Ukraines Role In The (New) European Intelligence
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine ????????
Kyiv In addition to accelerating the production of its own anti-ballistic defense system by integrating it into the relevant supply chain, asanalyzedyesterday in these pages,Ukraines rapid accession to the EU would strengthen European intelligence not only quantitatively but also fundamentally change its nature. Ukraine would introduce into the EU system a warfare rationale based on urgency, operational integration, and risk-taking, a rationale currently largely absent from the EUs architecture.
Europe is dependent on the United States not because of technical incompetence but because of its political architecture. It collects enormous quantities of HUMINT, especially in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe. It is technically advanced in SIGINT thanks to contributions from countries such as France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, and it excels in OSINT, sometimes even outperforming the United States.The problem, however, lies not in collecting that data but in the sovereignty of the decision-making cycle. Often referred to as European intelligence, the EU INTCEN is not an operational structure: it does not use its own data but collects that provided by individual countries. It has no decision-making power and no direct channel to a unified military structure. It is an analytical hub, not a strategic intelligence service. Valuable information flows into the EU INTCEN, but it stops there because it lacks a connection to an apparatus capable of commanding drones, satellites, and military or cyber attacks.
Within the EU, world-class services such as the French DGSE, the German BND (excellent in SIGINT), the Italian AISE (also excellent in HUMINT), the Spanish CNI (leading in the Mediterranean and African regions), and other technologically advanced Northern European SIGINT entities cooperate, reporting to national governments, not to the EU.European intelligence exists but is not sovereign; it operates in a slow, horizontal, negotiated chain that often requires the consensus of all 27 governments and is not connected to a single military apparatus. The American system operates rapidly in a vertical decision-making chain and is closely integrated into the Defense Department. Ukraine received numerous European warnings about Russian troop buildup, unit rotations, and enemy logistical patterns. But for strategic targeting and intelligence-related strikes, it had no choice but to rely on the United States. When Washington turned off the tap, Europe had no alternative pipeline ready, and Ukraine found itself blinded.During the American information blackout in Kursk, Tokyo and Paris provided it with vital intelligence: the only fighters in the air were Mirage-2000s, whose radars provided valuable information supplemented by data from a network of French satellites that operate independently and integrate with NATO only when necessary. Tokyo also has autonomous satellite ISR, naval and space SIGINT, and a short decision chain.It was a strategic humiliation for Europe because a non-European actor had filled a European void. France did not replace American intelligence, but it prevented total blackout by providing independent analysis of Russian movements, SIGINT, and GEOINT through national assets (satellites and ISR cooperation) and by maintaining direct channels with Kyiv even when relations with Washington were cool. This was possible becauseFrance is the only European power with a truly sovereign vision of strategic autonomy: its decision-making chain is short (DGSE Presidency Armed Forces), and intelligence is conceived as an instrument of power. It is no coincidence that it is the only European country with a complete nuclear deterrent and willing to assume the political risk associated with the use of intelligence.
With a possible return of Great Britain, the EU could also count on MI6, among the best HUMINT agencies in the world, with strong penetration into Russia and the Middle East and top-level analytical capabilities.Ukraines rapid accession to the EU, however, would not only represent a geopolitical expansion but also a qualitative acceleration of the European intelligence system. For the first time, the EU would integrate a player that operates daily in a high-intensity war environment, with capabilities developed under real pressure, not in exercises or stable contexts.
Since 2022, Ukrainian intelligence has undergone a forced but rapid evolution, shifting from a reformed post-Soviet model to an adaptive warfare ecosystem. Its two pillars are: the SBU a hybrid domestic counterintelligence service already structured for warfare, with deep penetration of Russian networks, neutralization of agents and saboteurs, close integration with territorial forces, and infrastructure protection and the HUR, which has evolved into offensive military intelligence with tactical HUMINT directly linked to strikes, covert operations, and unconventional operations across borders. The recentappointmentof the former HUR chief as head of the Presidents Office is indicative of this, resulting in a radically different communications approach at the strategic level.Kyiv has learned to use intelligence as a survival function and a condition for the states existence. This has led to extremely short decision-making times, institutional tolerance for risk, and a culture of immediate error correction. By contrast, the EU operates within a preventive and consensual paradigm, not an existential one. Kyiv has developed models in which the loss of a node does not interrupt the flow of information, targeting does not depend on a single central hub, and information is quickly accessible to operational units. For the EU, this would be a crucial added value. Ukraine would fill the Unions structural gaps, forcing it to function as a strategic player, not a coordinator.
A significant portion of the US press, however, tends to portray Ukrainian deep strikes as the near direct product of American intelligence. This interpretation is analytically incomplete and, in some respects, technically flawed. The reason lies in the nature of the systems employed and the type of intelligence required to make them effective.In the HUMINT domain, Ukraine enjoys structural advantages that no other ally can replicate: a historical and social presence in Russian and occupied territories; pre-existing networks (civilian, technical, industrial, military); linguistic and operational continuity; and rapid cross-validation capabilities. Coordinated primarily by HUR and SBU, these networks have enabled Kyiv to map air bases, identify operational routines, monitor asset concentration and dispersal times, and validate targets before engagement.
Ukrainian HUMINT does not replace American HUMINT: however, it often renders it superfluous for operational targeting.
The main misunderstanding in the American narrative centers on the SIGINT/ISR profile. American cruise missiles (such as the Tomahawk) require complex mission planning because they rely on TERCOM/DSMAC maps, signal libraries, ISR updates, and satellite and naval deconfliction.Ukrainian cruise missiles are not integrated into the US-led global ecosystem and therefore continue to function fully without American intelligence. This is because they are based on a radically different concept: GPS/INS navigation, pre-programmed waypoints, limited dynamic corrections, and static or semi-static targets. They use what Kyiv has at its disposal without the need for deep intelligence. The coordinatedattackagainst Russian strategic and tactical air bases is a prime example, relying solely on elements endogenous to the Ukrainian system. The US press tends to overestimate the American role for three reasons: a systemic bias resulting from the difficulty in accepting the autonomous capabilities of an ally perceived as assisted; conceptual confusion regarding technical elements such as those described, which leads to confusing strategic sharing with operational dependence; and its role in reinforcing the idea of US control over escalation by emphasizing its domestic military and industrial role.
From a European perspective, it is therefore important to understand thatUkraine in the EU would not be a beneficiary of security but a provider of critical capabilities.
Without the absorption of this know-how, European intelligence will remain technically advanced but politically defused. With Ukraine, the Union would have the opportunity perhaps its last to bridge the gap between knowledge and action.
The continuous blackouts severely damaged the heating system of our house in Western Ukraine while we were here in Donbas.
Without electricity, the pump couldnt circulate the liquid while the fire was lit. As a result, the system caught fire, and the whole house was at risk of burning. Fortunately, it did not, but the whole system needs to be changed, and the house needs to be restored. Tubes are all bent, walls are blackened by haze, and the heating system doesnt work, requiring an entirely new system.
We are doing our best since Allas parents live there, but theres still a lot to work on here, too, as the people around us are in no better situation.
Were renewing our fundraising campaign and thanking everyone who joins to help us restore what Russia is destroying. Even a small donation helps. Well keep you updated on developments.
Thank you all, friends ????????
烏克蘭在（新）歐洲情報格局中的作用
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻譯：旺財球球
烏克蘭前線報道????????
基輔正如昨日本欄所分析的，除通過將自有反彈道防禦係統納入相關供應鏈以加快其生產外，烏克蘭迅速加入歐盟不僅會在數量上增強歐洲情報力量，還將從根本上改變其性質。烏克蘭會向歐盟體係引入一種基於緊迫性、作戰一體化與敢於冒險為核心的戰爭邏輯這是當前歐盟架構中大多缺失的要素。
歐洲對美國的依賴並非源於技術無能，而是政治架構所致。歐洲在人工情報（HUMINT）方麵收集大量情報，尤其是在巴爾幹、南高加索和東歐地區；在電子信號情報（SIGINT）方麵也具備技術優勢，這得益於法國、德國、意大利和西班牙等國的貢獻；在開源情報（OSINT）方麵表現出色，有時甚至超過美國。然而問題不在於數據的采集，而在於決策周期的主權。被稱為歐洲情報的歐盟情報與反恐中心（EU INTCEN）並非一套作戰性機構：它不直接運用自身采集的數據，而是匯編各成員國提供的情報。它無決策權、無通向統一軍事機構的直接通道；它是一個分析樞紐，而非戰略情報機構。大量有價值的信息流入EU INTCEN，但多半止步於此，因為它缺乏與能夠指揮無人機、衛星以及軍事或網絡打擊的裝置相連的通路。
在歐盟內部，世界級情報機構如法國的對外安全總局（DGSE）、以電子偵察見長的德國聯邦情報局（BND）、在人力情報上同樣出色的意大利對外情報局（AISE）、在地中海和非洲地區領先的西班牙國家情報中心（CNI），以及其他北歐的技術先進的SIGINT機構。這些機構相互合作，但它們向各自國家政府負責，而非向歐盟負責。歐洲確實存在情報能力，但並不具備主權性；其運作為緩慢、橫向、協商式的鏈條，通常需要27國政府的一致同意，且未與單一軍事機構相連。美國體係則以垂直決策鏈快速運作，並與國防部緊密整合。烏克蘭曾多次收到歐洲關於俄軍集結、部隊輪換及敵方後勤規律的預警。但在戰略性選點與情報相關打擊上，烏克蘭別無選擇隻得依靠美國。
當華盛頓關閉信息源時，歐洲並無備用管線，烏克蘭隨之陷入失明。在庫爾斯克發生美國情報封鎖期間，東京與巴黎向其提供了關鍵情報：當時空中唯一出動的戰鬥機為幻影?2000（Mirage?2000），其雷達提供了重要情報，並由一組獨立運行的法國衛星網絡補充數據這些衛星僅在必要時與北約對接。日本同樣擁有獨立的衛星偵察與監視（ISR）、海上與太空SIGINT以及簡短的決策鏈。對於歐洲而言，這是一次戰略性的羞辱：一個非歐洲行為體填補了歐洲的空白。法國並未完全取代美國情報，但通過國家資產（衛星與ISR合作）提供對俄軍動向、SIGINT與地理情報（GEOINT）的獨立分析，並在與華盛頓關係冷卻時保持與基輔的直接通道，從而避免了全麵的信息真空。這之所以可能，是因為法國是唯一具備真正主權性戰略自主願景的歐洲大國：其決策鏈短（DGSE－總統府－武裝力量），並將情報視為權力工具。法國也是唯一擁有完整核威懾力量並願意承擔與情報使用相關政治風險的歐洲國家，這並非偶然。
若英國重回歐盟，歐盟還可能重新獲得MI6全球最優秀的HUMINT機構之一，具備對俄及中東的深度滲透能力，及頂級的分析能力。更重要的是，烏克蘭迅速加入歐盟不僅是地緣政治的擴張，更將在質的層麵加速歐洲情報體係。歐盟將首次納入一名每天在高強度戰爭環境中運作、在真實壓力下而非在演習或穩定環境中鍛造能力的參與者。
自2022年以來，烏克蘭情報經曆了一次被迫但迅速的演變，從改良後的後蘇聯模式轉向適應性戰爭生態係統。其兩大支柱為：SBU（安全局）一種已為戰爭重構的混合型國內反間諜與安全機構，深度滲透俄方網絡、鏟除特工與破壞分子、與地方部隊緊密整合並負責基礎設施保護；以及HUR（軍事情報局）已發展為進攻性軍事情報機構，具備將戰術HUMINT直接與打擊、隱蔽行動及跨境非常規行動相聯結的能力。最近任命前HUR首腦出任總統辦公廳主任即表明了這一點，進而在戰略層麵帶來了截然不同的溝通方式。基輔已經學會將情報作為一種生存功能和國家存在的前提。這導致了極短的決策時間、製度性容忍風險以及即時糾錯的文化。相較之下，歐盟運作在一種以預防與共識為主的範式，而非存在主義範式。基輔已發展出一種模式：節點喪失不會中斷信息流，打擊不依賴單一中心樞紐，情報能迅速為作戰單元所用。對歐盟而言，這是極為關鍵的附加價值。烏克蘭將填補歐盟的結構性空白，迫使其以戰略行為體而非單純協調者的身份運作。
然而，美國媒體有相當一部分傾向於將烏克蘭的深度打擊直接歸因於美國情報。這一解讀在分析上並不完整，且在某些層麵存在技術偏差。原因在於所用係統的性質以及使其有效所需情報的類型。在HUMINT領域，烏克蘭具有其他盟友難以複製的結構性優勢：在俄羅斯及被占領土的曆史性與社會性存在；既有網絡（民用、技術、工業、軍事）；語言與作戰延續性；以及迅速的交叉驗證能力。由HUR與SBU主導協調的這些網絡，使基輔得以繪製空軍基地圖、識別作戰常規、監測兵力集結與分散時間點，並在實施打擊前對目標進行驗證。
烏克蘭的人源情報並不取代美國的人源情報；但在作戰選點上，它常使美方情報變得非必需。
美國敘事中的主要誤解集中在SIGINT/ISR特性上。美國的巡航導彈（如戰斧）需複雜的任務策劃，依賴地形匹配（TERCOM）/目標匹配（DSMAC）地圖、信號庫、ISR更新及衛星和海軍去衝突。烏克蘭的巡航導彈並未集成入美國主導的全球生態係統，因此在沒有美情報的情形下仍能完全運作。這是因為兩者基於截然不同的理念：烏方多采用GPS/慣導（INS）導航、預設航點、有限的動態修正，及針對靜態或半靜態目標的方案。它們使用基輔現有資源，而不依賴深度情報。對俄方戰略與戰術空軍基地的協同打擊便是一典型，僅依賴烏克蘭體係內生要素即可完成。美國媒體高估美方作用有三方麵原因：一是體製性偏見，難以接受一個被視為受援助的盟友具備自主能力；二是對上述技術要素的概念性混淆，將戰略共享與作戰依賴混淆；三是出於強化美方對升級態勢控製的敘述需要，誇大其國內軍事與工業角色。
從歐洲視角看，重要的是明白：若烏克蘭加入歐盟，它並非安全的受益者，而是關鍵能力的提供者。
若不吸收這類專有技能和經驗，歐洲情報將繼續在技術上先進但在政治上失能。有了烏克蘭，歐盟將獲得一次或許是最後一次彌合認知與行動之間差距的機會。
（圖：在撰寫本文前，我從靠近基輔與布查的沃爾澤爾市現場報道照片中的標語寫著我們會成功版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
持續的停電嚴重損壞了我們在烏克蘭西部的家中的供暖係統，而我們當時就在頓巴斯。
沒有電，點著的爐火無法通過水泵循環熱水。結果，係統起火，整個房子麵臨著燒毀的風險。幸而未被燒毀，但整個係統需要更換，房子也需要修複。管道都是歪的，牆壁被煙霧熏黑，供暖係統無法正常工作，需要徹底更換。
我們正在盡最大努力，因為Alla的父母住在那裏，但這裏還有許多工作要做，周圍的人處境也好不到哪兒去。
我們正在重啟籌款活動，感謝每一位支持我們修複被俄羅斯摧毀一切的朋友。即使是小額捐款也有幫助。我們會及時更新進展。
感謝大家，朋友們。
????????如果你相信我們的工作，請支持我們????????????
在過去的三年裏，我們一直在烏克蘭戰爭的各個前線進行報道
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