二戰勝利後美國朝野對“盟友”蘇聯抱有不切實際的幻想。“凱南電報”點醒夢中人-眾人皆醉，唯有他看清蘇聯本質

美國是很愚蠢的，1946年還對蘇聯抱有良好願景，直到凱南電報。

四平之戰國軍擊退共軍，美嚴禁國軍追擊。後林彪部在獲得蘇聯大量武器、物資及人員的補充後，東山再起。

1946年-1948年，美國竟聯手英國，對華實施武器禁運。

借口：美國國內人民反對提供武器打內戰。

在國共和談時，它做了什麽損害中華民國的事，我也懶得去看了。

不過我知道，抗戰勝利後，它就逼迫國民政府裁軍100萬，而那些久經沙場的戰士，因為找不到工作，很多又被中共招募進去。

凱南電報：眾人皆醉，唯有他看清蘇聯本質

喬治凱南的長電報 全文與中英對照

背景人物：大使級代辦喬治凱南和秘書多蘿西海斯曼

主題：向國務卿提交的《對蘇聯的指控》（喬治凱南

級別：秘密

地點：莫斯科，

時間：1946 年 2 月 22 日-晚上 9 點[2月22日--3日下午52點收到]

861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram

The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. [Received February 22--3: 52 p.m.]

國務院2月3日第284號電令要求回答的問題，既複雜又非常敏感，既與我們常規思考極為不同，又對分析我們所處的國際環境十分重要，我實在無法將我的回複壓縮在一份簡單的電文中，又避免造成我認為是非常危險的過分簡單化。據此，我希望國務院能夠容忍我將我的回複用五個部分提出。這五部分的小標題分別是：

1、蘇聯戰後（戰略）思維的基本特征；

2、這一思維的背景；

3、這一思維在政府政策層麵的反映；

4、這一思維在非政府層麵的反映；

5、從美國政策角度的可行性推斷。

請允許我先就對電報通訊所造成的負擔表示歉意。然而，所涉及的問題，特別是考慮到目前發生的事件，是那麽的急迫、那麽的重要，我認為對這些問題的解釋如果這些問題確實需要我們予以重視的話（采用如此長電的形式）是值得的。

下麵是我的解釋。

511. Answer to Depts 284, Feb 3 [13] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:

(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.

(2) Background of this outlook

(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level.

(4) Its projection on unofficial level.

(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.

I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. There follows

第一部分 蘇聯政府宣傳機器所宣揚的戰後（戰略）思維的基本特征如下：

一、蘇聯仍處於敵對的資本主義（世界）的包圍之中，長期看來，取得並保持永久的和平共處是不可能的。正如斯大林1927年對一個美國工人代表團所表述的：在國際革命繼續發展的過程中，將會出現兩個世界規模的中心：一個是社會主義中心，吸引著所有傾向於發展社會主義的國際；一個是資本主義中心，集結著那些希望走資本主義道路的國際。這兩個中心之間為了爭奪世界經濟主導權的鬥爭將會決定世界範圍內資本主義和共產主義的命運。

二、資本主義世界正在受到它本身固有的多種矛盾的困擾。這些衝突無法通過和平的妥協得以解決，其中最大的是美國與英國之間的衝突。

三、資本主義內部的衝突不可避免地要導致戰爭。由此產生的戰爭可能會有兩種形式：一種是資本主義內部兩個資本主義國家之間的戰爭，一種是對社會主義世界的侵略戰爭。聰明的資本家們，為了規避資本主義內部的衝突，盡管是徒勞的，但會傾向於發動第二種戰爭。

四、對蘇聯的侵略，盡管對侵略者來說最終將是災難性的，但也會減緩蘇聯社會主義建設的步伐，因此，必須不惜一切地予以製止。

五、資本主義國家之間的衝突，盡管對蘇聯意味著危險，但對社會主義事業的發展卻提供了巨大的可能性，特別是隻要蘇聯保持軍事上的強大、意識形態的一致和對目前傑出領導人的忠誠。

六、必須牢記的是，（蘇聯）並非認為資本主義世界都是敵人。除了那些不可救藥的反動分子和資產階級，它還包含了：（一）一些可以由共產黨組織團結起來的開明的積極分子；（二）其他一些力量，其態度、追求和行為恰巧在客觀上對蘇聯的利益有益（目前出於策略上的考慮，這些力量被稱為進步和民主分子）。為了蘇聯的目的，必須對這些力量加以鼓勵和利用。

在資本主義社會中的那些反動力量中，最具危險性的是那些被列寧稱之為人民的假朋友，也就是所謂溫和社會主義者或社會民主領導人（換言之，即非共產主義左翼分子）。這些人比那些徹頭徹尾的反動派更為危險，這是因為後者至少是以真實的麵目出現，而前者是在打著社會主義的旗號迷惑人們，為反動資本者服務。

關於前提就是這些了。那麽，依據這些前提到底能對蘇聯的政策做出怎樣的推斷？大致如下：

一、所有（的政策）都必須為了發展蘇聯相對的力量，令其成為國際社會的一個要素。相反，所有能夠削弱資本主義國際的力量和影響的機會，都必須緊緊抓住，無論是以集體的，還是以單個的形式。

二、蘇聯以及其在世界範圍內的朋友的所作所為，都必須是致力於利用和加深資本主義國家之間的分歧和衝突。假若這些分歧和衝突不斷深化，最終引發一場帝國主義的戰爭，那麽，這場戰爭必須演變成在不同的資本主義國家內部發生的革命起義。

三、對世界上的民主進步力量，必須最大限度地予以利用，以期按照蘇聯的利益對資本主義國家的政府造成壓力。

四、必須與世界上的（溫和）社會主義和社會民主主義的領導人作不懈、無情的鬥爭。

Part 1: Basic Features of Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine

Are as Follows:

(a) USSR still lives in antagonistic capitalist encirclement with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American workers:

In course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in entire world.

(b)Capitalist world is beset with internal conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between England and US.

(c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars between two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of capitalism, incline toward latter.

(d) Intervention against USSR, while it would be disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.

(e) Conflicts between capitalist states, though likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present brilliant leadership.

(f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it includes (1) certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in acceptable communistic parties and (2) certain other elements (now described for tactical reasons as progressive or democratic) whose reactions, aspirations and activities happen to be objectively favorable to interests of USSR These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.

(g) Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist society, most dangerous of all are those whom Lenin called false friends of the people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders (in other words, non-Communist left-wing). These are more dangerous than out-and-out reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true colors, whereas moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing devices of socialism to seine interests of reactionary capital.

So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:

(a) Everything must be done to advance relative strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity most be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers.

(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russias friends abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an imperialist war, this war must be turned into revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries.

(c) Democratic-progressive elements abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.

(d) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist and social-democratic leaders abroad.

第二部分 （戰後蘇聯戰略）思維的背景。

在分析這樣的（蘇聯）政黨思維的實踐層麵上的細節之前，對這個思維的某些方麵，我希望提請注意。

首先，這個思維並不代表俄國人民的自然思維。總的來講，俄國人民大致上對外部世界是友善的，樂意了解外部世界，渴望以他們認為所具備的優勢去衡量外部世界；最重要的是，他們也期盼著和平生活，希望能享受勞動的果實。政黨路線隻是體現了那些由政府宣傳機器向大眾不遺餘力、堅持不懈灌輸所展現的信條，而大眾在心底深處常常對那些信條存在著驚人的抗拒情緒。但是，這樣的政黨路線對那些權利機器的主宰者們包括政黨、秘密警察和政府的思維和行為，卻具有約束力，而我們所不得不要應付的也就是這樣一部分人。

其次，必須提請注意的是，上述政黨路線所依據的前提條件，大多並非真實。過去的經驗表明，資本主義和社會主義國家之間的和平共處和互惠互利是完全可能的。發達國家內部的衝突，已不再源於資本者對生產資料的占取，而隻是反映了發達的都市化和工業化之間的矛盾；俄國迄今仍未經曆工業化和都市化發展所產生的矛盾，原因並不在於其所實行的社會主義製度，而僅僅是出於它的落後。資本主義國家的內部衝突並非一定導致戰爭；起碼並非所有的戰爭是由於這個原因而爆發的。在今天談侵略蘇聯的可能性，特別是在消滅了德國（法西斯）和日本（軍國主義）以及近期的（美蘇合作）示範之後，真是無稽之談。如果不受到堅持敵對和顛覆勢力的挑釁，今天的資本主義世界完全能夠保持自身的和平，也能夠與蘇聯和平相處。最後，任何一個精神正常者都沒有理由懷疑西方國家的溫和社會主義者的誠意。例如，在斯堪的納維亞國家，隻要有機會，他們總是致力於改善勞工大眾的生活條件，否認他們在這方麵所取得的成功，是不公正的。

這些前提之所以是錯誤的，是由於每一個都基於（二）戰前的經驗，而且每一個前提的謬誤之處都被那場戰爭所充分證明。事實上，英美間的分歧並非西方世界的主要分歧。除了那些軸心國，資本主義國家並沒有為了解決自身的分歧而加入反對蘇聯的十字軍遠征。蘇聯不僅沒有將一場帝國主義的戰爭演變成內戰和革命，卻為了共同的目的和承諾，不得不與資本主義國家同仇敵愾，並肩戰鬥。

盡管如此，所有這些毫無根據並被證明是錯誤的判斷，在今天，仍然被大膽地提出。這意味著什麽？這意味著蘇聯黨的路線並非基於對俄羅斯外部局勢的客觀分析；這意味著蘇聯黨的路線的製定與俄羅斯以外的條件無任何關聯；這還意味著蘇聯黨的路線的產生隻是出於在俄羅斯戰前就存在的、今天仍然存在的內部的本質上的需要。

克裏姆林宮對世界事務神經質的認知的最深處是俄羅斯傳統的、本能的不安全感。起初，這種不安全感，產生於一個和平地生活在廣袤而無法設防的平原上的農作居民與一群凶暴的遊牧民為鄰的結果。最近的這場戰爭，由於俄羅斯人打交道的是經濟發達的西方人，使得（俄羅斯人）對地區內出現較之以前更強大、更發達、組織更嚴密的社會產生新的恐懼。但是，這種新的不安全感與其說是在折磨著一般俄羅斯民眾，毋寧說是在折磨著俄國的統治者。這是因為，俄羅斯統治者無疑感覺到，他們的統治是一個形式上相對無序的統治，其心理基礎脆弱而且虛假，無法與西方國家的政治製度相提並論。因此，他們一向懼怕來自外部的滲透，懼怕與西方世界直接接觸，對一旦俄羅斯人民了解了外部世界的真相或是外國人民了解了俄羅斯內部的真相所可能帶來的後果擔憂不已。結果，為了求得安全，他們學會的隻是如何徹底地置對手於死地的方法，從沒考慮與對手建立契約和妥協。

馬克思主義在西歐傳播了半個世紀毫無建樹，但在俄羅斯卻能星火燎原、一舉成功，這絕非偶然。隻有在這樣一個從未擁有過和睦的鄰邦，甚或在其內部和外部也從未產生過得以容忍的力量均衡的國土上，一個崇尚社會間的經濟衝突是無法通過和平手段解決的學說的民族中，馬克思主義才能得以發揚。自建立了布爾什維克政權之後，由於列寧的詮釋，馬克斯的教義變得更加凶狠好鬥，更具排他性，成為激發不安全感的無與倫比的動力，正因為此，那些布爾什維克統治者們對不安全的感受，要比俄羅斯曆史上的任何統治者都要強烈得多。也正是在這種教義所寓含的利他主義的內涵中，他們找到了本能地懼怕外部世界的正當理由，找到了除了獨裁而不知如何統治的根據，找到了沒有他們不敢實踐的殘暴的因由，也找到了他們要求別人作出犧牲的根據。正是以馬克思主義的名義，他們的所作所為蕩滌了哪怕隻是一個細微的倫理價值。今天，他們已經離不開這樣一個教義了，因為這個教義已經成為他們在道德與思辨上讓別人不得不傾倒的遮羞布。沒有了它，他們在曆史麵前，與俄羅斯一長串的為了內部的脆弱尋求外部安全，以至不斷提升軍事力量的凶殘而驕奢的統治者們相比，充其量隻能排在這些統治者的尾末。這就是為什麽蘇聯的目標總是需要用馬克思主義的衣缽嚴格包裝的原因，也是為什麽任何人不得輕視蘇聯（對外）事務中教義重要性的原因。這樣，蘇聯領導人迫於曆史和現狀的實際需要，就提出一種教條，把外部世界描繪成為一個罪惡的、敵視的、威脅著蘇聯的世界，並認為這個世界內部滋生著蔓延疾病的細菌，注定要被越來越多的內部騷動所破壞，最後難逃蒸蒸日上的社會主義理論的致命一擊，從而讓位給一個新的、更美好的世界。這種論點為蘇聯擴充國家警察與軍事力量提供了依據，為將俄羅斯人民與外部世界隔離提供了理由，為完全體現俄羅斯統治者本能和特性的不斷擴大警察權限的壓力提供了正當性。從本質上看，這隻是躁動不安的俄羅斯民族主義運動的穩步前進，而在這個流延了數個世紀的運動中，進攻與防禦的理念一直是不可救藥地混為一談的。但是在國際馬克思主義的偽裝下，對絕望的、飽受戰爭創傷的世界人民做出塗上蜜甜的承諾，這個運動因此比曆史上任何時候都要更加危險，更加險惡。

蘇維埃政黨的教義喧嚷，就大多數提出的人而言，並不能認作一定是虛狂的，或是偽詐的。這些人大多對外部世界不甚了解，思想上過於依賴，以至不會對自我催眠術質疑，也不會對他們樂於而且容易相信的東西輕易提出疑問。最後，我們仍然麵對一個尚未解開的謎：在這個國家到底有誰如果確有此人的話能夠獲得對外部世界準確而不偏見的信息。由於這個政府在充滿了東方式的秘密和陰謀氛圍中運作，歪曲和毒化信息來源和內容的可能無時不在。俄羅斯人對客觀事實的不信任實際上他們根本不承認客觀事實的存在使得他們堅信所有表述的事實都不過是為了某種險惡目的所服務的工具。人們由足夠理由懷疑，現今的政府本身就是一個大陰謀中的一部分。作為眾多人中的一員，我就懷疑斯大林本人能否得到客觀地反映外部世界的信息。這裏可以充分衡量俄羅斯人如何實施微妙的詭計，在這點上，俄國人過去擅長的爾虞我詐、勾心鬥角的伎倆，大有施展的餘地。外國政府無法將他們對俄關係的立場和理由在俄國決策者麵前清晰地表述實際上往往隻是受到那些看上去彬彬有禮但身份模糊、鮮為人知的所謂顧問們的接待，對這些人，既不能輕易約見，也無法產生影響。在我看來，和是最令人焦慮的莫斯科外交特征。西方政治家要想有所建樹，就必須了解這裏所麵對困難的實質之所在。

Part 2: Background of Outlook

Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.

First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power--party, secret police and Government--and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.

Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of intolerance and subversion capitalist world of today is quite capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in Western countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been given chance to show what they could do.

Falseness of those premises, every one of which predates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of Western World. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aim.

Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation beyond Russias borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.

At bottom of Kremlins neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenins interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why Soviet purposes most always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet leaders are driven [by?] necessities of their own past and present position to put forward which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing, but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given finalCoup de graceby rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis provides justification for that increase of military and police power of Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers. Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.

It should not be thought from above that Soviet party line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too dependent to question [apparent omission] self-hypnotism, and who have no difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this Government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians for objective truth--indeed, their disbelief in its existence--leads them to view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world. Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely before Russian policy makers--extent to which they are delivered up in their relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisors whom they never see and cannot influence--this to my mind is most disquieting feature of diplomacy in Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.

第三部分 蘇聯（戰後戰略）思維在政府政策層麵的反映。

至此，我們已經了解了蘇聯計劃的內涵與來龍去脈。那麽，在政策的實施層麵，我們又會麵對什麽？

正如國務院詢問電報所隱含的，蘇聯的（對外）政策是在兩個平台上操作的：一、政府平台，體現了那些以蘇聯政府名義采取的動作；二、隱秘平台，表現為那些由某些機構采取的但蘇聯政府偶然是由其指示的行動。

這兩個平台所展現的政策，均旨在服務於（本文）第一部分所表述的一和四基本政策目標。通過其他平台所采取的行動會有很大差異，但在目的、時機和效果方麵是相互呼應的。

至於政府平台的政策，我們應該注意以下幾方麵：

一、所有旨在增強和提升蘇聯政權權威和信譽的國內政策，包括：強化軍事工業化進程；最大限度地發展武裝力量；為了向外國人宣傳所做出的大規模展示；那些為了掩蓋弱點、迷惑對手的對內長期秘密行動。

二、在時機成熟和成功有望的時候，所有為了擴展蘇聯力量的試圖。目前，這樣的試圖主要集中於被認為具有現時戰略需要的幾個相鄰地區，如伊朗北部、土耳其，也有可能包括波恩赫爾姆。然而，一旦隱秘的蘇聯政治影響在新的地區取得成功，其他地區也會被受到考慮。以此類推，一個友善的波斯政府會被要求為蘇聯在波斯灣開放一個港口。假若西班牙共產黨取得政權，蘇聯有可能立即啟動對在直布羅陀海峽建立基地的訴求。當然，諸如此類的動作，隻有在非政府的（平台）準備完成後才會以政府的名義來推行。

三、隻要看到有擴張蘇聯實力或限製和減弱其他國家實力的機會，俄羅斯人是會以政府的名義參與國際組織。對於聯合國，莫斯科從不認為該組織是為了建立一個基於相互利益和共同目標的永久穩定的國際社會的機製，而隻是看作是一個為了私利能夠利用的場合。隻要這個判斷和訴求不變，蘇聯將留在聯合國內。但是，一旦認為該組織隻是令他們難堪、限製了其勢力擴張，一旦發現通過其他途徑能夠實現自己的擴張目標時，蘇聯會毫不猶豫地拋棄聯合國。此舉的隱含意義是：他們堅信自己已經強大到這樣的程度，以至不惜通過撤出聯合國而與其他國家決裂，將對其目標和安全有威脅的聯合國變成一個無效機構，並用一個符合他們利益的國際武器取代之。因此，蘇聯對聯合國的態度在很大程度上取決於這樣幾個因素：其他國家對該組織的忠誠度，以及這些國家為了通過聯合國推動和平和實現代表我們思考方式的具有希望的國際生活觀所做出的努力，所表現的決心和所展示的團結。請允許我重申：莫斯科對聯合國的理想並無任何抽象意義的首肯，它對該組織的態度主要源於實際的和策略上的考慮。

四、對殖民地和落後的、依賴他人的地區和人民，蘇聯的政策，即便是通過政府平台實施的，都將是為了削弱西方發達國家（在這些地區）的實力、影響甚至與這些地區的接觸的實現，因為，從理論上看，一旦這樣的政策實施成功，那麽這些地區將會出現權力真空，有利於蘇聯支持的共產主義勢力的滲透。在我看來，蘇聯施壓要求參與（聯合國）托管的安排，表現的是企望在這些地區處於能夠弱化西方影響的地位的要求，並非為了構建一個能夠發揮蘇聯影響力的渠道。盡管也期望建立這樣的渠道，但蘇聯傾向於依賴其他的渠道，而不是通過政府的托管安排。據此，我們可以預見，蘇聯將會要求參與所有涉及托管和類似的機製，並通過所獲取的地位削弱西方對這些地區和人民的影響力。

五、俄羅斯人將會竭盡全力地與所有可能傾向於反對西方權力大國的國家發展正式關係，加強蘇聯的影響。這種政策傾向將會廣泛涉及諸如德國、阿根廷、中東和其他國家。

六、在國際經濟領域，蘇聯的政策將集中於對蘇聯和蘇聯控製的相鄰國家作為一個整體的絕對主宰地位的訴求。但是，這將是個潛在的政策，就其公開表述的路線來看，具體的政策尚不明晰。自戰爭結束後，蘇聯政府對涉及對外貿易的議題表現出奇怪的緘默。假若有可能爭取到大批量的長期的信用貸款，我相信蘇聯政府會如30年代那樣對建立一個國際經濟交流的必要性表示口頭上的讚同。否則，我認為，蘇聯的對外貿易有可能僅限於蘇聯自己的安全區內，包括在德國的占領區，官方對國家間發展經濟合作的基本原則會采取漠視的態度。

七、關於文化交流，蘇聯對加深國際民族間文化了解的必要性也一樣會表示口頭上的讚同，即便是這樣的表態，一旦在實踐中被認為有損蘇聯民族的安全，便會被取消。蘇聯涉及這方麵的政策表現仍將限於那些毫無生氣的交流方式，包括牢牢控製下的官方訪問和活動，鋪天蓋地的伏特加酒，以及冗長而缺乏人任何長久意義的講話。

八、在此之外，蘇聯與各個外國政府的官方關係將按所謂正確路線的實行之，即：將無例外地強調蘇聯的威望和代表性，同時也強調利益而非良好的風度的任何一個細微之處。

Part 3: Projection of Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official Level

We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?

Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes: (1) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.

Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic policies (a) to (d) outlined in part 1. Actions taken on different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in purpose, timing and effect.

On official plane we must look for following:

(a) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.

(b) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a friendly Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist control, question of Soviet base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.

(c) Russians will participate officially in international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose, Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that it is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal to render UNO ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, replace it with an international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which those nations defend in UNO the peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially pragmatic and tactical.

(d) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations, on theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a vacuum which will favor Communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of Western influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken Western influence among such peoples.

(e) Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense Strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. This applies to such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries, etc.

(f) In international economic matters, Soviet policy will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip service, as it did in 1930s to desirability of building up international economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign trade may be restricted largely to Soviets own security sphere, including occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to principle of general economic collaboration among nations.

(g) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with superabundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.

(h) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take what might be called correct course with individual foreign governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol as distinct from good manners.

第四部分 以下部分可以被認為是我們對蘇聯為了其基本政策目標在非官方或是隱秘的（如那些蘇聯政府否認參與）的平台上將會實行的方式和方法的預測。

在這個平台上實施（蘇聯）政策推介的機構如下：

一、其他國家共產黨內部最為核心的部分。盡管此類人具有與他們的真實身份無關聯的公共麵貌，但他們實際上聯係緊密，形成了一個世界共產主義的地下活動中心，恰如一個隱秘的共產國際，受到莫斯科的嚴密控製和指導。這個內部核心的成員，盡管他們所隸屬的是個合法的政黨，但他們的活動是通過地下管道進行的，記住此點，十分重要。

二、共產黨的一般成員。請注意此類人與上述人員是有區別的，而這個區別近來越來越大了。過去，外國共產黨的活動多為公開和秘密、合法和陰謀的混合，這個現象是十分令人費解的或者對莫斯科而言起碼是不方便的，現在，幾乎所有的秘密活動均僅限於黨內的核心部分，並有效地轉入地下，今天的一般黨員已經不被信任，甚至對運動的真實情況都不甚了解，隻是作為各自國家內部政治運動的真誠參與者而被推出，對該黨與外國政府的隱秘的關係一無所知。隻有在那些共產黨仍具有人數上優勢的國家，這些黨員分子才會經常參加活動，並以集體的形式出現。作為一條規則，他們隻是被用來對那些不太會被懷疑是蘇聯政府的工具的組織，根據具體需要和可能，進行滲透發揮影響，甚至予以控製，以便達到通過某些組織的活動而非以一個獨立的政治實體采取直接行動的目的。

三、各國都有大量屬於國家級協會和團體的此類組織，完全可能通過上述滲透的方式受到影響和控製。這些組織一般包括：工團，青年聯合會，婦女協會，民族團體，宗教組織，社會機構，文化社團，自由主義的刊物，出版社，等等。

四、國際組織同樣存在著（共產黨）通過對不同的國家社會部分施加影響而遭受滲透的可能。最有可能發揮這種影響的有工會、青年聯合會和婦女聯合會。對此特別需要提出的，而且幾乎具有致命的重要性的，是國際工人運動。對這個運動，莫斯科看到了能夠讓媳婦政府在國際事務中無法集中注意力的可能，也看到了建立國際性的壓力組織以逼迫某些國家的政府采取有利於蘇聯的行動或停止不利於蘇聯的政策的可能。

五、俄羅斯東正教教會和它遍布海外的分會，以及通過這些教堂與一般的東正教教堂的聯係。

六、泛斯拉夫運動以及其他源於蘇聯境內少數民族如阿塞拜疆、亞美尼亞、土庫曼人等的運動。

七、那些願意或多或少為蘇聯的政策目的效勞的外國政府於執政集團，諸如目前的保加利亞、南斯拉夫政府、北波斯政權、中國共產黨集團等。這些政府和勢力，不僅其宣傳機器被蘇聯所利用，而且在具體政策上頁會相當大程度地服務於蘇聯。

可以預料的是，由這些勢力組成的這樣一個廣泛、龐大的機器將會受到（莫斯科的）利用，盡管利用的程度會因人而異、因勢而異，但在方式上會出現如下幾種：

一、打擊主要西方國家的政治與戰略潛力。在這些國家內，將會出現旨在打擊人民自信心、破壞國防建設、激化社會與工業動亂以及挑起任何形式的分裂的活動。所有心懷不滿和受到不公正待遇者，無論是經濟的還是民族的，都將被挑唆通過以消滅社會中敵對勢力為目的的暴力方式去尋求正義和解決問題，而非通過調解和妥協的方式。於是，窮人將會與富人形成對立，黑種人將會與白種人形成對立，年輕人將會與年長者形成對立，新來者將會與久居者形成對立，不一而足。

二、特別地通過非政府平台挑起暴力，以削弱西方大國在殖民地、落後地區或依賴他人的民族地區的實力和影響。為此，西方殖民統治的所有錯誤和不當將會受到毫無保留地揭露和利用。西方大國內部的自由主義勢力將會動員起來反對殖民主義政策。附庸國人民對宗主國的不滿也將會受到挑唆。盡管這些著名的和附庸國家的人民會被鼓勵爭取實現脫離西方大國統治的獨立，實際上，由蘇聯控製的傀儡政治勢力會在積極準備，一旦獨立實現，他們即會上台控製政權。

三、任何一個有可能阻礙蘇聯的政策目的推行的外國政府將會受到下台和解散的壓力。這種壓力可能在三種情況下出現：政府公開直接反對蘇聯的對外政策目標（如土耳其、伊朗）；政府關閉國境線以阻止共產黨的滲透（如瑞士、葡萄牙）；政府在那些對共產黨控製十分重要的人群中爭取到的認同的力度很大，如英國的工黨政府。（有時，上述兩種情況在同一國家出現。一旦如此，共產黨的反擊將會尤其激烈和殘酷。）

四、作為一條法則，共產黨分子在國外的活動，是為了消滅個人任何形式的獨立，無論是經濟上的，政治上的，還是道德方麵的。他們的製度隻能對付那些已經被迫完全依附於更高的權威的人。據此，所有經濟上獨立者諸如企業經營者、不動產擁有者、成功的農民和藝術家，以及所有在當地社區具有信譽和起領袖作用的人，例如受人愛戴的牧師或地方政治人物，都是需要被詛咒、被打擊的人。即便是在蘇聯內部，地方官員也會不間斷地異地任職，以防他們在一地紮根太深。蘇聯這樣的做法實在不隻是一個巧合。

五、（莫斯科）將會竭盡其能，使得西方主要大國出現相互敵對。在美國人民中，將會造出反英的輿論，在英國人中，將會煽動反美的情緒。包括德國等歐洲大陸國家，將會出現反對盎格魯-撒克遜權利的言論。所有存在這些情緒的國家，將會受到進一步煽動，那些不存在這些情緒的國家，將會受到挑唆。所有能夠詆毀和破壞任何形式的、將俄羅斯排斥在外的團結和一致的可能都會受到利用。因此，任何形式的國際組織，隻要有礙共產主義分子的滲透和控製，武力是天主教會，國際經濟合作組織，或是貴族和皇室的國際同盟，必將處於來自它們的議論炮火攻擊之中。

六、總而言之，蘇聯通過非官方平台的所作所為，從性質上看，是消極的，具有破壞性的，是為了摧毀蘇聯控製以外的所有力量的根源而設計的。這與蘇聯與對手不能妥協、建設隻有在共產主義勢力取得控製後才能開始的本能認知是完全相符合的。然而在此背後，所實施的是對外國政府不懈的、堅韌不拔的滲透壓力，直至取得對政府內主要機構特別是警察係統的控製。蘇聯的政權是一個無與倫比的警察政權，由於沙皇時代的半明半暗的專製陰謀傳統，他們已經習慣了將使用警察力量放在首要考慮的位置。任何人在探測蘇聯人動機時都不得忽視這一點。

Part 4: Following May Be Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e. on Plane for Which Soviet Government Accepts no Responsibility

Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are following:

1. Inner central core of Communist Parties in other countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines, despite legality of parties with which it is associated.

2. Rank and file of Communist Parties. Note distinction is drawn between those and persons defined in paragraph 1. This distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign Communist Parties represented a curious (and from Moscows standpoint often inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered underground, while rank and file--no longer even taken into confidence about realities of movement--are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through [apparent omission] organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate political party.

3. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor unions, youth leagues, womens organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.

4. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and womens organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking western governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR

5. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.

6. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan, Armenian, Turcoman, etc.) based on racial groups within Soviet Union.

7. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc. Not only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be placed extensively at disposal of USSR

It may be expected that component parts of this far-flung apparatus will be utilized in accordance with their individual suitability, as follows:

(a) To undermine general political and strategic potential of major western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to spelt redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents, etc.

(b) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts will be made to weaken power and influence of Western Powers of [on] colonial backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred. Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial administration will be mercilessly exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in Western countries will be mobilized to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among dependent peoples will be stimulated. And while latter are being encouraged to seek independence of Western Powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when independence is achieved.

(c) Where individual governments stand in path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims (Turkey, Iran), where they seal their territories off against Communist penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly, like Labor Government in England, for moral domination among elements which it is important for Communists to dominate. (Sometimes, two of these elements are present in a single case. Then Communist opposition becomes particularly shrill and savage. [)]

(d) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic, political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been brought into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are financially independent--such as individual businessmen, estate owners, successful farmers, artisans and all those who exercise local leadership or have local prestige, such as popular local clergymen or political figures, are anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local officials are kept constantly on move from one job to another, to prevent their taking root.

(e) Everything possible will be done to set major Western Powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans, will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or cohesion among other [apparent omission] from which Russia might be excluded. Thus, all forms of international organization not amenable to Communist penetration and control, whether it be the Catholic [apparent omission] international economic concerns, or the international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must expect to find themselves under fire from many, and often [apparent omission].

(f) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is doming But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for penetration and command of key positions in administration and especially in police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of in ganging Soviet motives.

第五部分 從美國政策角度的可行性推斷。

概括起來，我們所麵對的是這樣一個政治力量，它堅信與美國的妥協根本不可能，堅信為了蘇聯權利的安全必須破壞我們的社會的內部和諧，必須消滅我們賴以生存的傳統生活方式，必須摧毀我們國家在國際上的權威。這個政治力量孕育並成長於極其深厚、極其強烈的俄羅斯民族主義的思潮之中，完全控製了世界上最偉大之一的民族和人民的能量和世界上資源最為富饒的國土。此外，這個政治對手還擁有一架能夠在其他國家發揮影響力的經過精心製作的龐大的組織機器，這部機器具有驚人的靈活性和持久性，操縱這部機器的人，他們采用地下方式的技巧和經驗是史無前例的。最後，從其基本反應上看，這個政治對手對現實似乎視而不見，充耳不聞。對其而言，人類社會浩瀚的客觀事實，不是作為不斷衡量和改進思維的參照係，而是作為一個用來人為地、隨意地選個別現象去支撐其早已形成的思維的百寶囊。這種對待客觀事實的態度與我們恰恰相反。顯然，這裏所描繪的並非一幅讓人賞心悅目的前景。然而，如何麵對這樣一個對手和力量，無疑已成為我們外交上從未經曆的最大挑戰，恐怕也將是我們未來所麵臨的最大挑戰。如何應對這樣的挑戰，應該是我們目前的政治和政策設計者製定（對外政策）的出發點。對於這樣的挑戰，必須以戰爭期間解決重大戰略問題時的全麵、慎重和小心對待它，而且如果必要，還要在計劃方麵做出同樣大的努力，來處理這個問題。至於答案是什麽，在這裏我是無法提出的。但是，我希望能借此明確地表述我的觀點：我們完全具有解決這個難題的力量，而且完全可以避免采用一場大的戰爭的形式。為了支持我的這一觀點，請允許我提出如下一些令人振奮的觀察：

一、蘇聯的實力，與希特勒的德國不一樣，既不是基於長期陰謀策劃，也不具備冒險性。它如何按計劃行事是不會得逞的，它也冒不必要的風險。因為它對理性分析無動於衷，對邏輯的力量又是高度敏感。基於這個理由，當任何時候出現抵抗時，它是可能常常也這樣退卻的。所以，假若它的對手擁有足夠的力量並明確地展示使用這個力量的決心，那麽，（它的對手）實際上使用這個力量的可能幾乎不存在。（我們）隻要將類似的局勢妥善地處理好，那麽，出現拿聲望做賭注而介入軍事衝突的必要性也是很小的。

二、麵對作為一個整體的西方世界，蘇聯人仍然是處於弱勢的一方。因此，蘇聯人能否扭轉劣勢，取決於西方世界所展示的團結、堅定和魄力的程度。而我們具備影響這個因素的實力。

三、作為一種內部政權的形式，蘇維埃政權的優越之處迄今尚未得到證明。它仍然不得不證明，這個政權是能夠經受得住權利從一個人或一個團體向另一個人或團體交接這樣一個根本的考驗。列寧的逝世，是這個權利的首次交接，它所產生的影響讓蘇聯國家15年間不得安生。斯大林的去世或退休，就是這個權力交接的第二次考驗，而即便這次也不會是最後一次這樣的考驗。由於它近期的領土擴張，蘇聯統治製度將會碰到一連串更多的麻煩，而這些麻煩曾令過去的沙皇們頭痛不已。在這裏的我們完全有利於相信，自從內戰結束之後，俄羅斯廣大民眾對共產主義教條的心理反感，從未像今天這樣強烈。在俄羅斯，政黨已經從未一個龐大而有效起碼在目前的獨裁統治機器，但是，這個政黨已經不再是鼓舞人們情感的源泉。據此，（蘇維埃）運動的內部健康和長久並不可以看作是一個確定的事實。

四、所有蘇聯安全區域以外的蘇維埃式的宣傳，本質上是消極而具有破壞性的。因此，通過充滿智慧和具有建設性意義的宣傳將其打敗，相對是容易的。

基於上述理由，我認為，我們應該冷靜、理智地處理俄羅斯問題。至於具體如何實施，我謹希望以本文的結束語的方式提出以下建議：

一、我們的第一步必須是對我們所麵對的（共產主義）運動的實質予以了解，並認識其客觀存在。我們必須像醫生診斷一個難以控製的不可理喻的病人那樣，用同樣的勇氣，同樣客觀態度，同樣的中立立場和同樣的決心去研究這個問題，避免受其感情上困惑或幹擾。

二、我們必須教育我們的公眾，了解俄羅斯問題的真相。對這一點的重要性，我無論如何強調都是不過分的。為此，單靠新聞界已無法做到，政府必須擔負起主要責任，因為政府對所麵對的實際問題的認識更為清晰，處理問題的經驗更為充分。我們沒有必要在問題的黑暗麵前怯而止步。我堅信，一旦我們的民眾了解到這個情勢的真相，那種歇斯底裏地反蘇情緒會得到大大緩解，因為沒有什麽再比不知情要更為危險，更為可怕。當然，認為更多地暴露我們針對蘇聯的困難以至不利於美蘇關係的觀點也成立。我認為，假如真的存在著危機，那麽，我們就必須有勇氣去麵對它，而且越早越有利。但是，我實在看不出我們會觸發怎樣的危機。即使我們追求的是與俄羅斯人民的偉大友誼，我們在國內的（政治）賭注也是很小的。實際上（在俄羅斯），我們沒有什麽投資需要保護，不會失去任何具有實質意義的貿易，不需要保護多少本國公民，也沒有太多的文化交流需要保留。我們唯一的賭注，是我們希望得到的，而非我們實際上已經擁有的。我堅信，隻要我們的公眾受到教育，隻要我們與蘇聯的交往完全置於現實的客觀的基礎之上，我們實現期望的可能性將會大得多。

三、（我們應對蘇聯問題的挑戰）相當程度上必須依賴於我們社會的健康和活力。世界共產主義就像是一種惡性的寄生蟲，隻會發生在生了病的肌膚組織上生存。在這一點上，國內和對外政策便交織在一起。每一個能夠解決我們自身社會問題（的政策），每一個可以提升我們自己人民的自信心、紀律性、士氣和集體精神的勇敢而堅定的舉動，都是針對蘇聯的一個外交勝利，這要比集體精神的勇敢而堅定的舉動，都是針對蘇聯的一個外交勝利，這要比數千個（與莫斯科之間產生的）外交文件和共同聲明要更有價值得多。假若我們無法消除宿命論的影響，無法改變我們的社會麵對（外部）挑戰的漠然，莫斯科將得分，因為莫斯科無法不利用（我們的）這些（弱點）在外交政策上獲利。

四、我們必須對其他國家展現和描繪出一個我們所希望看到的，但要比以前更加積極、更加富有建設性的世界的前景。隻是希望別人按我們的政治模式發展是遠遠不夠的。不少的國家與人民，起碼在歐洲，由於過去的經曆已經疲憊不堪，而且（對曆史的重演）懼怕萬分，因此，他們對自身的安全的興趣遠比對抽象的自由要大得多。他們需要的是領導，並非隻是責任。我們必須比蘇聯提供更多他們所需求的領導。如果我們不這樣去做的話，俄羅斯人是一定會責無旁貸的。

五、最後，我們必須對堅守我們的人類社會的信念和方式充滿自信和勇氣。畢竟，在應對蘇聯共產主義挑戰中最大的危險，是我們讓自己變成了我們所需要應對者那樣。

Part 5: [Practical Deductions From Standpoint of US Policy]

In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanentmodus vivendithat it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of worlds greatest peoples and resources of worlds richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendenciously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:

(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.

(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.

(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenins death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalins death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.

(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:

(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.

(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.

(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqus. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.

(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.

(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.

喬治凱南

800.00B 國際紅日/2 - 2546: 航空電報

KENNAN

800.00B International Red Day/2 - 2546: Airgram