A Peaceless Peace
By:Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine ????????
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Mykhailivka The debate over the so-called 20-point peace plancontinues to rage in Ukraine. Radio and television are reporting on it with seriousness and widespread, deferential concern. Skepticism is widespread at all levels of society, so much so that, in aninterviewwith Fox News on the sidelines of his Mar-a-Lago meeting with his American counterpart, Donald Trump, President Volodymyr Zelensky himselfadmittedthat if put to a referendum that included the possibility of Ukrainian withdrawal from Donbas (as desired by Washington) the plan would be rejected.
In reality, even without this unfortunate clause, its current form isdoomed to failurebecause it repeats the gravest errors of the past and advances points that are legally incompatible and practically unmanageable.
Throughout 2024, Trumpclaimedhe could end the Russian invasion of Ukraine in less than 24 hours, without ever explaining how.Once back at the White House, not in a day but in a year, he made it clear that the plan didnt exist and that he would hand the pen to the Russians to draft it.Moscow seized the opportunity, compiling alistof 28 maximalist demands incompatible with international law and unacceptable to Kyiv.
Throughout 2025,the word peace was so overused that it lost its meaning even in perspective, replacing victory, which Zelensky hadusedin his 5-point plan (and 3 classified annexes) until the eve of the American electoral event. To avoid hurting the ego of the new White House occupant, the decision was made to translate the 28 Russian points into prose, creatinga jumble of contradictory clauses and legal and operational inconsistencies that mask the structural risk of reactivating the conflict under the guise of an ambiguous and unenforceable peace.
We have dedicated anarticlethat has received widespread attention to thelegally unsustainable and dangerous nature of binding Ukraine to non-nuclear activity as isclaimedto be enshrined in point 11 of the 20-point peace plan.
Butpoints 1, 2, 5, and 6 also constitute an oxymoron, as does the idea of a free trade area intended to apply to the territories of Ukraine illegally occupied by the Russian Federation (TOT).
In thosepoints, Ukraines territorial sovereignty is confirmed (1), a non-aggression agreement is proposed between it and the Russian Federation (2) and between the latter and Europe (6, except to specify in point 7 that Ukraine will be part of it), with monitoring of the conflict line, and the conditions for a military response and the reinstatement of Western sanctions in the event of a new invasion are dictated (5).
By definition,Ukrainian sovereignty is incompatible with any architecture that normalizes or institutionalizes Russian rule over parts of its territory. Constructinga hybrid of de jure Ukrainian and de facto Russian sovereignty is precisely the kind of ambiguity that breeds disputes, incidents, and war.
A domestic Russian law enshrining non-aggression toward Ukraine or Europe does not constrain clandestine military action, nor does it establish enforcement mechanisms. The experience of the little green men proxy militias, contractors, separatists, and unmarked volunteers should have taught us something.
MoscowsignedtheMinsk I agreements, denying its involvement in the conflict. It described itself as a mediator and blamed local militiasfor violating those agreements. In Ilovaisk, Ukrainian forcesinflictedheavy losses on those separatists. Moscowintervenedwith regular units, encircling the Ukrainians andpromisinga humanitarian corridor, which itviolated, massacring their outgoing columns.
The same pattern wasrepeatedin Debaltseve, which wascapturedby the Russians in February 2015 after the ceasefirestipulatedin theMinsk II agreementscame into effect. It was a symbolic event that demonstrated how monitoring the conflict line is intrinsically insufficient in the absence of guaranteed access and coercive tools. The OSCE SMM, the most robust monitoring instrument everdeployedin Europe, hasdocumentedfor years systematic restrictions on freedom of movement, interference, technical limitations, and the closure of key areas.
Sucha non-aggression agreement can be falsified within 24 hours in a context of gradual, subthreshold escalation across thousands of kilometers of gray zones like todays.
Besides being easily sabotaged, it carriesthe risk that the US will not interveneif the triggering event remains ambiguous or disputed. If the military response depends on the classification of an invasion or attack, Moscows classic strategy is to obscure the attribution, create information fog, and rely on the fact that while Western democracies argue, its troops advance.
Who would classify the event? With what timeframe and evidentiary standards? How can Ukraines territorial integrity be restored without violating agreements that create the perfect incentive for permanent hybrid warfare?
The proposal to establish a free trade area in the TOT assumes unified customs authorities, border control, inspection and compliance capabilities, effective jurisdiction, investment protection, and the absence of hostile powers on the territory.
This isthe exact opposite of the TOT, where Russian control is maintained but Ukrainian sovereignty is preserved, and every economic flow ends up financing the occupation, thereby violating Western non-recognition.
Creating a free trade zone there not only means implicitly recognizing the Russian occupation an unenforceable legal fiction but also clearing illicit trafficking in Europe, fueling endless disputes over property and securities, structural smuggling, and the triangulation of laundered goods between rubles, hryvnias, and euros.
Likewise,the premature lifting of Western sanctions against the Russian Federation would be strategically suicidal, since they remain the EUs primary instrument of coercion and residual deterrent.
In the absence of an active military force,easing the only form of sustained pressure before the full restoration of Ukraines territorial sovereignty and international law means paying in advance for yet another empty promise from Moscow.
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在過去三年裏，作為自由撰稿人，我們一直在烏克蘭戰爭的所有前線進行報道，自從大規模
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沒有真正和平的和平
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻譯：旺財球球
烏克蘭前線報道????????
米哈伊利夫卡關於所謂20點和平計劃的爭論在烏克蘭依然激烈。廣播和電視對此進行了嚴肅而廣泛的報道，引發了普遍的關注。社會各階層對和平計劃的懷疑情緒相當普遍，以至於在與美國方麵唐納德川普在海湖莊園會晤期間接受福克斯新聞采訪時，澤倫斯基總統本人承認如果進行一項包括烏克蘭從頓巴斯撤出的可能性（正如華盛頓所希望的）的公投，該計劃將會被拒絕。
實際上，即使沒有這一不幸條款，該計劃當前的形式也注定要失敗，因為它重複了過去最嚴重的錯誤，並提出了在法律上不兼容且在實踐中無法管理的要點。
（圖：我的小侄子在烏克蘭利沃夫展出的烏克蘭技術設備殘骸中玩耍????????版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
在整個2024年，特朗普聲稱他可以在不到24小時內結束俄羅斯對烏克蘭的入侵，卻從未解釋具體如何實現。一旦回到白宮，不是在一天而是在一年之內，所有人都明白了他並沒有什麽計劃，並準備將筆交到俄羅斯人手裏，讓他們來起草（計劃）。莫斯科借機起草了一份包含28項國際法不容且基輔無法接受的極端要求。
在整個2025年，和平一詞被過度使用，以至於它甚至在遠景中也失去了意義，取而代之的是勝利，而澤倫斯基在美國選舉前夕，他的5點計劃（以及3個機密附錄）中使用的正是這個詞。為了不傷害新任白宮負責人的自尊，決策者決定將這28個俄羅斯要求翻譯成法律文書，形成了一堆矛盾的條款以及法律和操作上的不一致，掩蓋了在模糊和不可執行的和平之名下重新激活衝突的結構性風險。
我們發表了一篇廣受關注的文章，專門探討了將烏克蘭綁定於無核狀態的法律不可持續性和危險性這一觀點據稱被寫入20項和平計劃中的第11點。
但第1、2、5和6條同樣構成了自相矛盾的悖論，像是針對適用於被俄羅斯聯邦非法占領的烏克蘭領土（TOT）的自由貿易區的設想。
在這些條款中，確認了烏克蘭的領土主權（1），提出了烏克蘭與俄羅斯聯邦之間（2）及其俄羅斯與歐洲之間（6，除了在第7點中說明烏克蘭將成為其中一部分）的不侵略協議，並規定了對衝突線的監控、以及在新入侵發生時軍事響應和恢複西方製裁的條件（5）。
根據定義，烏克蘭的主權與任何使俄羅斯對烏部分領土的統治正常化或製度化的架構都是不相容的。構建一個法律上是烏克蘭的、事實上是俄羅斯的混合主權體，正是造成爭端、事故和戰爭的模糊性。
一項明確規定不侵略烏克蘭或歐洲的俄羅斯國內法律並不限製秘密軍事行動，也沒有建立執行機製。小綠人的經驗代理民兵、承包商、分裂分子和無標記誌願者的經曆應該教會我們一些東西。
莫斯科簽署了明斯克第一協議，否認其參與到衝突中。它自稱為調解者，並將違反這些協議的責任歸咎於地方武裝。在伊洛瓦伊斯克，烏克蘭軍隊對這些分裂分子造成了重大損失。莫斯科派出常規部隊介入進行幹預，包圍了烏克蘭人，並承諾提供人道走廊，但隨後違反了這一承諾，屠殺了他們撤出的隊伍。
在德巴爾采夫，同樣的模式重現。俄羅斯在2015年2月奪取了該地區，當時明斯克第二協議規定的停火已經生效。這是一個象征性事件，表明在缺乏有保障的進入和強製手段的情況下，監控衝突線本質上是完全不夠的。歐洲曆史上最強大的監控工具歐安組織特派團（OSCE SMM）多年來記錄了（俄）對自由通行的係統性限製、幹擾、技術限製和關鍵區域的封閉。
這樣的不侵略協議可以在24小時內被篡改，特別是在當今這樣的數千公裏灰色地帶的漸進、臨界狀態升級的背景下。
除了容易被破壞外，這樣的協議還存在一個風險，即如果觸發事件模糊或存在爭議，美國可能不會介入幹預。如果軍事響應取決於對入侵或攻擊的界定，莫斯科的經典策略就是模糊歸因，製造信息迷霧，並依賴西方民主國家相互爭論的事實，借機其軍隊就得以推進。
誰來對事件進行界定？采用什麽時間框架和證據標準？在不違反協議的情況下，如何恢複烏克蘭的領土完整，而這些協議又為永久的混合戰爭創造了完美的激勵？
（圖：我站在被俄羅斯聯邦摧毀的烏克蘭捷爾諾波爾的一處民用基礎設施內版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
在被俄羅斯聯邦非法占領的烏克蘭地區建立自由貿易區的提議，假設有統一的海關管理、邊界控製、檢查和合規能力、有效的管轄權、投資保護，以及在該地區不存在敵對勢力。
這與TOT的情況完全相反，在那裏俄方控製仍然存在，但烏克蘭的主權收法律保護，每一筆經濟活動最終都資助了占領方，因而違反了西方的不承認政策。
在那裏創建一個自由貿易區不僅意味著隱含地承認俄羅斯的占領這是一種無法執行的法律幻影還意味著清理歐洲的非法販運，助長了無休止的財產和證券爭議、結構性走私以及在盧布、格裏夫納和歐元之間洗錢貨物的三角交易。
（圖：另一個被俄羅斯聯邦摧毀的烏克蘭民用基礎設施版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
同樣，西方過早解除對俄羅斯聯邦的製裁將是戰略自殺，因為這些製裁仍然是歐盟主要的施壓工具和剩餘威懾手段。
在沒有有效軍事力量的情況下，在烏克蘭完全恢複領土主權及國際法完全恢複之前，放鬆唯一的持續施壓方式，意味著提前為莫斯科的又一個空頭承諾付出代價。
（圖：撰寫本文前，我在烏克蘭頓巴斯地區烏茲諾瓦的照片版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
