正文

過家家

(2012-12-01 02:02:04) 下一個
過家家的遊戲,中外大同小異。

遊戲閑置好久了,此刻繼續進行時.

Our knowledge springs from two fundamenal sourses of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in the prduction] of concepts). Through the first an object is given to us, through the second the object is thought in relation to that [given] representation (which is a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intution without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical. When they contain sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object), they are empirical. When there is no mingling of sensation with the representation, they are pure. Sensation may be entitled the material of sensibel knowlede. Pure intuition, therefore, contains only the form of sensible knowledge. Pure intuition, therefore, contains only the form under which something is intuited; the pure concept only the form of the thought of an object in general. Pure intuitions or pure concepts alone are possible a priori, emprical intuitions and emprical comcepts only a posteriori. 

字是以一個個的碼出來的,本博客的唯一功能;書是一葉葉的翻過去的,飯還沒吃完,重度中毒。。

朋友,拈花一笑,謝謝。

累了,啊嗚。。。。。。

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