風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
Niccolò Machiavelli 君主論 The Prince
君主論
維基百科 最後修訂於2025年1月14日
《君主論》（意大利語：Il Principe，或翻譯為《君王論》）是意大利文藝複興時期作家尼科洛·馬基雅維利的政治論著，於1513年獻給洛倫佐二世·德·美第奇，但此書在馬基雅維利死後第五年的1532年才公開出版。美第奇家族的教皇克萊門特七世允許書藉出版發行。
《君主論》篇幅不長，但由於書中主張有違常人道德觀念，自手稿首次麵世以來就爭議不斷。《君主論》的中心主題是“如有必要，君主是應該使用不道德的手段去實現目標（例如榮譽和生存）”：
對於一個君主來說，不僅不必具備各種美德，而且還要保留那些不會使自己亡國的惡行在守信和失信方麵，君主應當效法狐狸與獅子
貶義詞“馬基雅維利主義”正由此書衍生出來，連帶“政治”和“政客”也含有了貶義。
《君主論》有時被稱為是現代哲學，特別是現代政治哲學的第一批著作，《君主論》仿佛是傳統風格的作品，但人們普遍認為它特別具有創新性。部分原因是因為它是用意大利語而不是拉丁語編寫的，自從但丁的《神曲》和其他文藝複興時期文學作品出版以來，這種做法就越來越流行。
摘要
[編輯]- 在善良與惡行方麵，對於一個君主來說，不僅不必具備各種美德，而且還要保留那些“不會使自己亡國”的惡行。
- 在慷慨與吝嗇方麵，寧可被稱吝嗇，也不要因慷慨而讓民眾覺得橫征暴斂，“在我們的時代裏，我們看見隻有那些曾經被稱為吝嗇的人們，才做出了偉大的事業；至於別的人，全都失敗了。”[1]“明智之士寧願承受吝嗇之名，因其雖帶來罵聲但不會引起憎恨。倘追求慷慨之譽，則必招致貪婪之名，而貪婪之名則使罵聲與憎恨俱來。”[2]
- 在殘暴和仁慈方麵，君主對於殘暴這個惡名不必介意，所應重視的倒是不要濫用仁慈，因為仁慈會帶來滅頂之災， “被人畏懼比受人愛戴是安全得多的”。[3]“因為關於人類，大致上可以這樣說：他們是忘恩負義的、善變的，是偽裝者、冒牌貨，是趨利避害的。”[3]但君主要掌握好使用殘暴手段的限度和範圍，即要迅速做完一切惡行，對臣民的財產和他們的妻女不要染指。
- 在守信和失信方麵，君主應當效法狐狸與獅子。“由於獅子不能夠防止自己落入陷阱，而狐狸則不能夠抵禦豺狼。因此，君主必須是一頭狐狸以便認識陷阱，同時又必須是一頭獅子，以便使豺狼驚駭。” [4]當遵守信義對自己不利，或原來使自己作出諾言的理由不複存在時，一位英明的君主絕不能夠、也不應當遵守信義。但君主又必須深知怎樣掩飾這種獸性，並需做一個偉大的偽裝者和偽善者，要顯得具備一切優良品質。“因為群氓總是被外表和事物的結果所吸引，而這個世界中盡是群氓。”[5]
- 在尊重與輕視方麵，君主必須要受人尊重，君主一定要學會避免那些可能使自己受到憎恨或輕視的事情。君主必須像提防暗礁一樣提防被人認為變幻無常、輕率淺薄、軟弱怯懦、優柔寡斷，君主應該努力在行動中表現偉大、英勇、嚴肅莊重、堅忍不拔，使人們對自己抱有“誰都不要指望欺騙他或者瞞過他”的見解，這樣才能對抗一切陰謀，坐穩江山。[6]
- 在人民與貴族方麵，君主應避免自己因袒護人民而受到貴族的責難，也要避免因袒護貴族而受到人民的非議，就應設立作為第三者的裁判機關（議會），而用不著君主擔負責任。“對於國王和王國來說，世界上再沒有比這個製度更好、更審慎，再沒有比這個方法更安全的了。”[7]
- 在施恩與負責方麵，務必把擔負責任的事情委諸他人辦理，而把布惠施恩的事情由自己掌管。君主必須依靠行動，贏得偉大與才智非凡的聲譽。當一位君主公開表示自己毫無保留地讚助某一方或反對另一方，他也會受到尊重，采取這種態度明確的辦法，總是比保持中立更有用處。[8]
- 在擇才與辨奸方麵，君主必須表明自己愛才，起用有才之人，對於各個行業中傑出的人物授予榮譽，激勵公民在職業上能安心地從事其職務，給人民以歡樂。君主對待臣下一方麵要使他感恩戴德、分享榮譽、分擔職責，另一方麵要避開諂媚者。
- 總之，君主不應相信命運，要使自己的做法符合時代的特性，完成“將意大利從蠻族手中解放出來”的偉業。
分析
馬基雅維利強調，有必要研究“有效真理”（verita effetuale），而不是依靠“想像中的共和國和公國”。他用比喻了光榮的行為和犯罪的行為之間的區別，他說：“有兩種競爭方式，一種是依法進行的，另一種是通過武力進行的；第一種適用於人，第二種適用於人和野獸”。
馬基雅維利在《君主論》中，也沒有解釋何為至善的道德或政治目標。馬基雅維利認為，將來的君主自然會以榮譽或生存為目標。他將這些目標與美德和審慎視為良好政治所必不可少的。更多的美德，意味著更少的依賴偶然的機會，是馬基雅維利時代受古典影響所產生的“人文常識”，即使這有爭議。
然而，馬基雅維利的進步遠遠超出了其他作家。他使用“美德”和“審慎”一詞來指代追求榮譽和進取的品格，這與基督徒對這些用語的傳統用法形成強烈反差，但更符合皈依基督信仰前的古希臘與古羅馬時期的原始概念，馬基雅維利鼓勵野心和冒險精神。因此，在與傳統的另一次突破中，他不僅考慮了穩定性，還考慮了徹底的創新。進行重大改革可以顯君主的美德並賦予他榮耀。馬基雅維利顯然認為意大利在他的時代需要重大改革，並且他的觀點得到了廣泛認可。
馬基雅維利的描述鼓勵君主光榮地控製自己的命運，在某些情況下，盡管存在危險和必要的情況，但在某些情況下需要重新定義“模式和秩序”。
文章目錄及概要
[編輯]- 第一章 君主國的種類及其獲得之方法 （Chapter I: Of the Various Kinds of Princedom, and of the Ways in Which They Are Acquired）
- 第二章 論世襲君主國 （Chapter II: Of Hereditary Princedoms）
- 作者主要論述了世襲君主國的利弊，好處在於擁有較為穩固的統治，由於所謂的“習慣性傾向”，那些世代傳承的統治法則早已被人民所接受，隻要統治者不越矩，不做過分出格之事（例如荒淫無度），順應民心安邦治國並非難事。而弊處也正在於墨守陳規遵循舊製而缺乏變革的意識，其終究將要被曆經改革得以強盛的新興國家所侵犯。正如本章結尾所總結那樣“曆史發展的規律以無可辯駁的事實表明：每一個變革總是為新變革做準備，並促成另一個新的變革的發生！”
- 第三章 論混合君主國 （Chapter III: Of Mixed Princedoms）
- 相較於世襲製王國，混合君主國的統治難度要大的多。作為被征服土地的原有居民在心理上自然而然地會有對征服者的抵觸感，如何鞏固新政權是征服者麵臨的首要問題。對此作者給予了較為細致的分析。他區分了兩種情況：
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- 第一種：當新的領土從與征服者語言、風俗習慣等較為接近的國土中征服而來時，新統治者需要從兩方麵做起：
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- 其一，通俗的說法即是“斬草除根，永絕後患”。對所征服土地尚存的舊勢力殘黨，予以徹底消滅。
- 其二，維持該地區原有的語言，風俗習慣、法律等社會規範，給予一定程度的尊重。
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- 第二種：當新的領土是從與征服者語言、風俗習慣等存在較大差異的國土中征服而來時：
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- 其一，新的統治者應實行的最有效的方法是，君主親自押陣，駐營紮寨，以防暴亂。好處在於即使出現叛亂事件也可以及時鎮壓；同時還可防止財富被不法官吏所掠奪；最後，能夠及時解決當地臣民的申冤求助。總之利大於弊。
- 其二，一種既省事又經濟的治理方法是建立殖民地，其原則是盡可能把對當地原有居民的損害降至最低。作者在此還分析了建立武裝部隊的弊端，即浪費大量財力，同時極易激起當地被征服居民的反抗。由此可見建立殖民地是安定新邦的有力措施。
- 除了以上兩種統治措施外，作者特別指出需要重視外國勢力的滲透，提防那些被征服的弱小領地為了生存而投靠境外勢力顛覆自己的行徑。
- 第四章 論亞曆山大大帝所征服的大流士王國在其崩逝後為何未反抗新君 （Chapter IV: Why the Kingdom of Darius, Conquered by Alexander, Did Not, on Alexander's Death, Rebel Against His Successors）
- 大流士王國正是屬於第一種類型，因此亞曆山大付出巨大代價將其擊潰，但之後卻可以較為穩固實施統治，正如書中所言：“假如亞曆山大的繼承者們能夠團結一致的話，那麽他們永久地享有這片土地是不成問題的；假如他們不因為起內訌而引起一係列的糾紛，那個王國是不會出現其他亂子的。”[9]
- 第五章 論占領前自有法律之城市或君主國當如何統治 （Chapter V: How Cities or Provinces Which Before Their Acquisition Have Lived Under Their Own Laws Are To Be Governed）
- 作者認為有三種方法可以選擇：
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- 第一種：徹底摧毀原有法律條文等舊製。
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- 第二種：征服者坐鎮被征服地親自統治。
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- 第三種：尊重原有法律等製度，但需要按期進貢，且建立一個忠心的“寡頭製”政府。
- 作者舉出了斯巴達在雅典和底比斯，羅馬在征服希臘建立“寡頭製”失敗的例子來證明第三種選擇的不可靠。而最好的辦法即是第一種和第二種。如作者所指出的那樣：“任何一個人要想成為一個自由城市的新生統治者，若不以摧毀這個城市作先決條件，那麽他所得到的報應則是坐以待斃。”因為原有居民隨時可以恢複舊有統治秩序下的自由和法律為理由起義推翻現有統治，這種所謂的“複仇”心理使得新生的政權麵臨很大的威脅，所以君主可以選擇徹底將之毀滅或者親自加以統治。
- 第六章 論以武以德建立之新君主國 （Chapter VI: Of New Princedoms Which a Prince Acquires With His Own Arms and by Merit）
- 由於鞏固新政權的重重困難，使得唯有強力的措施才更加有效。“當人們不再有信仰的時候，就隻能依靠武力迫使他們就範。”[10]
- 統治者的成功是自身才能和外在機會的共同產物。但依靠自身的才能是更為重要的，且這種統治更為長久有效。作者為此舉了敘拉古希倫二世的例子，希倫二世通過自身的努力，例如廣交朋友，組建新軍、審慎地選擇盟友等建立自己的王國，由卑微的庶民一躍為古老城邦的最高統治者—敘拉古之王。
- 第七章 論借兵或幸運建立之新君主國 （Chapter VII: Of New Princedoms Acquired By the Aid of Others and By Good Fortune）
- 通過他人的部隊，或是透過運氣而獲取君主國，統治難度要高得多，因為既不可靠也不穩定，君主既不容易去維護，也沒有能力保持自己的君位。作者為此也給出了自己解決措施，君主為了確保新邦免遭侵犯，就有必要爭取外交、建立軍隊、巧施計謀，有必要消滅要加害自己的人，甚至有必要時也可以消滅有二心的軍隊，再創一支新軍。對外交也需要重視，應該使外國君主殷殷勤勤地幫助自己，或者誠惶誠恐地服從自己。也因此對惡名昭彰的凱撒·波吉亞給予高度讚賞。
- 第八章 論以罪行建國之君主 （Chapter VIII: Of Those Who By Their Crimes Come to Be Princes）
- 仰賴罪刑建國，確實是邪惡的，但阿加托克利斯那樣無比奸詐、殘暴的人，反而能夠穩固自己的統治，這在作者看來是恰當地使用殘暴手段的結果，所以君主應審時度勢施暴。正如文中所說：“惡行應該一次把它幹完，以便老百姓少受一些損害，老百姓的積怨就少些；相反，恩惠應該是一點一點地賜予，以便百姓能夠好好品嚐恩惠的滋味。”[11]總之，最重要的就是君主要學會與百姓和諧相處。
- 第九章 論市民之君主國 （Chapter IX: Of the Civil Princedom）
- 市民之君主國是受到本國市民擁戴而建立的國家，包括民眾和貴族兩種方式的擁戴而成。由於民眾的目的比貴族的目的更加公正，民眾需要的僅僅是不受壓迫，而貴族則需要得更多，受本性驅使，貴族還希望可以壓迫他人。因此，如果是受民眾支持而被擁戴為君主，應與民眾保持友好關係即可。而如果是憑借貴族力量而成為君主，那麽爭取民眾的支持，更是首要的任務。此外，作者特別指出了贏得民心的最好辦法並非是一成不變的，重要的是因地製宜。
- 第十章 論衡量所有君主國力量之道 （Chapter X: How the Strength of All Princedoms Should Be Measured）
- 君主的統治依賴於自身，同時又需要他人力量的援助。因此，作為一個明君，首先需要做的是建立穩固的防衛措施，準備充足的糧食，以備將來遭受敵人的侵襲後可以堅定民眾的意誌。
- 第十一章 論教會君主國 （Chapter XI: Of Ecclesiastical Princedoms）
- 教會君主國統治難度較小，最為安寧和穩定，因為依靠強大的宗教信仰的力量，如同奧古斯丁所說的上帝之城，君主完全可以實行穩固統治，即使在外敵入侵的情況下，臣民也必將遵循內心的準則而堅定地效忠君主，而非背信棄義，這正是信仰力量的偉大之處，它要比單純依靠武力的桎梏更為有效。
- 第十二章 論軍隊的種類與雇傭軍 （Chapter XII: How Many Different Kinds of Soldiers There Are, and of Mercenaries）
- 作者認為穩固統治的保障在於“擁有健全的製度、完善的法律和優良的軍隊”[12]作者此處著重指出了軍隊的重要性，認為所謂的雇傭軍是極為危險的，他們僅僅為了獲得微薄的軍餉而在戰場上作戰，毫無忠義之心，作者更直接了當指出了當時意大利崩潰衰亡的原因正是過分依賴雇傭軍的結果。
- 此外，作者還分析了雇傭軍的起源，由於教會神權對於世俗王權的勝利，意大利落入了教會和部分建立共和國的市民手中，不識治國尤其是軍隊治理之道的他們，隻有雇傭大量外國軍人為其作戰，雇傭軍由此產生。建立在這種赤裸裸的“雇傭關係”基礎上的軍隊必然不會全心投入作戰，正如馬基維利所指出的那樣：“戰鬥中他們盡量不進行屠殺而是活捉俘虜，而且戰後不要求敵方贖金即將俘虜大赦釋放。他們並不夜襲城市，城市的防軍亦不夜襲野營。他們在軍隊的周圍既不樹立柵欄，或者挖掘壕溝建築工事，也不在冬季出征作戰。而所有這些又都是他們的兵法所允許的，並且這也是他們為著避免疲勞和危險這兩者而想出來的絕招。”[13]
- 第十三章 論援軍、混合軍以及本國軍隊 （Chapter XIII: Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and National Arms）
- 援軍即是“當一個君主麵臨窘境，便請求一個強國進行援助和保衛自己的時候派來的軍隊”[14]相比於雇傭軍，求助於強國外援的危險要更大。由於援軍本身即是一支訓練有素的隊伍，內部結構層次緊密，團結一致，且完全聽命於他國君主，對於君主來說如同一個“強悍的侵略者”，國家也隨時可能麵臨毀滅的危險。可以說，不管是雇傭軍還是強國外援，借助他人的力量取得的勝利，不是真正的勝利。
- 第十四章 論君主對於軍事之責 （Chapter XIV: Of the Duty of a Prince In Respect of Military Affairs）
- 作者認為君主在軍事方麵的職責包括：“從事戰爭、軍事製度和紀律以及軍事方麵的研究”[15]。身為君主如果不懂軍事，就會遭到蔑視，試想一個白丁如何讓鎧甲之徒（軍隊）信服。其次身為一個全然不知用兵的君主，苟且安身於武裝的臣仆之中，也是不合情理的。
- 君主可以通過兩種途徑來提高自己的軍事素養：
- 第一種:行動。如經常地參與狩獵活動，鍛煉身體，以適應艱苦的生活環境；此外，還要專注於戰爭專業的研究。作者於此特別指出地理知識的重要性，君主要全麵了解各種地理地形，知道如何使用軍事手段保衛國土。同時通過舉一反三，以此很容易地推斷出其他相似地區的相關知識。
- 憑心智方麵思考。培養思維能力，重在閱讀曆史，深入研究在曆史上聲名顯赫的曆史人物，樹立楷模以此效仿。
- 第十五章 論世人尤其君主之褒貶 （Chapter XV: Of the Qualities In Respect of Which Men, and Most of all Princes, Are Praised or Blamed）
- 作者強調自己關注於現實的真實情況而非不切實際的想象。對於哲學史上哲學家們所構想出的眾多理想王國（如柏拉圖的《理想國》，亞裏士多德《政治學》中所構想的城邦）。因而君主重在根據具體情況采取適合的治國方略，善於審時度勢，明辨真偽。
- 第十六章 論慷概與吝嗇 （Chapter XVI: Of Liberality and Miserliness）
- 在慷慨和吝嗇兩種性格中，作者認為君主更應該追求吝嗇。從常識上來說，慷慨顯然是一種善行，而吝嗇則多為貶義。但作者卻認為，君主為慷慨不得不揮霍錢財，大肆攫取財富，而向人民大量課金，以保有慷慨之虛名。相比之下，隨著時間的推移，人民看到那些吝嗇的君主，通過勤儉節約，而逐漸積累財富以建設國家、抗擊侵略之時，態度自然轉變。明君寧可接受吝嗇之名，也不要遭受人民的憎恨。
- 第十七章 論殘忍與慈仁，受人愛戴與受人畏懼之利弊 （Chapter XVII: Of Cruelty and Clemency, and Whether It Is Better To Be Loved or Feared）
- 作者認為，相比於慈仁，殘忍更有利於統治。原因在於過分仁德以至縱容凶殺劫掠危害整個社會秩序，最終使國家陷入危難之中。必要的強力手段雖會使人畏懼，但卻不會使人憎恨。正如文章所說：“一個被人畏懼，同時又不為人們所憎恨的君主，就是一個成功的君主。”[16]
- 此外，作者還給出了另一個理由：“人們之所以愛君主，是基於他們自己的意誌；而畏懼君主，則是基於君主的意誌。因此，一位明君辦任何事情，都應當將自己的地位及自己的意誌建立在自己能夠控製的方麵，而不能立足在他人的意誌之上。”[17]
- 第十八章 論君主守信之道 （Chapter XVIII: How Princes Should Keep his word）
- 守信是一種美好的品德，但在持性惡觀點的作者看來，人根本做不到守信不渝、忠誠不二，因為人本身具有獸性的一麵，而這必須訴諸武力才可予以製服。
- 其次，君主還需效仿狐狸學會掩飾自己的獸性，但在必要時刻要學會察言觀色、見風使舵。為了維護國家的統治，背信棄義、不講仁慈甚至違反教義、清規，這在作者看來都是合理的。但是這並非是鼓勵作惡，而隻是在迫不得已的情況下才會如此，道義上我們不應違背善道。
- 第十九章 論君主應避免受鄙視及憎恨 （Chapter XIX: That a Prince Should Seek to Escape Contempt and Hatred）
- 本章主要論述了君主如何免遭人民的鄙視和憎恨，為此他舉了大量實例來做論證。首先，作者分析了君主受人鄙視的原因，即喜怒無常、輕率淺薄、軟弱怯懦和優柔寡斷的特質。因此君主需要建立威嚴莊重、堅忍不拔的形象，讓人民甘心臣服於他，君主的職責也在於充分滿足人民需要，使之安居樂業。
- 作者認為當時法國是統治秩序最好的國家。原因在於他們設立了眾多優越的製度，議會既是其中之一。作為一個第三方的裁判機構，它的設立既可以起到約束貴族從而保護平民的作用，同時還可以確保君主免於承擔責任。作者由此得出結論：“君主務必委諸他人辦理承擔責任之事，並親自施恩布德。同時又可推出以下結論：君主既要嗬護貴族，又不能因此使人民對自己產生怨恨。”[18]
- 第二十章 論城堡以及其他許多君主習用策略之利弊 （Chapter XX: Whether Fortresses, and Certain Other Expedients to Which Princes Often Have Recourse, are Profitable or Hurtful）
- 城堡是抵禦外敵、保衛國家的有利措施。但作者卻認為，判斷城堡是否有利要具體問題具體分析：“一位君主如果害怕人民更甚於外國人，他就應當建築城堡；如果他害怕外國人更甚於人民，他就應當摧毀城堡。”[19]城堡並非萬能的，僅僅依賴城堡，而無視本國人民，是該被譴責的。
- 第二十一章 論君主獲得聲望的行事準則 （Chapter XXI: How a Prince Should Bear Himself So As to Acquire Reputation）
- 君主獲得聲望的最佳做法既是做出驚天動地的偉業，並盡情施展自己的才能，西班牙國王費爾南多二世即是一個典型例子。
- 作者認為在外交上，需要堅定地選擇支持或反對，中立是不明智的，應該選擇加入一方並支持其作戰。原因在於“如果你不公開表態，最終也會成為那個勝者的戰利品，而敗者也將譏笑你，遇此情形，你還提不出任何言辭來為自己抗辯，或者找別人來庇護你。”[20]在選擇支持哪一方問題上，作者認為，君主投靠一個實力強於自己的國家，結果必為階下囚。君主要極力避免陷入任人擺布的境地，要審慎選擇，而非草率行事。
- 君主也要做到珍惜人才，任人惟賢，激勵人們工作盡職。同時還要尊重人們的風俗習慣，適時給與人們假期以歡度節日，重視並給與各種社會團體特殊關照，但尊重之餘，君主始終要保持自己的權威和尊嚴。
- 第二十二章 論君主之大臣 （Chapter XXII: Of the Secretaries of Princes）
- 對君主來說，如何選取大臣是檢驗其統治才能高低的重要標準。作者給出了自己的判斷準則：那些過於關注自己私人利益超過他人利益的大臣絕不是好大臣，君主要對此予以警惕。
- 此外，君主也要采取措施讓大臣盡心盡責地臣服於自己。方法在於給予他們必要恩惠同時又讓其分擔職責。
- 第二十三章 論遠佞之道 （Chapter XXIII: That Flatterers Should Be Shunned）
- 謅媚小人自古都是正義社會的毒瘤，對於君主來說，小人的讒言更是必須提防的，需要臣民敢於說真話而非粉飾太平，但是敢於直言在一定程度上也是對君主威嚴的一種挑戰。為此作者自己給出解決方法，即選拔有識之士有限度的參論時政，給予他們充分的發言權，但前提是君主必須保持自己的絕對權威性，君主的意願是起主導作用的。即：隻是對於君主有意征詢的問題，才允許臣民獻言、獻策。本章結尾作者給出了精妙的論斷：“君主的賢明未必出自良好的忠言；而一切良好的忠言，不論來自何人，必然處於君主的賢明。”[21]
- 第二十四章 論意大利諸君主失國之因 （Chapter XXIV: Why the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their States）
- 作為一個具有強烈愛國熱情的公民，作者致力於為祖國的統一穩定而探索實踐。作者仔細考察那個時代意大利各個君主，如那不勒斯國王以及米蘭公爵失國原因，主要在於：沒有一支強大穩定的軍隊；君主缺乏治國之策而失去人民的擁護和貴族的效忠。而在作者看來，君主唯有依靠自身的實力才可解決統治危機。
- 第二十五章 論命運如何影響人間及如何應急 （Chapter XXV: What Fortune Can Effect in Human Affairs, and How She May Be Withstood）
- 大凡遇到不如意之事，世人終將一切歸於天命的造化而自求安慰。但作者卻是個積極的抗爭者：“命運是我們行動的半個主宰，但是它留下其餘一半或者幾乎一半歸我們支配。”我們需要依賴主動性。完全聽任命運的支配即是統治垮台之日。但是需要注意的是，我們的決策必須順應環境時代的變化，並且勇於直麵命運的挑戰。
- 第二十六章 將意大利從蠻族手中解放的勸告 （Chapter XXVI: An Exhortation to Liberate Italy from the Barbarians）
影響
這本書曾被視為改變世界的16本書之一（見美國學者道恩斯《改變世界的書》），與《聖經》、《資本論》等書並列。本書是西方許多君主、領袖學習統治術的經典。相傳本書是“英王查理一世愛不釋手；英國護國公克倫威爾珍藏著它的手稿影本；法王亨利四世被刺殺時，人們發現他貼身帶的，竟然是一部染血的《君主論》；普魯士腓特烈大帝把它作為自己決策的依據；路易十四，這位赫赫有名的法國國王，每晚必溫習此書，並說：“不讀此書不能高枕而眠”；拿破侖對《君主論》也百讀不厭，勝利的聯軍在清掃滑鐵盧戰場時，從繳獲的拿破侖的禦車中，發現了一本他寫滿批注的《君主論》；希特勒放在床邊經常從中汲取力量；墨索裏尼稱之為政治家的指南……”。[22][23]
解讀
基督徒觀點認為《君主論》的政治理論邪惡令人震驚。即使放在當時的曆史背景下來看，仍然是過分而不可接受的，“馬基雅維利主義”一詞因而產生，特地描繪“為達到目而不擇手段”，以及“表麵仁厚實則殘忍的虛偽政治”等等特質。
但是，也有人認為“為達目的而可以不擇手段”的觀點是對於馬基雅維利的誤讀，因為馬基雅維利也指出了邪惡手段的一些限製，首先，他指出隻有維持穩定和繁榮才是國家可以追求的正當目標，個人為了其利益而不擇手段則不是正當的目標，而且也不能正當化邪惡的手段。再者，馬基雅維利並沒有完全否定道德的存在，也並非鼓吹完全的自私或墮落。英國政治哲學家昆廷·斯金納在《近代政治思想的基礎》中指出過：“對於馬基雅維利就像對於其他人文主義者一樣，美德這個概念被用來指一種不可或缺的品質，這種品質能使統治者使令人的厭惡命運的打擊和箭頭轉向並從而立誌取得榮譽、榮耀和名聲。”在〈意大利君主們失國之因〉一章中，馬基維利認為一位新君主要鞏固新政權，首先需要意識到的是：“使用那些建立在你自己的行動和美德之上的方法才是“唯一正確和持久的方法。”。此外馬基雅維利明白澄清了他的定義，以及采取殘忍手段的前提（必須要快速、有效、而且短期）。
解讀為諷刺
有學者認為該書的目的是對專製君主的諷刺。盧梭在《民約論》中提到該書是為了向讀者展示共和相對專製的優點。安東尼奧·葛蘭西認為該書不是寫給統治階級看的，而是寫給老百姓看的。因為統治階級本來就會接受這種教育，不需要看這本書。
參見
法家- 《論李維》
- 《巨靈論》
- 厚黑學
- 馬基雅維利主義 (心理學)
The Prince
From Wikipedia
The Prince (Italian: Il Principe [il ?print?ipe]; Latin: De Principatibus) is a 16th-century political treatise written by the Italian diplomat, philosopher, and political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli in the form of a realistic instruction guide for new princes. The Prince shocked many readers by assuming that immoral acts are justifiable if they achieve political glory.[1]
From Machiavelli's correspondence, a version was apparently being written in 1513, using a Latin title, De Principatibus (Of Principalities).[2] However, the printed version was not published until 1532, five years after Machiavelli's death. This was carried out with the permission of the Medici pope Clement VII, but "long before then, in fact since the first appearance of The Prince in manuscript, controversy had swirled about his writings".[3]
Although The Prince was written as if it were a traditional work in the mirrors for princes style, it was generally agreed as being especially innovative. This is partly because it was written in the vernacular Italian rather than Latin, a practice that had become increasingly popular since the publication of Dante's Divine Comedy and other works of Renaissance literature.[4][5] Machiavelli illustrates his reasoning using remarkable comparisons of classical, biblical, and medieval events, including many seemingly positive references to the murderous career of Cesare Borgia, which occurred during Machiavelli's own diplomatic career.
The Prince is sometimes claimed to be one of the first works of modern philosophy, especially modern political philosophy, in which practical effect is taken to be more important than any abstract ideal. Its world view came in direct conflict with the dominant Catholic and scholastic doctrines of the time, particularly those on politics and ethics.[6][7]
This short treatise is the most remembered of Machiavelli's works, and the most responsible for the later pejorative use of the word "Machiavellian". It even contributed to the modern negative connotations of the words "politics" and "politician" in Western countries.[8] In subject matter, it overlaps with the much longer Discourses on Livy, which was written a few years later. In its use of near-contemporary Italians as examples of people who perpetrated criminal deeds for political ends, another lesser-known work by Machiavelli to which The Prince has been compared is the Life of Castruccio Castracani.
Summary
[edit]Each part of The Prince has attracted extensive commentary over centuries. Machiavelli's writings continue to provoke examination of leadership and government, posing age-old issues regarding the nature of power and the decisions that rulers must make to preserve it.[9]
Letter to Lorenzo de' Medici, Duke of Urbino
[edit]Machiavelli prefaces his work with an introductory letter to Lorenzo de' Medici, Duke of Urbino, the recipient of his work.
The subject matter: New Princedoms (Chapters 1 and 2)
[edit]The Prince starts by describing its subject. In the first sentence, Machiavelli uses the word "state" (Italian stato, which could also mean "status") to cover, in neutral terms, "all forms of organization of supreme political power, whether republican or princely". How the word "state" acquired its modern meaning during the Renaissance has been the subject of much academic debate, with this sentence and similar ones in the works of Machiavelli being considered particularly important.[10]
Machiavelli explained here that The Prince is about princedoms, indicating that he has written about republics elsewhere, which is a reference to the Discourses on Livy. Commentators note that in fact he mixes discussion of republics into this work in many places, effectively treating republics as a type of princedom with many strengths. More importantly, and less traditionally, he distinguishes new princedoms from established hereditary princedoms.[11] He deals with hereditary princedoms quickly in Chapter 2, saying that they are much easier to rule. For such a prince, "unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him".[12] Gilbert (1938:19–23), comparing this claim to traditional presentations of advice for princes, wrote that the novelty in chapters 1 and 2 is the "deliberate purpose of dealing with a new ruler who will need to establish himself in defiance of custom". Normally, these types of works were addressed only to hereditary princes. He thinks Machiavelli may have been influenced by Tacitus as well as his own experience.
This categorization of regime types is also "un-Aristotelian"[13] and apparently simpler than the traditional one found for example in Aristotle's Politics, which divides regimes into those ruled by a single monarch, an oligarchy, or by the people, in a democracy.[14] Machiavelli also ignores the classical distinctions between the good and corrupt forms, for example between monarchy and tyranny.[15]
"Mixed" princedoms (Chapters 3–5)
[edit]New princedoms are either totally new or they are "mixed", meaning that they are new parts of an older state, already belonging to that prince.[16]
New conquests added to older states (Chapter 3)
[edit]Machiavelli generalizes that there were several virtuous Roman ways to hold a newly acquired province, using a republic as an example of how new princes can act:
- to install one's princedom in the new acquisition, or to install colonies of one's people there, which is better.
- to indulge the lesser powers of the area without increasing their power.
- to put down the powerful people.
- not to allow a foreign power to gain reputation.
More generally, Machiavelli emphasizes that one should have regard not only for present problems but also for the future ones. One should not "enjoy the benefit of time", but rather the benefit of one's virtue and prudence, because time can bring evil, as well as good.
Machiavelli notes in this chapter on the "natural and ordinary desire to acquire" and as such, those who act on this desire can be "praised or blamed" depending on the success of their acquisitions. He then goes into detail about how the King of France failed in his conquest of Italy, even saying how he could have succeeded. Machiavelli views doing harm to enemies as a necessity, stating, "if an injury is to be done to a man, it should be so severe that the prince is not in fear of revenge".[17]
Conquered kingdoms (Chapter 4)
[edit]
In some cases, the old king of the conquered kingdom depended on his lords; 16th-century France, or in other words France as it was at the time of writing of The Prince, is given by Machiavelli as an example of such a kingdom. These are easy to enter, but difficult to hold.
When the kingdom revolves around the king, with everyone else his servant, then it is difficult to enter, but easy to hold. The solution is to eliminate the old bloodline of the prince. Machiavelli used the Persian empire of Darius III, conquered by Alexander the Great, to illustrate this point, and then noted that if one considers it, they will find this historical example similar to the "kingdom of the Turk" (Ottoman Empire) in their time – making this a potentially easier conquest to hold than France would be.[18]
Conquered free states, with their own laws and orders (Chapter 5)
[edit]Gilbert (1938:34) notes that this chapter is quite atypical of any previous books for princes. Gilbert supposed the need to discuss conquering free republics is linked to Machiavelli's project to unite Italy, which contained some free republics. As he also notes, the chapter in any case makes it clear that holding such a state is highly difficult for a prince. Machiavelli gives three options:
- Ruin them, as Rome destroyed Carthage, and also as Machiavelli says the Romans eventually had to do in Greece.[19]
- Go to live there and rule it personally.
- Keep the state intact, but install an oligarchy.
Machiavelli advises the ruler to go the first route, stating that if a prince does not destroy a city, he can expect "to be destroyed by it".[20]
Totally new states (Chapters 6–9)
[edit]Conquests by virtue (Chapter 6)
[edit]
Princes who rise to power through their own skill and resources (their "virtue") rather than luck tend to have a hard time rising to the top, but once they reach the top they are very secure in their position. This is because they effectively crush their opponents and earn great respect from everyone else. Because they are strong and more self-sufficient, they have to make fewer compromises with their allies.
Machiavelli writes that reforming an existing order is one of the most dangerous and difficult things a prince can do. Part of the reason is that people are naturally resistant to change and reform. Those who benefited from the old order will resist change very fiercely, and those who may stand to benefit from the new order will be less enthusiastic in their support, because the new order is unfamiliar and they are not certain it will live up to its promises. Moreover, it is impossible for the prince to satisfy everybody's expectations. Inevitably, he will disappoint some of his followers. Therefore, a prince must have the means to force his supporters to keep supporting him even when they start having second thoughts, otherwise he will lose his power. Only armed prophets, like Moses, succeed in bringing lasting change. Machiavelli claims that Moses killed uncountable numbers of his own people in order to enforce his will.
Machiavelli was not the first thinker to notice this pattern. Allan Gilbert wrote: "In wishing new laws and yet seeing danger in them Machiavelli was not himself an innovator,"[21] because this idea was traditional and could be found in Aristotle's writings. But Machiavelli went much further than any other author in his emphasis on this aim, and Gilbert associates Machiavelli's emphasis upon such drastic aims with the level of corruption to be found in Italy.
Conquest by fortune, meaning by someone else's virtue (Chapter 7)
[edit]According to Machiavelli, when a prince comes to power through luck or the blessings of powerful figures within the regime, he typically has an easy time gaining power but a hard time keeping it thereafter, because his power is dependent on his benefactors' goodwill. He does not command the loyalty of the armies and officials that maintain his authority, and these can be withdrawn from him at a whim. Having risen the easy way, it is not even certain such a prince has the skill and strength to stand on his own feet.
This is not necessarily true in every case. Machiavelli cites Cesare Borgia as an example of a lucky prince who escaped this pattern. Through cunning political maneuvers, he managed to secure his power base. Cesare was made commander of the papal armies by his father, Pope Alexander VI, but was also heavily dependent on mercenary armies loyal to the Orsini brothers and the support of the French king. Borgia won over the allegiance of the Orsini brothers' followers with better pay and prestigious government posts. To pacify the Romagna, he sent in his henchman, Remirro de Orco, to commit acts of violence. When Remirro started to become hated for his actions, Borgia responded by ordering him to be "cut in two" to show the people that the cruelty was not from him, although it was.[22] When some of his mercenary captains started to plot against him, he had them captured and executed. When it looked as though the king of France would abandon him, Borgia sought new alliances.
Finally, Machiavelli makes a point that bringing new benefits to a conquered people will not be enough to cancel the memory of old injuries, an idea Allan Gilbert said can be found in Tacitus and Seneca the Younger.[23]
Of Those Who Have Obtained a Principality Through Crimes (Chapter 8)
[edit]Conquests by "criminal virtue" are ones in which the new prince secures his power through cruel, immoral deeds, such as the elimination of political rivals.
Machiavelli offers two rulers to imitate, Agathocles of Syracuse and Oliverotto Euffreducci. After Agathocles became Praetor of Syracuse, he called a meeting of the city's elite. At his signal, his soldiers killed all the senators and the wealthiest citizens, completely destroying the old oligarchy. He declared himself ruler with no opposition. So secure was his power that he could afford to absent himself to go off on military campaigns in Africa.
Machiavelli then states that the behavior of Agathocles is not simply virtue, as he says, "Yet one cannot call it virtue to kill one's citizens, betray one's friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion; these modes can enable one to acquire empire, but not glory. [...] Nonetheless, his savage cruelty and inhumanity, together with his infinite crimes, do not permit him to be celebrated among the most excellent men. Thus, one cannot attribute to fortune or virtue what he achieved without either."
Machiavelli then goes to his next example, Oliverotto de Fermo, an Italian condottiero who recently came to power by killing all his enemies, including his uncle Giovanni Fogliani, at a banquet. After he laid siege to the governing council and terrified the citizenry, he had then set up a government with himself as absolute ruler. However, in an ironic twist, Oliverotto was killed the same way his opponents were, as Cesare Borgia had him strangled after he invited Oliverotto and Vitellozzo Vitelli to a friendly setting.
Machiavelli advises that a prince should carefully calculate all the wicked deeds he needs to do to secure his power, and then execute them all in one stroke. In this way, his subjects will slowly forget his cruel deeds and the prince can better align himself with his subjects. Princes who fail to do this, who hesitate in their ruthlessness, will have to "keep a knife by his side" and protect himself at all costs, as he can never trust himself amongst his subjects.
Gilbert (1938:51–55) remarks that this chapter is even less traditional than those it follows, not only in its treatment of criminal behavior, but also in the advice to take power from people at a stroke, noting that precisely the opposite had been advised by Aristotle in his Politics (5.11.1315a13). On the other hand, Gilbert shows that another piece of advice in this chapter, to give benefits when it will not appear forced, was traditional.
Becoming a prince by the selection of one's fellow citizens (Chapter 9)
[edit]A "civil principality" is one in which a citizen comes to power "not through crime or other intolerable violence", but by the support of his fellow citizens. This, he says, does not require extreme virtue or fortune, only "fortunate astuteness". For this is one of the four means of coming about a principality (the other three being by virtue, fortune, and criminality).
Machiavelli makes an important distinction between two groups that are present in every city, and have very different appetites driving them: the "great" and the "people". The "great" wish to oppress and rule the "people", while the "people" wish not to be ruled or oppressed. A principality is not the only outcome possible from these appetites, because it can also lead to either "liberty" or "license".
A principality is put into place either by the "great" or the "people" when they have the opportunity to take power, but find resistance from the other side. They assign a leader who can be popular to the people while the great benefit, or a strong authority defending the people against the great.
Machiavelli goes on to say that a prince who obtains power through the support of the nobles has a harder time staying in power than someone who is chosen by the common people; since the former finds himself surrounded by people who consider themselves his equals. He has to resort to malevolent measures to satisfy the nobles.
Also a prince cannot afford to keep the common people hostile as they are larger in number while the nobles smaller.
Therefore, the great should be made and unmade every day. Two types of great people might be encountered:
- Those who are bound to the prince: Concerning these it is important to distinguish between two types of obligated great people, those who are rapacious and those who are not. It is the latter who can and should be honoured.
- Those who are not bound to the new prince: Once again, these need to be divided into two types – those with a weak spirit (a prince can make use of them if they are of good counsel) and those who shun being bound because of their own ambition (these should be watched and feared as enemies).
How to win over people depends on circumstances: Machiavelli advises:
- Do not get frightened in adversity.
- One should avoid ruling via magistrates, if one wishes to be able to "ascend" to absolute rule quickly and safely.
- One should make sure that the people need the prince, especially if a time of need should come.
How to judge the strength of principalities (Chapter 10)
[edit]The way to judge the strength of a princedom is to see whether it can defend itself, or whether it needs to depend on allies. This does not just mean that the cities should be prepared and the people trained; a prince who is hated is also exposed.
Ecclesiastical principates (Chapter 11)
[edit]
This type of "principality" refers explicitly to the Catholic Church as an example, which is of course not traditionally thought of as a principality. According to Machiavelli, these are relatively easy to maintain, once founded. They do not need to defend themselves militarily, nor to govern their subjects.
Machiavelli discusses the recent history of the Church as if it were a princedom that was in competition to conquer Italy against other princes. He points to factionalism as a historical weak point in the Church, and points to the recent example of the Borgia family as a better strategy which almost worked. He then explicitly proposes that the Medici are now in a position to try the same thing.
Defense and military (Chapters 12–14)
[edit]Having discussed the various types of principalities, Machiavelli turns to the ways a state can attack other territories or defend itself. The two most essential foundations for any state, whether old or new, are sound laws and strong military forces.[24] A self-sufficient prince is one who can meet any enemy on the battlefield. He should be "armed" with his own arms. However, a prince that relies solely on fortifications or on the help of others and stands on the defensive is not self-sufficient. If he cannot raise a formidable army, but must rely on defense, he must fortify his city. A well-fortified city is unlikely to be attacked, and if it is, most armies cannot endure an extended siege. However, during a siege a virtuous prince will keep the morale of his subjects high while removing all dissenters. Thus, as long as the city is properly defended and has enough supplies, a wise prince can withstand any siege.
Machiavelli stands strongly against the use of mercenaries, and in this he was innovative, and he also had personal experience in Florence. He believes they are useless to a ruler because they are undisciplined, cowardly, and without any loyalty, being motivated only by money. Machiavelli attributes the Italian city states' weakness to their reliance on mercenary armies.
Machiavelli also warns against using auxiliary forces, troops borrowed from an ally, because if they win, the employer is under their favor and if they lose, he is ruined. Auxiliary forces are more dangerous than mercenary forces because they are united and controlled by capable leaders who may turn against the employer.
The main concern for a prince should be war, or the preparation thereof, not books. Through war a hereditary prince maintains his power or a private citizen rises to power. Machiavelli advises that a prince must frequently hunt in order to keep his body fit and learn the landscape surrounding his kingdom. Through this, he can best learn how to protect his territory and advance upon others. For intellectual strength, he is advised to study great military men so he may imitate their successes and avoid their mistakes. A prince who is diligent in times of peace will be ready in times of adversity. Machiavelli writes, "thus, when fortune turns against him he will be prepared to resist it."
The Qualities of a Prince (Chapters 14–19)
[edit]Each of the following chapters presents a discussion about a particular virtue or vice that a prince might have, and is therefore structured in a way which appears like traditional advice for a prince. However, the advice is far from traditional.
A Prince's Duty Concerning Military Matters (Chapter 14)
[edit]Machiavelli believes that a prince's main focus should be on perfecting the art of war. He believes that by taking this profession an aspiring prince will be able to acquire a state, and will be able to maintain what he has gained. He claims that "being disarmed makes you despised." He believes that the only way to ensure loyalty from one's soldiers is to understand military matters. The two activities Machiavelli recommends practicing to prepare for war are physical and mental. Physically, he believes rulers should learn the landscape of their territories. Mentally, he encouraged the study of past military events. He also warns against idleness.
Reputation of a prince (Chapter 15)
[edit]Because, says Machiavelli, he wants to write something useful to those who understand, he thought it more fitting "to go directly to the effectual truth ("verità effettuale") of the thing than to the imagination of it". This section is one where Machiavelli's pragmatic ideal can be seen most clearly. Machiavelli reasons that since princes come across men who are evil, he should learn how to be equally evil himself, and use this ability or not according to necessity. Concerning the behavior of a prince toward his subjects, Machiavelli announces that he will depart from what other writers say, and writes:
Since there are many possible qualities that a prince can be said to possess, he must not be overly concerned about having all the good ones. Also, a prince may be perceived to be merciful, faithful, humane, frank, and religious, but most important is only to seem to have these qualities. A prince cannot truly have these qualities because at times it is necessary to act against them. Although a bad reputation should be avoided, it is sometimes necessary to have one. In fact, he must sometimes deliberately choose evil:
Generosity vs. parsimony (Chapter 16)
[edit]If a prince is overly generous to his subjects, Machiavelli asserts he will not be appreciated, and will only cause greed for more. Additionally, being overly generous is not economical, because eventually all resources will be exhausted. This results in higher taxes, and will bring grief upon the prince. Then, if he decides to discontinue or limit his generosity, he will be labeled as a miser. Thus, Machiavelli summarizes that guarding against the people's hatred is more important than building up a reputation for generosity. A wise prince should be willing to be more reputed a miser than be hated for trying to be too generous.
On the other hand: "of what is not yours or your subjects' one can be a bigger giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander, because spending what is someone else's does not take reputation from you but adds it to you; only spending your own hurts you".
Cruelty vs. mercy (Chapter 17)
[edit]
Machiavelli begins this chapter by addressing how mercy can be misused which will harm the prince and his dominion. He ends by stating that a prince should not shrink from being cruel if it means that it will keep his subjects in line. After all, it will help him maintain his rule. He gives the example of Cesare Borgia, whose cruelty protected him from rebellions.[26] He contrasts this example with the leaders of Florence, who, through too much mercy, allowed the city of Pistoia to destroy itself.
In addressing the question of whether it is better to be loved or feared, Machiavelli writes, "The answer is that one would like to be both the one and the other; but because it is difficult to combine them, it is far safer to be feared than loved if you cannot be both." As Machiavelli asserts, commitments made in peace are not always kept in adversity; however, commitments made in fear are kept out of fear. Yet, a prince must ensure that he is not feared to the point of hatred, which is very possible.
This chapter is possibly the most well-known of the work, and it is important because of the reasoning behind Machiavelli's famous idea that it is better to be feared than loved.[27] His justification is purely pragmatic; as he notes, "Men worry less about doing an injury to one who makes himself loved than to one who makes himself feared." Fear is used as a means to ensure obedience from his subjects, and security for the prince. Above all, Machiavelli argues, a prince should not interfere with the property of their subjects or their women, and if they should try to kill someone, they should do it with a convenient justification.
Regarding the troops of the prince, fear is absolutely necessary to keep a large garrison united and a prince should not mind the thought of cruelty in that regard. For a prince who leads his own army, it is imperative for him to observe cruelty because that is the only way he can command his soldiers' absolute respect. Machiavelli compares two great military leaders: Hannibal and Scipio Africanus. Although Hannibal's army consisted of men of various races, they were never rebellious because they feared their leader. Machiavelli says this required "inhuman cruelty" which he refers to as a virtue. Scipio's men, on the other hand, were known for their mutiny and dissension, due to Scipio's "excessive mercy" – which was, however, a source of glory because he lived in a republic.
In what way princes should keep their word (Chapter 18)
[edit]Machiavelli notes that a prince is praised for keeping his word. However, he also notes that in reality, the most cunning princes succeed politically. A prince, therefore, should only keep his word when it suits his purposes, but do his utmost to maintain the illusion that he does keep his word and that he is reliable in that regard. Machiavelli advises the ruler to become a "great liar and deceiver", and that men are so easy to deceive, that the ruler won't have an issue with lying to others. He justifies this by saying that men are wicked, and never keep their words, therefore the ruler doesn't have to keep his.
As Machiavelli notes, "He should appear to be compassionate, faithful to his word, guileless, and devout. And indeed he should be so. But his disposition should be such that, if he needs to be the opposite, he knows how." As noted in chapter 15, the prince must appear to be virtuous in order to hide his actions, and he should be able to be otherwise when the time calls for it; that includes being able to lie, though however much he lies he should always keep the appearance of being truthful.
In this chapter, Machiavelli uses "beasts" as a metaphor for unscrupulous behavior. He states that while lawful conduct is part of the nature of men, a prince should learn how to use the nature of both men and beasts wisely to ensure the stability of his regime. In this chapter however, his focus is solely on the "beastly" natures.[28] In particular, he compares the use of force to the "lion", and the use of deception to the "fox", and advises the prince to study them both. In employing this metaphor, Machiavelli apparently references De Officiis by the Roman orator and statesman Cicero, and subverts its conclusion, arguing instead that dishonorable behavior is sometimes politically necessary.[29]
Avoiding contempt and hatred (Chapter 19)
[edit]Machiavelli divides the fears which monarchs should have into internal (domestic) and external (foreign) fears. Internal fears exist inside his kingdom and focus on his subjects, Machiavelli warns to be suspicious of everyone when hostile attitudes emerge. Machiavelli observes that the majority of men are content as long as they are not deprived of their property and women, and only a minority of men are ambitious enough to be a concern. A prince should command respect through his conduct, because a prince who raises no contempt of the nobles and maintains the satisfaction of the people, Machiavelli assures, should have no fear of conspirators working with external powers. Conspiracy is very difficult and risky in such a situation.
Machiavelli apparently seems to go back on his rule that a prince can evade hate, as he says that he will eventually be hated by someone, so he should seek to avoid being hated by the commonfolk.
Roman emperors, on the other hand, had not only the majority and ambitious minority, but also a cruel and greedy military, who created extra problems as they demanded iniquity. While a prince should avoid being hated, he will eventually be hated by someone, so he must at least avoid the hatred of the most powerful, and for the Roman emperors this included the military who demanded iniquity against the people out of their own greed. He uses Septimius Severus as a model for new rulers to emulate, as he "embodied both the fox and the lion". Severus outwitted and killed his military rivals, and although he oppressed the people, Machiavelli says that he kept the common people "satisfied and stupified".
Machiavelli notes that in his time only the Turkish empire had the problem of the Romans, because in other lands the people had become more powerful than the military.
The Prudence of the Prince (Chapters 20–25)
[edit]Whether ruling conquests with fortresses works (Chapter 20)
[edit]Machiavelli mentions that placing fortresses in conquered territories, although it sometimes works, often fails. Using fortresses can be a good plan, but Machiavelli says he shall "blame anyone who, trusting in fortresses, thinks little of being hated by the people". He cited Caterina Sforza, who used a fortress to defend herself but was eventually betrayed by her people.
Gaining honours (Chapter 21)
[edit]A prince truly earns honour by completing great feats. King Ferdinand of Spain is cited by Machiavelli as an example of a monarch who gained esteem by showing his ability through great feats and who, in the name of religion, conquered many territories and kept his subjects occupied so that they had no chance to rebel. Regarding two warring states, Machiavelli asserts it is always wiser to choose a side, rather than to be neutral. Machiavelli then provides the following reasons why:
- If your allies win, you benefit whether or not you have more power than they have.
- If you are more powerful, then your allies are under your command; if your allies are stronger, they will always feel a certain obligation to you for your help.
- If your side loses, you still have an ally in the loser.
Machiavelli also notes that it is wise for a prince not to ally with a stronger force unless compelled to do so. In conclusion, the most important virtue is having the wisdom to discern what ventures will come with the most reward and then pursuing them courageously.
Nobles and staff (Chapter 22)
[edit]The selection of good servants is reflected directly upon the prince's intelligence, so if they are loyal, the prince is considered wise; however, when they are otherwise, the prince is open to adverse criticism. Machiavelli asserts that there are three types of intelligence:
- The kind that understands things for itself – which is excellent to have.
- The kind that understands what others can understand – which is good to have.
- The kind that does not understand for itself, nor through others – which is useless to have.
If the prince does not have the first type of intelligence, he should at the very least have the second type. For, as Machiavelli states, "A prince needs to have the discernment to recognize the good or bad in what another says or does even though he has no acumen himself".
Avoiding flatterers (Chapter 23)
[edit]This chapter displays a low opinion of flatterers; Machiavelli notes that "Men are so happily absorbed in their own affairs and indulge in such self-deception that it is difficult for them not to fall victim to this plague; and some efforts to protect oneself from flatterers involve the risk of becoming despised." Flatterers were seen as a great danger to a prince, because their flattery could cause him to avoid wise counsel in favor of rash action, but avoiding all advice, flattery or otherwise, was equally bad; a middle road had to be taken. A prudent prince should have a select group of wise counselors to advise him truthfully on matters all the time. All their opinions should be taken into account. Ultimately, the decision should be made by the prince and carried out absolutely. If a prince is given to changing his mind, his reputation will suffer. A prince must have the wisdom to recognize good advice from bad. Machiavelli gives a negative example in Emperor Maximilian I; Maximilian, who was secretive, never consulted others, but once he ordered his plans and met dissent, he immediately changed them.
Prudence and chance
[edit]Why the princes of Italy lost their states (Chapter 24)
[edit]After first mentioning that a new prince can quickly become as respected as a hereditary one, Machiavelli says princes in Italy who had longstanding power and lost it cannot blame bad luck, but should blame their own indolence. One "should never fall in the belief that you can find someone to pick you up". They all showed a defect of arms (already discussed) and either had a hostile populace or did not know to secure themselves against the great.
How Much Fortune Can Do in Human Affairs, and in What Mode It May Be Opposed (Chapter 25)
[edit]As pointed out by Gilbert (1938:206) it was traditional in the genre of Mirrors of Princes to mention fortune, but "Fortune pervades The Prince as she does no other similar work". Machiavelli argues that fortune is only the judge of half of our actions and that we have control over the other half with "sweat", prudence and virtue. Even more unusual, rather than simply suggesting caution as a prudent way to try to avoid the worst of bad luck, Machiavelli holds that the greatest princes in history tend to be ones who take more risks, and rise to power through their own labour, virtue, prudence, and particularly by their ability to adapt to changing circumstances.
Machiavelli even encourages risk taking as a reaction to risk. In a well-known metaphor, Machiavelli writes that "it is better to be impetuous than cautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is necessary, if one wants to hold her down, to beat her and strike her down."[30] Gilbert (p. 217) points out that Machiavelli's friend the historian and diplomat Francesco Guicciardini expressed similar ideas about fortune.
Machiavelli compares fortune to a torrential river that cannot be easily controlled during flooding season. In periods of calm, however, people can erect dams and levees in order to minimize its impact. Fortune, Machiavelli argues, seems to strike at the places where no resistance is offered, as had recently been the case in Italy. As de Alvarez (1999:125–30) points out that what Machiavelli actually says is that Italians in his time leave things not just to fortune, but to "fortune and God". Machiavelli is indicating in this passage, as in some others in his works, that Christianity itself was making Italians helpless and lazy concerning their own politics, as if they would leave dangerous rivers uncontrolled.[31]
Exhortation to Seize Italy and to Free Her from the Barbarians (Chapter 26)
[edit]Pope Leo X was pope at the time the book was written and a member of the Medici family. This chapter directly appeals to the Medici to use what has been summarized in order to conquer Italy using Italian armies, following the advice in the book. Gilbert (1938:222–30) showed that including such exhortation was not unusual in the genre of books full of advice for princes. But it is unusual that the Medici family's position of Papal power is openly named as something that should be used as a personal power base, as a tool of secular politics. Indeed, one example is the Borgia family's "recent" and controversial attempts to use church power in secular politics, often brutally executed. This continues a controversial theme throughout the book.
Analysis
[edit]
As shown by his letter of dedication, Machiavelli's work eventually came to be dedicated to Lorenzo di Piero de' Medici, grandson of Lorenzo the Magnificent, and a member of the ruling Florentine Medici family, whose uncle Giovanni became Pope Leo X in 1513. It is known from his personal correspondence that it was written during 1513, the year after the Medici regained control of Florence, and a few months after Machiavelli's arrest, torture, and banishment by the in-coming Medici regime. It was discussed for a long time with Francesco Vettori – a friend of Machiavelli – whom he wanted to pass it and commend it to the Medici. The book had originally been intended for Giuliano di Lorenzo de' Medici, young Lorenzo's uncle, who however died in 1516.[32] It is not certain that the work was ever read by any of the Medici before it was printed.[33] Machiavelli describes the contents as being an un-embellished summary of his knowledge about the nature of princes and "the actions of great men", based not only on reading but also, unusually, on real experience.[34]
The types of political behavior that are discussed with apparent approval by Machiavelli in The Prince were regarded as shocking by contemporaries, and its immorality is still a subject of serious discussion.[35] Although the work advises princes how to tyrannize, Machiavelli is generally thought to have preferred some form of republican government.[36] Some commentators justify his acceptance of immoral and criminal actions by leaders by arguing that he lived during a time of continuous political conflict and instability in Italy, and that his influence has increased the "pleasures, equality and freedom" of many people, loosening the grip of medieval Catholicism's "classical teleology", which "disregarded not only the needs of individuals and the wants of the common man, but stifled innovation, enterprise, and enquiry into cause and effect relationships that now allow us to control nature".[37]
On the other hand, Strauss (1958:11) notes that "even if we were forced to grant that Machiavelli was essentially a patriot or a scientist, we would not be forced to deny that he was a teacher of evil".[38] Furthermore, Machiavelli "was too thoughtful not to know what he was doing and too generous not to admit it to his reasonable friends".[39]
Machiavelli emphasized the need for looking at the "effectual truth" (verita effetuale), as opposed to relying on "imagined republics and principalities". He states the difference between honorable behavior and criminal behavior by using the metaphor of animals, saying that "there are two ways of contending, one in accordance with the laws, the other by force; the first of which is proper to men, the second to beast".[40] In The Prince he does not explain what he thinks the best ethical or political goals are, except the control of one's own fortune, as opposed to waiting to see what chance brings. Machiavelli took it for granted that would-be leaders naturally aim at glory or honour. He associated these goals with a need for "virtue" and "prudence" in a leader, and saw such virtues as essential to good politics. That great men should develop and use their virtue and prudence was a traditional theme of advice to Christian princes.[41] And that more virtue meant less reliance on chance was a classically influenced "humanist commonplace" in Machiavelli's time, as Fischer (2000:75) says, even if it was somewhat controversial. However, Machiavelli went far beyond other authors in his time, who in his opinion left things to fortune, and therefore to bad rulers, because of their Christian beliefs. He used the words "virtue" and "prudence" to refer to glory-seeking and spirited excellence of character, in strong contrast to the traditional Christian uses of those terms, but more keeping with the original pre-Christian Greek and Roman concepts from which they derived.[42] He encouraged ambition and risk taking. So in another break with tradition, he treated not only stability, but also radical innovation, as possible aims of a prince in a political community. Managing major reforms can show off a Prince's virtue and give him glory. He clearly felt Italy needed major reform in his time, and this opinion of his time is widely shared.[43]
Machiavelli's descriptions encourage leaders to attempt to control their fortune gloriously, to the extreme extent that some situations may call for a fresh "founding" (or re-founding) of the "modes and orders" that define a community, despite the danger and necessary evil and lawlessness of such a project. Founding a wholly new state, or even a new religion, using injustice and immorality has even been called the chief theme of The Prince.[44] Machiavelli justifies this position by explaining how if "a prince did not win love he may escape hate" by personifying injustice and immorality; therefore, he will never loosen his grip since "fear is held by the apprehension of punishment" and never diminishes as time goes by.[45] For a political theorist to do this in public was one of Machiavelli's clearest breaks not just with medieval scholasticism, but with the classical tradition of political philosophy, especially the favorite philosopher of Catholicism at the time, Aristotle. This is one of Machiavelli's most lasting influences upon modernity.
Nevertheless, Machiavelli was heavily influenced by classical pre-Christian political philosophy. According to Strauss (1958:291) Machiavelli refers to Xenophon more than Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero put together. Xenophon wrote one of the classic mirrors of princes, the Education of Cyrus. Gilbert (1938:236) wrote: "The Cyrus of Xenophon was a hero to many a literary man of the sixteenth century, but for Machiavelli he lived". Xenophon also, as Strauss pointed out, wrote a dialogue, Hiero which showed a wise man dealing sympathetically with a tyrant, coming close to what Machiavelli would do in uprooting the ideal of "the imagined prince". Xenophon however, like Plato and Aristotle, was a follower of Socrates, and his works show approval of a "teleological argument", while Machiavelli rejected such arguments. On this matter, Strauss (1958:222–23) gives evidence that Machiavelli may have seen himself as having learned something from Democritus, Epicurus and classical materialism, which was however not associated with political realism, or even any interest in politics.
On the topic of rhetoric, Machiavelli, in his introduction, stated that "I have not embellished or crammed this book with rounded periods or big, impressive words, or with any blandishment or superfluous decoration of the kind which many are in the habit of using to describe or adorn what they have produced". This has been interpreted as showing a distancing from traditional rhetoric styles, but there are echoes of classical rhetoric in several areas. In Chapter 18, for example, he uses a metaphor of a lion and a fox, examples of force and cunning; according to Zerba (2004:217), "the Roman author from whom Machiavelli in all likelihood drew the simile of the lion and the fox" was Cicero. The Rhetorica ad Herennium, a work which was believed during Machiavelli's time to have been written by Cicero, was used widely to teach rhetoric, and it is likely that Machiavelli was familiar with it. Unlike Cicero's more widely accepted works however, according to Cox (1997:1122), "Ad Herennium ... offers a model of an ethical system that not only condones the practice of force and deception but appears to regard them as habitual and indeed germane to political activity". This makes it an ideal text for Machiavelli to have used.
The Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci argued that Machiavelli's audience for this work was not the classes who already rule (or have "hegemony") over the common people, but the common people themselves, trying to establish a new hegemony, and making Machiavelli the first "Italian Jacobin".[46]
Influence
[edit]To quote Bireley (1990:14):
Machiavelli's ideas on how to accrue honour and power as a leader had a profound impact on political leaders throughout the modern West, helped by the new technology of the printing press. Pole reported that it was spoken of highly by his enemy Thomas Cromwell in England, and had influenced Henry VIII in his turn towards Protestantism, and in his tactics, for example during the Pilgrimage of Grace.[47] A copy was also possessed by the Catholic king and emperor Charles V.[48] In France, after an initially mixed reaction, Machiavelli came to be associated with Catherine de Medici and the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre. As Bireley (1990:17) reports, in the 16th century, Catholic writers "associated Machiavelli with the Protestants, whereas Protestant authors saw him as Italian and Catholic". In fact, he was apparently influencing both Catholic and Protestant kings.[49]
One of the most important early works dedicated to criticism of Machiavelli, especially The Prince, was that of the Huguenot, Innocent Gentillet, Discourse against Machiavelli, commonly also referred to as Anti Machiavel, published in Geneva in 1576.[50] He accused Machiavelli of being an atheist and accused politicians of his time by saying that they treated his works as the "Koran of the courtiers".[51] Another theme of Gentillet was more in the spirit of Machiavelli himself: he questioned the effectiveness of immoral strategies (just as Machiavelli had himself done, despite also explaining how they could sometimes work). This became the theme of much future political discourse in Europe during the 17th century. This includes the Catholic Counter Reformation writers summarised by Bireley: Giovanni Botero, Justus Lipsius, Carlo Scribani, Adam Contzen, Pedro de Ribadeneira, and Diego de Saavedra Fajardo.[52] These authors criticized Machiavelli, but also followed him in many ways. They accepted the need for a prince to be concerned with reputation, and even a need for cunning and deceit, but compared to Machiavelli, and like later modernist writers, they emphasized economic progress much more than the riskier ventures of war. These authors tended to cite Tacitus as their source for realist political advice, rather than Machiavelli, and this pretense came to be known as "Tacitism".[53]
Modern materialist philosophy developed in the 16th, 17th and 18th century, starting in the generations after Machiavelli. The importance of Machiavelli's realism was noted by many important figures in this endeavor, for example Jean Bodin,[54] Francis Bacon,[55] Harrington, John Milton,[56] Spinoza,[57] Rousseau, Hume,[58] Edward Gibbon, and Adam Smith. Although he was not always mentioned by name as an inspiration, due to his controversy, he is also thought to have been an influence for other major philosophers, such as Montaigne,[59] Descartes,[60] Hobbes, Locke[61] and Montesquieu.[62]
In literature:
- Machiavelli is featured as a character in the prologue of Christopher Marlowe's The Jew of Malta.
- In William Shakespeare's tragedy Othello, the antagonist Iago has been noted by some literary critics as being archetypal in adhering to Machiavelli's ideals by advancing himself through machination and duplicity with the consequence of causing the demise of both Othello and Desdemona.[63]
Amongst later political leaders:
- The republicanism in seventeenth-century England which led to the English Civil War, the Glorious Revolution and subsequent development of the English Constitution was strongly influenced by Machiavelli's political thought.[64]
- Most of the Founding Fathers of the American Revolution are known or often proposed to have been strongly influenced by Machiavelli's political works, including Benjamin Franklin, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton and John Adams.[65][66]
- Under the guidance of Voltaire, Frederick the Great of Prussia criticised Machiavelli's conclusions in his "Anti-Machiavel", published in 1740.
- At different stages in his life, Napoleon I of France wrote extensive comments to The Prince. After his defeat at Waterloo, these comments were found in the emperor's coach and taken by the Prussian military.[67]
- Italian dictator Benito Mussolini wrote a discourse on The Prince.[68]
- Soviet leader Joseph Stalin read The Prince and annotated his own copy.[69]
20th-century Italian-American mobsters were influenced by The Prince. John Gotti and Roy DeMeo would regularly quote The Prince and consider it to be the "Mafia Bible".[70][71]
Rapper Tupac Shakur read The Prince while in prison recovering from an attempt on his life. After he was released he used a pseudonym "Makaveli", referencing Machiavelli.[72] Death Row Records released The Don Killuminati: The 7 Day Theory the posthumous album under the name of Makaveli.
Interpretations
[edit]Timeline of composition
[edit]There has been much debate of when Machiavelli actually composed The Prince (and his other works).[73] Commentators have viewed this question to be of great importance, as some interpreters believe that Machiavelli changed his views between the composition of The Prince, and the composition of The Discourses. Hans Baron is one of such commentators who argued that Machiavelli must have changed his mind dramatically in favor of free republics, after having written The Prince.[74] Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov, in the introduction to their translation of The Discourses on Livy, state that there are no discrepancies between The Prince and his later works, and that it "seems the safest" to see them "as a pair of works, not much different, if at all, in time of composition."[75] Scholar William Connell views that the composition and development of The Prince was a lengthy process with his ideas being revised from 1513 to 1515.[73]
Other interpretations
[edit]Satire
This interpretation was famously put forth by scholar Garrett Mattingly (1958), who stated that "In some ways, Machiavelli's little treatise was just like all the other 'Mirrors of Princes', in other ways it was a diabolical burlesque of all of them, like a political Black Mass."[76]
This position was taken up previously by some of the more prominent Enlightenment philosophes. Diderot speculated that it was a work designed not to mock, but to secretly expose corrupt princely rule. And in his The Social Contract, the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau said:
Whether or not the word "satire" is the best choice, the interpretation is very rare amongst those who study Machiavelli's works. For example Isaiah Berlin states that he cannot find anything other than Machiavelli's work that "reads less" like a satirical piece.[77] Maurizio Viroli writes: "In my opinion, none of these defenses of Machiavelli is valid. The view that The Prince is the "book of Republicans" comes from Rousseau's desire to rescue its author's bad reputation and make The Prince consistent with the Discourses on Livy, the text in which Machiavelli developed a comprehensive republican theory of liberty and government" and added that the claim "misrepresents the meaning of the text."[78]
Deceit
Mary Dietz, in her essay "Trapping The Prince", writes that Machiavelli's agenda was not to be satirical, as Rousseau had argued, but instead was "offering carefully crafted advice (such as arming the people) designed to undo the ruler if taken seriously and followed."[79] By this account, the aim was to reestablish the republic in Florence. She focuses on three categories in which Machiavelli gives paradoxical advice:
- He discourages liberality and favors deceit to guarantee support from the people. Yet Machiavelli is keenly aware of the fact that an earlier pro-republican coup had been thwarted by the people's inaction that itself stemmed from the prince's liberality.
- He supports arming the people despite the fact that he knows the Florentines are decidedly pro-democratic and would oppose the prince.
- He encourages the prince to live in the city he conquers. This opposes the Medici's habitual policy of living outside the city. It also makes it easier for rebels or a civilian militia to attack and overthrow the prince.
According to Dietz, the trap never succeeded because Lorenzo – "a suspicious prince" – apparently never read the work of the "former republican."[80]
Translations
[edit]- Machiavelli, Niccolò (1908), "The Prince", Translated by W.K. Marriot (1847–1927).
- Machiavelli, Niccolò (1958), "The Prince", Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others, vol. 1. Translated by Allan Gilbert.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò (1961), The Prince, London: Penguin, ISBN 978-0-14-044915-0 . Translated by George Bull.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò (1985), The Prince, University of Chicago Press. Translated by Harvey Mansfield.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò (1992), The Prince, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, ISBN 0-393-96220-2. Translated by Robert M. Adams (A Norton Critical Edition, 2nd ed., with "Backgrounds, Interpretations, Marginalia").
- Machiavelli, Niccolò (1995), The Prince, Everyman. Translated and Edited by Stephen J. Milner. Introduction, Notes and other critical apparatus by J.M. Dent.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò (2006), El Principe/The Prince: Comentado Por Napoleon Bonaparte / Commentaries by Napoleon Buonaparte, Mestas Ediciones. Translated into Spanish by Marina Massa-Carrara.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò (2009), The Prince, Penguin Classics. Translated by Tim Parks.
- Machiavelli, Niccolò (2015), The Prince with Related Documents, Bedford St. Martins. 2d rev. ed. Translated and edited by William J. Connell.
Other works by Machiavelli
[edit]See also
[edit]- Mirrors for princes, the genre
- Secretum Secretorum, a medieval treatise also known as "Book of the science of government: on the good ordering of statecraft"
- Leviathan, a book on political realism by Thomas Hobbes
