Adam Casey 武裝 軍援助破壞外國獨裁政權

武裝起來：軍事援助如何穩定和破壞外國獨裁政權

https://www.amazon.com/Up-Arms-Stabilizes_and-Destabilizes_Foreign-Autocrats/dp/1541604016

作者：Adam E Casey (Author)，2024 年 4 月 2 日

這是一本“非凡的……必讀”書籍（史蒂文·列維茨基，紐約時報暢銷書《民主如何消亡》的合著者），探討了冷戰期間外國超級大國的支持如何支撐和推翻獨裁政權，為當今的大國競爭提供了教訓

在整個冷戰期間，美國和蘇聯競相支持國外的友好獨裁政權。今天，人們普遍認為，這種軍事援助使盟國獨裁者得以生存，從台灣的蔣介石到埃塞俄比亞的門格斯圖·海爾·馬裏亞姆。

在《武裝起來》一書中，政治學家亞當·E·凱西駁斥了普遍接受的觀點：在冷戰期間，對獨裁政權的援助往往會適得其反。凱西利用大量原創研究來表明，盡管向友好政權投入了數十億美元，但美國支持的獨裁者的執政時間並不比沒有外部援助的獨裁者長。

事實上，美國的援助往往無意中破壞了獨裁政權的穩定。美國鼓勵外國政權建立像美國一樣強大、獨立的軍隊，但這些軍隊往往會自己發動政變。相比之下，蘇聯提倡軍隊服從執政政權，消除了軍事接管的威脅。凱西總結說，最終，是屈從的軍隊——而不是外部援助——幫助獨裁者維持權力。

在大國競爭再度升溫的時代，《武裝起來》對海外幹預的不可預見的後果提供了寶貴的見解，揭示了軍事援助如何既能幫助獨裁者倒台，也能幫助他們崛起。

Up in Arms: How Military Aid Stabilizes―and Destabilizes―Foreign Autocrats

https://www.amazon.com/Up-Arms-Stabilizes_and-Destabilizes_Foreign-Autocrats/dp/1541604016 
by Adam E Casey (Author) April 2, 2024

An “extraordinary…must-read” (Steven Levitsky, New York Times–bestselling coauthor of How Democracies Die) look at how support from foreign superpowers propped up—and pulled down—authoritarian regimes during the Cold War, offering lessons for today’s great power competition

Throughout the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union competed to prop up friendly dictatorships abroad. Today, it is commonly assumed that this military aid enabled the survival of allied autocrats, from Taiwan’s Chiang Kai-shek to Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile Mariam. 
 
In Up in Arms, political scientist Adam E. Casey rebuts the received wisdom: aid to autocracies often backfired during the Cold War. Casey draws on extensive original research to show that, despite billions poured into friendly regimes, US-backed dictators lasted in power no longer than those without outside help. In fact, American aid often unintentionally destabilized autocratic regimes. The United States encouraged foreign regimes to establish strong, independent armies like its own, but those armies often went on to lead coups themselves. By contrast, the Soviets promoted the subordination of the army to the ruling regime, neutralizing the threat of military takeover. Ultimately, Casey concludes, it is subservient militaries—not outside aid—that help autocrats maintain power. 
 
In an era of renewed great power competition, Up in Arms offers invaluable insights into the unforeseen consequences of overseas meddling, revealing how military aid can help pull down dictators as often as it props them up.