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.what a year - 2008
The folloing arthors are all in investment banks or investment division in Canadian banks. Enjoy reading and hope you like it too.
去年六七月，忙著一個USD 700 mm high yield bond private placement deal. 一切就緒，七月十六號周一sales force launched the sale, 周二S&P宣布review all morgage-related securities, and possible downgrading many of them. 市場一片嘩然，融資成本急劇上升,client 和 我們最終不得不取消這次融資。現在回過頭來看，當時如果get deal done, 不管market pricing 多麽高， 完全好於現在完全沒有liquity 的市場， no matter how credit-worthy your client is. Consider Canadian Big 5 banks borrowing spread is now 200 bp over 5 year gov't bonds, v.s. 50 bp spread a year ago.
From a perspective of history review:
(Irresponsible borrowing + irresponsible lending) -->subprime morgage crisis --> defaults + foreclosures --> housing prices slump --> Morgage-backed securities MBSs & CDOs priced down --> Mark-to-Market accounting rule forced banks to write down assets dramatically ---> substantial losses and everyone in desperate need to raise cash and shore up Balance Sheet --> no credits, no liquidity, financing closed to everyone --> bankruptcies --> damage to real economy and on edge of recession.
簡單的說，最根本的是housing markets. 什麽時候房價到了底，stablize 了，才到經濟看好的時候。美國人民習慣了house equity=提款機, 而美國經濟又是消費主導，一旦consumer 弱了demand, 麻煩就長久了。
現在的financial crisis, 直接的根源是financial institutions 不停的write down assets & report losses. Regulation 對financial institutions 有capital requirements. 融不到資，就是死路一條。解決的辦法有兩個，1。 change accounting rules. No mark to market any more but historical prices. 2. take toxic assets away from financial institutions' B/S. 兩種方法都能避免write down.
但是方法1行不通。用 Ben Bernanke 的話說，不再mark-to-market 對investor confidence 打擊太大, 市場需要rely on instituions best estimates of their assets. 用 Jeff Robin (CIBC's chief economist) 的話說，you can't change the rule while the game is in the middle of the play.
那麽政府700 billion的 bail-out plan 就能理解了: 政府把所有的toxic assets 都拿走，留給finnaical institutions a clean balance sheet. No further write downs/losses, markets will stablize over time.
Bail out 的作用肯定是有的，至少不會再有大的financial institutions file for Chapter 11. GS and MS will likely survive (Buffet 10% dividend deal is just unbelievably rich). 但是感覺是治標不治本，副作用還挺大。(別的不說，inflation 肯定是上去的，print 那麽多的money, Fed has to tight soon, which on the other hand hurtseconomy)。Root cause 還是在housing markets. 怎麽讓經濟好轉，人民有錢，房價起穩，才是良藥。
就像發高燒的人，僅僅在額頭上貼冰塊是不行的，還是要找到良藥下肚。從美國政府的角度來講，financial industry 燒得奄奄一息了，還是趕快加冰塊降溫保命（bail-out plan)，至於良藥治病(housing), 現在管不著了，慢慢來吧
Q 1:
A couple of thoughts regarding the bailout:
1). the $700 bln will be paid by installments ($250/100/350 bln). How much existing "toxic assets" on major financial institutions' B/S now? how much more assets we may expect to be downgraded to be "toxic" in the coming future?
2). the answer to the first question depends largely on the housing market, as you elaborated. Maybe more accurately, depends on the Default rate and Delinquent rate. Here comes three factors for the Default rate: housing price, unemployment rate, and the housing inventory absorption rate. To make things even more complicated, we don't know how many % of the mortgage payers are for pure investing/speculating, and how many % for self-occupancy.
3). above are just RMBS (maybe some CMBS). How much other ABS, underlying assets of credit card receivables/car loans/student loans, are under the danger of downgrading? How serious it is about that pool of "toxic assets candidates"?
Any comment?
A 1:
1, Nobody knows exactly how much "toxic waste" there are on the Bank's balance sheet among US Banks or around the world. Some banks are not forth coming on their exposure, others are financed through off-balance sheet funding vehicle, therefore, the the exact number is a mystery. However, according to Mr. Bill Gross, another $500billion seems to be need to calm the market.
2, In terms of US housing market. There are two things need to be considered. a) the Asset value keeps falling. When the asset value reaches the bottom, that's when we will start seeing the recovery of the debt/credit related financial crisis. b)stress tests on existing mortgage debts, two street conventions are based on UBS and JP Morgan methodology, Intex and Markit seems to be the only two data source provide necessary data for analysis. However, due to complexity of the underlying asset classes are not simply subprime, alt-a or prime mortgages, but also include RMBS, CMBS, CDO, CDO Squares. Information related to complex ABS are difficult to help analyst to figure out whether these are subprime, alt-a or prime related products. Different assumptions are utilized for delinquency rate, and default rate. However, honestly speaking, when Merrill sold their "toxic waste" for 22cents on a dollar back in Aug, everyone was shocked on the street. Fortunately, no such fire sales were followed by other banks.
3, Seems like the trouble related to the Mortgage related ABS has spilled over into other asset classes. GM selling GMAC, big three suspended their leasing options for new vehicles. The ripple effect is yet to be seen on the main street.
A 2:
Like Z mentioned, no one know the exact size of the taxic waste. Two reasons: 1. The complexitiy of the securities. For many MBS, CMBS, CDOs, they were sliced and re-packaged N times that nobobody knows exactly what's the underlying assets are, let alone the intrinsic values. 2. The disfunctioning markets makes valution extremely difficult if not impossible.
Two methods of valuation: intrisic value approach that discounts future cash flows to the present value. For a MBS, for instance, as you said, future payments are unpredictable because of the unknown default rates and delinuent rates. Those inputs are contingent on the economy - on a macro level, the GDP growth rate, inflation and unemployment rates; on a micro level, how consumer feels of their pockets, therefore the willingness to spend, as well as how corporates feels of the profit prospects in intermediary or long term, hence the willingness to invest/expand. In short, in a world filled with high uncertainty, the best maybe creat senarioes to get a sense of how bad it could be.
Even the discount rate is changing dramaticlly because of the dramatic change of availability of liquidity and the degree of risk aversion of the market. Therefore, intrisic valuation even using complex simulation models do not work well in current situation. Garbage in, garbage out.
The market relative valuation works only if market is functioning. In fact, asset pricing is a pivatal role of capital markets. but now markets totally disfuncting - no liquidity, no flow, no trade, no financing. Everything is still, no trading to give a fair market value of assets. What a terrible situation it is. JP Morgan acquired WaMu. The latter has $176 billion exposure to mortgage markets, including more risky ones with payment deferral options . JPM write them down 31 billlion. This latest transaction will provide a benchmark to gauge the value of similar assets. JPM may derived the 20% mark down based on current available information. But things will and are changing. Maybe 40% write down is appropriate 3 months from now.
Back to your topic, is $700 billion enough? Some say the first tranche may be $350 bn that's far from enough. Like you and Zuluking said, if mortgage trouble spill over to other security classes via the deterioration of economy, this could be only the begining of the end.
we are in an uncharted era, everthing is experimental in nature. Let the smart guys like Paulson and Benanke to cope with the tough situation. We just carefully observe, think and learn.
Part 2:
說明一下啊，自己不是高人，剛開始在投行幹不多久，處於學習和知識積累的原始階段。要求自己 follow markets, make sense of what's happening now and what’s happened in the past, 就可以啦。Only if 一年前能寫出現在發生的事情，哈哈，那我早就成億萬富翁了。Think of Lehman's stock, 52 week high of $67.73 and closing yesterday at $0.29. 更不用說利用杠杆 and long put options 等等的回報了。
當然，forward looking, predicting future 是自己努力的方向，現在還遠遠沒有那個水平。實業家和金融家，一個經營實體，一個經營預期。A senior or successful banker, economist, investment professional or financier 都是在做predicting the future with the definition of success being a higher possibility of accuracy on average over time. 通俗的說是bets on a binary outcome: Long position 是說你看好未來, 你認定underlying assets 會漲，Short position 則相反。這個underlying asset 可以是實物，比如 real estate, commodities. 也可以是虛物，a paper claim or contract. 比如 bonds, stocks, options.
能先人一步，看出大勢，提前布局，才是牛人。成為牛人，要站在前人的肩膀上，精通曆史的前提下，Look forward to make reasonable bets. Bernanke 被稱為研究1929-1933 Great Depression 的第一人。有此基礎，才能掌門Fed, 決定未來as he makes interest rate decision 是基於對未來六個月或者一年經濟，市場的預期 given the lagging effects。
事物都有兩麵性，辯證的統一於一體。比如Finance 的核心就兩個字：Risk + Reward. 所有一切的金融活動都圍繞著這兩個字。金融活動放大了的人性, 也就兩個字：Fear + Greed， 對應於金融的R&R. 我對risk的理解，risk=uncertainty. Uncertaintyyou are making bets now on future events/outcomesuccess or failure = judgment call of a probability on outcome. No arbitrage 的另外一個定義是：Future cash flow with CERTAINTY must earn RISK FREE rate. Rate spread 恰恰是uncertainty 的體現。正因為 risk, uncertainty, bets, rewards 金融行業才是那麽的精彩，那麽的令人exciting. 投行的人很多喜歡Poker game，因為poker game 一樣在玩 risk, rewards, bet with uncertainty.
大成功者，常常能在絕望中看到機遇，在瘋狂中看到涅滅。巴菲特在市場對投行一片絕望之時，砸向GS 5 billions. GS 在07年初所有商行和投行都為之瘋狂的mortgage securities 中took short position，成為唯一一家沒有report loss的big financial institution. 看到帖子，有人問投行是不是就此沒落了，要我說，yes and no. Yes because standalone investment BANK 確實不存在了，No because Investment BANKING絕對不會沒落，隻是經曆一個big cycle, and big adjustments, 兩三年後在廢墟（也是養料）之中，會重新站起而更加輝煌。這是capital markets 資本主義核心特征決定的。
另一個帖子說，家長給孩子選專業，遠離金融，還是醫生好。個人感覺，現在恰恰應該進學校學金融。1. You not only learn the books, but have a chance to learn much much more by observing markets combined with your knowledge from school. 2. 就像買房買股票，大部分人是買漲不買跌，所以掙錢的人是少數。如果你同意這是一個cycle, 就應該在現在金融危機，到處layoff的時候入場，而非相反。2005，2006 年經濟騰飛，金融燙手的時候去學MBA 現在畢業，很難找工作。兩三年後，實體經濟起穩發展，虛擬經濟（金融業）的作用就是放大實體經濟的輝煌而會更加燦爛。3。更不要說中國的金融人才需求，given the potential to develop our homeland’s capital markets.
最後再說一下自己對投行的理解, z寫過這方麵很好的文章。投行有廣義和狹義之分。廣義的投行很廣，包括investment banking, capital markets (that include debt capital markets DCM, and equity capital markets, ECM, foreign exchanges, derivatives markets), sales and trading, or even include brokerage and equity research. 純正的投行是指狹義的Investment Banking. 主要做兩個業務線：Capital raising and M&A advisory. Capital raising 幫企業從markets中籌錢，包括IPO, secondary offering, debt underwriting, private placements. M&A financial advisor 就是幫企業買或賣assets or entities. 有人說Lehman 投行幹的活就是自己投5塊，leverage up 95, 再賣出101 or 102. 這僅僅是 Lehman capital markets division 的 一小部分業務，i.e., financial products origination and sales. 看看official news on a deal that says “Barclays … acquired Lehman's North American investment banking and capital markets businesses for $250 million in cash...” Investment banking 和capital markets 兩個部門幹的不是一樣的活。
Another article:
這一段時間，太多的事情發生了。美國的銀行不論大小，一個接著一個在倒閉。獨立投行的操作模式在美國徹底改變了。美國政府的700個億的救市計劃到底能不能有效果，大家都在拭目以待。但是，有一個肯定的答案就是美元在700個億救市後將會貶值。
美國人心惶惶， FDIC 和加拿大的CDIC一樣，如果銀行倒閉的話，會保證銀行儲蓄客戶的存款在10萬美金之內不會有任何損失。對於一般的中產階級，有一定的存款的話，可以分散到幾個銀行，而保證自己的存款，養老經不會被這次金融危機吞並掉。但是對於，有錢人來說，或是大型機構來說，這10萬美元的保證打水漂都不夠。一時間紛紛湧入treasury market. 這就造成了一個非常非常奇怪的現象。9月19日這周，美國的t-bill market在史無前例的情況下跌倒了negative yield. 也就是說，投資人，知道買了t-bill後，會損失一部分錢，但還是紛紛投入到treasury bill 當中去。因為，大家都相信美國政府不會破產。（這其實也是很值得討論的一個話題，這就不說了）。這也說明，現在美國人有多麽的慌張。treasury會跌到負數原來是不可想象的。過去這幾周將會被寫入曆史。其實，我們現在經曆的都將被寫入曆史。
再作個比較，昨天，周五（9月26日），MacDonald's的CDS叫價26.5bps,而Uncle Sam的CDS一度叫到了30bps. 也就是說投資人甚至認為uncle sam的破產機會要比麥當勞都要高。市場簡直到了發瘋的地步。
在這種情況下，投資人紛紛跳水，套現。 股市近期還會下跌，原來很liquide的money market的流通率也變得不流通了。一時間，大家都在買黃金，買政府債券。
Peace out...
The folloing arthors are all in investment banks or investment division in Canadian banks. Enjoy reading and hope you like it too.
去年六七月，忙著一個USD 700 mm high yield bond private placement deal. 一切就緒，七月十六號周一sales force launched the sale, 周二S&P宣布review all morgage-related securities, and possible downgrading many of them. 市場一片嘩然，融資成本急劇上升,client 和 我們最終不得不取消這次融資。現在回過頭來看，當時如果get deal done, 不管market pricing 多麽高， 完全好於現在完全沒有liquity 的市場， no matter how credit-worthy your client is. Consider Canadian Big 5 banks borrowing spread is now 200 bp over 5 year gov't bonds, v.s. 50 bp spread a year ago.
From a perspective of history review:
(Irresponsible borrowing + irresponsible lending) -->subprime morgage crisis --> defaults + foreclosures --> housing prices slump --> Morgage-backed securities MBSs & CDOs priced down --> Mark-to-Market accounting rule forced banks to write down assets dramatically ---> substantial losses and everyone in desperate need to raise cash and shore up Balance Sheet --> no credits, no liquidity, financing closed to everyone --> bankruptcies --> damage to real economy and on edge of recession.
簡單的說，最根本的是housing markets. 什麽時候房價到了底，stablize 了，才到經濟看好的時候。美國人民習慣了house equity=提款機, 而美國經濟又是消費主導，一旦consumer 弱了demand, 麻煩就長久了。
現在的financial crisis, 直接的根源是financial institutions 不停的write down assets & report losses. Regulation 對financial institutions 有capital requirements. 融不到資，就是死路一條。解決的辦法有兩個，1。 change accounting rules. No mark to market any more but historical prices. 2. take toxic assets away from financial institutions' B/S. 兩種方法都能避免write down.
但是方法1行不通。用 Ben Bernanke 的話說，不再mark-to-market 對investor confidence 打擊太大, 市場需要rely on instituions best estimates of their assets. 用 Jeff Robin (CIBC's chief economist) 的話說，you can't change the rule while the game is in the middle of the play.
那麽政府700 billion的 bail-out plan 就能理解了: 政府把所有的toxic assets 都拿走，留給finnaical institutions a clean balance sheet. No further write downs/losses, markets will stablize over time.
Bail out 的作用肯定是有的，至少不會再有大的financial institutions file for Chapter 11. GS and MS will likely survive (Buffet 10% dividend deal is just unbelievably rich). 但是感覺是治標不治本，副作用還挺大。(別的不說，inflation 肯定是上去的，print 那麽多的money, Fed has to tight soon, which on the other hand hurtseconomy)。Root cause 還是在housing markets. 怎麽讓經濟好轉，人民有錢，房價起穩，才是良藥。
就像發高燒的人，僅僅在額頭上貼冰塊是不行的，還是要找到良藥下肚。從美國政府的角度來講，financial industry 燒得奄奄一息了，還是趕快加冰塊降溫保命（bail-out plan)，至於良藥治病(housing), 現在管不著了，慢慢來吧
Q 1:
A couple of thoughts regarding the bailout:
1). the $700 bln will be paid by installments ($250/100/350 bln). How much existing "toxic assets" on major financial institutions' B/S now? how much more assets we may expect to be downgraded to be "toxic" in the coming future?
2). the answer to the first question depends largely on the housing market, as you elaborated. Maybe more accurately, depends on the Default rate and Delinquent rate. Here comes three factors for the Default rate: housing price, unemployment rate, and the housing inventory absorption rate. To make things even more complicated, we don't know how many % of the mortgage payers are for pure investing/speculating, and how many % for self-occupancy.
3). above are just RMBS (maybe some CMBS). How much other ABS, underlying assets of credit card receivables/car loans/student loans, are under the danger of downgrading? How serious it is about that pool of "toxic assets candidates"?
Any comment?
A 1:
1, Nobody knows exactly how much "toxic waste" there are on the Bank's balance sheet among US Banks or around the world. Some banks are not forth coming on their exposure, others are financed through off-balance sheet funding vehicle, therefore, the the exact number is a mystery. However, according to Mr. Bill Gross, another $500billion seems to be need to calm the market.
2, In terms of US housing market. There are two things need to be considered. a) the Asset value keeps falling. When the asset value reaches the bottom, that's when we will start seeing the recovery of the debt/credit related financial crisis. b)stress tests on existing mortgage debts, two street conventions are based on UBS and JP Morgan methodology, Intex and Markit seems to be the only two data source provide necessary data for analysis. However, due to complexity of the underlying asset classes are not simply subprime, alt-a or prime mortgages, but also include RMBS, CMBS, CDO, CDO Squares. Information related to complex ABS are difficult to help analyst to figure out whether these are subprime, alt-a or prime related products. Different assumptions are utilized for delinquency rate, and default rate. However, honestly speaking, when Merrill sold their "toxic waste" for 22cents on a dollar back in Aug, everyone was shocked on the street. Fortunately, no such fire sales were followed by other banks.
3, Seems like the trouble related to the Mortgage related ABS has spilled over into other asset classes. GM selling GMAC, big three suspended their leasing options for new vehicles. The ripple effect is yet to be seen on the main street.
A 2:
Like Z mentioned, no one know the exact size of the taxic waste. Two reasons: 1. The complexitiy of the securities. For many MBS, CMBS, CDOs, they were sliced and re-packaged N times that nobobody knows exactly what's the underlying assets are, let alone the intrinsic values. 2. The disfunctioning markets makes valution extremely difficult if not impossible.
Two methods of valuation: intrisic value approach that discounts future cash flows to the present value. For a MBS, for instance, as you said, future payments are unpredictable because of the unknown default rates and delinuent rates. Those inputs are contingent on the economy - on a macro level, the GDP growth rate, inflation and unemployment rates; on a micro level, how consumer feels of their pockets, therefore the willingness to spend, as well as how corporates feels of the profit prospects in intermediary or long term, hence the willingness to invest/expand. In short, in a world filled with high uncertainty, the best maybe creat senarioes to get a sense of how bad it could be.
Even the discount rate is changing dramaticlly because of the dramatic change of availability of liquidity and the degree of risk aversion of the market. Therefore, intrisic valuation even using complex simulation models do not work well in current situation. Garbage in, garbage out.
The market relative valuation works only if market is functioning. In fact, asset pricing is a pivatal role of capital markets. but now markets totally disfuncting - no liquidity, no flow, no trade, no financing. Everything is still, no trading to give a fair market value of assets. What a terrible situation it is. JP Morgan acquired WaMu. The latter has $176 billion exposure to mortgage markets, including more risky ones with payment deferral options . JPM write them down 31 billlion. This latest transaction will provide a benchmark to gauge the value of similar assets. JPM may derived the 20% mark down based on current available information. But things will and are changing. Maybe 40% write down is appropriate 3 months from now.
Back to your topic, is $700 billion enough? Some say the first tranche may be $350 bn that's far from enough. Like you and Zuluking said, if mortgage trouble spill over to other security classes via the deterioration of economy, this could be only the begining of the end.
we are in an uncharted era, everthing is experimental in nature. Let the smart guys like Paulson and Benanke to cope with the tough situation. We just carefully observe, think and learn.
Part 2:
說明一下啊，自己不是高人，剛開始在投行幹不多久，處於學習和知識積累的原始階段。要求自己 follow markets, make sense of what's happening now and what’s happened in the past, 就可以啦。Only if 一年前能寫出現在發生的事情，哈哈，那我早就成億萬富翁了。Think of Lehman's stock, 52 week high of $67.73 and closing yesterday at $0.29. 更不用說利用杠杆 and long put options 等等的回報了。
當然，forward looking, predicting future 是自己努力的方向，現在還遠遠沒有那個水平。實業家和金融家，一個經營實體，一個經營預期。A senior or successful banker, economist, investment professional or financier 都是在做predicting the future with the definition of success being a higher possibility of accuracy on average over time. 通俗的說是bets on a binary outcome: Long position 是說你看好未來, 你認定underlying assets 會漲，Short position 則相反。這個underlying asset 可以是實物，比如 real estate, commodities. 也可以是虛物，a paper claim or contract. 比如 bonds, stocks, options.
能先人一步，看出大勢，提前布局，才是牛人。成為牛人，要站在前人的肩膀上，精通曆史的前提下，Look forward to make reasonable bets. Bernanke 被稱為研究1929-1933 Great Depression 的第一人。有此基礎，才能掌門Fed, 決定未來as he makes interest rate decision 是基於對未來六個月或者一年經濟，市場的預期 given the lagging effects。
事物都有兩麵性，辯證的統一於一體。比如Finance 的核心就兩個字：Risk + Reward. 所有一切的金融活動都圍繞著這兩個字。金融活動放大了的人性, 也就兩個字：Fear + Greed， 對應於金融的R&R. 我對risk的理解，risk=uncertainty. Uncertaintyyou are making bets now on future events/outcomesuccess or failure = judgment call of a probability on outcome. No arbitrage 的另外一個定義是：Future cash flow with CERTAINTY must earn RISK FREE rate. Rate spread 恰恰是uncertainty 的體現。正因為 risk, uncertainty, bets, rewards 金融行業才是那麽的精彩，那麽的令人exciting. 投行的人很多喜歡Poker game，因為poker game 一樣在玩 risk, rewards, bet with uncertainty.
大成功者，常常能在絕望中看到機遇，在瘋狂中看到涅滅。巴菲特在市場對投行一片絕望之時，砸向GS 5 billions. GS 在07年初所有商行和投行都為之瘋狂的mortgage securities 中took short position，成為唯一一家沒有report loss的big financial institution. 看到帖子，有人問投行是不是就此沒落了，要我說，yes and no. Yes because standalone investment BANK 確實不存在了，No because Investment BANKING絕對不會沒落，隻是經曆一個big cycle, and big adjustments, 兩三年後在廢墟（也是養料）之中，會重新站起而更加輝煌。這是capital markets 資本主義核心特征決定的。
另一個帖子說，家長給孩子選專業，遠離金融，還是醫生好。個人感覺，現在恰恰應該進學校學金融。1. You not only learn the books, but have a chance to learn much much more by observing markets combined with your knowledge from school. 2. 就像買房買股票，大部分人是買漲不買跌，所以掙錢的人是少數。如果你同意這是一個cycle, 就應該在現在金融危機，到處layoff的時候入場，而非相反。2005，2006 年經濟騰飛，金融燙手的時候去學MBA 現在畢業，很難找工作。兩三年後，實體經濟起穩發展，虛擬經濟（金融業）的作用就是放大實體經濟的輝煌而會更加燦爛。3。更不要說中國的金融人才需求，given the potential to develop our homeland’s capital markets.
最後再說一下自己對投行的理解, z寫過這方麵很好的文章。投行有廣義和狹義之分。廣義的投行很廣，包括investment banking, capital markets (that include debt capital markets DCM, and equity capital markets, ECM, foreign exchanges, derivatives markets), sales and trading, or even include brokerage and equity research. 純正的投行是指狹義的Investment Banking. 主要做兩個業務線：Capital raising and M&A advisory. Capital raising 幫企業從markets中籌錢，包括IPO, secondary offering, debt underwriting, private placements. M&A financial advisor 就是幫企業買或賣assets or entities. 有人說Lehman 投行幹的活就是自己投5塊，leverage up 95, 再賣出101 or 102. 這僅僅是 Lehman capital markets division 的 一小部分業務，i.e., financial products origination and sales. 看看official news on a deal that says “Barclays … acquired Lehman's North American investment banking and capital markets businesses for $250 million in cash...” Investment banking 和capital markets 兩個部門幹的不是一樣的活。
Another article:
這一段時間，太多的事情發生了。美國的銀行不論大小，一個接著一個在倒閉。獨立投行的操作模式在美國徹底改變了。美國政府的700個億的救市計劃到底能不能有效果，大家都在拭目以待。但是，有一個肯定的答案就是美元在700個億救市後將會貶值。
美國人心惶惶， FDIC 和加拿大的CDIC一樣，如果銀行倒閉的話，會保證銀行儲蓄客戶的存款在10萬美金之內不會有任何損失。對於一般的中產階級，有一定的存款的話，可以分散到幾個銀行，而保證自己的存款，養老經不會被這次金融危機吞並掉。但是對於，有錢人來說，或是大型機構來說，這10萬美元的保證打水漂都不夠。一時間紛紛湧入treasury market. 這就造成了一個非常非常奇怪的現象。9月19日這周，美國的t-bill market在史無前例的情況下跌倒了negative yield. 也就是說，投資人，知道買了t-bill後，會損失一部分錢，但還是紛紛投入到treasury bill 當中去。因為，大家都相信美國政府不會破產。（這其實也是很值得討論的一個話題，這就不說了）。這也說明，現在美國人有多麽的慌張。treasury會跌到負數原來是不可想象的。過去這幾周將會被寫入曆史。其實，我們現在經曆的都將被寫入曆史。
再作個比較，昨天，周五（9月26日），MacDonald's的CDS叫價26.5bps,而Uncle Sam的CDS一度叫到了30bps. 也就是說投資人甚至認為uncle sam的破產機會要比麥當勞都要高。市場簡直到了發瘋的地步。
在這種情況下，投資人紛紛跳水，套現。 股市近期還會下跌，原來很liquide的money market的流通率也變得不流通了。一時間，大家都在買黃金，買政府債券。
Peace out...
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