念的統一。參見黑格爾的《哲學全書》中的“精神哲學”。
In modern times, the two main schools that have developed in response or opposition to this Hegelian tradition are Phenomenology and Existentialism. Phenomenology, founded by Edmund Husserl, focuses on the contents of the human mind (see noema) and how phenomenological processes shape our experiences.[54] Existentialism, a school of thought led by Jean-Paul Sartre, focuses on the content of experiences and how the mind deals with such experiences.[55]
現代，兩個從響應或者反對黑格爾傳統發展起來的主要學派是現象學和存在主義。由胡塞爾（Edmund Husserl）建立的現象學關注於人類心靈的內容（意向相關項）和現象的過程如何塑造了我們經驗。存在主義，一種由薩特（Jean-Paul Sartre）引領的學派，關注於經驗的內容和心靈是如何處理經驗的。
An important, though not very well known, example of a philosopher of mind and cognitive scientist who tries to synthesize ideas from both traditions is Ron McClamrock. Borrowing from Herbert Simon and also influenced by the ideas of existential phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger, McClamrock suggests that man's condition of being-in-the-world ("Dasein", "In-der-welt-sein") makes it impossible for him to understand himself by abstracting away from it and examining it as if it were a detached experimental object of which he himself is not an integral part.[56]
雖然知道人不多，作為一個力圖綜合兩種傳統的心靈哲學家和認知科學家的例子的是Ron McClamrock。借鑒Herbert Simon，受到存在主義現象學家梅洛-龐蒂（Maurice Merleau-Ponty）和海德格爾（Martin Heidegger）的影響，McClamrock提出了這樣的看法：人的狀況是“在世界之中存在”（"Dasein", "In-der-welt-sein"），但人們卻想采用了從這種狀況中抽離出來並檢驗它的方法來理解他自己，就好像這種狀態是一個被分開的經驗性對象，對它來說他不是一個整合而不可分的部分，這是不可能成功的。
Consequences of philosophy of mind
There are countless subjects that are affected by the ideas developed in the philosophy of mind. Clear examples of this are the nature of death and its definitive character, the nature of emotion, of perception and of memory. Questions about what a person is and what his or her identity consists of also have much to do with the philosophy of mind. There are two subjects that, in connection with the philosophy of the mind, have aroused special attention: free will and the self.[1]
心靈哲學的推論
有無數的主題受到了心靈哲學中發展出來的觀念的影響。關於此的明顯的例子是死亡的本性和它的最終特性，情緒、感覺、記憶的本性。關於一個人是什麽和他或她的同一性的由什麽組成的問題也和心靈哲學有很大的關係。有兩個和心靈哲學有關的主題引起了人們特別的注意，它們是：自由意誌和自我。
Free will
Main article: Free will
In the context of the philosophy of mind, the question about the freedom of the will takes on a renewed intensity. This is certainly the case, at least, for materialistic determinists.[1] According to this position, natural laws completely determine the course of the material world. Mental states, and therefore the will as well, would be material states which means human behavior and decisions would be completely determined by natural laws. Some take this argumentation a step further: people cannot determine by themselves what they want and what they do. Consequently, they are not free.[57]
自由意誌
參見主體文章：自由意誌
在心靈哲學的文本環境中，關於意誌的自由的問題再次得到了關注。至少對於唯物主義決定論者情況是這樣的。按照他們的立場，自然規律完全決定了物理世界的過程。精神狀態，以及同樣的對於意誌，也是物質的狀態，這意味著人類的行為和決定也完全被自然規律所決定。這討論延伸一步就是：人們，他們自己，不能決定他們要什麽，他們做什麽。由此推論，他們沒有自由。
This argumentation is rejected, on the one hand, by the compatibilists. Those who adopt this position suggest that the question "Are we free?" can only be answered once we have determined what the term "free" means. The opposite of "free" is not "caused" but "compelled" or "coerced". It is not appropriate to identify freedom with indetermination. A free act is one where the agent could have done otherwise if she had chosen otherwise. In this sense a person can be free even though determinism is true.[57] The most important compatibilist in the history of the philosophy was David Hume. [58]Nowadays, this position is defended, for example, by Daniel Dennett.[59]
在一方麵，這個看法被相容論者所拒絕。采納這個立場的人們提出，問題“我們是自由的嗎？”隻有在我們能夠決定“自由”一詞是什麽意思後才能被回答。 “自由”的反麵不是“受因果約束的”而是“強迫的”或者“強製的”。把自由定義成不確定的是合適的。一個自由的行為是一種行為者如果選擇其它的的那他就可以做其它的狀況。在這種意義下，即使決定論是真的，一個人也可以是自由的。哲學史上最重要的相容論者是休謨（David Hume）。現在，這個立場被諸如Daniel Dennett等所拒絕。
On the other hand, there are also many incompatibilists who reject the argument because they believe that the will is free in a stronger sense called originationism.[57] These philosophers affirm that the course of the world is not completely determined by natural laws: the will at least does not have to be and, therefore, it is potentially free. The most prominent incompatibilist in the history of philosophy was Immanuel Kant.[60] Critics of this position accuse the incompatibilists of using an incoherent concept of freedom. They argue as follows: if our will is not determined by anything, then we desire what we desire by pure chance. And if what we desire is purely accidental, we are not free. So if our will is not determined by anything, we are not free.[57]
在另一方麵，也有許多非相容論者，它們拒絕這個觀點，由於他們以一種被稱為源起論的方式強烈地相信意誌自由。這些哲學家強調世界的過程不完全是被自然規律決定的：至少意誌不是如此，也由此它是潛在的自由的。哲學史上最突出的非相容論者是康德（Immanuel Kant）。這個立場的批評家譴責非相容論者在使用一個不前後一貫的自由概念。他們的觀點如下：如果我們的意誌不是被任何東西決定的，那麽我們就是完全偶然地想要我們所想要的。那麽如果我們所想要的完全是意外的，我們就不是自由的。所以如我們的意誌不是被任何東西所決定，我們就不是自由的。
The self
The philosophy of mind also has important consequences for the concept of self. If by "self" or "I" one refers to an essential, immutable nucleus of the person, most modern philosophers of mind will affirm that no such thing exists.[61] The idea of a self as an immutable essential nucleus derives from the Christian idea of an immaterial soul. Such an idea is unacceptable to most contemporary philosophers, due to their physicalistic orientations, and due to a general acceptance among philosophers of the scepticism of the concept of 'self' by David Hume, who could never catch himself doing, thinking or feeling anything.[62] However, in the light of empirical results from developmental psychology, developmental biology and the neurosciences, the idea of an essential inconstant, material nucleus - an integrated representational system distributed over changing patterns of synaptic connections - seems reasonable.[63]
自我
心靈哲學在自我的概念方麵也有重要的推論。如果一個人用“自我”或者“我”一詞來指一個本質上的、不變的他這個人的核心，大多數現代心靈哲學家回斷言說沒有這麽一個東西存在。把自我看成是一個本質的不變的核心的觀念源於基督教的非實質的靈魂的觀念。這樣的一種觀念對現代的大多數哲學家來說是不可接受的，由於他們物理主義的取向，由於一個在哲學家中被大體上接受了的休謨對“自我”概念的懷疑論看法：一個人從不能捕捉到他自己正在做什麽，想什麽或者感到什麽。然而，依照發展著的心理學、發展著的生物學和神經科學的經驗主義的結果，那種有一個本質的，變化無常的，物質性的核心——一個分布於變化著的突觸連接模式中的整合的代表係統——的看法也似乎是有道理的。
In view of this problem, some philosophers affirm that we should abandon the idea of a self.[61] For example, Thomas Metzinger and Susan Blackmore both practice meditation, claiming that this gives us reliable conscious experience of selflessness.[64] Philosophers and scientists holding this view frequently talk of the self, "I", agency and related concepts as 'illusory', a view with parallels in some Eastern religious traditions, such as anatta in Buddhism.[65] But this is a minority position. More common is the view that we should redefine the concept: by "self" we would not be referring to some immutable and essential nucleus, but to something that is in permanent change. A well-known defender of this position is Daniel Dennett.[61]
考慮到這個問題，一些哲學家斷言我們應該拋棄自我的觀念。比如，Thomas Metzinger和Susan Blackmore都踐行過冥想，宣稱這給我們關於無我的可靠的感知經驗。持有這樣觀點的哲學家和科學家經常談論自我，“我”，行為者和關於“幻”的概念，這個概念在東方宗教傳統中也有接近的內容，比如佛教中的無我。但這是一個少數人的立場。更普遍的觀點是我們要重新定義概念：用“自我”一詞我們不應指某種不變的和本質的核心，而應指一些一直在變化著的東西。這個立場的一個有名的擁護者是Daniel Dennet。
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind
Philosophy of mind
心靈哲學
Philosophy of mind is the philosophical study of the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, and consciousness, and of the nature of their relationship with the physical body: the so-called "mind–body problem".[1]
心靈哲學是對心靈的本性、精神事件、精神功能、精神性質和認知、以及它們和物理身體的關係的本性（這被稱為“心身問題”）的哲學性研究。
Dualism and monism are two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve the mind–body problem. Dualism asserts the separate existence of mind and body, and can be traced back to Plato[2] and Aristotle[3][4][5] in the West and the sankhya school of Hindu philosophy in the East[6] and was most precisely formulated in modern terms by René Descartes in the 17th century.[7] Monism, first proposed in the West by Parmenides and in modern times by Baruch Spinoza, maintains that there is only one substance; in the East, rough parallels might be the Hindu concept of Brahman or the Tao of Lao Tzu.[8]
二元論和一元論是兩個主要的嚐試解決心身問題的思想流派。二元論主張心靈和身體的分立存在，在西方可以追溯到柏拉圖（Plato）和亞裏斯多德（Aristotle），在東方可以追溯到印度哲學的數論派，在17世紀由笛卡兒（René Descartes）用現代的語言最為精確地表述了出來。一元論，在西方首次由巴門尼德（Parmenides）提出，現代有斯賓諾莎（Baruch Spinoza）提出，主張隻有一種實體；在東方與此大致平行的觀點是印度教的梵天概念和老子（Lao Tzu）的道。
Substance dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, while property dualists maintain that the mind is a jumble of independent properties that emerge from the brain and cannot be reduced to it, but that it is not a distinct substance.[9] Physicalists argue that only the brain actually exists, idealists maintain that the mind is all that actually exists, and neutral monists adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. The most common monisms in the 20th and 21st centuries have all been variations of materialism (or physicalism), including behaviorism, the identity theory, and functionalism.[10]
實體二元論主張心靈是獨立存在的實體，而屬性二元論持有心靈是從大腦中顯現出來的獨立屬性的混雜，它們不能被還原到大腦，但也不是獨立的另一種實體。物理主義者主張隻有大腦是真實存在的，理念主義者持有心靈是全部的真實存在，中立一元論主張有另一種中立實體，物質和心靈都是這種未知實體的屬性。在20和21世紀最常見的一元論是各種的唯物主義（或者物理主義），包含行為主義，同一理論和功能主義。
Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive or non-reductive physicalist position, maintaining in their different ways that only the brain exists.[10] Reductivists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by neuroscientific accounts of brain processes and states.[11], [12], [13] Non-reductionists argue that though the brain is all there is, the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable and cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science.[14], [15] Continued neuroscientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues, but they are far from having been resolved, and modern philosophers of mind continue to ask, "How can the subjective qualities and the intentionality (aboutness) of mental states and properties be explained in naturalistic terms?"[16], [17]
最現代的心靈哲學家接受還原或者非還原的物理主義，在這兩條不同道路上都持有隻有大腦是存在的觀點。還原主義者主張所有的精神狀態和屬性將最終由大腦處理和狀態的神經理由來解釋。非還原主義者主張雖然大腦是所有，用於描述和解釋心靈的謂語和詞匯是獨立的並且不能被還原到語言或更低地還原到物理科學的層次。持續的神經科學的發展已經幫助澄清了這些問題中的一部分，但離解決還很遠，現代心靈哲學家繼續在問，“如何能夠把精神狀態和屬性的主觀品質和意向性（關於性）用自然主義的詞匯來解釋？”
Contents [hide]
1 The mind–body problem
2 Dualist solutions to the mind–body problem
2.1 Arguments for dualism
2.2 Interaction dualism
2.3 Other forms of dualism
3 Monist solutions to the mind–body problem
3.1 Behaviorism
3.2 Identity theory
3.3 Functionalism
3.4 Nonreductive physicalism
3.5 Eliminative materialism
4 Linguistic criticism of the mind–body problem
5 Naturalism and its problems
5.1 Qualia
5.2 Intentionality
6 Philosophy of mind and science
6.1 Neurobiology
6.2 Computer science
6.3 Psychology
7 Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition
8 Consequences of philosophy of mind
8.1 Free will
8.2 The self
9 See also
10 Notes and references
11 Further reading
12 External links
目錄
1 心身問題
2 心身問題的二元論解決方案。
2.1 二元論的爭議
2.2 相互作用的二元論
2.3 其它形式的二元論
3 心身問題的一元論解決方案
3.1 行為主義
3.2 同一理論
3.3 功能主義
3.4 非還原的物理主義
3.5 取消的物理主義
4 心身問題的語言學批判
5 自然主義及其問題
5.1 感受性質
5.2 意向性
6 心靈哲學和科學
6.1 神經生物學
6.2 計算機科學
6.3 心理學
7 大陸傳統下的心靈哲學
8 心靈哲學的推論
8.1 自由意誌
8.2 自我
9 參見
10 參考和注釋
11 擴展閱讀
12 外部鏈接
The mind–body problem
The mind–body problem is essentially the problem of explaining the relationship between minds, or mental processes, and bodily states or processes.[1] Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli which arrive at our various sensory organs from the external world and that these stimuli cause changes in the states of our brain, ultimately causing us to feel a sensation which may be pleasant or unpleasant. Someone's desire for a slice of pizza will tend to cause that person to move their body in a certain manner in a certain direction in an effort to obtain what they want. But how is it possible that conscious experiences can arise out of an inert lump of gray matter endowed with electrochemical properties?[10] How does someone's desire cause that individual's neurons to fire and his muscles to contract in exactly the right manner? These are some of the essential puzzles that have confronted philosophers of mind at least from the time of René Descartes.[7]
心身問題
心身問題是解釋心靈、精神過程和身體狀態、過程之間關係的本質性問題。我們的知覺經驗依賴於從外界到達我們各種感覺器官的各種刺激，並且這些刺激導致了我們大腦狀態的變化，最終導致我們感受到了一個讓我們高興或不高興的感覺。某個人對一片比薩的渴望將導致這個人向一個特定的方向以特定的方式移動他的身體來力圖得到他所想要的東西。但現在感覺經驗是如何能夠從一個被賦予了電化學屬性的無生命的灰白物質中產生呢？而某人的願望又是如何導致了某個神經細胞的激發並且他的肌肉精確以正確的方式收縮？一些本質性的謎題至少從勒奈·笛卡兒時代開始就擺在了心靈哲學家的麵前了。
Dualist solutions to the mind–body problem
Dualism is a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, which begins with the claim that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical.[9]
二元論者對心身問題的解決方案
二元論是一係列的關於心靈和物質關係的觀點，這些觀點從宣稱精神現象在一定角度上不是物理性的開始。
One of the earliest known formulations of mind-body dualism existed in the eastern sankhya school of Hindu philosophy (c. 650 BCE) which divided the world into purusha (mind/spirit) and prakrti (material substance).[6] In the Western philosophical tradition, we first encounter similar ideas with the writings of Plato and Aristotle, who maintained, for different reasons, that man's "intelligence" (a faculty of the mind or soul) could not be identified with, or explained in terms of, his physical body.[2], [3]
最早被人們知道的明確表達出來的心身二元論存在於早期的印度哲學的數論學派（公元前650年），他們把世界劃分成原人（心靈/靈魂）和原質（物質實體）。在西方哲學傳統中，我們首先在柏拉圖和亞裏斯多德的作品中遇到相似的想法，他們出於不同的理由也持有人們的“智能”（心靈或靈魂的一種功能）不與物理身體同一以及不能由物理身體來解釋的觀點。
However, the best-known version of dualism is due to René Descartes (1641), and holds that the mind is a non-physical substance.[7] Descartes was the first to clearly identify the mind with consciousness and self-awareness and to distinguish this from the brain, which was the seat of intelligence. Hence, he was the first to formulate the mind–body problem in the form in which it still exists today.[7]
然而，最為著名的二元論當算勒奈·笛卡爾，說的是心靈是一種非物質的實體。笛卡爾是首次清晰地用知覺和自我意識來確定出心靈和並將其與大腦的區分開來，心靈是智能的所在地。因此，是他第一個把心身問題用現在依然在用的方式清晰地表達出來。
Arguments for dualism
The main argument in favour of dualism is simply that it appeals to the common-sense intuition of the vast majority of non-philosophically-trained people. If asked what the mind is, the average person will usually respond by identifying it with their self, their personality, their soul, or some other such entity, and they will almost certainly deny that the mind simply is the brain or vice-versa, finding the idea that there is just one ontological entity at play to be too mechanistic or simply unintelligible.[9] The majority of modern philosophers of mind reject dualism, suggesting that these intuitions, like many others, are probably misleading. We should use our critical faculties, as well as empirical evidence from the sciences, to examine these assumptions and determine if there is any real basis to them.[9]
二元論的爭議
支持二元論的說法簡單說來就是它投合大量的沒有哲學訓練的人們的常識直覺。如果問心靈是什麽，正常人將通常以對他們自己、他們的個性、他們的靈魂或者其他這樣的對象的確認作為回答。並且他們也幾乎都將拒絕心靈簡單地隻是大腦或者反過來（大腦隻是心靈）的說法，覺得那種舞台上隻有一種存在論的對象的狀況是太機械了或者僅是太讓人莫名其妙了。現代心靈哲學的主流拒絕二元論，說這些直覺，和其他的許多直覺一樣，很容易令人誤解。我們要使用我們批判的能力，還有科學裏的經驗證實，來檢驗這些假設並決定是否有什麽東西真的是基於它們的。
Another very important, more modern, argument in favor of dualism consists is the idea that the mental and the physical seem to have quite different and perhaps irreconcilable properties.[18] Mental events have a certain subjective quality to them, whereas physical events obviously do not. For example, what does a burned finger feel like? What does blue sky look like? What does nice music sound like? Philosophers of mind call the subjective aspects of mental events qualia (or raw feels).[18] There is something that it is like to feel pain, to see a familiar shade of blue, and so on; there are qualia involved in these mental events. And the claim is that qualia seem particularly difficult to reduce to anything physical.[19]
另一個非常重要的，更現代的，支持二元論的想法是精神的和物質好像有著非常不同也許是互相矛盾的屬性。精神事件有著相當主觀性的品質，而物理事件明顯不是如此。比如， 一個燒過的手指的感覺是什麽樣的？藍天看起來是什麽樣的？美好的音樂聽起來如何？心靈哲學家稱精神事件的主觀方麵為感受性質（或生感覺）。存在著一些東西似乎可以感到疼，看到一點點地藍色，等等；在這些精神事件中包含著感覺性質。用斷言來說是感受性質似乎特別難以還原到如何物質的東西上去。
Interaction dualism
Interactionist dualism, or simply interactionism, is the particular form of dualism first espoused by Descartes in the Meditations.[7] In the 20th century, its major defenders have been Karl Popper and John Carew Eccles.[20] It is the view that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, causally interact with physical states.[9] Descartes' famous argument for this position can be summarized as follows: Fred has a clear and distinct idea of his mind as a thinking thing which has no spatial extension (i.e., it cannot be measured in terms of length, weight, height, and so on) and he also has a clear and distinct idea of his body as something that is spatially extended, subject to quantification and not able to think. It follows that mind and body are not identical because they have radically different properties, according to Descartes.[7]
相互作用的二元論
相互作用的二元論，或者隻是相互作用論，是二元論的某種特定形式，首先由笛卡爾在沉思錄中提出的。在20世紀，它的主要擁護者有卡爾·波普爾和John Carew Eccles。它是如此的觀點：精神狀態，比如信仰和願望，有原因地地和物理狀態相互作用。笛卡爾的最著名的關於這一點的論據可以被總結如下：佛瑞德有一個清晰和獨特的關於他的心靈的觀點，作為一個思想著的沒有空間廣延性（比如，他不能用長度，重量，高度等等來測量）的東西，並且他也有關於他的身體的清晰和獨特的觀點，他的身體是有用空間廣延性的，可以用量衡量的，不能思考的。隨之而來的想法就是：按笛卡爾的說法，心靈和身體是不一樣的，由於他們有著根本上不同的屬性。
At the same time, however, it is clear that Fred's mental states (desires, beliefs, etc.) have causal effects on his body and vice-versa: a child touches a hot stove (physical event) which causes pain (mental event) and makes him yell (physical event) which provokes a sense of fear and protectiveness in the mother (mental event) and so on.
同時，然而，顯然佛瑞德的精神狀態（願望，信仰等等）因果性地影響他的身體，反之亦然：一個小孩碰到一個燙火爐（物理事件）導致了疼痛（精神事件）使得他大叫（物理事件），這激發了她媽媽的恐懼感和保護欲（精神事件）等等。
Descartes' argument obviously depends on the crucial premise that what Fred believes to be "clear and distinct" ideas in his mind are necessarily true. Most modern philosophers doubt the validity of such an assumption, since it has been shown in modern times by Freud (a third-person psychologically-trained observer can understand a person's unconscious motivations better than he does), by Duhem (a third-person philosopher of science can know a person's methods of discovery better than he does), by Malinowski (an anthropologist can know a person's customs and habits better than he does), and by theorists of perception (experiments can make one see things that are not there and scientists can describe a person's perceptions better than he can), that such an idea of privileged and perfect access to one's own ideas is dubious at best.[21]
笛卡爾的論據明顯地依賴於關鍵的前提：佛瑞德相信他心靈中“清晰和獨特”的觀點不可避免地是真的。大多數現代哲學家懷疑這一個假定，由於現代的人們已經看到的許多新的成果。弗洛伊德的第三人稱的受過心理訓練的觀察者能夠理解比某人自己更好地理解他的無意識的動機，Duhem的一個第三人稱的科學哲學家能夠比某人更好地知道他的探索時使用的方法，Malinowski的一個人類學家能夠比某人自己更好地知道他的傳統和習慣，還有感知理論說明實驗可以使得某人看見不在那裏的東西，科學家可以比某人自己能夠的更好地描述他的感覺）。這樣的認為一個人對自己的觀念有優先的和完美的訪問性的想法受到人們最多的懷疑。
Other forms of dualism
Other important forms of dualism which arose as reactions to, or attempts to salvage, the Cartesian version are:
其它形式的二元論
其它重要的二元論形式還有如下，它們作為對笛卡爾版本的反響或挽救嚐試而出現。
1) Psycho-physical parallelism, or simply parallelism, is the view that mind and body, while having distinct ontological statuses, do not causally influence one another, but run along parallel paths (mind events causally interact with mind events and brain events causally interact with brain events) and only seem to influence each other.[22] This view was most prominently defended by Gottfried Leibniz. Although Leibniz was actually an ontological monist who believed that only one fundamental substance, monads, exists in the universe and everything else is reducible to it, he nonetheless maintained that there was an important distinction between "the mental" and "the physical" in terms of causation. He held that God had arranged things in advance so that minds and bodies would be in harmony with each other. This is known as the doctrine of pre-established harmony.[23]
1）身心平行論，或者簡單稱為平行論，是這樣一種觀點：有著不同的存在論狀態的心靈和身體並不在因果性上互相影響，但以平行的方式一起運行（心靈事件和心理事件間有因果交互作用，大腦和大腦事件間有因果交互作用），看起來像是互相影響著。這個觀點主要的支持者有哥特弗裏德·萊布尼茲。雖然萊布尼茲實際上是一個存在論上的一元論者，他相信隻有一種基礎實體——單子——存在於宇宙中，以及其它的所有東西都可以還原成它，但是他還是持有在精神和物質之間從因果關係上看有明顯的不同的觀點。他堅持上帝事先安排了事物，這樣心靈和身體就可以相互的協調一致。這被稱為先定的和諧。
2) Occasionalism is the view espoused by Nicholas Malebranche which asserts that all supposedly causal relations between physical events or between physical and mental events are not really causal at all. While body and mind are still different substances on this view, causes (whether mental or physical) are related to their effects by an act of God's intervention on each specific occasion.[24]
2）偶因論是馬勒伯朗士支持的觀點，這個觀點斷言所有的物理事件之間或者物理事件和精神事件之間的因果關係並非因果性的。雖然在這個觀點中身體和心靈依然是不同的實體，原因（無論精神的還是物理的）通過上帝在各個具體場合的幹預行為而關聯於它們的效果。
3) Epiphenomenalism is a doctrine first formulated by Thomas Henry Huxley.[25] Fundamentally, it consists in the view that mental phenomena are causally inefficacious. Physical events can cause other physical events and physical events can cause mental events, but mental events cannot cause anything, since they are just causally inert by-products (i.e. epiphenomena) of the physical world.[22] The view has been defended most strongly in recent times by Frank Jackson.[26]
3）副現象論是一種首先由赫胥黎清晰提出的學說。根本地說它堅持精神現象在因果上是無效用的。物理事件能夠導致其它的物理事件並且物理事件可以導致精神事件，但精神事件不能導致任何事情，這是由於它們隻是以物理世界為原因的惰性的副產品（比如副現象）。這個觀點近期有Frank Jackson進行了有力地辯護。
4) Property dualism asserts that when matter is organized in the appropriate way (i.e. in the way that living human bodies are organized), mental properties emerge. Hence, it is a sub-branch of emergent materialism.[9] These emergent properties have an independent ontological status and cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the physical substrate from which they emerge. This position is espoused by David Chalmers and has undergone something of a renaissance in recent years.[27]
4）屬性二元論提出但物質以恰當的方式組織（比如以活著的人體的方式組織），精神現象就會湧現。因此，它是湧現唯物主義的子分支。這些湧現的屬性有一個獨立的存在論狀態並且不能還原到或者解釋到它們所從出的物理基底上。這個陣營有David Chalmers支持，在近幾年正在複興。
Monist solutions to the mind–body problem
In contrast to dualism, monism states that there is only one fundamental substance. Today the most common forms of monism in Western philosophy are physicalistic.[10] Physicalistic monism asserts that the only existing substance is physical, in some sense of that term to be clarified by our best science.[28] However, a variety of formulations are possible (see below). Another form of monism is that which states that the only existing substance is mental. Such idealistic monism is currently somewhat uncommon in the West.[10]
心身問題的一元論解決方案
與二元論正相反，一元論宣稱隻有一種基本物質。今天在西方哲學最普遍的一元論形式是物理主義。物理主義的一元論斷言唯一存在的物質是物理性的，這點在某種意義上被我們最好的科學所澄清。關於此有許多種可能的表達方式（見下）。另一個可能的一元論形式說的是那唯一存在的實體是精神。這樣的唯心主義的一元論現在在西方不很常見。
Phenomenalism, the theory that all that exists are the representations (or sense data) of external objects in our minds and not the objects themselves, was adopted by Bertrand Russell and many of the logical positivists during the early 20th century.[29] It lasted for only a very brief period of time. A third possibility is to accept the existence of a basic substance which is neither physical nor mental. The mental and physical would both be properties of this neutral substance. Such a position was adopted by Baruch Spinoza[8] and popularized by Ernst Mach[30] in the 19th century. This neutral monism, as it is called, resembles property dualism. In the following discussion, only physicalistic monisms are considered. (See also: idealism.)
現象主義，這個理論說所有存在著的是外部對象在我們心靈中的表象（或者感覺資料），而不是那些對象自身。這個理論被羅素和20世紀的許多邏輯實證主義者所采納。它持續了很短的一段時間。第三種的可能性是接受基本實體的存在，這種基本實體既不是物質的也不是心靈的。心靈和物質都是這種中立實體的屬性。這樣的觀點在19世紀被斯賓諾莎所采用，並由馬赫推廣。這種中立的一元論，就如它的名字一樣，類似於性質二元論。在下麵的討論中，隻有物理主義一元論被考慮在內。（參見唯心主義）
Behaviorism
Main article: Behaviorism
Behaviorism dominated philosophy of mind for much of the 20th century, especially the first half.[10] In psychology, behaviorism developed as a reaction to the inadequacies of introspectionism.[28] Introspective reports on one's own interior mental life are not subject to careful examination for accuracy and are not generalizable. Without generalizability and the possibility of third-person examination, the behaviorists argued, science is simply not possible.[28] The way out for psychology was to eliminate the idea of an interior mental life (and hence an ontologically independent mind) altogether and focus instead on the description of observable behavior.[31]
行為主義
參見主體文章：行為主義
在20世紀的大部分時間裏，特別是前半個世紀，行為主義支配了心靈哲學。在心理學領域，行為主義作為對內省主義的不充分性的反應而發展了起來。一個人自己的內部精神生活的內省性的報告不會為了精確性而受製於精心的檢測，而且也是不可歸納的。行為主義爭辯說，沒有了可概括性和第三人稱實驗的可能性，那很簡單地科學在此也就沒有了可能性。心理學可取的道路就隻是去除內部精神生活的觀念（因此也就是去除一種存在論的獨立心靈）並把注意力放在可觀察行為的描述上。
Parallel to these developments in psychology, a philosophical behaviorism (sometimes called logical behaviorism) was developed.[28] This is characterized by a strong verificationism, which generally considers unverifiable statements about interior mental life senseless. But what are mental states if they are not interior states on which one can make introspective reports? The answer of the behaviorist is that mental states do not exist but are actually just descriptions of behavior and/or dispositions to behave made by external third parties in order to explain and predict others' behavior.[32]
和這些心理學的發展並行的，一個哲學上的行為主義（有時被叫做邏輯行為主義）發展了起來。它以強烈的實證主義為特征，這種想法一般把關於內部精神生活的不可驗證的陳述當作無意義的。但如果沒有個人能夠進行內省報告的內部狀態，那什麽是精神狀態呢？行為主義的回答是精神狀態並不存在，它實際上就是由外部的第三人為了解釋或預見他人行為而做出的行為與/或行為傾向的描述。
Philosophical behaviorism is considered by most modern philosophers of mind to be outdated.[1] Apart from other problems, behaviorism implausibly maintains, for example, that someone is talking about behavior if she reports that she has a wracking headache.
哲學性的行為主義被大多數的現代心靈哲學家認為是過時了的。行為主義持有的這樣的看法：如果她某人報告說她頭痛得厲害，那麽他隻是在談論她的行為。先不管其它問題，單是這就讓人難以置信。
Identity theory
Main article: Type physicalism
Type physicalism (or type-identity theory) was developed by John Smart[13] and Ullin Place[33] as a direct reaction to the failure of behaviorism. These philosophers reasoned that, if mental states are something material, but not behavior, then mental states are probably identical to internal states of the brain. In very simplified terms: a mental state M is nothing other than brain state B. The mental state "desire for a cup of coffee" would thus be nothing more than the "firing of certain neurons in certain brain regions".[13]
同一理論
參見主體文章：類型物理主義
類型物理主義（或稱為類型同一理論）是由John Smart和Ullin Place作為對行為主義的缺點的直接響應而發展起來的。這些哲學家如此推理：如果精神狀態是一些物質性的東西，而不是行為，那麽精神狀態就可能和大腦的內部狀態是同一的。簡單地說：一個精神狀態M隻是大腦的狀態B。精神狀態“想要一杯咖啡”也從而隻是“在大腦特定區域的特定神經的激發”。
Despite a certain initial plausibility, the identity theory faces at least one heavy challenge in the form of the thesis of multiple realizability, which was first formulated by Hilary Putnam.[15] It seems clear that not only humans, but also amphibians, for example, can experience pain. On the other hand, it seems very improbable that all of these diverse organisms with the same pain are in the same identical brain state. If this is not the case however, then pain cannot be identical to a certain brain state. Thus the identity theory is empirically unfounded.[15]
雖然一開始看起來似乎有道理，同一理論也至少在其采用的多重真實理論方式上麵臨著一個嚴重的挑戰，這由Hilary Putnam首次明確提出。似乎很清楚的是不隻是人類，比如兩棲類，也能夠體驗到疼痛。另一方麵，各種不同的有相同的痛感的生物體都處於同一的大腦狀態，這似乎也不大可能。這樣同一理論就經驗看來沒有依據。
But even if this is the case, it does not follow that identity theories of all types must be abandoned. According to token identity theories, the fact that a certain brain state is connected with only one "mental" state of a person does not have to mean that there is an absolute correlation between types of mental states and types of brain state. The type-token distinction can be illustrated by a simple example: the word "green" contains four types of letters (g, r,e, n) with two tokens (occurrences) of the letter e along with one each of the others. The idea of token identity is that only particular occurrences of mental events are identical with particular occurrences or tokenings of physical events.[34] Anomalous monism (see below) and most other non-reductive physicalisms are token-identity theories.[35] Despite the problems faced by the type identity theory, however, there is a renewed interest in it these days, primarily due to the influence of Jaegwon Kim.[13]
但即使情況是如此，這並不導致說各種類型的同一理論必須被拋棄。按照標記同一理論，一個特定的大腦狀態一定關聯於人的唯一的“精神”狀態是一個事實，但這並不必須意味著在精神狀態的類型和大腦狀態的類型之間一定要有一個完全的對應關係。類型和標記之間的差別可以用簡單的例子演示出來：詞“green”包含了四種類型的字母（g，r，e，n），其中字母e出現了兩次（兩個標記，兩次發生），一個跟著另一個。記號同一的觀點說的是隻有精神狀態的特定發生是和特定物理事件的發生、標記是同一的。反常的一元論（見下）和大多數其它的非還原論的物理主義是標記同一理論。不管類型同一理論麵臨的問題，最近由於Jaegwon Kim的影響，又獲得了人們的興趣。
Functionalism
Main article: Functionalism (philosophy of mind)
Functionalism was formulated by Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor as a reaction to the inadequacies of the identity theory.[15] Putnam and Fodor saw mental states in terms of an empirical computational theory of the mind.[36] At about the same time or slightly after, D.M. Armstrong and David Kellogg Lewis formulated a version of functionalism which analyzed the mental concepts of folk psychology in terms of functional roles.[37] Finally, Wittgenstein's idea of meaning as use led to a version of functionalism as a theory of meaning, further developed by Wilfrid Sellars and Gilbert Harman.
功能主義
參見主體文章：功能主義（心靈哲學）
功能主義是由Hilary Putnam和Jerry Fodor作為對同一理論的不充分性的響應而提出來的。Putnam和Fodor從一個經驗的計算性的心靈理論角度看待精神狀態。幾乎在同一時間或者稍後一些，D.M. Armstrong和David Kellogg Lewis提出了一個版本的功能主義，其中把民族心理學中的精神概念用功能角色來分析。最後，維特根斯坦的意義即使用的觀點導致了一種版本的作為意義理論的功能主義，這個方向由Wilfrid Sellars和Gilbert Harman進一步推進。
What all these different varieties of functionalism share in common is the thesis that mental states are essentially characterized by their causal relations with other mental states and with sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. That is, functionalism quantifies over, or abstracts away from, the details of the physical implementation of a mental state by characterizing it in terms of non-mental functional properties. For example, a kidney is characterized scientifically by its functional role in filtering blood and maintaining certain chemical balances. From this point of view, it does not really matter whether the kidney be made up of organic tissue, plastic nanotubes or silicon chips: it is the role that it plays and its relations to other organs that define it as a kidney.[36]
所有這些不同的功能主義共享的理論是：精神狀態本質地以其和其它精神狀態、感覺輸入、行為輸出的因果關係為特點。這也就是說，功能主義是從一個精神狀態的物理實現細節中，通過使用非精神性的功能屬性來刻畫，從而量化或者說是抽象出來的。比如，一個腎按科學的方法來刻畫其特點就在於它在過濾血液和維持一定的化學平衡上的功能性角色。從這個觀點看，腎是否是由器官組織還是由塑料納米管、矽芯片組成的並不重要：是它所扮演的角色和它和其它器官之間的關係界定了它是一個腎。
Nonreductive physicalism
Many philosophers hold firmly to two essential convictions with regard to mind–body relations:
1. Physicalism is true and mental states must be physical states.
2. All reductionist proposals are unsatisfactory: mental states cannot be reduced to behavior, brain states or functional states.[28]
非還原性的物理主義
許多哲學家對於心身關係堅定地持有兩個本質性的信念：
1.物理主義是對的並且精神狀態必須是物理狀態。
2.所有的還原主義者的提議都是不能令人滿意的：精神狀態不能被還原到行為、大腦狀態或者功能狀態上。
Hence, the question arises whether there can still be a non-reductive physicalism. Donald Davidson's anomalous monism[14] is an attempt to formulate such a physicalism.
因此，問題就來了，是否可以有非還原性的物理主義。Donald Davidson的反常的一元論就是一次想要闡明這樣一種物理主義的嚐試。
The idea is often formulated in terms of the thesis of supervenience: mental states supervene on physical states, but are not reducible to them. "Supervenience" therefore describes a functional dependence: there can be no change in the mental without some change in the physical.[38]
這個觀點通常用隨附理論的方式描述：精神狀態隨附在物理狀態上，但又不能還原到物理狀態。隨附性描述了一種功能的依賴：可以在精神上有（原文是沒但看起來像應是有？）變化而在物質上沒有變化。
Eliminative materialism
Main article: Eliminative materialism
If one is a materialist but believes that all reductive efforts have failed and that a non-reductive materialism is incoherent, then one can adopt a final, more radical position: eliminative materialism. Eliminative materialists maintain that mental states are fictitious entities introduced by everyday "folk psychology".[11] Should "folk psychology", which eliminativists view as a quasi-scientific theory, be proven wrong in the course of scientific development, then we must also abolish all of the entities postulated by it.
取消的物理主義
參見主體文章：取消的物理主義
如果一個人是唯物主義者但相信所有還原的努力都已經失敗了，以及一個非還原的唯物主義是條理不通的，那麽一個人接受一個最終的、更激進的立場是：取消的唯物主義。取消的唯物主義持有的觀點是：精神狀態是由“民族心理學”介紹進來的假想的實體。“民族心理學”被取消主義者看成是一種準科學的理論，它應該在科學的發展過程中被證明是錯誤的嗎？而後我們就必須廢除所有由它假定的實體。
Eliminativists such as Patricia and Paul Churchland often invoke the fate of other, erroneous popular theories and ontologies which have arisen in the course of history.[11], [12] For example, the belief in witchcraft as a cause of people's problems turned out to be wrong and the consequence is that most people no longer believe in the existence of witches. Witchcraft is not explained in terms of some other phenomenon, but rather eliminated from the discourse.[12]
取消主義者，比如Patricia和Paul Churchland經常那些引用其它的、錯誤地廣受歡迎的在曆史中湧現出來的理論和存在論。比如，魔法中作為人們遇到的各種問題原因的信念，現在被當成錯誤的而被排除出去了，其後果是大多數人們不再相信女巫的存在了。魔法並不被解釋成其它的現象，而是從人們的談話中被取消了。
Linguistic criticism of the mind–body problem
Each attempt to answer the mind–body problem encounters substantial problems. Some philosophers argue that this is because there is an underlying conceptual confusion.[39] Such philosophers reject the mind–body problem as an illusory problem. Such a position is represented in analytic philosophy these days, for the most part, by the followers of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Wittgensteinian tradition of linguistic criticism.[40] The exponents of this position explain that it is an error to ask how mental and biological states fit together. Rather it should simply be accepted that humans can be described in different ways - for instance, in a mental and in a biological vocabulary. Illusory problems arise if one tries to describe the one in terms of the other's vocabulary or if the mental vocabulary is used in the wrong contexts.[40] This is the case for instance, if one searches for mental states of the brain. The brain is simply the wrong context for the use of mental vocabulary - the search for mental states of the brain is therefore a category error or a pure conceptual confusion.[40]
對心身問題的語言學上的批判
每種回答心身問題的努力都麵臨不小的問題。一些哲學家說這是由於這個問題中有一些底層的概念混淆。這樣的哲學家把心身問題看成是一個幻想出來的問題而加以拒絕。現在在很大程度上，分析哲學通過由維特根斯坦的追隨者和維特根斯坦的語言批判傳統代表了這個立場。這個立場的代表者解釋說：問精神和生物狀態之間如何相互結合是錯誤的。他們寧可更簡單地接受人可以在不同的方式上被描述的觀點，比如，可以以精神的方式或以生物學詞匯的方式。如果一個人嚐試用其中另一方的詞匯來描述某方，或者精神性的詞匯被用在了錯誤的上下文中，這都會導致幻想性的心身問題的出現。舉個例子，比如一個人在大腦中去搜尋精神狀態。簡要說來，大腦對精神性詞匯來說是一個錯誤的上下文、用詞環境，也由此這個對精神狀態的搜尋就是一個範疇錯誤或者說是一個純粹的概念混淆。
Today, such a position is often adopted by interpreters of Wittgenstein such as Peter Hacker.[39] However, Hilary Putnam, the inventor of functionalism, has also adopted the position that the mind–body problem is an illusory problem which should be dissolved according to the manner of Wittgenstein.[41]
今天，這樣的立場經常被維特根斯坦的解釋者所采納，比如Peter Hacker。然而，普特南（Hilary Putnam），功能主義的發明者，也采用這個立場：心身問題是一個幻想出來的問題，要按維特根斯坦的方式被解決掉。
Naturalism and its problems
The thesis of physicalism is that the mind is part of the material (or physical) world. Such a position faces the fundamental problem that the mind has certain properties that no material thing possesses. Physicalism must therefore explain how it is possible that these properties can emerge from a material thing nevertheless. The project of providing such an explanation is often referred to as the "naturalization of the mental."[28] What are the crucial problems that this project must attempt to resolve? The most well-known are probably the following two:[28]
自然主義及其問題
物理主義的基礎是心靈是物質（或物理）世界的一部分。這樣的立場麵臨的基本問題是：心靈有著物質的物體所不具有的特定的性質。由此物理主義必須解釋這些性質如何能夠從一個物質的東西中湧現出來的。提供這樣一個解釋的方案經常借助於“精神的植入”。什麽是這些方案必須嚐試去解決的至關重要的問題呢？最廣為人知的可能就是如下的兩個：
Qualia
Main article: Qualia
Many mental states have the property of being experienced subjectively in different ways by different individuals.[19] For example, it is obviously characteristic of the mental state of pain that it hurts. Moreover, your sensation of pain may not be identical with mine, since we have no way of measuring how much something hurts or describing exactly how it feels to hurt. Where does such an experience (quale) come from? Nothing indicates that a neural or functional state can be accompanied by such a pain experience. Often the point is formulated as follows: the existence of cerebral events, in and of themselves, cannot explain why they are accompanied by these corresponding qualitative experiences. Why do many cerebral processes occur with an accompanying experiential aspect in consciousness? It seems impossible to explain.[18]
感受性質
參見主體文章：感受性質
許多精神狀態有著被不同個人以不同方式主觀性地體驗著的性質。比如，受傷時有著明顯個性化的關於疼痛的精神狀態。此外，你的疼痛的體驗不會和我的相同一，由於我們沒有一個方式可以來衡量一個東西被傷害得如何厲害，或者精確地描述他對傷害的感覺。這的一個經驗（感受性質）從何而來？沒有什麽能夠指定那樣的一個神經或功能狀態會伴隨著這樣的一個疼痛經驗。這個觀點經常被表述如下：他們的或者他們身體中的大腦事件的存在不能解釋為何他們伴隨有這些對應的感受性質的經驗。 為何許多大腦過程的發生都有一個伴隨的意識中的經驗性方麵？這看來不可能被解釋。
Yet it also seems to many that science will eventually have to explain such experiences.[28] This follows from the logic of reductive explanations. If I try to explain a phenomenon reductively (e.g., water), I also have to explain why the phenomenon has all of the properties that it has (e.g., fluidity, transparency).[28]In the case of mental states, this means that there needs to be an explanation of why they have the property of being experienced in a certain way.
雖然在許多人看起來似乎科學最終將不得不解釋這樣的經驗。這源於還原性解釋的邏輯。如果我嚐試還原性的解釋一個現象（比如，水），我也不得不解釋為何這個現象有它所有的那些性質（比如：流動性、透明性）。對於精神狀態，這意味著需要一個解釋，以一定的方式來解釋為何他們有被解釋的那些性質。
Intentionality
Intentionality is the capacity of mental states to be directed towards (about) or be in relation with something in the external world.[17] This property of mental states entails that they have contents and semantic referents and can therefore be assigned truth values. When one tries to reduce these states to natural processes there arises a problem: natural processes are not true or false, they simply happen.[42] It would not make any sense to say that a natural process is true or false. But mental ideas or judgments are true or false, so how then can mental states (ideas or judgments) be natural processes? The possibility of assigning semantic value to ideas must mean that such ideas are about facts. Thus, for example, the idea that Herodotus was a historian refers to Herodotus and to the fact that he was an historian. If the fact is true, then the idea is true; otherwise, it is false. But where does this relation come from? In the brain, there are only electrochemical processes and these seem not to have anything to do with Herodotus.[16]
意向性
意向性是精神狀態具有的直接朝向（關於）和外部世界或者和外部世界處於關係中的能力。這個精神狀態的性質使得他們具有了內容和語義上的指稱物，並從而能被賦予真值。當人們想要把這些狀態還原成自然過程的時候，出現了一個問題：自然過程並不是真的或假的，它們隻是發生了。說一個自然過程是真的還是假的這沒有意義。但精神觀念或者判斷是真的或者假的，那麽精神狀態（觀念或判斷）如何的是自然過程呢？把一個語義值分配給一個觀點的可能性意味著這樣的觀念必須要是關於事實的。這樣，比如，希羅多德是一個曆史學家的觀念提到了希羅多德以及他是一個曆史學家的事實。如果這個事實是真的，那麽這個觀念是真的；否則，它是假的。但是這樣的關係從何而來？在大腦裏，那裏隻有電化學的過程並且那裏好像和希羅多德沒有任何關係。
Philosophy of mind and science
Humans are corporeal beings and, as such, they are subject to examination and description by the natural sciences. Since mental processes are not independent of bodily processes, the descriptions that the natural sciences furnish of human beings play an important role in the philosophy of mind.[1] There are many scientific disciplines that study processes related to the mental. The list of such sciences includes: biology, computer science, cognitive science, cybernetics, linguistics, medicine, pharmacology, psychology, etc.[43]
心靈哲學和科學哲學
人類是物質的存在物，同樣地，他們適用於自然科學的檢驗和描述。由於精神過程不是獨立於身體過程的，自然科學提供的關於人類的描述在心靈哲學中也占有重要的地位。有許多科學學科研究與精神相關的過程。這樣的科學包括：生物學，計算機科學，認知科學，控製論，語言學，醫學，藥理學，心理學，等等。
Neurobiology
The theoretical background of biology, as is the case with modern natural sciences in general, is fundamentally materialistic. The objects of study are, in the first place, physical processes, which are considered to be the foundations of mental activity and behavior.[44] The increasing success of biology in the explanation of mental phenomena can be seen by the absence of any empirical refutation of its fundamental presupposition: "there can be no change in the mental states of a person without a change in brain states."[43]
神經生物學
生物學的理論背景，和現代自然科學大體上說來一樣，在基礎上是唯物主義的。研究的對象首先是物理過程，物理過程被看成是精神活動和行為的基礎。由於缺乏任何經驗主義的駁斥它的基礎假設：“一個人沒有大腦狀態的改變就沒有精神狀態的改變。”，生物學在解釋精神現象上不斷取得成功。
Within the field of neurobiology, there are many subdisciplines which are concerned with the relations between mental and physical states and processes:[44]
Sensory neurophysiology investigates the relation between the processes of perception and stimulation.[45]
Cognitive neuroscience studies the correlations between mental processes and neural processes.[45]
Neuropsychology describes the dependence of mental faculties on specific anatomical regions of the brain.[45]
Lastly, evolutionary biology studies the origins and development of the human nervous system and, in as much as this is the basis of the mind, also describes the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of mental phenomena beginning from their most primitive stages.[43]
在精神生物學的領域內，有許多分支學科是涉及到精神和物理狀態、過程之間的關係的：
感覺神經生理學研究感覺過程和刺激之間的關係。
認知神經科學研究精神過程和神經過程之間的關係。
神經心理學描述精神本能對特定大腦解剖組織的依賴關係。
最後，進化生物學研究人類神經係統的起源和發展，由於這是心靈的基礎。也描述精神現象從它最原始階段開始的個體發育和係統發育。
The methodological breakthroughs of the neurosciences, in particular the introduction of high-tech neuroimaging procedures, has propelled scientists toward the elaboration of increasingly ambitious research programs: one of the main goals is to describe and comprehend the neural processes which correspond to mental functions (see: neural correlate).[44] A very small number of neurobiologists, such as Emil du Bois-Reymond and John Eccles have denied the possibility of a "reduction" of mental phenomena to cerebral processes, partly for religious reasons.[20] However, the contemporary neurobiologist and philosopher Gerhard Roth continues to defend a form of "non-reductive materialism."[46]
神經科學的方法上的突破，特別是高科技的神經成像程序的引入，推動著科學家營建雄心勃勃的研究計劃：一個主要的目標是描述和理解對應於那些精神功能（參見：“神經關係”）的神經過程。一個非常少的神經生物學家，比如Emil du Bois-Reymond和John Eccles已經拒絕了從精神現象到大腦過程的“還原”的可能性，這部分地是出於宗教的原因。然而，現代神經生物學家和哲學家Gerhard Roth在不斷地為一種“非還原的唯物主義”辯護。
Computer science
Computer science concerns itself with the automatic processing of information (or at least with physical systems of symbols to which information is assigned) by means of such things as computers.[47] From the beginning, computer programmers have been able to develop programs which permit computers to carry out tasks for which organic beings need a mind. A simple example is multiplication. But it is clear that computers do not use a mind to multiply. Could they, someday, come to have what we call a mind? This question has been propelled into the forefront of much philosophical debate because of investigations in the field of artificial intelligence ("AI").
計算機科學
計算機科學關心的是信息的自動處理過程（或至少被賦予信息的物理符號係統），並依靠這樣的過程而成其為計算機。從一開始，計算機程序員就能夠開發出讓計算機執行任務的程序，這樣的任務對一個有機存在者來說是需要擁有心靈才能完成的。一個簡單的例子是乘法運算。但很顯然計算機並不使用心靈來做乘法。他們是否會在某一天擁有我們稱為心靈的東西？由於對人工智能的研究，這個問題已經被提到了許多哲學討論的議題中。
Within AI, it is common to distinguish between a modest research program and a more ambitious one: this distinction was coined by John Searle in terms of a weak AI and a strong AI. The exclusive objective of "weak AI", according to Searle, is the successful simulation of mental states, with no attempt to make computers become conscious or aware, etc. The objective of strong AI, on the contrary, is a computer with consciousness similar to that of human beings.[48] The program of strong AI goes back to one of the pioneers of computation Alan Turing. As an answer to the question "Can computers think?", he formulated the famous Turing test.[49] Turing believed that a computer could be said to "think" when, if placed in a room by itself next to another room which contained a human being and with the same questions being asked of both the computer and the human being by a third party human being, the computer's responses turned out be to indistinguishable from those of the human. Essentially, Turing's view of machine intelligence followed the behaviourist model of the mind - intelligence is as intelligence does. The Turing test has received many criticisms, among which the most famous is probably the Chinese room thought experiment formulated by Searle.[48]
在人工智能中，在一種謙虛的探索和一個更雄心勃勃的探索之間通常有一個分界：John Searle將這個分界的兩方分別稱為弱人工智能和強人工智能。按Searle的看法，成功模擬精神狀態被排除在“弱人工智能”的目標之外，不去嚐試將計算機變得有意識和感知等。關於強人工智能的目標可以回溯到一個計算機領域的先驅圖靈（Alan Turing）。作為對“計算機能思考嗎？”問題的一個回答，他提出了著名的圖靈測試。圖靈相信一個計算機能夠被稱得上“思考”如果他通過如下的測試：把它放在一個房間裏，而在隔壁的房間裏有一個人，有第三個人對這台計算機和這個人提一樣的問題，計算機的響應測試後被認為是無法和人的響應區分開來。本質上來說，圖靈關於機器智能的觀點是取行為主義者的心靈模型的——智能就是智能所做的。圖靈測試受到了許多批評，在其中最有名的可能是由Searle表述出來的中文屋思考實驗了。
The question about the possible sensitivity (qualia) of computers or robots still remains open. Some computer scientists believe that the specialty of AI can still make new contributions to the resolution of the "mind body problem". They suggest that based on the reciprocal influences between software and hardware that takes place in all computers, it is possible that someday theories can be discovered that help us to understand the reciprocal influences between the human mind and the brain (wetware).[50]
關於計算機或者機器人的感受能力（感受性質）的可能性的問題還處在討論中。一些計算機科學家相信人工智能專業還能對“心身問題”的解答做出新的貢獻。他們提出基於所有計算機中軟件和硬件的相互影響，可能有天能夠發現有助於我們理解人類心靈和大腦（濕件）之間相互影響的理論。
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Psychology
Psychology is the science that investigates mental states directly. It uses generally empirical methods to investigate concrete mental states like joy, fear or obsessions. Psychology investigates the laws that bind these mental states to each other or with inputs and outputs to the human organism.[51]
心理學
心理學是直接考察精神狀態的科學。它一般使用經驗主義的方法來考察具體的精神狀態，像快樂，害怕或者困擾。心理學考察把這些精神狀態間以及他們和有機體的輸入、輸出之間互相約束的規律，
An example of this is the psychology of perception. Scientists working in this field have discovered general principles of the perception of forms. A law of the psychology of forms says that objects that move in the same direction are perceived as related to each other.[43] This law describes a relation between visual input and mental perceptual states. However, it does not suggest anything about the nature of perceptual states. The laws discovered by psychology are compatible with all the answers to the mind–body problem already described.
對此的一個例子是感知心理學。這個領域中的科學家發現了形式感知普遍規律。形式心理學的一條規律是：在相同方向上運動的物體會被感到是關聯在一起的。這個規律描述了視覺輸入和精神感覺狀態之間的關係。然而，它沒有對關於感覺狀態的本性提出什麽看法。心理學家發現的規律可以和所有已經描述的對心身問題的回答相兼容。
Philosophy of mind in the continental tradition
Most of the discussion in this article has focused on the predominant school (or style) of philosophy in modern Western culture, usually called analytic philosophy (sometimes also inaccurately described as Anglo-American philosophy).[52] Other schools of thought exist, however, which are sometimes (also misleadingly) subsumed under the broad label of continental philosophy.[52] In any case, the various schools that fall under this label (phenomenology, existentialism, etc.) tend to differ from the analytic school in that they focus less on language and logical analysis and more on directly understanding human existence and experience. With reference specifically to the discussion of the mind, this tends to translate into attempts to grasp the concepts of thought and perceptual experience in some direct sense that does not involve the analysis of linguistic forms.[52]
大陸傳統下的心理哲學
這篇文章中的大部分討論是關注在現代西方文化中有支配性的哲學學派（或樣式），他們通常被稱為分析哲學（有時也不嚴格地被叫為英美哲學）。還存在著其他的學派，然而，它們有時（也是令人誤解的）被包括在大陸哲學的大標簽下。無論如何，在這個標簽下的各個學派（現象學，存在主義，等等）和分析哲學的取向不同在前者更少地關注語言和邏輯分析，而更多地關注對人類存在和經驗的直接理解。在關於心靈的討論中，它們傾向於嚐試抓住的思想和感覺經驗的概念，采用一種直接的方式而不涉及語言形式的分析。
In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel discusses three distinct types of mind: the subjective mind, the mind of an individual; the objective mind, the mind of society and of the State; and the Absolute mind, a unity of all concepts. See also Hegel's Philosophy of Mind from his Encyclopedia.[53]
在黑格爾（Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel）的《精神現象學》中，黑格爾討論了三種不同的心靈類型：主體性的心靈，一個個體的心靈；客體性的心靈，社會和國家的心靈；絕對的心靈，一個各種概念的統一。參見黑格爾的《哲學全書》中的“精神哲學”。
In modern times, the two main schools that have developed in response or opposition to this Hegelian tradition are Phenomenology and Existentialism. Phenomenology, founded by Edmund Husserl, focuses on the contents of the human mind (see noema) and how phenomenological processes shape our experiences.[54] Existentialism, a school of thought led by Jean-Paul Sartre, focuses on the content of experiences and how the mind deals with such experiences.[55]
現代，兩個從響應或者反對黑格爾傳統發展起來的主要學派是現象學和存在主義。由胡塞爾（Edmund Husserl）建立的現象學關注於人類心靈的內容（意向相關項）和現象的過程如何塑造了我們經驗。存在主義，一種由薩特（Jean-Paul Sartre）引領的學派，關注於經驗的內容和心靈是如何處理經驗的。
An important, though not very well known, example of a philosopher of mind and cognitive scientist who tries to synthesize ideas from both traditions is Ron McClamrock. Borrowing from Herbert Simon and also influenced by the ideas of existential phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger, McClamrock suggests that man's condition of being-in-the-world ("Dasein", "In-der-welt-sein") makes it impossible for him to understand himself by abstracting away from it and examining it as if it were a detached experimental object of which he himself is not an integral part.[56]
雖然知道人不多，作為一個力圖綜合兩種傳統的心靈哲學家和認知科學家的例子的是Ron McClamrock。借鑒Herbert Simon，受到存在主義現象學家梅洛-龐蒂（Maurice Merleau-Ponty）和海德格爾（Martin Heidegger）的影響，McClamrock提出了這樣的看法：人的狀況是“在世界之中存在”（"Dasein", "In-der-welt-sein"），但人們卻想采用了從這種狀況中抽離出來並檢驗它的方法來理解他自己，就好像這種狀態是一個被分開的經驗性對象，對它來說他不是一個整合而不可分的部分，這是不可能成功的。
Consequences of philosophy of mind
There are countless subjects that are affected by the ideas developed in the philosophy of mind. Clear examples of this are the nature of death and its definitive character, the nature of emotion, of perception and of memory. Questions about what a person is and what his or her identity consists of also have much to do with the philosophy of mind. There are two subjects that, in connection with the philosophy of the mind, have aroused special attention: free will and the self.[1]
心靈哲學的推論
有無數的主題受到了心靈哲學中發展出來的觀念的影響。關於此的明顯的例子是死亡的本性和它的最終特性，情緒、感覺、記憶的本性。關於一個人是什麽和他或她的同一性的由什麽組成的問題也和心靈哲學有很大的關係。有兩個和心靈哲學有關的主題引起了人們特別的注意，它們是：自由意誌和自我。
Free will
Main article: Free will
In the context of the philosophy of mind, the question about the freedom of the will takes on a renewed intensity. This is certainly the case, at least, for materialistic determinists.[1] According to this position, natural laws completely determine the course of the material world. Mental states, and therefore the will as well, would be material states which means human behavior and decisions would be completely determined by natural laws. Some take this argumentation a step further: people cannot determine by themselves what they want and what they do. Consequently, they are not free.[57]
自由意誌
參見主體文章：自由意誌
在心靈哲學的文本環境中，關於意誌的自由的問題再次得到了關注。至少對於唯物主義決定論者情況是這樣的。按照他們的立場，自然規律完全決定了物理世界的過程。精神狀態，以及同樣的對於意誌，也是物質的狀態，這意味著人類的行為和決定也完全被自然規律所決定。這討論延伸一步就是：人們，他們自己，不能決定他們要什麽，他們做什麽。由此推論，他們沒有自由。
This argumentation is rejected, on the one hand, by the compatibilists. Those who adopt this position suggest that the question "Are we free?" can only be answered once we have determined what the term "free" means. The opposite of "free" is not "caused" but "compelled" or "coerced". It is not appropriate to identify freedom with indetermination. A free act is one where the agent could have done otherwise if she had chosen otherwise. In this sense a person can be free even though determinism is true.[57] The most important compatibilist in the history of the philosophy was David Hume. [58]Nowadays, this position is defended, for example, by Daniel Dennett.[59]
在一方麵，這個看法被相容論者所拒絕。采納這個立場的人們提出，問題“我們是自由的嗎？”隻有在我們能夠決定“自由”一詞是什麽意思後才能被回答。 “自由”的反麵不是“受因果約束的”而是“強迫的”或者“強製的”。把自由定義成不確定的是合適的。一個自由的行為是一種行為者如果選擇其它的的那他就可以做其它的狀況。在這種意義下，即使決定論是真的，一個人也可以是自由的。哲學史上最重要的相容論者是休謨（David Hume）。現在，這個立場被諸如Daniel Dennett等所拒絕。
On the other hand, there are also many incompatibilists who reject the argument because they believe that the will is free in a stronger sense called originationism.[57] These philosophers affirm that the course of the world is not completely determined by natural laws: the will at least does not have to be and, therefore, it is potentially free. The most prominent incompatibilist in the history of philosophy was Immanuel Kant.[60] Critics of this position accuse the incompatibilists of using an incoherent concept of freedom. They argue as follows: if our will is not determined by anything, then we desire what we desire by pure chance. And if what we desire is purely accidental, we are not free. So if our will is not determined by anything, we are not free.[57]
在另一方麵，也有許多非相容論者，它們拒絕這個觀點，由於他們以一種被稱為源起論的方式強烈地相信意誌自由。這些哲學家強調世界的過程不完全是被自然規律決定的：至少意誌不是如此，也由此它是潛在的自由的。哲學史上最突出的非相容論者是康德（Immanuel Kant）。這個立場的批評家譴責非相容論者在使用一個不前後一貫的自由概念。他們的觀點如下：如果我們的意誌不是被任何東西決定的，那麽我們就是完全偶然地想要我們所想要的。那麽如果我們所想要的完全是意外的，我們就不是自由的。所以如我們的意誌不是被任何東西所決定，我們就不是自由的。
The self
The philosophy of mind also has important consequences for the concept of self. If by "self" or "I" one refers to an essential, immutable nucleus of the person, most modern philosophers of mind will affirm that no such thing exists.[61] The idea of a self as an immutable essential nucleus derives from the Christian idea of an immaterial soul. Such an idea is unacceptable to most contemporary philosophers, due to their physicalistic orientations, and due to a general acceptance among philosophers of the scepticism of the concept of 'self' by David Hume, who could never catch himself doing, thinking or feeling anything.[62] However, in the light of empirical results from developmental psychology, developmental biology and the neurosciences, the idea of an essential inconstant, material nucleus - an integrated representational system distributed over changing patterns of synaptic connections - seems reasonable.[63]
自我
心靈哲學在自我的概念方麵也有重要的推論。如果一個人用“自我”或者“我”一詞來指一個本質上的、不變的他這個人的核心，大多數現代心靈哲學家回斷言說沒有這麽一個東西存在。把自我看成是一個本質的不變的核心的觀念源於基督教的非實質的靈魂的觀念。這樣的一種觀念對現代的大多數哲學家來說是不可接受的，由於他們物理主義的取向，由於一個在哲學家中被大體上接受了的休謨對“自我”概念的懷疑論看法：一個人從不能捕捉到他自己正在做什麽，想什麽或者感到什麽。然而，依照發展著的心理學、發展著的生物學和神經科學的經驗主義的結果，那種有一個本質的，變化無常的，物質性的核心——一個分布於變化著的突觸連接模式中的整合的代表係統——的看法也似乎是有道理的。
In view of this problem, some philosophers affirm that we should abandon the idea of a self.[61] For example, Thomas Metzinger and Susan Blackmore both practice meditation, claiming that this gives us reliable conscious experience of selflessness.[64] Philosophers and scientists holding this view frequently talk of the self, "I", agency and related concepts as 'illusory', a view with parallels in some Eastern religious traditions, such as anatta in Buddhism.[65] But this is a minority position. More common is the view that we should redefine the concept: by "self" we would not be referring to some immutable and essential nucleus, but to something that is in permanent change. A well-known defender of this position is Daniel Dennett.[61]
考慮到這個問題，一些哲學家斷言我們應該拋棄自我的觀念。比如，Thomas Metzinger和Susan Blackmore都踐行過冥想，宣稱這給我們關於無我的可靠的感知經驗。持有這樣觀點的哲學家和科學家經常談論自我，“我”，行為者和關於“幻”的概念，這個概念在東方宗教傳統中也有接近的內容，比如佛教中的無我。但這是一個少數人的立場。更普遍的觀點是我們要重新定義概念：用“自我”一詞我們不應指某種不變的和本質的核心，而應指一些一直在變化著的東西。這個立場的一個有名的擁護者是Daniel Dennet。
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