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慕尼黑理事追美問萬斯 你引起的爭議前所未有

(2025-05-10 23:40:32) 下一個

慕尼黑理事追美問萬斯 你引起的爭議前所未有

慕尼黑安全會議理事會主席追來美國拷問萬斯:你引起的爭議前所未有!我們專門出了小本本!俄烏會談,俄國根本沒興趣咋辦?

A Conversation with the Vice President of the United States | Munich Leaders Meeting
Munich Security Con
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rE-tqUrwBMc

2025年5月7日

與美國副總統對話 | 慕尼黑領導人會議

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rE-tqUrwBMc
2025年5月7日

美國副總統JD Vance將在華盛頓特區舉行的慕尼黑領導人會議上與慕尼黑安全會議基金會理事會主席Wolfgang Ischinger大使進行討論。

發言人:

JD Vance
美國副總統

Wolfgang Ischinger
大使(退休);慕尼黑安全會議基金會理事會主席

華盛頓特區慕尼黑領導人會議

美國新政府已啟動美國外交和安全政策的重大調整,其中一些調整對歐洲施加了巨大壓力。這促使歐洲領導人重新做好準備,做出一些艱難的決定,其中許多決定早就應該做出。然而,這也引發了人們對美國與其跨大西洋夥伴國共同安全及共同戰略利益的承諾的質疑。

六十多年來,加強跨大西洋夥伴關係一直是慕尼黑安全會議的核心使命。自2009年以來,慕尼黑安全會議(MSC)每年都會在華盛頓特區舉辦跨大西洋高層會議,每次都在美國新政府就職後不久舉行。

今年的慕尼黑領導人會議再次為大西洋兩岸及其他地區的高級決策者提供了一個及時且非正式的平台,以應對當前的摩擦並確定共同的政策重點,並在二月份慕尼黑安全會議的基礎上取得進展。

跨大西洋在政策和地區挑戰方麵存在巨大分歧,但持久的共同安全和經濟利益也同樣重要。在華盛頓特區舉行的慕尼黑領導人會議以加強跨大西洋夥伴關係的“基礎”為重點,旨在推動就麵向未來、注重成果的聯??合議程進行討論。與會者將特別探討跨大西洋合作在安全與防務、經濟與貿易、能源和技術等領域麵臨的機遇與障礙。
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【傑森口譯】慕尼黑安全會議理事會主席 沃爾夫岡·伊辛格 追來美國拷問萬斯:你引起的爭議前所未有!我們專門出了小本本!俄烏會談,俄國根本沒興趣咋辦?美中要就台灣問題達協議?美國還視自己為歐洲強國嗎?如何阻止核武在中東擴散?

大家早上好!哇,好多人啊。
副總統先生,我們很高興您能來。 這顯然是我們這次在華盛頓召開的慕尼黑安全
會議的亮點。 我希望不是,當然...
這是個亮點。 今天上午非常榮幸歡迎您來到這裏。 實際上,對於那些不經常參加慕尼黑會議的人來說, 這已經是副總統第三次參加這個會議的活動了。二月份的時候, 您在慕尼黑的演講引發了一場關於一些根本價值觀的, 相當有爭議的辯論。 那次和我們在以往會議上見過的任何情況都不一樣。

實際上, 我們出版了一本小冊子, 你們出去的時候會拿到一份。這是關於那次演講以及來自世界各地的反響。 好的。

關於根本價值觀、 言論自由 和法治應該如何解讀 和應用的激烈辯論,直到今天仍在繼續。 但是昨天我們 和您的團隊為今天的會議做準備時,我們達成了一致,他們也同意, 今天我們應該著重討論當前外交政策的挑戰,我們共同麵臨的挑戰。

再次感謝各位抽出時間。 時間有限,我就直接開始吧。

您第一次來慕尼黑的時候, 還是俄亥俄州的參議員。提到俄亥俄州,我就想到了《代頓協議》。 三十年前, 也就是1995年,我當時是德國的談判代表。

所以當時, 我其實在俄亥俄州代頓住了一個月。 太好了。為什麽這一點很重要? 因為正是通過美國的幹預,因為美國的幹預, 歐洲才得以在當時的巴爾幹半島實現和平。

如果可以的話, 我想問我的第一個問題, 是關於美國和歐洲的。 一位傑出的美國前外交官,理查德·霍爾布魯克,, 大約三十年前在《外交事務》 上發表文章寫道,美國是, 並且應該仍然是一個歐洲強國。

今天,三十年過去了, 我的問題是, 您是否認為美國應該繼續將自己視為一個歐洲強國?記得在慕尼黑, 你曾說過“我們仍然是同一支隊伍的”。 我們現在還是嗎?

這對美國在歐洲的存在, 以及美國與歐洲的關係, 意味著什麽? 這是我的第一個問題。
好的,首先感謝。 抱歉,我的麥克風好像壞了, 不過我們有備用的, 大家現在能聽到我說話嗎?

很好。 嗯,是的,首先,我很高興來到這裏, 也很高興能進行這次對話,
我一直很期待。 是的,我仍然認為美國和歐洲是同一陣營的。
你知道, 有時我被批評為過於現實, 認為外交政策純粹是基於交易價值。
美國能從中得到什麽? 世界其他國家又能從中得到什麽?
如果隻關注事務性的價值, 我們有時會忽略人道主義或道德層麵。
但是,至少在對歐洲的看法上, 這並不能完全概括我的觀點,
因為我認為歐洲文明和美國文明、 歐洲文化和美國文化是緊密相連的,
而且它們將永遠聯係在一起。 我認為試圖在美國 和歐洲的關係之間打入一個楔子是完全荒謬的。
當然,這並不意味著我們之間不會有分歧。 正如你之前提到的演講, 這也不意味著歐洲不能批評美國,
或者美國不能批評歐洲。 但我認為, 從根本上講, 我們必須而且也確實屬於同一個文明陣營。
我認為, 在二十一世紀, 這意味著什麽, 這顯然是一個大問題。
川普總統和我相信, 這意味著歐洲應該在國防方麵承擔更多的責任。
我認為, 坦率的說, 大西洋兩岸的我們, 在過去的二十年裏, 都有點過於安於現狀,
而這種安全態勢不足以應對未來二十年的挑戰。 所以,這個聯盟有很多方式會演變和改變,
就像這個聯盟從1945年到1975年, 再從1975年到2005年那樣演變
和改變。 我的確認為我們正處於這樣一個階段, 需要重新思考很多大問題,
但我的確認為我們應該一起重新思考這些大問題。 這是我和總統都堅信的。
而且,你提到這是我第三次在慕尼黑安全會議上發言。 當然,前兩次都是在慕尼黑,
我總是很懷念第一次, 那次我是作為俄亥俄州的參議員來的,
而且我很高興你有機會在代頓待一個月。 我喜歡代頓。 如果能稱得上是大城市的話,
它算是我長大的地方附近, 最大的城市了。 在第一個小組討論上,我和戴維·拉米都在。
當時他還是個地位不高的反對派成員, 當然他現在是英國偉大的外交部長,
我和他已經成了好朋友。 所以我仍然認為歐洲盟友關係非常重要,
但我認為, 為了使其重要, 為了我們彼此成為真正的朋友(我認為我們是
非常好的朋友), 我們必須討論重要的問題, 我知道這是整個組織工作的重要組成部分,
所以我很高興來到這裏。 非常感謝。 我認為歐洲已經收到了這樣的信息, 那就是我們需要承擔更多責任。 正如你們所知,我們都在努力增加開支。
有些人確實增加了非常多的國防開支,
另一些人則稍微落後, 但我認為我們正朝著正確的方向前進。 嗯,讓我來談談一個非常具體、緊迫的問題,
烏克蘭。 從我們在媒體上看到的情況來看,
川普政府似乎 和我們歐洲的大部分人一樣認為, 不幸的是, 俄羅斯似乎並不真正願意結束這場軍事對抗。
如果這是評估結果, 如果這是我們的集體評估,
您能否談談美國接下來的戰略? 我們都希望這場戰爭結束。 而且,我個人認為,
川普政府開啟與烏克蘭 和俄羅斯對話的進程是正確的。 但是,俄羅斯似乎對可能提供給他們的“交易”
不感興趣。 所以,請您談談下一步的計劃。
好的,關於這個問題,我想先說幾點。 首先,感謝您對本屆政府的讚賞。
顯然,我認為我們啟動談判進程是正確的。 我認為俄羅斯和烏克蘭之間的戰鬥已經持續太久了。
很明顯,雙方都有很多人喪生, 而且有大量無辜者失去了生命。
我們的觀點是, 這場戰爭持續了這麽長時間, 而雙方甚至沒有就結束衝突的必要條件進行建
設性的對話, 這很荒謬。 我認為, 川普總統一直很擅長的一件事,
也因此受到了很多批評, 在我看來, 來自美國和一些歐洲媒體的批評是不公平的,
那就是我所說的戰略現實主義或戰略洞察力。 換句話說,
你不必同意俄羅斯為這場戰爭提出的理由, 當然,川普總統和我本人都批評了這次全麵入侵,
但你必須嚐試理解對方的立場, 才能結束衝突。 我認為川普總統在這方麵一直非常明確,
那就是實際上迫使俄羅斯人說出: “為了結束衝突,我們想要什麽。”
再說一次, 你不必同意他們的要求, 你可以認為他們的要求太過分,
當然,俄羅斯人提出的第一個和平提議, 我們的反應是: “你們的要求太過分了。”
但談判就是這樣展開的。 我倒不至於…… 我還沒那麽悲觀。
我不會說,俄方不希望解決問題。 我想說的是, 目前俄方提出了一係列要求,
一係列讓步, 以此來結束衝突。 我們認為他們的要價太高了。 當然,烏克蘭也很重要。
他們是另一方, 至少是直接衝突的另一方, 我們必須問,
烏克蘭需要什麽, 他們需要什麽才能使這場衝突圓滿結束?
我們會繼續進行對話。 總統已經說過, 如果他認為沒有取得進展,
他會退出。 我認為, 大概每隔四到五周,
你就會聽到一些美國官員,
有時是多位美國官員說, “本周我們需要再進一步”。
特別是, 我們現在希望采取的步驟是, 我們希望俄羅斯 和烏克蘭都能就坐下來談判的一些基本準則達
成一致。 顯然,美國樂於參與這些對話, 但俄羅斯和烏克蘭開始對話非常重要。
我們認為這是我們希望采取的下一個重要步驟。 為什麽這很重要? 原因是,
我提到了俄羅斯, 但烏克蘭也給我們遞交了一份文件, 上麵寫著
“為了從我們的角度成功解決這場衝突, 我們需要什麽”。 可以預見的是,
俄羅斯和烏克蘭的立場之間存在著巨大的鴻溝, 我們認為談判的下一步是努力彌合這一鴻溝。
我們認為, 如果雙方不進行一些直接談判, 我們可能無法完全調解此事。
所以我們關注的是這個。 但我現在還沒有對此感到悲觀。
我的意思是, 顯然,俄方和烏方還沒有達成一致,
因為戰鬥仍在繼續。 烏方表示他們同意停火,三十天的停火。 我們對此表示讚賞。
俄方表示, “三十天的停火不符合我們的戰略利益。”, 重要的是要了解對方的立場,
你不必非得反對它。 所以我們試圖超越對三十天停火的堅持,
更多的關注長期解決方案會是什麽樣子, 並且我們一直試圖推動事態發展。
最後一點, 我想說的是, 我認為這可能不會讓在座的各位感到驚訝,
但有很多不在場的人在關注著。 坦率的說,我們對雙方都感到失望。
他們彼此憎恨, 以至於如果你和任何一方談話一個小時, 前30分鍾他們都在抱怨一些曆史上的委屈。
是的。 那些四年前、五年前,或者十年前的事。
我知道, 人們之間開戰肯定是因為存在很多不滿
和問題。 但我們正盡力發揮建設性作用, 以推動和平對話向前發展。
我想重複一下川普總統多次說過的一句話, 那就是我們堅信,
這場衝突持續下去對我們、 對歐洲、
對俄羅斯, 和對烏克蘭都沒有好處。 我們認為,
如果各方冷靜下來, 我們就能促成持久和平, 這將有利於烏克蘭和俄羅斯的經濟發展,
最重要的是, 能夠結束對生命的摧殘。 我認為人們低估了我們美國總統在這件事上的態度,
他對此懷有真正的人道主義衝動。 他厭惡無辜人民喪生,
甚至厭惡士兵在不必要的衝突中喪生。 他隻是想停止殺戮。
這也會繼續是美國的政策。 但很明顯, 正如各位所見,
我們會根據各方提出的訴求來調整政策並作出反應。
好的, 非常感謝。
如果可以的話,我想補充兩點。 我認為對我們這些與烏克蘭為鄰的歐洲人,
如果你願意的話,也可以說是與俄羅斯為鄰的歐洲人來說 ——我們現在逐漸意識到,
目前的情況不僅僅是烏克蘭抵抗俄羅斯侵略的防禦戰,
它也對整個歐洲的安全構成了威脅。
換句話說, 這也間接的關係到我們的防衛, 不僅僅是烏克蘭。
所以我們非常希望看到這場戰爭能夠結束,
而且我認為, 談判和結束衝突的關鍵在於,
結果必須是持久的, 不會在未來三個月、
六個月或九個月內再次破裂。 副總統先生,
鑒於時間有限, 問題繁多, 如果可以的話,
請允許我轉到另一個問題,中國。
正如我們所理解的, 這對美國, 對貴國的外交政策來說, 是一個關鍵的挑戰。
這對我們歐洲來說, 也是一個非常重要的問題。
美國已經將中國定義為未來許多年的關鍵戰略挑戰。
這也是美國政府官員告訴我們, 美國必須更多的參與亞洲事務,
因此需要減少在歐洲的駐軍和力量的理由。
但現在, 有媒體報道稱, 白宮可能對與中國達成戰略協議感興趣,
甚至可能包括台灣問題。 您能否簡單談談川普政府的中國戰略?
我沒有看到你提到的那些關於台灣戰略協議的報道, 所以我對此不作評論。
我可以肯定的說, 我們兩國政府之間沒有就這個問題進行過戰略 協議的對話。
我們討論過的是, 我們不能吸收全世界的生產過剩。
在過去的三十年裏, 這在某種程度上一直是美國經濟扮演的角色,
包括對歐洲也是如此。 順便說一句, 我們並不責怪德國人奉行一項使其出口商強大
的政策。 我們隻是希望美國領導層能夠采取一項能夠增
強我們出口商實力的政策, 因為現在我們發現自己處境非常不穩定。
我說“我們”指的是整個西方, 指的是北約聯盟, 指的是美國和歐洲,
因為在一個高度複雜、 高度全球化的供應鏈世界中, 我們發現自己越來越依賴於那些可能並不以我
們最佳利益為出發點的國家。 即使他們是還算不錯的貿易夥伴, 但是把所有的雞蛋放在一個籃子裏,
在經濟上來說仍然有點冒險。 總統的意思是,
我們必須重新平衡全球經濟, 尤其是在與中國的貿易關係上。 我們不能再吸收每年數千億美元,
甚至接近一萬億美元的貿易順差, 而其中大部分來自中國。
這種再平衡意味著, 我們認為中國應該讓本國人民更多的消費。
他們為了增加巨額出口, 一直壓低國內消費水平。
這意味著在一些全球貿易協議中, 美國製造商需要得到更公平的對待。
這意味著我們將不得不與我們在歐洲的一些朋友, 以及一些更具對抗性的國家達成一些新的貿易協議。
當然,我們也要小心, 因為雖然我們想要重新平衡全球貿易,
而且這無疑是我們政策的明確目標, 但我們也要確保以正確的方式做到這一點。
是的,你們已經看到媒體報道說中方主動聯係了美國。
當然,我們會和他們坐下來談。 我不打算透露太多細節,
也不會預先判斷談判結果, 但我們希望能夠為了美國工人以及美國製造商
的利益來重新平衡貿易。 這是我們的政策。 我們認為在做到這一點的同時,
至少可以 和中國以及世界上許多其他國家保持開放的對話。
但這並不意味著舊的經商方式會保持穩定 或持續下去。
這根本不可能。 十年前就不可持續, 四年前肯定也不可持續, 我們非常致力於改變它。
但是我們願意 和我們的朋友以及那些更具對抗性的國家進行對話,
討論這種再平衡最終會是什麽樣子。 大家要記住, 總統宣布這些對全球貿易體係的根本性變革的
“解放日” 才過去剛剛差不多三十天。 所以,我們正處於一個重大轉變的初期階段。
我認為這一轉變將真正有益於美國和歐洲。 但從根本上說,
這件事必須發生, 而且將在川普總統的領導下發生。
好的。 如果你們和中國之間展開初步討論,
我認為這很好。 您能否詳細說明一下,
您對歐盟 和美國就這些貿易問題進行成功討論的期望是什麽?
我們能給我們在布魯塞爾的朋友們帶去什麽信息嗎?
因為從我們的角度來看, 這顯然也是一個非常緊迫的問題。
好的。 簡單來說,我們和很多歐洲朋友的高層, 包括總統和國家元首之間,
我和歐洲政府官員之間,以及貿易代表之間, 都進行了非常好的對話,
也包括貿易協定中非常具體的技術細節。 這些對話正在進行中, 但我可以先提出幾個總體原則。
我認為首先, 美國希望它的出口商, 以及工人, 能夠得到更公平的待遇。
我們希望, 就像美國市場向許多歐洲商品開放一樣, 我們也希望歐洲市場能夠向美國商品開放。
這裏麵既有農業方麵的因素, 也有增值製造業方麵的因素。 我們認為, 在軟件以及更偏硬件的技術方麵,
我們有一些很棒的國防技術公司。 一方麵, 我們的歐洲朋友說“我們想要加強國防,
我們想要承擔更多的責任”, 但另一方麵, 如果銷售軟件和硬件的是美國公司,
他們似乎就不太願意合作。 我們認為這是不合理的。
我們認為我們擁有世界上最好的軍事硬件 和軟件,
而且我們認為, 作為好盟友的一部分, 我們當然希望歐洲在歐洲大陸的防務中發揮更
大的作用, 但我們也認為他們可以與許多優秀的美國公司合作。
所以,再說一次,這不一定是一個零和博弈。 這可能是一個非常協同的關係,
但基本原則是, 我們認為世界上大多數國家對美國出口商
和美國公司的態度都過於強硬。 我們希望整個世界對美國工人生產的產品更加開放。
明白。 有時候歐洲的官員會說:
“我們要懲罰美國科技公司, 但我們絕不會用這種方式懲罰歐洲科技公司。”,
我們隻是希望多一點公平, 或者用總統最喜歡的詞來說,對等。
而且,我們認為和歐洲進行這種對話非常容易, 希望我們的歐洲朋友也同意這一點。
呃,我朋友示意我們時間快到了。 我盡量....
我正玩得開心呢。我們可以再回答幾個問題。 好的,很好。 我的團隊在後邊很緊張。你們看不到,但是……
我們會盡量簡短。 非常感謝。 我們聽說未來幾天或兩周內,
總統將出訪中東。 是的。 該地區有很多未解決的問題,
其中就包括伊朗及其核野心等等。
您能談談這個地區嗎? 我是說, 未解決的問題太多了,
比如加沙問題, 還有伊朗德黑蘭的問題。 您期望達到的目標是什麽? 會爭取伊朗濃縮鈾減為零嗎?
有人建議這樣做, 還是說我們會重蹈十年前達成的協議的覆轍?
是的,之前的協議, 也就是《聯合全麵行動計劃》存在一些問題。
這是協議在美國的名字。 我想在歐洲也是這麽叫的。 協議的兩個大問題是,
第一,執行或核查機製非常薄弱。 我認為它實際上並沒有起到阻止伊朗走上核武
器道路的作用。 這是必須改變的一點。 第二,我們認為他們核計劃的某些部分在《聯合全麵
行動計劃》 下被保留了下來, 雖然它們不是核武器, 伊朗也沒有核武器,
但這使得伊朗可以繼續朝著核武器的方向發展, 如果他們啟動開關並按下啟動按鈕的話。
而且我們不能隻從伊朗的角度來考慮這個問題, 正如總統所說,
我們認為這裏存在一種協議, 可以讓伊朗重新融入全球經濟,
這對伊朗人民來說是件非常好的事情, 而且可以徹底阻止他們獲得核武器的任何機會。
這就是我們談判的目標。 正如總統所說, “A方案對伊朗人民,
甚至對伊朗領導層中的一些人來說都非常好, 而B方案則非常糟糕。
這對所有人來說都很糟糕, 也不是我們想要的, 但這總比伊朗擁有核武器這個“C選項”要好。”
對於美國政府來說, 這是完全不可能接受的, 沒有任何商量的餘地。
還有其他一些值得思考的事情, 因為這不僅僅是關於伊朗。 如果伊朗擁有了核武器,
那麽下一個擁有核武器的國家會是誰? 當那個國家擁有核武器後,
再下一個國家又是誰? 我們真正關心的不僅僅是伊朗, 而是核擴散問題。
總統在幾周前的一次采訪中也說過, 在媒體的漩渦中,
信號和噪音混雜, 這個信號非常明顯, 但卻被噪音淹沒了。
總統非常厭惡核擴散,我也一樣。 我認為總統會非常樂意與俄羅斯
和中國坐下來, 共同商討如何改善現狀,
大幅減少全球範圍內的核武器數量。 當然,這並非朝夕之間可以實現的,
但願幾年後我們能有機會進行這樣的對話。
但如果放任世界各地多個政權競相研發核武器,
那麽這一切都無從談起。 而且我們真的認為, 如果伊朗這塊多米諾骨牌倒下,
你將會看到核武器在中東地區擴散。 這對我們非常不利,
對我們的朋友非常不利, 這是我們認為不能發生的事情。
所以,在不對談判進行預判的情況下, 我想說目前為止一切都還不錯。
我們對伊朗人對我們提出的一些要點的回應感 到非常滿意。 我們對一些中間人
和在場人士所發揮的作用感到非常滿意, 特別是阿曼人, 他們發揮了非常積極的作用,
我們對此表示感謝。 所以目前為止, 我們走在正確的道路上,
但這終究會結束, 結果要麽是伊朗放棄他們的核項目, 他們的核武器項目。
他們可以擁有民用核能,沒問題。 但我想問一個基本的問題, 世界上哪個國家擁有民用核能和鈾濃縮能力,
但沒有核武器? 答案是,沒有。 現在沒有任何一個國家隻擁有民用核項目,
如果他們同時具備完整的基礎設施, 能夠將濃縮鈾提煉到90%以上,
達到製造核武器所需的裂變材料的水平。 所以我們的提議很簡單,
我們不反對各國發展核能, 但你們不能擁有能夠製造核武器的鈾濃縮項目,
這是我們的底線。 好的,我想我們大多數人都完全同意這一點,
特別是, 我想,作為一個無核國家,
我們的目標是維持核不擴散。 是的。
這點非常重要。 這讓我可以轉到下一個, 也就是關於北約的最後一個問題。 因為大多數人不明白,
在過去七十年裏, 我們在美國領導下建立的北約, 一直是國際核不擴散的重要工具。
是的。 如果我們當年沒有美國在歐洲的核存在,
我估計至少會有兩三個、 四五個歐洲國家會發展核武器,
如果他們沒有這種(安全)保障的話。 對。
所以北約在核不擴散方麵發揮了重要作用。 六周後, 我們將迎來北約峰會,
同樣,有很多問題。 其中一個將是國防開支的持續問題,
正如我們之前在討論中提到的那樣。 歐洲國家正在加大投入, 但我們也聽到了本屆美國政府提出的更宏偉的要求。
那麽您能否談談您對北約峰會的期望?
在國防開支方麵, 您希望峰會取得什麽樣的成果? 歐洲需要做多少才能減輕美國在歐洲的負擔?
是的,我認為這其中包含幾個不同的部分。
首先,總統已經表示, 他希望看到北約的國防開支達到GDP的5%,
並且他認為這與我們的歐洲盟友告訴我們的, 他們對世界上某些威脅的擔憂程度相符。
而且,鑒於不幸的是, 過去幾十年裏許多歐洲國家的軍隊發展都停滯不前,
所以現在需要迎頭趕上, 這就是總統設定的目標。
當然,歐洲國家會自己做出決定, 但我們認為這是一個合理的目標。
但真正重要的不僅僅是支出本身, 還在於資金的使用方式。 再次,當我們審視一些歐洲盟友時,
我們感到擔憂。 我在第一次參加慕尼黑安全會議時就提出了這一點,
即當我回顧十年前、 十五年前、 二十年前的德國時, 德國做得非常出色的一點是,
他們保持了其經濟的工業實力, 使其與第一世界的生活水平相符。 但現在我們在歐洲看到的是,
我們的許多歐洲朋友正在去工業化, 而與此同時, 我們都看到, 真正的硬實力的經濟基礎需要非常強大
和有力的工業。 因此,不僅僅是花錢, 盡管這很重要, 我們要確保的是,
為第一世界生活水平提供動力的同一經濟引擎, 在萬不得已時,
可以生產戰爭武器。 所以,我認為這其中既有完全獨立於支出水平的經濟因素,
當然也有支出水平的問題。 但我們真心希望, 也真心關注歐洲能夠自幾自足。
幾周前我接受了一次采訪, 當時我試圖強調, 是的,我們和歐洲之間會有分歧,
歐洲和我們之間也會有分歧。 有時,我會回想起2003年美國在中東的政策,
坦率的說, 我希望我們當時聽取了歐洲朋友的意見。 但我認為在這個問題上,
我們從根本上是正確的。 而且我很高興看到我們的許多歐洲朋友也認識
到這一點, 並認識到歐洲確實必須在歐洲大陸的防務中發 揮更大的作用。
我認為我們在這點上是有共識的, 隻是如何實現以及最重要的是如何快速實現的問題。
當然,在德國, 正如你們所見, 我們國家出現了一線希望,在國防開支方麵,
我們已經消除了所謂的“死亡刹車”。 德國新政府現在有機會大幅增加國防開支。
換句話說, 我認為我們能夠很好的回應您剛才所說的話。
女士們、先生們,我們的精彩討論到此結束。
我非常感謝大家允許這次會議以問答形式進行。 好的。 嗯,我相信我們可以繼續討論一上午,
但我知道各位還有其他安排。 最後,請允許我總結一下, 我和我的團隊都非常希望,
各位能夠願意並準備好延續這個傳統,
即美國能在慕尼黑安全會議的重要活動中保持 您這個級別的代表出席。
您不是第一位來到慕尼黑安全會議的美國副總統,
但我們非常感謝您以副總統的身份蒞臨本次會議。 請您明年再光臨慕尼黑。
非常感謝副總統先生。 謝謝。
請允許我說幾句總結性的發言。 首先,我感謝您的友善之辭。
我感謝您的再次邀請。 二月份之後, 我還不確定是否還會收到邀請,
很高興知道邀請仍然有效。 我們已經替您考慮過了。
第二點, 既然你們提到了德國, 我想代表總統向默茨總理表示祝賀。
我知道接下來幾天我們會和他進行對話, 我們很期待。 最後一點是,我不想重複那份文件裏的內容。但我在上次慕尼黑演講中提到的一點, 雖然沒有得到太多的關注, 但我認為同樣重要:
那就是, 我在上次演講中所說的一切, 對之前的美國政府
和對歐洲任何國家的政府都同樣適用。 而且,我發自內心,
以朋友的身份來說, 在約束言論自由的邊界, 與失去人民的信任之間,
存在一種平衡。 每個國家劃定的界限都會有所不同。
每個國家都認為有些事情是超出政治辯論範疇的。 我理解, 我接受這一點,
如果一個國家劃定的界限與美國略有不同, 我也沒意見。
但我認為我們所有人, 特別是美國, 都必須非常小心,
不要以某種方式劃定界限, 以至於實際上破壞了我們文明賴以建立的民主
合法性。 我認為這才是問題的根本所在。
不是說歐洲不好,美國就好。 而是我認為歐洲和美國都有點偏離了軌道,
我希望我們都能一起回到正軌上來。 我們當然願意,
並且有能力參與到這項工作中來, 我也相信大家也是如此。 謝謝。 上帝保佑你們。

A Conversation with the Vice President of the United States | Munich Leaders Meeting

Munich Security Con
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rE-tqUrwBMc
2025年5月7日

The US Vice President JD Vance will participate in a discussion with Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, President of the Foundation Council of the Munich Security Conference, at our Munich Leaders Meeting in Washington, DC.

Speakers: 
 
JD Vance 
Vice President, United States of America

Wolfgang Ischinger
Ambassador (ret.); President of the Foundation Council, Munich Security Conference Foundation

The Munich Leaders Meeting in Washington, DC
The new US administration has set major shifts in US foreign and security policy in motion – including some that put significant pressure on Europe. This has jolted European leaders into renewed readiness to take some difficult decisions, many long overdue. However, it has also given rise to doubts about US commitment to mutual security and shared strategic interests with its transatlantic partners.  

For more than six decades, strengthening the transatlantic partnership has been at the heart of the Munich Security Conference’s mission. Since 2009, the MSC has hosted high-level transatlantic gatherings in Washington, DC, always shortly after the inauguration of a new US administration.  

This year’s Munich Leaders Meeting again provides senior decision-makers from both sides of the Atlantic and beyond with a timely and informal platform to address current frictions and identify joint policy priorities, building on the Munich Security Conference in February.  

Transatlantic differences on policy and regional challenges are substantial. However, so are enduring common security and economic interests. With a focus on strengthening the “basics” of the transatlantic partnership, the Munich Leaders Meeting in Washington, DC, aims to drive discussion on a future-proof and results-oriented joint agenda. In particular, participants will discuss opportunities and obstacles for transatlantic cooperation in areas such as security and defense, economics and trade, energy, and technology. 
<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Wolfgang Ischinger

[Applause] how we doing
good morning everybody wow what a crowd what a crowd mr vice President we're so happy to have you here this morning this
is of obviously the highlight of our Munich Security Conference uh meeting in
Washington DC i hope not i hope not but it is the highlight it's really a great honor to welcome you here this morning
um actually for those of you who have not been regular participants in Munich
this is the third time already that the vice president is participating in a Munich Security Conference
event when you came to Munich last February your speech kicked off a pretty
controversial debate about fundamental values sure unlike anything we have ever
had at the Munich Security Conference and actually we published a brochure
copy of which you'll have on the way out about the speech and the reactions to it
from around from around the world uh this intense debate about how
fundamental values how the freedom of speech the rule of law should be
interpreted and applied continues to this day sure but when we prepared for this meeting
with your team yesterday we agreed and they agreed that today we should try to
focus on current challenges of foreign policy sure um which confront us
together so thank you again for making yourself available we don't have a great deal of time so uh I'll not come up with
a long introduction and I just want to get us started the first
time you came to Munich you were still a senator from Ohio what I associate with Ohio is the
Dayton agreement 30 years ago in 1995 i was at that time actually the German
negotiator so I actually lived in Dayton Ohio for one entire month so that's
right and this and and why is this important because it was through US intervention i
see it was through US intervention that peace was brought about in Europe in the
Balkans at that time uh so if I may let me ask my first question
u about the US and Europe a
distinguished former US diplomat Richard Hullbrook wrote almost exactly 30 years
ago in a foreign affairs article uh that the United States is and should remain a
European power today 30 years ago my question is
do you think that the United States should continue to see itself as a
European power in Munich remember you actually said and I quote we are still
on the same team are we and what does that mean for the US presence in Europe and
relationship with Europe first question 

JD Vance 

sure well first of all thank you and I'm sorry my microphone apparently is broken
but uh we have we have another one so that's good so everybody can hear me now right everybody can hear me great good
um yeah so so first of all um thrilled to be here and thrilled to to have this conversation i've been looking forward
to it and yeah I I do still very much think that the United States and Europe
are on the same team and I I think that this is you know sometimes I've been criticized as a hyper realist right i
think of foreign policy purely in terms of transactional values what does the America get out of it what do the you
know rest of the world get out of it and and try to you know focus so purely on the transactional value of it that we
ignore sometimes the humanitarian or the moral side of it and I think at least with Europe that's actually not a full
encapsulation of my views because I think that you know European civilization and American civilization
European culture and American culture are very much linked and they're always going to be linked and I I think it's
it's completely ridiculous to think that you're ever going to be able to drive a firm wedge between the United States and
Europe now that doesn't mean we're not going to have disagreements and of course you know you brought up the speech earlier it doesn't mean that
Europeans won't criticize the United States or the United States won't criticize Europe but I do think fundamentally we have to be and we are
on the same civilizational team and I think obviously there's a big question about what that means in the 21st
century i think you know obviously the president and I believe that it means a little bit more Europe European burden
sharing on the defense side i think that it means that all of us frankly on both sides of the Atlantic have gotten a
little bit uh too comfortable with the security posture of the last 20 years and that frankly that security posture
is not adequate to meet the challenges of the next 20 years so there are a lot of ways in which this alliance will
evolve and change in the same way that the alliance evolved and changed from 1945 to 1975 and from 1975 to 2005 i do
think that we're in one of these phases where we're going to have to rethink a lot of big questions but I do think that
we should rethink those big questions together that is a fundamental belief of both me and the president and you know
you mentioned this is my third time speaking uh with the Munich Security Conference group obviously the first
couple of times were in Munich and I always remember very fondly of course that the very first time it was as a
United States senator representing Ohio and I'm glad you got to spend a month in Dayton i love Dayton it's kind of the closest big city if you can call it a
big city to where I grew up uh but on that first panel I was on that panel and also David Lambie who at the time was a
a a lowly member in opposition and of course now is the great foreign secretary of the United Kingdom and he
and I have become good friends so I I I still think that this European alliance is very important but I think that for
it to be important and for us to be real friends with each other and I think that we are very much real friends we've got
to talk about the big questions and I know that's an important part of what this entire group does so I'm glad to be
here great thank you so much u and I think the message has arrived in Europe
that we need to carry a significantly larger share of the burden as you know
we are all trying to spend more some are are spending really a lot more others
are lagging behind a little bit but we're moving in the right direction I think um let me let me turn to a really
concrete urgent issue ukraine the Trump administration from
what we have seen in the media etc seems to
agree with most of us in Europe that unfortunately Russia does not seem to be
really willing to end this military confrontation um if that's the assessment if that if
that's our collective assessment uh could you talk a little bit about US
strategy going forward we we all want this war to end and and let me say as a
very personal comment I think the Trump administration did the right thing by
starting this process of talking to the Ukrainians talking to the Russians but
the Russians seem not to be interested in the kind of quote unquote deal that
could be offered to them so talk to us a little bit about how you see the next steps yeah so so let me say a couple of
things about this f first of all I I appreciate your kind words about the administration obviously I think it was the right thing to do for us to start
the process of negotiation i think for too long the the Russians the Ukrainians
have been fighting obviously there's been a lot of people dying on both sides there have been a lot of innocent loss of life and our view is it's absurd that
you've had this war go on for so long and the two sides aren't even talking constructively about what would be
necessary for them to end the conflict and I think that um you know one of the things that that the President Trump has
always been very good at and he's gotten a lot of criticism unfair criticism in my view from both the American and some
of the European press is is what I would call a strategic realism or a strategic
insight in other words you don't have to agree with the Russian justification for
the war and certainly both the president and I have criticized the full-scale invasion but you have to try to
understand where the other side is coming from to end the conflict and I think that's what President Trump has been very deliberate about is actually
forcing the Russians to say "Here is what we would like in order to end the conflict." And and again you don't have
to agree with it you can think that the request is too significant and certainly the first peace offer that the Russians
put on the table our reaction to it was you're asking for too much but this is how negotiations unfold and I wouldn't
say I'm not yet that pessimistic on this i wouldn't say that the Russians are uninterested in bringing this thing to a
resolution what I would say is right now the Russians are asking for a certain set of requirements a certain set of
concessions in order to end the conflict we think they're asking for too much
okay and then obviously uh the Ukrainians matter a lot they're the other SAR side they're the other party
at least to the direct conflict and we have to ask what is the Ukrainian what do they what do they need in order um to
bring this conflict to a successful completion and we're going to continue to have that conversation now what the
president has said is that he will walk away if he thinks he's not making progress and I think that you know about
once every four or five weeks you will hear some American official or sometimes multiple American officials say this is
a week where we need to make another step and in particular the step that we would like to make right now is we would
like both the Russians and the Ukrainians to actually agree on some basic guidelines for sitting down and
talking to one another obviously the United States is happy to participate in those conversations but it's very
important for the Russians and the Ukrainians to start talking to one another we think that is the next big
step that we would like to take and why does that matter the reason it matters is because again I mentioned the
Russians but also the Ukrainians have also been sort of they they've they've put a piece of paper in our hands that
says this is what we would need in order to bring this conflict to a successful resolution from our perspective and
there's a big gulf predictably between where the Russians and the Ukrainians are and we think the next step in the
negotiation is to try to close that gulf we think it's probably impossible for us to mediate this entirely without at
least some direct negotiation between the two and so that's what we focus on but I I'm I'm not yet a pessimist on
this i mean obviously you know the Russians and the Ukrainians are not there yet because the fighting is still
going on you know the Ukrainians have have said they would agree to a ceasefire a 30-day ceasefire we
appreciate that what the Russians have said again you don't have to disagree with it but it's important to understand
where the other side is coming from what the Russians have said is a 30-day ceasefire is not in our strategic
interest so we've tried to move beyond the obsession with a 30-day ceasefire and more on the what would the long-term
settlement look like and we've tried to consistently advance the ball one final point I'd make about this I think this
probably wouldn't surprise anybody in the room but there are a lot of people watching who are not in the room is is a
frustration that we've had frankly with both sides is that they hate each other
so much that if you have an hour conversation with either side the first 30 minutes are just them complaining
about some historical grievance from four years ago or 5 years ago or 10 years ago look I understand it i
understand that people don't fight wars against each other without a lot of grievance and a lot of of problem but
we're trying to as much as we can play a constructive role in advancing the peace conversation forward what I I'll say
just to echo something that President Trump has said many times but I think it bears repeating is our strong view is
that the continuation of this conflict is bad for us it's bad for Europe it's bad for Russia and it's bad for Ukraine
we think that if cool heads prevail here we can bring this thing to a durable
peace that will be economically beneficial for both the Ukrainians and the Russians and most importantly will
stop the end of the of the destruction of human lives i think people underappreciate this about our president
here in the United States is he has a genuine humanitarian impulse about this he hates innocent people losing their
lives he hates even soldiers losing their lives in unnecessary conflicts he
just wants the killing to stop and that will that will continue to be America's policy but obviously as all of you have
seen we'll navigate that policy and react as the parties bring their grievances to us great thank you very
much i if I can just offer two footnotes to that i think for us
uh Europeans living as neighbors of Ukraine and if you wish also as
neighbors of Russia we have begun to understand that what we're looking at
here is not just the defensive war by Ukraine against the Russian aggression
it is also a confrontation that puts at
risk all of European security in other words it's indirectly our defense also it's not
just Ukraine and this is why we're so desperately interested in seeing that this u comes to an end hopefully and the
and and I I think the real trick for negotiations and for a conclusion of this is going to be that it's going to
be lasting and not not broken u in the next three six or nine months again let
me Mr mr Vice President since we have so little time there are so many issues if
I if you allow let me let me turn to another issue
china that's a key as we understand a key challenge for the United States for
your foreign policy it's also of tremendous interest for for us in Europe
so the United States has defined China as the key strategic challenge going
forward for coming probably many years this has also been the the justification the reasoning
when American staff members of yours tell us the United States must do must be much
more present in Asia and will therefore uh need to reduce their presence their
strength etc in Europe but now there are some signals in the media that you that
the United States government that the White House might actually be interested in a strategic deal with China maybe
even including on Taiwan could you talk a little bit about China strategy of the
Trump administration yes so I haven't seen those reports that you mentioned a strategic deal on Taiwan so I I wouldn't
speak to that i certainly say that would say that there has been no conversation between our governments about a strategic deal on on that particular
question what we have talked about of course is that we cannot absorb the
producer surplus of the entire world that has been the role of the American economy for the past 30 years in some
cases visav Europe and by the way we don't blame for example the Germans for pursuing a policy that makes their
exporters strong we just wish that American leadership had pursued a policy that made our exporters strong because
now we find ourselves in a very precarious place when I say we I mean the entire West i mean the NATO alliance
i mean the United States and Europe which is that we become in a world of hyper complicated hyper globalized
supply chains we find ourselves more and more reliant on countries that may not
have our best interest at heart and even if they're halfway decent trading partners it's still a little bit risky
to put all of your eggs in one proverbial basket economically and what the president has said is we must
rebalance the global economy visav China we cannot absorb hundreds of billions of
dollars close to a trillion dollars per year in annual surplus most of it coming
from the People's Republic of China and what that's going to mean in in in the rebalancing is that we think that the
PRC is going to have to frankly let their own population consume a little bit more they've held consumption levels
down in order to increase these massive exports it means that American manufacturers are going to have to be
treated more fairly in some of these global trade deals it means we're going to have to cut some new trade deals with
some of our friends in Europe but also with some of our more adversarial nations but but that also you know we
have to be careful here because while we want to rebalance global trade and that has certainly been the explicit goal of
our policy we also want to make sure that we do this in the right way and yes you've seen media reports that the
Chinese reached out to the United States of course we're going to sit down and talk to them i'm not going to divulge
too many details or prejudge the negotiations but we want to rebalance trade in the interests of American
workers in the interest of American manufacturers that is our policy we think that we can do that while
preserving at least an open dialogue with the PRC and with a lot of other nations all over the world uh but but
that that doesn't mean the old way of doing business is going to be stable or that it's going to persist it simply
cannot it was not sustainable 10 years ago it was certainly not sustainable four years ago and we're very very
committed to changing it but we're open to having conversations with both again our friends and more adversarial nations
about what that rebalancing ultimately looks like and and and people have to remember you know liberation day which
was where the president announced these this this fundamental change I think in the global trading system that was
almost exactly 30 days ago so we are in the early innings of a very significant
shift i think that shift is going to really enure to the benefit of both the United States but also of Europe but it
it's fundamentally it has to happen and it's going to happen under President Trump's leadership
all right um I think it's great if there are beginning discussions between you and
the Chinese uh could you expand a little more on what would your expectations be
for an EU US successful discussion of these trade issues uh is there any
message that we can take home to our friends in Brussels um because that's
also from our point of view obviously a very urgent issue yeah so it to put it very simply and
we've obviously had great conversations with a lot of our European friends at the very senior levels between you know
the president and heads of state between me and and officials in European governments but also with trade
representatives and also the very nitty-gritty technical details of a trade agreement so these conversations
are ongoing but I'll throw a few general principles out there i think the first is that again America wants its
exporters and and by implication its workers to be treated much more fairly we want American markets and sorry
excuse me in the same way that American markets have been open to a lot of European goods we'd like a lot of European markets to be open to American
goods now there's an agriculture component to that there's an value added manufacturing component to that uh we
think that we have in both the software but also the more harder technology side we have some great defense technology
firms where on the one hand we have our European friends saying we want to
actually build up our defense we want to do more burden sharing but on the other
hand it seems like some of our European friends are less open for business if the people selling software and hardware
are American firms well we think that's inconsistent we think that we have some of the best military hardware and
software in the world and we think part of being good allies is yes we obviously want the Europeans to take a bigger role
in the continental defense but we also think that there are a lot of great American companies that they can work with and so again this doesn't have to
be a zero- sum dynamic this can be a very synergistic relationship but the fundamental principle is we think that
most nations most nations in the world have been way too hard on American exporters and American firms we want to
make the entire world a little bit more open to the products built by American workers we're obviously biased we think
that they're the best in the world and we think that we can have a much better trading relationship with a lot of our
European friends if they were if they just dropped some of those both tariff but also non-tariff trade barriers there
are regulatory barriers there are sometimes you have a an official at the Ministry of Defense completely
disconnected as far as we can tell from a from an actual law or regulation who will just say we're not buying American
products sometimes you have officials in Europe who will say well we're going to penalize American technology firms in a
way that we would never penalize European technology firms we just want a little bit more fairness or to use the
president's favorite word reciprocity and again with with Europe we think that's a very very easy conversation to
have we hope our European friends agree great uh I get signs from my friend here
that we're quickly running out of time i'll try I'm having I'm having fun and
uh let's we can take a few more questions okay great wonderful my team over there is very nervous you guys can't see them behind but we'll be we'll
be we'll be brief so thank you very much um uh we we've heard that there is in
coming days or next two weeks a presidential trip to the Middle East coming up sure among the many unresolved
issues of that region is the issue of Iran and their nuclear ambition etc etc
could you talk a little bit about the region uh I mean there's so many unresolved issues the Gaza issue but
also Tehran what would we what would your expectation be what would the goal
be would you go for zero enrichment by Iran some people have suggested that or
are we looking at a a a a a replay of
the earlier you know agreement that was reached 10 years ago yeah so there are a
couple issues with the earlier agreement um the JCPOA as as uh it's it's called here in
the United States and I assume in Europe here here the two big issues with that agreement are number one the enforcement
or the inspections regime was incredibly weak and I I I don't think that it actually served the function of
preventing the Iranians from getting on the pathway to a nuclear weapon that's one thing that must be different and
then second yes we believe that there were some elements of their nuclear program that were preserved under
JCPOA that yes they weren't nuclear weapons iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon but allowed Iran to sort of stay
on this glide path towards a nuclear weapon if they flipped the switch and press go and we have to think about this
not just in terms of Iran which again the president has said this we think that there is a deal here that would
reintegrate Iran into the global economy that would be really good for the Iranian people but would result in the
complete sessation of any chance that they could get a nuclear weapon and that's what we're negotiating towards and as the president has said that's
option A and option B if option A is very good for the Iranian people and and and even um you know some of the folks
the leadership in Iran option B is very bad it's very bad for everybody and it's not what we want but it's better than
option C which is Iran getting a nuclear weapon that is what is completely off the table for the American
administration no ifs ands or buts now there are a couple of other things that are worth thinking about because this is
not just about Iran if Iran gets a nuclear weapon which country then next
gets a nuclear weapon and then when that country gets a nuclear weapon which country after that we really care not
just about Iran but about nuclear proliferation and yeah the president said this in an interview a few weeks ago it's one of these things that in the
in the maelstrom of the media the signal in the noise this was very much signal
but it got lost in the noise the president hates nuclear proliferation i hate nuclear proliferation and I I I
think that that the president would be very open to sitting down with the Russians and the Chinese and saying
"Look let's get this thing in a much better place let's reduce the number of nuclear weapons that are in the world at
large." That's obviously not a conversation for tomorrow that's a conversation God willing for a few years
from now but there is no way you get to that conversation if you allow multiple regimes all over the world to to to
basically enter this sprint for a nuclear weapon and we really think that if the Iran domino falls you're going to
see nuclear proliferation all over the Middle East that's very bad for us it's very bad for our friends and it's
something that we don't think can happen so without prejudging the negotiations I I will say so far so good we've been
very um happy by how the Iranians have responded to some of the points that we've made we've been very happy that
some of the intermediaries and some of the folks who are in the room the role that they've played the Omanis in particular have played a very positive
role and we're very grateful to that so so far we're on the right pathway but
this is going to end somewhere and it will end either in Iran eliminating
their nuclear program their nuclear weapons program they can have civil nuclear power okay we don't we don't
mind that but what let me ask this basic question which regime in the world has
civil nuclear power and enrichment without having a nuclear weapon and the
answer is no one no one right now has a civil nuclear program with their entire
enrichment infrastructure that can enrich to the you know 90 plus% needed to get to fistal material and a nuclear
weapon so our our our proposition is very simple yes we we don't care if people want nuclear power we're fine
with that but you can't have the kind of enrichment program that allows you to
get to a nuclear weapon and that's where we draw the line great i think we most
of us would totally agree with that and especially I think speaking on behalf of
a non-nuclear country with the goal of maintaining the nuclear non-prololiferation regime that's very
important uh that allows me to turn to my next or last question on NATO because
most people don't understand that the fact that we've had NATO under US
leadership for the last 70 years that has been an essential instrument of
international non-prololiferation if we had not had you u the US nuclear
presence in Europe I would be prepared to give you the uh at least two three four five
countries in Europe that would have gone nuclear if they had not had this reassurance so NATO has played a big
role in nuclear non- proliferation in six weeks time we have a NATO summit
coming up and uh again there are many many issues one will be the continuing
issue of defense spending uh as we mentioned earlier in our discussion
Europeans are doing more but we've also listened to uh to uh demands coming out
of uh the administration um that are even more ambitious so could you talk a
little bit about your level of expectation what would be your desired outcome of that NATO summit in terms of
defense spending in terms of of how much Europe will need to do on its own in
order to relieve the United States more in Europe yeah so I think there are two
there are a couple of different components of this so so first of all what the president has said is he'd like to see 5% spending on defense in NATO
and he thinks that that is consistent with what our European friends are telling us about how much they fear some
of the threats in the world and you know given unfortunately that a lot of
European militaries have not kept pace over the past few decades there's a bit
of catching up to do and so that is the goal that the president has set obviously European countries are going
to make their own determinations but that's what we think is a reasonable goal but it's really not just about the spend itself it's also how the money is
spent and it's again there there's this fear that we have when we look at some of our European friends and I I made
this point at the first Munich security conference I ever went to that when I looked at Germany 10 15 20 years ago one
of the things that the Germans were very good about is that they were they had kept the industrial strength of their
economy consistent with the first world standard of living but now what we see in Europe is a lot of our European
friends are de-industrializing at the very moment where we're all seeing the hard power underpinning or the economic
underpinning of real hard power requires very strong and powerful industry and so it's not just spending money as
important as that is it's making sure that the same economic engine that
powered first world living standards is actually geared towards producing god forbid weapons of war if those weapons
of war are ever necessary and so I I think there's both an economic component to this that's completely divorced from
the spending levels and then of course there's the spending levels too but we we really want and we really care about
Europe being self-sufficient i you I gave an interview a couple of weeks ago where I actually tried to to make the
point that yes we're going to have disagreements with Europe and Europe will have disagreements with us sometimes you know I would I would
hearken back to 2003 uh United States policy in the Middle East i frankly wish
we had listened to our European friends but I think this is an area where we're
fundamentally right and I think it's it's gratifying to see so many of our European friends recognize that and
recognize that Europe does really have to play a bigger role in continental defense i think we're all aligned on it
it's just a question of getting there and most importantly getting there quickly there is a glimmer of hope in
our country in Germany as I'm sure you've seen we've uh eliminated the
so-called debt break yes uh when it comes to defense spending so there is
now the opportunity for the incoming new government in Germany to spend significantly more uh in other words I
think we're we're in good shape in terms of responding to what you have just said um ladies gentlemen that brings us to
the end of this wonderful discussion i'm really grateful to you that you uh
allowed this to be a Q&A session sure um uh we could continue this I'm sure for
the uh rest of the morning but I know you have other things coming up uh may I
simply conclude by saying that we hope very much my team and I that you will be
willing and prepared to continue this young tradition that the United States
at major Munich Security Conference events will be represented at your level
uh you are not the first vice president of the United States who has come to the Munich Security Conference but we are
extremely grateful that you came in your new position please come again to Munich next year thank you very much Mr vice
President thank
you so if if I may just say a few things in conclusion first of all I appreciate the kind words and I appreciate the
invitation back i wasn't sure after February whether I'd get the invitation back but it's good to know uh that it's
still there we thought about it second of all uh second of all since you brought
up Germany I I wanted to of course u from the president issue our congratulations to Chancellor Mertz and
I know that we'll have a conversation with him in the next couple of days but we're looking forward to it and uh the
final point that I'd make is is you know not not to rehash what's in that in that document but one of the things that I
said in that speech that didn't get as much airplay but I thought was just as important is that everything that I said
there applied as much to the previous American administration as it did any
government in Europe and I and I think that this I I mean this from the heart and as a friend that there is a tradeoff
between policing the bounds of de democratic speech and debate and losing
the trust of our people every single country and we're all going to draw the lines a little bit differently every
single country says there are things that are outside the realm of political debate i understand that i accept that
and I'm fine if one country is going to draw those lines a little bit differently than the United States but I
think all of us including especially the United States we have to be careful that
we don't draw the lines in such a way that we actually undermine the very
democratic legitimacy upon which all of our civilization rests and I I think that is fundamentally the point here
it's not Europe bad America good it's that I think that both Europe and the United States we got a little bit off
track and I'd encourage us all to get back on track together we're certainly willing and able to participate in that work and I think all of you all too thank you god bless you great,thank you so much.

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