澳洲狡辯 單極之後 亞洲秩序走向何方，我們該怎麽做

單極之後：亞洲區域秩序將走向何方，我們應該怎麽做？

After Unipolarity: Where is the Asian regional order heading, and what should we be doing about it?  7 August 2024. 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuWtYtuYRIU

從本質上講，澳大利亞對 AUKUS 的承諾是投票幫助維護亞洲以美國為首的單極戰略秩序。但替代方案是什麽？如果無法保留舊秩序，會出現什麽樣的新區域秩序來取代舊秩序？我們將如何應對這些新秩序？

休·懷特教授的演講探討了這些問題，著眼於烏克蘭戰爭和中俄結盟所塑造的全球背景。它問，如果全球基於規則的秩序失敗，取而代之的是什麽——獨裁霸權還是政治多元化的多極化？這對亞洲，尤其是對澳大利亞和新西蘭意味著什麽？

懷特教授演講之後，新西蘭-中國理事會主席、惠靈頓維多利亞大學戰略研究中心高級研究員約翰·麥金農 (John McKinnon) 進行了專家討論。
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mcdou 大家好，我是新西蘭國際事務研究所的執行主任，我敢打賭，在惠靈頓一個溫和的冬天的晚上，我會非常熱烈地歡迎你們，特別是如果我可以歡迎國會議員，包括過去和現在的反對黨領袖和前部長和前總理，尊敬的海倫·克拉克，閣下，使團團長，以及外交使團的其他成員，新西蘭國際事務研究所的成員和所有其他來賓，我向你們問好，我隻是想祝賀你們有遠見，提前預定了你們在這裏的位置，因為我們已經預定了你們在這次活動中的位置，因為我們周一必須把門票賣光的牌子掛在這裏和奧克蘭，我們還有休·懷特的演講，我想這反映了人們對少數白人聲譽的興趣或認可。塔斯曼，當然，我們正處於一場相當直率和高調的公開討論之中，討論這個國家未來的對外防務和安全政策，這場辯論主要（但絕不僅限於）集中在新西蘭與美國、英國和澳大利亞的 Orcus 安全夥伴關係問題上，特別是參與所謂的 Orcus 支柱 2 下的先進軍事戰略共享問題，任何人隻要關注一下媒體報道，過去幾天休的采訪，顯然已經看到並清楚休斯對 Orus 的看法，他經常被問到這個問題，但我想今晚我們最好關注一個稍微更廣泛的問題，所以我們在研究亞洲的區域秩序及其演變，以及澳大利亞和新西蘭作為獨立國家可以（也許應該）如何應對這種演變非政府組織我們的研究所當然不會就這些問題發表意見，但是我們可以在鼓勵公眾理解和討論這些問題方麵發揮重要作用，特別是允許專家提供背景細節和灰色地帶，也許公眾辯論可能容易出現黑白二元性，嗯，這次活動當然是我們在研究所進行的長期對話的一部分，我們每年舉辦 80 多個活動，嗯，我會像以前多次請求的那樣，如果您對這些活動感興趣，請注冊成為研究所的成員，並繼續參與這些討論，這對新西蘭的未來非常重要，考慮到這一點，我真的很高興歡迎休·懷特教授今晚在這裏發言，多年來，他一直是澳大利亞戰略和防禦政策方麵的領軍實踐者、學者和思想家，在亞太安全問題和全球戰略方麵事務呃，他是澳大利亞國立大學戰略研究的梅裏圖斯教授，曾任澳大利亞高級國防和情報官員和部長顧問，是澳大利亞戰略政策研究所的第一任主任，他還是一位多產的書籍和文章作家，其中最新的一篇是呃如何保衛澳大利亞呃，休當然對這些海岸並不陌生，他曾多次在研究所發表演講，我在新西蘭國際評論中讀到，我們認為第一次是在 2002 年，在傑拉爾德麥基的領導下，他今晚在這裏，當時他發表了關於需要加強對澳大利亞和新西蘭國防政策的相互理解呃的演講呃，他還作為戰略研究中心的基恩伯格客座主席發表了一係列著名的演講呃，所以我們很快就會請休就這個問題講大約 20 分鍾左右之後，我很高興地宣布，今晚我們有約翰·麥金農（John McKinnon）擔任討論嘉賓，約翰是新西蘭最傑出的外交官和公務員之一，曾在北京外交部任職三次，其中兩次擔任大使，此外還曾在華盛頓和紐約任職，還曾分別擔任對外援助局局長、外交部副部長、國防部首席執行官和亞洲新西蘭基金會執行主任，他目前是新西蘭中國理事會主席，也是惠靈頓維多利亞大學哈卡戰略研究中心的高級研究員，因此，我們也非常期待休在這個話題上分享他的專業知識和經驗，我們將請他講大約 10 分鍾，然後我們將進入問答環節，請大家提出一些非常好的問題嗯，所以不用多說，我想邀請教授，謝謝，非常感謝，謝謝你的介紹和聽眾，讓我有機會回到新西蘭，再次分享一些觀點。我還要感謝海倫·克拉克和唐·布拉什，他們邀請我來這裏，他們為我組織了一個很棒的節目，讓我可以和人們交談，傾聽人們關於這一係列問題的意見。我可能會說，能和約翰·麥金農分享這個平台是一種特別的榮幸，除了他的其他資曆之外，他還是一位非常老的朋友和同事，我們在政府中以不同的方式一起做了很多工作，能和他分享這個平台是一種榮幸，其實這不是我們第一次分享這個平台，我也想說，我的意思是，感謝觀眾的到來是一種傳統，但在這種情況下，有這麽多的老朋友和同事這是我在新西蘭以不同身份長期和非常愉快的經曆，很高興看到你們都在這裏，我非常感謝你們的到來，今晚我將冒昧地使用代詞我們的和我們，來同時指澳大利亞和新西蘭，這並不是因為我認為我們兩個國家對外交和國防政策的態度是相同的，不需要區分，相反，40 年的漫長經驗，你們中的許多人會記得我提到的周年紀念日，教會我，事實恰恰相反，盡管我們在國家生活的許多方麵都非常接近，但我們在某些方麵非常不同，包括我們處理外交和國防政策的方式，他們也教會了我，我的一些老師也在房間裏，澳大利亞人認識到這一點是多麽重要，我要說的是，我們澳大利亞人並不總是這樣做，但我將要描述的情況和他們施加的壓力我們的外交和國防政策意味著，我認為，盡管差異始終存在，但隨著我們麵對一個世界和一個地區，我們將更加孤獨，共同努力對我們來說將變得更加重要，過去就像老布爾什維克曾經說過的那樣，澳大利亞和新西蘭都麵臨著關於 orcus 的選擇，這並非巧合，因為全球和我們更本地的區域秩序都陷入了深刻危機，您可能會說中東、歐洲和亞洲的區域秩序同時出現了危機，這些危機共同構成了全球秩序的重大曆史性危機，而我們關於 orus 的決定與此相吻合並非巧合的原因是，orcus 不僅僅是一項在澳大利亞購買新潛艇的計劃，也不是一項參與第二支柱下高科技研究國防研究和開發計劃的計劃，它是一種聲明，它是一種強烈一致和支持特定方法的聲明，用於管理和解決該全球和區域問題國際秩序危機是支持區域和全球秩序願景的聲明，這些願景是管理國際秩序的方法的基礎，任何關於國際秩序的討論都必須高度重視，首先要關注這一願景和方法的優點，以及這一願景是什麽，簡而言之，我們麵臨的全球和區域法律危機唯一可接受的結果是重新確立冷戰後美國主導的單極秩序，過去 30 年來，我們都享受了如此多的秩序，我想首先就國際秩序問題提出一些一般性觀點，因為國際秩序問題實際上對我們社區來說有點陌生，當然不是對學者來說，而是對我們其他人來說，因為我們所處的國際體係長期以來一直非常穩定和良性，後冷戰秩序已經持續了 35 年，後冷戰秩序的基礎是二戰後秩序，後冷戰秩序是一種延續和擴展，已經持續了 80 年，我們對自己在世界上的地位所采取的整個態度都是由這些非常持久的秩序所決定的，我們認為這種秩序是自然而正確的，我們傾向於認為它也會是永久的，現在這是一件很正常的事情，卡爾是我目前正在閱讀的一個人，我記得他在 1939 年 7 月寫了一本名為《20 年危機》的書，講述了 20 年的國際秩序危機，這場危機導致了第二次世界大戰，就在那個可憐的家夥把這本書放到書店幾周後，這本書實際上持續了很長時間，嗯，幸存了下來，但他指出，嗯，人們將一個如果他們從中受益，我們自然會認為我們所了解和熱愛的秩序不僅僅是一個好的秩序，而且是一個大寫的“R”的正確秩序，因此，我們傾向於非常保守或非常積極地應對對它的挑戰，因此，我們給予那些挑戰現有秩序的人道德上的認可，我們指責邪惡的領導人，特別是德皇和希特勒，因為德國在上個世紀連續挑戰歐洲秩序，而日本在20世紀中葉挑戰國際秩序，但卡提出的一個觀點是，更深層次的力量總是在發揮作用，這絕不僅僅是總統府裏有壞人，還有更多的事情需要解決，德國在歐洲的地位，日本和亞洲的地位，任何人想象舊製度會在第一世界長期運行良好都是愚蠢的戰爭可以繼續處理正在發生的事情，盡管那裏存在需要解決的緊張局勢，國際秩序需要適應 ajp Taylor，他是我目前正在閱讀的另一個人，希望能夠滋養和改善我的悲觀情緒，呃呃寫了一部名為《第二次世界大戰爆發的曆史》，我強烈推薦給你，他在書中寫道，他講述的故事是一個沒有英雄甚至沒有惡棍的故事，順便說一句，他因為寫這個而被英國學院開除，所以要小心，但這是一個值得思考的問題，因為他的觀點恰恰是，每個人都應該為 1930 年代的國際體係沒有以某種方式適應以防止第二次世界大戰而受到指責，所以我認為這些見解對我們今天很重要，我們傾向於認為，我談到的全球、國際和區域秩序麵臨的挑戰是由習近平和弗拉基米爾·普京以及那些統治伊朗的人造成的，但更深層次的因素在起作用你，特別是亞洲，正如曆史上經常發生的那樣，主要的深層因素是巨大的，在我們的情況下，財富和權力的分配發生了巨大的變化，事實上，財富和權力的分配發生了幾乎前所未有的變化，沒有什麽能推動國際秩序的變化，沒有什麽能推動對現有秩序的壓力，而改變的壓力和財富和權力分配的變化，隨著權力的轉移，關係也會發生變化，這在人類事務的每個層麵都是如此，所以捍衛現狀並不是唯一或必然正確的政策，有時它是，但不一定是唯一或正確的政策，我們真正需要做的是問自己，什麽樣的結果對我們最有利，什麽樣的秩序最符合我們的利益，在我們麵臨的新情況下，這種新情況正在對舊秩序施加壓力，現在讓我重點談談這對亞洲意味著什麽，亞洲的後冷戰秩序，維護這一秩序意味著維護我們的首要地位，特別是在東亞和西太平洋，這是一個事實上，從某些方麵來看，中國在亞洲的主導地位可以追溯到 100 年前，如果我可以選擇，我更希望得到這樣的結果，我實際上是汽車時代保守派中的一員，我希望看到舊秩序得以保留，但我認為在麵臨壓力的情況下，特別是在亞洲，隨著權力的新分配，這是不可能的，我之所以這麽說，是因為在我看來，目前亞洲危機的驅動因素是，隨著中國實力的增長，中國的目標是重新奪回其作為東亞太平洋地區大國的地位，它的目標是將美國趕出該地區，取代美國成為該地區的主導力量，我們需要反思這意味著什麽呢？這意味著我們正處於世界曆史上最大的戰略競爭之一之中，世界上兩個最強大的國家正在競爭，看誰將成為世界上最具活力和最繁榮地區的主導力量，沒有比這更大的了，他的曆史也發生在我們身上，這是真實的曆史，當然，這是因為亞洲如此之大，所以這不僅僅是關於亞洲，全球秩序的命運將在很大程度上取決於亞洲結果如何解決，台灣當然是這場競爭的主要焦點，我的意思是還有其他民間的華南 SE 第二湯姆摩爾等等，但嗯，但台灣是主要的，我會關注這一點，我隻是要記住，我也可以對南海說同樣的話，這不是因為台灣本身的內在意義，我不想說台灣本身不重要，當然，它是一個擁有 2500 萬人口的了不起的國家，但它因為華盛頓和北京幾十年來做出的選擇，它已經成為雙方在亞洲競爭中的力量和決心的考驗，它是這樣運作的，美國在西太平洋的地位，它行使領導權的事實，它行使了這麽長時間的首要地位，至少在1945年以來，主要是它的聯盟的產物，美國的聯盟使它成為亞洲的主導力量，這些聯盟反過來又取決於美國對盟友的信譽，不管發生什麽最壞的情況，他們都會保護他們，如果你去首爾，你去東京，或者去CRA，說到底這是怎麽回事，這就是它的全部意義所在，所以美國在西太平洋地位的維持絕對取決於這些聯盟信譽的維持，而台灣是中國可以測試我們信譽的地方，如果發現有缺陷，如果美國未能通過這些信譽測試，那麽它的聯盟就會失敗，如果它的聯盟失敗了，它的地位就會我認為，在亞洲的地位將不隻是受到侵蝕，而是遭到破壞。相反，隻要美國能夠阻止中國在台灣問題上測試其決心，測試其可信度，或者其他測試，那麽它在亞洲的地位就完好無損。這就是台灣今天如此重要和危險的原因。因此，當我們觀察亞洲正在發生的事情時，我們麵臨的關鍵問題是，美國的威懾力有多強。我將給你一個悲觀的答案。我將抵製住繼續談論這個問題的誘惑。美國在烏克蘭的威懾失敗了，這是非常重要的。你知道，無論人們想到什麽，這都是美國威懾力的失敗。它在亞洲非常薄弱，這是因為長期以來，美國在常規能力上對中國的壓倒性優勢一直在不斷喪失，特別是在海域，美國長期以來一直占據著這種優勢。美國已經無法再指望在台灣問題上與中國打贏常規海戰了。他們會輸，但他們贏不了，而且不贏也不夠好，而長期以來，在我看來，美國戰略家們似乎認為，如果常規平衡對他們不利，他們可以依靠核武器來阻止中國嚐試，因為美國在必要時會首先使用核武器，而這正是美國首先使用原則所要求的，這種預期已經越來越不可信，因為中國自身的威懾力和其反威懾能力已經增強，現在，這是美國在亞洲對台灣的威懾態勢的一個非常重大的轉變，而且就這一點而言，在其他地方，很難說服某人你將打一場他們知道你贏不了的戰爭，現在美國試圖通過建立聯盟來彌補其 DET Terence 態勢的下降，這就是奧庫斯的目的，這就是四方安全對話的目的，這就是許多美國戰略家例如，與日本和韓國的外交關係一直很好，但我在這裏要說的是，美國在亞洲或其他地區的盟友和夥伴，例如美國試圖讓北約加入，都沒有承諾明確支持美國，以增強美國的偵察能力，部分原因是他們沒有說過他們會這樣做，也是因為他們沒有做過，他們中沒有一個人有能力，即使是日本人，也可以對西太平洋中美衝突的結果產生真正重大的影響，你知道，通過對比，我隻是想指出，真的沒有什麽比這更好的了亞洲版北約 北約實際上承諾美國的北約盟友將與美國並肩作戰，當氣球升起時，這是一個真正堅定不移的承諾，我們在亞洲沒有這樣的承諾，因此，盡管美國決策者經常說他們有一個新興聯盟正在做同樣的事情，但我認為這不是現實，這反過來又表明了一個更深層次的現實，那就是雖然美國，或者至少我應該說美國決策者，華盛頓內部的人
想要保護隱私，但他們不會接受所涉及的成本和風險，他們不再準備為台灣而打第一次世界大戰，他們準備為烏克蘭而打第三次世界大戰，部分原因是
特別是在亞洲，對中國采取有效威懾態勢所涉及的成本和風險非常高，因為中國是美國有史以來麵臨的最強大的對手，原因很簡單，中國是相對於美洲最大的經濟體，美國曾經麵臨過，你知道這是一個非常關鍵的立場，但另一方麵，這不僅成本和風險非常高，而且這樣做的必要性，承擔這些成本和風險以支持美國在亞洲的舊領導秩序的必要性是薄弱的，它們太弱了，無法證明這些成本和風險是合理的。現在，讓我們通過將當前局勢與冷戰，以及第二次世界大戰和第一次世界大戰進行比較來思考這個問題，但隻關注冷戰，因為在冷戰期間，美國確實有決心，確實麵臨著必須付出巨大代價並接受難以置信的風險以遏製蘇聯的必要性，但蘇聯和中國之間的區別在於，蘇聯確實威脅到，特別是在冷戰初期，如果不加以遏製，它能夠主宰整個歐亞大陸，然而，這意味著任何權力，這是一個可以追溯到 19 世紀的美國古老觀念，即任何能夠主宰整個歐亞大陸都可能威脅到西半球的美國本土，蘇聯在 40 年代和 50 年代確實能夠做到這一點，如果它沒有被美國遏製的話，而中國則處於不同的境地，因為盡管中國相對於美國的力量要比蘇聯強大得多，但中國在歐亞大陸的鄰國，與它共享歐亞大陸的國家，或者至少其中一些國家相對於中國的力量要比蘇聯相對於其鄰國的力量要強大得多，比如印度、俄羅斯，不要輕視俄羅斯，它仍然是一個非常強大的地方，還有歐洲，這是一個非常奇怪的戰略實體，但無論如何，它仍然是一個清晰的戰略實體，所以我認為，我們看到的是一個中國能夠在歐亞大陸建立像蘇聯那樣威脅美國本土的態勢的可能性非常低的世界，因此，美國阻止中國主宰東亞和西太平洋的必要性要比美國當時的必要性低得多。防止蘇聯主宰西歐，所以你知道，曾經驅使美國采取冷戰期間非同尋常舉措的因素今天已經不複存在了，更廣泛地說，這意味著人們經常表達的擔憂是，如果我們放棄舊的冷戰美國主導的單極秩序，那麽它將是什麽樣？它將被中國主導的單極威權秩序所取代，我認為這是一個非常不可能的結果，更有可能的是，我將說，幾乎可以肯定的是，將取代的將是，我甚至會說，已經取代了後戰時單極美國秩序的是一個多極全球秩序，目前至少由五個大國組成，也許以後還會有更多大國，嗯，這將像曆史上多極秩序經常發揮作用的方式一樣，現在我們對多極秩序有點陌生，我要快速環顧一下房間，因為我們都不記得多極秩序是什麽樣子的，因為自 1948 年左右以來，隻有兩極秩序然後是單極秩序，但多極秩序在曆史上其實很常見，它們相當複雜，但可以很好地發揮作用，我們可以看看歐洲五大國的多極秩序是如何運作的，已經持續了許多個世紀，這對我們來說也不陌生，上次包括我們各國在內的國際社會著手建立新的國際秩序，我們在 1945 年舊金山第二次世界大戰結束時就這樣做了，當時我們集體建立了世界，或者至少是聯合國。他們當時被召集起來，著手設計聯合國，作為戰後世界全球秩序願景的表達，它是什麽，它的核心是什麽，安理會五個常任理事國，五個大國，他們被賦予特殊地位，正是因為他們似乎是大國，他們實際上並沒有完全正確地列出名單，但這是一個細節，嗯，英國或法國在我的五大國名單上，讓我說清楚，現在值得探討的是，在亞洲，多極秩序將產生的將反映在一個多極區域秩序中，如果我們把亞洲作為一個整體來看，因為重要的是要記住，雖然我們經常談論中國，但亞洲沒有一個正在崛起的大國，有兩個，印度，或者可能有三個，因為有印度尼西亞，印度尼西亞將在本世紀中葉之前成為世界第四大經濟體，沒有人確切知道那時印尼會是什麽樣子，但我們至少需要認識到，我們不僅要生活在多極全球秩序中，我們也要生活在多極區域秩序中，這對我們來說其實是個好消息，這意味著我們不再生活在這些大國的霸權之下，至少對於我們這些生活在所謂中國勢力範圍和印度勢力範圍邊界上的人來說，中國和印度在那裏，我們這些生活在邊界上的人，也就是緬甸人、馬來人、新加坡人、印尼人、澳大利亞人，你們，我們將在每一邊都有強大的力量，我們可以玩我所說的蒙古遊戲，你知道蒙古之所以存在，是因為它利用中國人來控製俄羅斯人，中國人會控製俄羅斯人，這對我們來說是真正的機會，對外交官來說，這一定有點令人興奮，是個好時機，但你知道這個這是我們未來的一個模型，我認為我們現在不需要爭論，我不想，我不想
給人留下這樣的印象，我認為這會有點麻煩，在那種多極秩序下工作會比在由我們的夥伴主導的單極秩序下工作要困難得多，但我們沒有太多的選擇，也許更重要的是，這不僅會讓我們更加困難，對一些國家來說，這將是災難性的，還會有一些悲劇發生，我認為烏克蘭的未來非常暗淡，我所說的暗示是台灣的未來也非常??暗淡，但這就是現實主義者最終作為國際體係共同做出一些選擇的地方，就像 1945 年在雅爾塔做出的選擇一樣，將東歐大片地區，特別是斯大林統治下的波蘭這是一個非常艱難的決定，但這個決定避免了美國和蘇聯之間的第一次世界大戰，當時蘇聯擁有世界上最龐大的軍隊，也是世界上最強大的軍隊。我可能會說，這是一場值得避免的戰爭，但我們不想忘記，一路上有很多非常艱難的選擇，但我認為，對於我們這些幸運的人來說，我們在這方麵很幸運，我們可以在這樣的世界中生存，值得我們重新審視，如果我們不把這個根基紮根，如果我們不適應生活在多極秩序而不是我們所熟知和熱愛的舊秩序中，會發生什麽？曆史強烈表明，如果我們不適應國際秩序的變化，我們將麵臨戰爭，當然在這個時代，這意味著核戰爭，我隻想強調，我在這裏談論的戰爭風險不是假設的，它必須影響我們的判斷。我們對未來國際秩序的願景以及我們如何追求這一願景所做出的決定，在很大程度上受到避免烏克蘭戰爭的重要性的影響，值得記住的是，任何確保俄羅斯在烏克蘭問題上失敗的努力，我們現在很清楚，都需要北約的直接幹預，直接麵臨核戰爭的風險，現在我可以就這種風險有多高展開一場引人入勝的辯論，但我想我的問題是，風險有多大，10% 20% 30% 我聽到了嗎？40% 這不是假設的，記住導彈在發射井裏，武器就在發射井上麵，在亞洲，中國試圖以我所說的方式考驗我們對台灣的決心，在我看來，這種誘惑非常大，中國人越覺得美國在虛張聲勢，說它會保衛台灣，他們就越有可能揭穿它的虛張聲勢，現在美國是在虛張聲勢，他們說布什在虛張聲勢，拜登已經四次表示他會這樣做，他似乎知道他在做什麽至少在那個場合我我認為美國人不知道他們是不是在虛張聲勢，這是一個非常危險的情況，但真正的問題是，中國有充分的理由認為他們在虛張聲勢，而為了戲劇化地表達或澄清這一點，你問問自己，美國必須做些什麽才能讓中國人完全清楚地知道他們不是在虛張聲勢，他們真的決心保衛台灣，這很簡單，隨著中國空中和海上能力的發展，美國也必須使其空中海上能力也如此，這樣它才能保持巨大的優勢，這種優勢支撐了它在70年代、80年代和90年代成功遏製中國，舉個例子，這對澳大利亞人來說相當具有現實意義，它必須再建兩個船廠來建造弗吉尼亞級潛艇，開始建造的不是每年1.33艘弗吉尼亞級潛艇，而是每年4到5艘，這就是美國在上次冷戰中所做的，他們就是這樣遏製蘇聯的這正是他們現在沒有做的事情，所以我認為，中國人很有可能會看看美國做了什麽，或者更確切地說沒有做什麽，然後認為這些人是在虛張聲勢，他們不是認真的，我認為中國人在這一點上是對的，我認為這是一個非常重要的判斷，當然，中國人很想揭穿虛張聲勢，因為出於我之前提到的原因，如果他們真的這麽做了，如果他們對台灣采取行動，而美國在說了所有事情之後，卻退縮了，說“不，對不起，我們要袖手旁觀”，在東京、東南亞甚至坎拉，他們會說我們真的相信這些人嗎？因為正如我之前所說，這是聯盟的核心，這就是為什麽如果虛張聲勢被揭穿，美國總統在淩晨 3 點發現自己在戰情室麵臨必須立即做出的決定，決定美國將如何回應，他們可能會意外地決定他們並不是在虛張聲勢，那麽它就不是為所有人準備的，這就是為什麽戰爭風險很高，值得記住的是，隻是重複一些強調我之前說過的話，戰爭風險很高，如果戰爭風險很高，那麽核武士的風險也很高，因為雙方都無法憑借常規力量取得決定性的結果，雙方都擁有足夠的核力量，現在讓我總結一下，這可能看起來有點誇張，但我認為我們不能在思考像 orcus 這樣的問題時，不僅僅是 orcus 問題，而是像 orcus 這樣的問題，我們不能回避討論我們我們的國家我的國家你的國家是否認為我們應該在必要時與中國開戰，以試圖維護美國在亞洲的領導秩序，因為這是我們可能麵臨的重大選擇，這是曆史時刻帶給我們的，我們必須麵對它，不是因為 orcus 我們簽署了它，如果你們簽署了它，我們就必須做這個有趣的問題，特別是對澳大利亞來說，但這不是因為這個，而是因為對 orcus 的承諾被美國視為一種強烈支持、認可和鼓勵他們應該與中國開戰的想法，如果這是維護美國在亞洲的秩序所必需的，因為這是今天美國似乎擁有的宣戰政策或隱含的宣戰政策，而獲得這種支持就是我們的目標。美國並不真正關心澳大利亞是否有核潛艇，我認為它並不真正關心澳大利亞或新西蘭是否簽署了支柱二研究項目，它關心的是獲得對整個問題方法的支持聲明，我認為這是個壞主意的原因是，我認為支持這種方法不會成功，不僅僅是因為我們不會贏得戰爭，而是因為財富和權力分配的轉變使美國不可能繼續成為亞洲的主要力量，或者就此而言，單極警察或全球力量，無論我們多麽希望它如此迅速地發展，那麽替代方案是什麽，我們還能做什麽呢？我們要做的第一件事就是接受我們現在生活在一個多極世界，不再試圖維護舊的單極世界，我們專注於建立一個秩序和機構，使單極世界為我們服務，就像我們在 1944 年 5 月努力嚐試使單極世界成為我們在第二次世界大戰後看到的多極秩序，然後它被冷戰的 B 兩極秩序劫持，就像我們努力工作一樣，在澳大利亞的案例中，我們外交神話的一部分是 Doc 努力轉向 1945 年在舊金山出現並完全出醜試圖管理安理會的運作方式，但沒有成功在所有事情上，他都做出了貢獻。我們需要做的第二件事是接受這樣一個事實：在亞洲，中國和印度將成為主導力量，我們需要塑造亞洲地區發生的事情，讓這個體係盡可能地為我們服務。值得一提的是，我們也曾經曆過這樣的情況。1944 年，澳大利亞和新西蘭坐在一起，談判了所謂的《澳新軍團條約》或《坎布拉條約》。這實際上是一項相當古怪的工作，而且再次出現了 EV 的名字，但這是我們兩國認真嚐試塑造我們的地區秩序以符合我們的利益的嚐試。現在，我們需要再次抱有這種雄心壯誌，因為沒有其他人會為我們做到這一點。第三件事是認識到，無論發生什麽，無論我們在這兩項努力中取得多大成功，這個世界對我們來說都將是一個更難生存的世界，它將要求我們付出更多，但不會是災難性的，所以我們需要為此做好準備，我們需要在外交上做好準備，這將改變我們外交的性質，你知道，隻要問問就知道了蒙古人，但問題的核心是，我們的鄰居對我們來說比我們的遠方老朋友重要得多，我們不能對此感情用事，而且在軍事上，我們需要做的是認識到，雖然亞洲大國在軍事上沒有威脅到我們，但中國在軍事上沒有威脅到澳大利亞或新西蘭，但從長遠來看，在新秩序中，我說的是，一個亞洲大國可能直接威脅我們的領土，而且軍事上威脅到我們的風險將比我們自1945年以來任何時候都要高，但如果沒有美國來援助我們，所以我們必須捫心自問，我們是否準備好在那種情況下獨立保衛自己，這些都是非常大的問題，但話又說回來，這是自歐洲人定居我們各自國家以來，我們國際環境發生的最大轉變，所以我們不應該感到驚訝，這要求我們回到一張白紙上，從頭開始思考很多事情，我們能做的最糟糕的事情就是試圖通過堅持我們所知道的事情來逃避這一點我的最後一點是回到我剛開始的地方，那就是有一件事我確實認為很清楚，那就是在這個新的世界裏，在這個新的亞洲，我們將比以前更加孤獨，但我們會在一起，我們對彼此的意義將比過去更大，非常感謝，謝謝 H，歡迎 John McKinnon，謝謝你的先生 K，非常感謝 Hugh，謝謝你的介紹，也感謝 Don 和 Helen 邀請 Hugh 來這裏舉辦這次活動，Hugh 和我相識已久，我們第一次見麵是在 1980 年代的 canra，我知道，因為那時我的女兒還是個蹣跚學步的孩子，現在她快要過零歲生日了，我不會提及，因為如果我這樣做，她會非常尷尬，我們有一個長期的協會，我很榮幸能夠分享這個平台，說我仍然不完全確定討論者是什麽，我想你會
發癢向 H 提問，也許我的角色隻是提供一點時間來組織這些問題，這樣你就可以以有力和簡潔的方式提出問題，我相信 heish 會期待這一點，但請允許我針對新西蘭對這些問題的看法發表一些看法，如果這似乎與你所說的沒有完全聯係，那麽我相信你會理解，在聽你說話之前我必須考慮一下這個問題，但我想談的第一件事實際上是關於語言的，因為我認為在這個國家，我們通常不會像澳大利亞人那樣討論安全和戰略問題，因此，我們聽到的很多話語在塔斯馬尼亞島的回聲中回蕩，我們知道這些話語在澳大利亞以非常活躍的方式以非常澳大利亞的方式進行，但實際上在這裏並沒有引起共鳴，這並不是說澳大利亞的做法是正確的，我們是錯誤的，反之亦然，這隻是我認為的一個事實我們不像澳大利亞那樣考慮這些重大戰略問題，可能是因為它們對我們的影響不大。現在你們很多人都知道已故的艾倫·吉內爾，他是一位經驗豐富的澳大利亞外交官，我認為他也是這個組織的澳大利亞對應機構的主席，他寫了一本名為《被拋棄的恐懼》的書，這是對澳大利亞外交政策的研究，我認為從 20 世紀 40 年代到現在，我認為沒有人在新西蘭寫過類似的書，但我懷疑如果他們寫了，那將是害怕被排除在外或害怕被遺忘之類的東西，這將是一套完全不同的命題，這隻是另一種說法，即我們在新西蘭的方式看待這些問題的方式往往與澳大利亞或其他國家的人看待問題的方式並不完全相同，但如果我可以解釋一下你的一個觀點，你可能對地緣政治戰略競爭不感興趣，但地緣政治戰略競爭對你感興趣，這對新西蘭來說可能是一個警鍾，我們實際上發現自己身處一個我們能夠追求國家利益的世界，對我們許多人來說，國家利益就是增加出口價值和做其他事情，但事實上，這關乎我們如何生存和生活在一個與我們成長的世界不太一樣的世界，但我也同意你的另一點，我確實同意你說的很多話，嗯，我們沒有太多的選擇，新西蘭甚至澳大利亞都能夠塑造其戰略環境，換句話說，我們基本上會接受它帶來的一切，所以如果這是關於美國的首要地位，那很好，如果這是關於中國的變得更強大，這就是我們要做的事情，如果是關於印度崛起，我們會找到處理這個問題的方法，我們不會，這並不是說我們可以影響很多事情，而是我們必須找到一種與各種國家打交道的方法，這樣在某些方麵，雖然我不會過分強調這一點，但我們可能更有能力，謝謝你，謝謝你同意我的觀點，我們可能更有能力在你描述的這個世界上運作，事實上，呃，我們的一些其他朋友，因為實際上，作為外交官，我們中的許多人都知道，我們必須在這個世界上運作很多年，我們不會走出去，人們說，天哪，是新西蘭大使來了，天哪，我最好把事情理清楚，說來奇怪，事情不是這樣的，呃，和你在一起，是的，我確定我做到了，但我們必須提出理由，所以從這個意義上說，我認為，呃，雖然我認為我們可以，我可以同意，和和和你知道，關於你所說的
關於可能發生的事情的描述，我隻是不知道這是否一定會給我們帶來世界末日，就像對澳大利亞的某些人來說
可能很多很多澳大利亞人一樣，嗯，我想說的另一點是，嗯，偏好，我認為這與新西蘭在未來可能發生或可能不會發生的某些情況下的反應有關，那就是我們目前更喜歡外交解決方案而不是軍事解決方案，現在你可能會說，這隻是一種現實的說法，我們在外交方麵有
東西可以提供，但在軍事方麵我們並沒有那麽多東西可以提供，但無論如何，我認為這是新西蘭根深蒂固的東西，例如，如果談到你關於台灣的問題，嗯，我可能比你更樂觀一點，因為
中國人可能會在那裏展示一些實力，嗯，我們當然
顯然我們承認整個一個中國政策，台灣是其中的一部分同時，我們一直表示，我們不希望通過武力解決這個問題，我們希望通過協議解決，我想，不管從你所概述的事件發展來看，這看起來多麽徒勞，我認為這在新西蘭決策者的心中仍然會非常突出，他們不想卷入看起來非常混亂的衝突，最後，如果我能簡要談談今天的主題，即 orus，因為我覺得如果我不談它，有人會問我一個問題，所以我最好先說，我的意思是，對於任何這種重大決定，我總是認為將其分解，而不是將其變成一種黑白分明的東西是有好處的，我非常尊重我們這裏的兩位主持人，他們一直在爭論這個問題，但我也采取了一種hsh 的評論中提到了一點避難所，你知道新西蘭中國理事會不是一個發表政策聲明的組織，所以我想堅持這一點，但我確實認為，如果你從什麽樣的運作互動互操作性的角度來看待它，這將帶來什麽，我們希望成為什麽樣的合作夥伴，如果你考慮一下，並從這些方麵進行分解，那麽思考正在呈現的問題會更容易一些，而不是簡單地將其視為一個黑白是或否的問題，我們是否簽署，我們是否簽署，我想說的最後一點是，我們實際上並不是世界上唯一的，除了我們在塔斯曼海對岸有朋友之外，這是一種非常有趣的關係，非常有意義，非常重要，而且很可能變得更加重要，我說的是，隨著我們的前進未來我們還必須考慮東南亞人民，以及您所描述的處於新興大國之間的其他人，該地區的每個人，包括我們自己，都必須弄清楚我們將如何在這個新世界中運作，也許事情與過去不太一樣，而從某種意義上說

After Unipolarity: Where is the Asian regional order heading, and what should we be doing about it?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuWtYtuYRIU
7 August 2024. 

In essence, Australia’s commitment to AUKUS is a vote to help preserve Asia’s US-led unipolar strategic order. But what are the alternatives?  What kinds of new regional order might emerge to take the old order’s place if it cannot be preserved?  And how would we fare in them?

Professor Hugh White’s presentation explores these questions, looking at the global context as shaped by the war in Ukraine and the alignment between China and Russia. It asks if the global Rules Based Order fails, what will take its place – authoritarian hegemony or politically diverse multipolarity? And what would it mean for Asia, and more particularly for Australia and New Zealand?

Professor White’s address is followed by additional expert discussion from John McKinnon, Chair of the New Zealand-China Council and Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Te Herenga Waka Victoria University of Wellington.
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mcdou greetings everybody is the executive director of the New Zealand Institute of international Affairs I bet
you a very warm welcome on on quite a mild Wellington Winters
evening um uh particularly if I could welcome uh members of parliament uh past
and present including opposition leaders um and former ministers and former prime
minister right honorable Helen Clark um your excellencies heads of mission uh
and others in the Diplomatic Corps members of the New Zealand Institute of international Affairs and all other
guests know my hi of my uh just like to congratulate you for
having the the the foresight to uh book your place here early because we had uh book your place at this event because we
had to put the the sold out signs up both here and in Oakland on Monday where we we also had Hugh White speaking um
and I guess this this reflects uh an interest uh or recognition both of of few whites reputation uh on the side of
the Tasman and of course that we're sort of in the midst of a a rather forthright and high-profile public discussion on
the future of foreign defense and security policy in this country um and
this debate has largely although by no means only focused on the question of
New Zealand's involvement in orcus security partnership with the US United Kingdom and Australia and a particular
uh involvement in um the sharing of advanced military strategies uh uh under
the so-call orcus pillar 2 um and anyone has followed the media coverage a few um
uh Hugh interviews in in the past few days has obviously seen um and will be well aware of of Hughes uh views on on
orus which he has been uh frequently asked about but um I guess it's good for us tonight to be focusing on a slightly
wider issue so we're looking at the um the regional uh order in Asia and how it's evolving and how Australia and New
Zealand uh could and maybe should uh respond to that Evolution uh as an independent non
government organization our Institute doesn't take views on our positions on such matters of course but uh we can
play an important role in encouraging public understanding and discussion of the issues particularly allowing experts
to provide uh context nuance and Shades of Gray where perhaps the public debate
might be prone to a duality of of black and white um and this event is of course
part of a long running conversation uh on that we're having at The Institute we host over 80 events a year and and uh
I'll make my my plea as I have many times before that that you know if you're finding these events of interest
to um register as a member of The Institute and uh stay involved in that
um in these discussions which are really important to the future of New Zealand uh with that in mind I'm really
pleased to welcome Professor Hugh White uh to speak here this evening for many years he's been a leading practitioner
academic and thinker an Australian strategic and defense policy on asia-pacific security issues and Global
strategic Affairs uh he is Meritus professor of strategic studies at the Australian
National University a former uh senior Australian defense and intelligence uh
official and ministerial advisor and was the first director of the Australian strategic policy Institute he's also a
prolific writer of books and articles among the latest of which uh how to defend Australia uh Hugh of course is no
stranger to these uh Shores he's spoken at The Institute numerous times and I was reading in the New Zealand
international review that we think the first time was in 2002 under the stewardship of Gerald McGee who's here
here tonight um when he delivered a talk on on uh need for greater Mutual understanding uh of Australian and New
Zealand defense policies uh and he's also delivered uh a prominent series of lectures as the kienberger visiting
chair at the center for strategic studies here um so we'll shortly ask
Hugh to speak for about 20 minutes or so on on the issue at hand and then after
Hugh I'm very pleased to say we've got uh John McKinnon um acting as discussion tonight John is one of New Zealand's
most distinguished diplomats and public servants he served three postings in Beijing uh with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and trade including two as Ambassador uh with additional postings in camra washhington and New York and
was also for a Time respectively the director of external assist Ms Bureau
the deputy secretary of Foreign Affairs chief executive of the ministry of defense and executive director of the
Asian New Zealand Foundation uh and he's currently chair of the New Zealand China Council and
also a senior fellow at the center for strategic studies here at the Haka
Victoria University of Wellington so we're very much looking forward also to Hugh's uh expertise and experience
imparted on on the topic and we'll ask him to speak for about 10 minutes and then we'll we'll move into a a Q&A so
get some some really good questions uh formulated um so without further Ado I'd
like to invite uh Professor hu thank
you well thank you very much heish both for the introduction and for the
audience so to speak and giving me this opportunity to come back to NZ and share
some views again I also to thank Helen Clark and Don Brash who have uh invited
me here and uh done a wonderful job of uh putting together a program for me to
talk to people and listen to people about uh this set of issues and I might say it's a particular pleasure to be
sharing the platform with John McKinnon who apart from all his other credentials
is also a very old and dear friend and colleague we' did quite a lot of work together in different ways in their
respective roles in government and it's a great pleasure to share this platform with him it's actually not the first time we've shared a platform I'd also
just like to say I mean it's traditional to thank the audience for coming but particularly in this case there are so
many old friends and colleagues here from my long and very happy experience
of dealing with New Zealand in different capacities it's so nice to see you all here I really appreciate you
coming now I'm going to take a Liberty tonight of using the pronouns our and we
to mean both Australia in New Zealand together and that's not because I believe that our two approaches our two
countries approaches to foreign and defense policy are identical and don't need to be distinguished on the contrary
40 long years of experience and many would of you will recognize the anniversary I'm referring
to taught me that the opposite is the case that in
fact um despite our very closeness in so many
dimensions of our national life we are very different in some ways in including the way in which we approach foreign and
defense policy and they they also taught me and some of my teachers are here in the room how important it is for
Australians to recognize that which I'm going to allow myself to say we in the Australian sense don't always
do but the circumstances I'm going to describe and the pressures that they
impose on our foreign and defense policies means I think that the
differences whilst always there are going to be less important as we Face a world and a region in which we will be
more alone together and working together will become even more important for us
into has in the past now as the old Bolsheviks used to
say it is not a coincidence that Australia and New Zealand both face choices about
orcus uh at a time of Deep crisis in both the global and our more local
Regional order the simultaneous crisis you might say in Regional orders in the Middle East in Europe and in and here in
Asia which together constitute a major I think truly historic crisis in in Global
Order and the reason why it's not a coincidence that our uh decisions about
orus coincide with this is that orcus is much more than a plan to acquire new
submarines in Australia case or a plan to take part in a high-tech research
defense research and development program under pillar two it is a statement orcus
is a statement of strong alignment and support for a particular approach to the management and resolution of that Global
and Regional Crisis in international order it it's it's a statement of support for a vision of the regional and
Global orders that underpin that approach to managing it and any discussion about orus must pay a lot of
attention primary attention I would say to the merits of that vision and that
approach and what is that Vision well the shorthand version is pretty simple
that the only acceptable outcome of the crisis in global and Regional law do we face is the reassertion of the post Cold
War us-led unipolar order which we've all enjoyed so much for the last 30
years now I I want to just start by making a few General points about
questions of international order because questions about International order are in fact a bit unfamiliar to us to our
communities um not to the academics of course but to the rest of us because the
international system in which we've been operating has been so stable and so benign for so long the post Cold War
order has lasted for 35 years the post World War II order on which the post Cold War order is based which the post
Cold War order is sort of a continu U ation and expansion has lasted for 80 years and our whole approach to our
place in place in the world has been framed by those very durable orders and
we see this order understandably as natural and right and we kind of tend to
expect that it's going to be permanent too now this is a normal thing to
do eh car is one of the guys I'm reading at the moment was the bloke who in I
think July of 1939 wrote a book called the 20 years crisis about the 20 years
crisis of international order which led to World War II just a couple of weeks after the poor bloke got the thing out
into the bookshops actually the book lasted very well um survived that but he
made the point that um it's normal that people attribute a unique
moral legitimacy to the status quo if they've benefited from it that we
naturally think of the order we we know and love if we love it as being not just
a good order but the right order with a capital R which therefore inclines us to
be very conservative or very aggressive in response to challenges to
it um and we we therefore attach moral appro to those who do challenge the
existing order we blame evil leaders in particular you know the Kaiser and
Hitler for Germany's successive challenges to the European order in the last century hito and Tojo for Japan's
challenge the international order um in uh the middle years of the of the 20th
century but one of the points that car makes is that the deeper forces are always at Play It's never just that
there are bad guys in the presidential Palace there's always a lot more going
on the place of Germany in Europe the place place of Japan and Asia needed to
be resolved and and it was and it was foolish for anyone to imagine that the
old system which had worked so well for so long particularly in the case of the
first world war could keep on handling what was going on though there were tensions there that needed to be
resolved and addressed the international order needed to adapt ajp Taylor who's the other guy I'm
reading at the moment to nourish and I hope refine my pessimism uh uh wrote A History called
the outbreak of the second World War I strongly recommend it to you uh in which he wrote that the story
he was telling was a story without Heroes and perhaps even without
villains H he got thrown out of the British Academy for writing that by the way so be careful but it's a point wor
thinking about because what his point was precisely that that everyone was to blame that the International System in
the 1930s didn't adapt in ways which prevented the second world war
so um I think those insights matter to us today we tend to see the challenges to
the global and intern and Regional orders that I've talked about being caused by people like xiin Ping and
Vladimir Putin and the guys who run Iran but deeper factors are at work you
Asia in particular uh as so often in history the the primary deeper factor is a massive
in our case massive shift in the distribution of wealth and power indeed an almost unparalleled shift in the
distribution of wealth and power and nothing drives changes in the international order nothing drives pressure on an existing order and
pressures to change and a shift in the distribution of of wealth and power in
the and as as power shifts relationships change that's true at every level of
human Affairs um and
so defending message to draw from that is defending the status quo is not the
only or necessarily the right policy it is sometimes but not necessarily the only or the right policy what we really
need to do is to ask ourselves what outcome is going to work best for us what kind of order is going to best
serve our interests in the new circumstances that we we face which are
putting pressure on the old order now let me focus on what that means in Asia the post Cold War order here in
Asia and preserving that order means preserving us Primacy particularly in
East Asia and the Western Pacific that's a Primacy actually which on some measures goes back a 100
years uh and just to be absolutely crystal clear if I had my choice that's
the outcome I'd prefer I am actually one of those conservative of the age car was talking about I would love to see the
old order pers preserve I just don't believe that's going to be possible in the face of the pressures that face
faces particularly in Asia with the new distribution of power um
and the reason I say that is that it does seem to me that what's driving the
crisis in order in Asia at the moment is that China as its power is grown aims to
reclaim its status as the regions East Asia the Pacific's great power it aims
to push America out of the region and to take America's place as the Region's leading power and we need to just sort
of reflect on what that means it does mean that we are sitting right in the middle of one of the biggest strategic
contests of the world has ever seen the world's two strongest states are competing as to which of them will be the leading power in the world's most
dynamic and prosperous region it doesn't get any bigger than this his history happens to us too this is real history
with a capital H and and of course it's because that's so big in Asia then it's
not just about Asia the the fate of the global order will be in large measure
determined by how that Asian outcome is resolved now Taiwan is of course the
Prime Focus for this contest I mean there are other folky South China SE second Tom mols and
so on but um but Taiwan is the primary one and I'll focus on that and I'll just
ask to remember that I could have said the same thing about the South China Sea uh as well and that's not because of the
intrinsic significance of Taiwan itself I don't want to say that Taiwan itself is not important C certainly is
it's a remarkable country of entity of 25 million people but it's because it has become
because of choices that have been made over many decades both in Washington and Beijing it has become the test of each
side's power and resolve in their contest in Asia and it works like this
really the US position in the Western Pacific the fact that it exercises the leadership Primacy that it's exercised
for so long is at least in the era since 1945 primarily a product of its
alliances it's America's alliances that make it the leading power in Asia those
alliances in turn depend on America's credibility of credibility to its allies
that the worst comes to worst they'll defend them that's if you go to Soul or you go to Tokyo or for that matter you
go to CRA and say what's in the end this all about that's what it's all about
and and so the the the maintenance of the US position in the Western Pacific does absolutely depend on the
maintenance of The credibility of those alliances and Taiwan is where China can test us credibility and if it's found
faulty if America fails those tests of credibility then it's a alliances will fail and if its alliances fail its
position in Asia will be I would say not just eroded but destroyed conversely of course as long
as America can deter China from testing its resolve testing its credibility uh
over Taiwan or one of the other tests then its position in Asia is intact
that's what makes Taiwan such an important and such a dangerous place
today so the key question question for us as we look out at what's happening in Asia is to ask well how robust is us
deterence and I'm going to give you a gloomy answer
uh I'm going to resist the temptation to talk longer about this us deterence has failed in Ukraine that's a very
important you know whatever else one thinks about is happening in urine it was it was a failure of us deterence a
and it's very weak in Asia it's weak because of a long steady loss
of of the conventional of the overwhelming advantage in conventional capabilities over China particularly in
the maritime space that America had for so long H to the point where the United
States can no longer expect to win uh a conventional Maritime war with China
over Taiwan not to say they'd lose it but they can't win it and not not
winning is not good enough moreover whereas for a long time American uh strategists seem to me to
assume that if the that as the conventional balance went bad on them they could rely on their nuclear weapons
to deter China from trying when the expectation that the United States would use nuclear weapons first if necessary
which is what us first use Doctrine requires that has become less and less credible as China's own deterrent and
its capacity the counter deter the United States has grown now that that is a very
significant shift in the deterrent posture of the United States in Asia in
relation to Taiwan and for and for that for that matter elsewhere it's very hard to persuade someone that you're going to
fight a war that they know you know you can't
win now America has tried to make up for this decline in their DET Terence
posture by building a coalition um and that's what orcus is
all about that's what the quad is all about that's what a lot of American strategic diplomacy with Japan and South
Korea for example has been all about but I'm here to say that none of America's
allies and partners in or Partners in Asia or beyond for that matter America trying to bring nato in for
example have committed to support the United States clearly enough to enhance
America's Det to any significant degree that's partly because of what they say none of them have said they
will and it's also because of what they haven't done that is none of them have
capabilities even the Japanese that can make a really substantial difference to the outcome of a conflict between
America and China in the Western Pacific and you know by way of contrast I just
make the point that there there really is nothing like an Asian NATO for all the talk NATO really commits America's
NATO allies to go to war alongside the United States when the balloon goes up it's a it's a real deep unshakable
commitment we just don't have anything like that in Asia and therefore although US policy makers often talk as if that
em they have an emerging Coalition which is doing the same kind of thing I I just don't think that's a
reality and this in turn shows a deeper reality which is that whilst America or
at least I should say American policy makers the folks inside the Beltway do
want to preserve privacy they will not accept the costs and risks
involved they're not preparing to fight World War I over Taiwan anymore they are
prepared to fight World War III Over Ukraine and that's partly because
particularly in Asia the costs and risks involved in and
in an effective deterrence posture against China are very high because China is let's be clear about this the
most formidable rival the United States has ever faced for the simple reason that it's got the biggest economy
relative to Americas that the United States has ever faced uh and that's a you know that's a
really critical position but the other side of coin is that it's not just the cost and risks are very high but the
imperatives to do so the imperatives to shoulder those costs and risks to support uh the old us lead order in Asia
are weak and they're much too weak to justify those costs and risks now want
think about this by comparing the present situation with the Cold War and for that matter World War II and World
War I but just to focus on the Cold War what because during the Cold War the United States did have the resolve did
face the imperative to pay extraordinary costs and accept unbelievable risks in
order to contain the Soviet Union but the difference between the Soviet Union and China was that the Soviet Union
genuinely threatened particularly in the early phases of the Cold War to be able to dominate the whole of
Eurasia if it wasn't contained and yet uh and the the the
implications of that was that any power and this is an old American idea dating right back to the 19th century that any
power that that could dominate the whole of Eurasia could threaten the United States at home in the Western Hemisphere
and the Soviet Union really was in the 40s and 50s if it had not been contained by the United States capable of doing
that whereas China is just not in the same position because although China is much stronger relative to the United
States than the Soviet Union ever was China's Neighbors on Eurasia the countries it shares Eurasia with or
least some of them are much stronger relative to China than the Soviet Union was relative to its neighbors
there's India there's Russia and don't WR write Russia off it's still a very formidable place and there's Europe a
very strange strategic entity but a clearly clear strategic entity nonetheless and so I think what we we
we're seeing a world in which the chances of China being able to build the
posture in Eurasia that would threaten the United States at home the way the Soviet Union did is very low and
therefore the imperative for the United States to prevent China dominating East Asia and the Western Pacific are way lower than the imperatives the United
States had for example to prevent uh the Soviet Union dominating uh West Western
Europe so there's a you know the the the the the things that used to drive the
United States to the extraordinary steps that took during the Cold War are just not there
today and more broadly what that means is that the fears that are often
expressed that the alternative if we let the old po Cold War us lead unipolar
order go what will be what it will be replaced by is a unipolar authoritarian
order led by China I think that is a very unlikely outcome much much more
likely I'm going to say pretty near certain is that what will replace I
would even say what is already replacing the postco war unipolar us Le
order is a multipolar global order consisting at the moment at least of
five great Powers perhaps some more down the track um uh which will work the way
multipolar orders have often worked through history now we're a bit unfamiliar with multipolar orders going
to take a quick look around the room because none of us remember what a multi-polar order looked like because
since about 1948 there's only been a bipolar order and then a unipolar order but multipolar order is actually very
familiar to history um they're quite complicated ated but they can work quite
well and we can look for example at the examp at how the multi-polar order of
five great Powers as it happened functioned in Europe uh for for for many
centuries um and it's also not unfamiliar to us
from the last time that the International Community including our countries set out to build a new
international order we did that in 1945 at San Francisco the end of the second
world war when we collectively the the world or at least the United Nations as
they were then called set out to design the United the the the the UN and as an
expression of a vision of of global order in the post-war world and what it
was what it was right at the heart of it five permanent members of the security Council five great
Powers who were given a special status precisely because they were what seemed to be great Powers they didn't actually
get the list quite right but that's a that's a detail um rather in Britain or France
are on my list of five great Powers let me be clear so now in that just worth
exploring that for a minute in Asia that multi-polar order
would produce would would would be reflected in a multi-polar regional order if we look at Asia as a whole
because it's very important to remember that although we talk a lot about China there's there's not one Rising great
power in Asia there's two there's India or there's maybe three because there's
Indonesia and Indonesia will well before the middle of the century be the fourth biggest economy in the world nobody
quite knows what Indonesia is going to be like uh in that at that time but we
at least need to recognize that we're not just going to be living in a multi-polar global order we're going to
be living in multi-polar Regional order as well and that's actually good news
for us it means that rather than living under one or other of those Powers clear
hegemony at least for those of us who live on the boundary between what one might call a Chinese sphere of influence
and an Indian sphere of influence China and India there and those of us who live on the
boundary that's the Burmese ties the Malay I singaporeans
the Indonesians the Australians you guys we're going to have
a great power on each side of us and we can play what I call the Mongolian game you know Mongolia exists because it
keeps the Russians Bay using the Chinese and the Chinese would Bay keeping the Russians there are real opportunities
for us there got to be a bit exciting be a good be a good time for for for diplomats but um uh you know this is
this is a this is a model of our future which I don't think we need to dispar about now I don't want to I don't want
to give the impression I think this is going to be a dottle uh working in that kind of multi-polar order will be much
harder than working in a unipolar order dominated by our mates but we don't get
much choice about it it's also perhaps more important to say that it's not just going to be
harder for us for some countries it will be disastrous there will be some tragedies
involved uh I think the future for Ukraine is very Grim myself and the
implication of what I've said is that the future for Taiwan is very Grim in as well
but and this is where the realist imy comes out in the end we collectively as
an International System are going to have to make some choices just as at Yalta in 1945 the choice was made to
leave large slabs of Eastern Europe particularly Poland under Stalin's boot
which was a very tough decision but it was a decision that avoided World War I between the United States and the Soviet
Union at a time when the Soviet Union had the biggest army of the world had ever seen um best army of the world had
ever seen too I might say that that was a war worth
avoiding but we don't we don't want to forget that it's some very tough choices
along along the way but but I think for those of us who are lucky and
we are lucky in this respect we can survive in this kind of
World um and it's worth just turning the coin over and recognizing what happens
if we don't take that roote what happens if we don't adapt ourselves to living in a multi-polar order rather than the old
order that we know and love history strongly suggests that if we don't accommodate changes to the international
order we will face war and of course in this era that means nuclear war and I just want to stress
the point the risk of war that I'm talking about here is not hypothetical it must weigh on our judgments that the
sorts of decisions we make about the vision we have of future International order and how we pursue it is is has
been very strongly influenced by the importance of avoiding war in Ukraine is
worth remembering that any effort to ensure Russia's defeat against Ukraine
we now it's now clear would require Direct NATO intervention with a direct
risk of nuclear war now I can have an engaging debate about how high that risk is but I guess my question is well how
much risk is okay 10% 20% 30% do I hear
40% this is this is not hypothetical remember the missiles are there in the
silos the weapons are on top of them and in Asia well the Temptation for China to
test us resolve over Taiwan in the way I've talked about seems to me to be very
high and the more the Chinese think America is bluffing when it says it will defend
Taiwan the more likely they are to call its Bluff now is America
bluffing they say bush has Bush Biden has said four times that he would he
seems to have known what he was saying on that occasion at least um I I I don't think the Americans know
whether they're bluffing or not not and that is a very dangerous situation but the real point is that
China has very good reason to think that they are bluffing and to just dramatize that or
clarify that you ask yourself well what what would America have to have done to make it absolutely crystal clear to the
Chinese that they weren't fluffing that they really were determined to defend Taiwan well it's pretty simple as
China's air and Maritime capability went like that America would have had to make its air Maritime capability go like that
too so that it preserved the massive Advantage which had underpinned its successful deterence of China through
the 70s ' 80s and 90s it would have had to for example to take an example which is rather topical for Australians in
this context gone out and built another two yards to build Virginia class
submarines and start building not 1.33 Virginia class submarines a year but four or five a year that's the sort of
thing America did you not the last Cold War that's how they deterred the Soviet Union that's exactly what they haven't done now so I think there's a very real
chance that the Chinese look at what America has done or rather what it hasn't done and think these guys are
bluffing they're not serious and I and I think the Chinese are right about that that's I think it's a really important
judgment and of course the Temptation for the Chinese to call a bluff is high because for the reasons I mentioned before if they do if they move against
Taiwan and America after all the things have said stands back and says no sorry
we're going to sit this one out and in Tokyo and in
so and all through southeast Asia and even in canra they'll say really are we
trusting these guys because that is as I said before the heart of the the heart
of the alliance and that's why if the bluff is called and a US
president finds himself eles at 3:00 in the morning in The Situation Room facing
a decision that has to be made right now about how the United States
respond they might accidentally after all decide they weren't bluffing after all and then it's not for one and
all which is why the risk of war is high and it's worth bearing in mind just to
repeat some emphasize something I said before that the risk of war is high if
the risk of war is high than the risk of a nuclear Warrior is high because neither side can achieve a decisive
result with their conventional forces and both sides have plenty of nuclear forces
available now let me conclude this may seem a bit
melodramatic but I don't think we can in thinking about questions like orcus and
not just the orcus question but questions like orcus we cannot dis avoid a discussion of whether we our countries
my country your country believe we should go to war with China if necessary to try to preserve
the US lead order in Asia because that is the that is the big choice we potentially face this is what this
moment in history has delivered to us and we have to face that not because
orcus us having signed up to it if you guys sign up to it obliges us to do that
interesting question but particularly for Australia but it's not because of that it's because
commitment to orus is seen particularly seen by the us as a strong statement of support and
endorsement and encouragement to the idea that they
should go to war with China if that's necessary to preserve the US Le order in Asia because that is the declaratory
policy that the United States today seems to have or the implied declaratory policy that and and and securing that
kind of support is what orus is about America doesn't really care whether Australia has nuclear bad sub Ranch and
I don't think it really cares whether Australia or for that matter New Zealand sign up to the pillar two research
projects what it cares about is getting a statement of support for that approach
to the whole problem and the reason why I think that's a bad idea is that I don't think
that support that approach is going to succeed and not just because we won't win a war but because the shift in the
distribution of wealth and power AC impossible for America to remain the primary power in Asia or for that matter
the unipol or Global power no matter how much we like might like it to so very
quickly what's the alternative what else do we do well the first thing we do is
accept that we do now live in a multi-polar world and stop trying to preserve the old unipolar world we focus
on building an order and institutions that make that unipolar world work for us just as we
worked in 1944 5 to try and make the unip the multi-polar order that we saw
emerging after the second world war before it was hijacked by the B bipolar order of the Cold War just as we tried
worked hard in Australia's case part of our diplomatic mythology is Doc effort
turn ever turning up at San Francisco in 1945 and making a complete ass of himself trying to manage the way in
which the security Council was going to function didn't succeed in everything but he made a difference the second
thing we need to do is to accept that in Asia China and India are going to be the leading powers and we need to shape what
happens regionally in Asia to make that system work as well for us as possible
too and it's worth bringing mind we've been this way as well Australia and New Zealand sat down together in
1944 and negotiated What's called the Anzac pact or the Cambra pact which was
actually a pretty wacky piece of work and once again doc EV names all over it but but it was a serious attempt by our
two countries to try and shape our our regional order to to to suit our interests now we
need to have that ambition again because nobody else is going to do it for
us and the third thing to do is to recognize that whatever happens no matter how successful we are in those
two efforts this will be a harder world for us to live in is going to demand
more of us but not disastrously so what we need to do is to prepare for it we
need to prepare for it diplomatically and it will change the nature of our
diplomacy you know just ask the Mongolians but the heart of it is that
our neighbors will be much more important to us than our old distant friends and we can't be sentimental
about that but also militarily what we need to do is to
recognize that whilst Asia great Powers don't threaten us militarily yet China
doesn't threaten Australia militarily or New Zealand but in the longer term in the New Order I'm talking about the risk
that a great an Asian great power could threaten our territory us directly and militarily will be higher than we have
known at any time since 1945 but without the US coming to our Aid and so we do
have to ask ourselves whether we are prepared to do what's required to defend ourselves VES
independently in that situation now these are very big questions but then again this is the
biggest shift in our International circumstances since European settlement of our respective countries and so we
shouldn't be surprised this requires us to go right back to a blank sheet of paper and think out an think a lot of
things through from scratch and the the the worst thing we can do is to try and
evade that by just sticking to what we know and love
my final point is to go back to where I started almost started and that is that one thing I do think is clear is that in
this new world in this new Asia we will be we will be more alone
than we've been before but we'll be alone together and we'll mean more to one another than we have in the past
thank you very much
thanks H and welcome John McKinnon thank you was your
sir K and uh thank you very much Hugh uh thank you heish for your introduction
thank you also to Don and Helen for making this event possible by inviting Hugh over here uh Hugh and I go back a
long way we first met in the 1980s in canra I know that because the time my
daughter was a toddler and now she's approaching a zero birthday which I will not mention because she'd be deeply
embarrassed if I did so uh we have a long Association I'm very honored to be able to share this platform that said
I'm still not entirely sure what a discussant is um I imagine that you will
itching to ask questions of H and maybe my role is simply to provide a little bit of time for you to formulate those
questions so you can deliver them with the punchiness and the uh Bri brevity that I'm sure at heish will will be
looking for but let me just make a couple of um observations about what he
was said in terms of New Zealand's perspective on these issues and uh and if it does not seem entirely connected
here with what you said well I'm sure you'll you'll understand that I had to think about this before hearing you but
the first thing I want to talk about is actually about language because I think that in this country we don't normally
discuss security and strategic issues in the way that people do in Australia and
so that much of the discourse that we hear Echoes of across the tasma and that
we we know goes on in a very Lively manner in a very Australian manner in Australia doesn't actually have a
resonance here and that's not to say that how Australia does this right and we're wrong or vice versa it's simply I
think a a fact of the way that we don't think so much about these big strategic issues as Australia does maybe because
they're not quite so impactful on us now many of you will know the late lamented
uh Alan ginel who wrote uh he was a very experienced Australian Diplomat and I think also the president of the
Australian equivalent of this organization he wrote a book called fear of Abandonment which was a study of
Australian foreign policy I think from the 1940s through now I don't think
anybody's quite written an equivalent in New Zealand but I suspect if they did it would be something like fear of being
left out or fear of being forgotten it would be a rather different sort of set
of propositions and that is simply another way of saying that the way we in
New Zealand look at some of these issues often is not exactly the same as as uh as people look at it in Australia or in
other countries but if I can paraphrase one of your points you may not be
interested in geopolitical strategic competition but geopolitical strategic competition is interested in you and
this is a this is a since could be a bit of a wakeup call for New Zealand that we actually find ourselves in a world which
is not the world in which we have been able to pursue our national interests which for many of us has been about
increasing the value of our exports and doing such other things but it's about in fact how do we exist and live in a
world which isn't quite the world of which which we grew up but I would also
agree with you on another point I do actually agree with quite a lot of what you said um we don't get much choice in
this New Zealand even l and Australia is able to shape its strategic environment
in other words we are there basically we will take what it comes so if this is about the United States Primacy fine if
it's about China becoming more powerful well that's what we'll make our way with that if it's about India rising up we'll
find ways of dealing with that we don't it's not so much about we can influence
things but we have to find a way of managing relations with a great variety of countries so that in some ways
although I wouldn't over State this we may be better equipped thank you thank
you for agreeing with me we may be better equipped to operate in this in this world that you've described then in
fact uh some of our other friends because it's actually the world that as many of us as diplomats know we have had
to operate in for many many years we don't go out in the world and people say my goodness it's New Zealand Ambassador
coming my goodness I better sort things out strange to say it doesn't really happen like that and uh
with you yeah yeah I'm sure I did yeah but we have we have to make the case regardless and so in that sense I think
uh while while I think we can I can agree and and and you know with what you're saying in terms of the
description of what may lie head I just don't know that it could necessarily be as apocalyptic for us as it might seem
to be for certainly some people in Australia many maybe many many people in Australia um another point I'll just
make in terms of uh preferen and this is something which I think Bears on how New
Zealand might react in certain situations which may or may not occur in the future and that is we by far prefer
diplomatic solutions to military ones now you might say well that's simply a realistic way of saying well we have
something to offer in diplomacy and we don't have quite so much to offer in terms of the military but in any case
it's something that I think runs quite deep in New Zealand so for instance if to come to your point about Taiwan which
um I I probably a little more optimistic than you about the the the the fact that
the Chinese may have some exhibit some of strength there um we certainly
obviously we we recognize the whole One China policy and Taiwan as part of that at the same time we've always said quite
consistently we don't want this to be resolved by force we want it to be resolved by agreement and I imagine that
that would be however um vain that may seem in terms of the turn of events
which you were outlining uh that is something I think that will still be quite prominent in the terms of the
minds of New Zealand policy makers that they will not want to be involved in something which is uh looks to be a very
messy messy sort of conflict um finally if I can just touch very briefly on the
subject of the day namely orus uh because I feel if I don't touch on it somebody's going to ask me a question so
I may as well get in first I mean with any big decision of this kind I always
think there's a merit in breaking it down and in not making it a sort of a black and white and I say this with
great respect to our Two Hosts here who willough H hosts who have been arguing
the case about this but just I also take a little bit of Refuge in hsh's comment about you know the New Zealand China
Council as a is not a an organization which makes statements about policy so I
want to stick to that but I do think that if you look at it in terms of you know what sort of
uh operational interaction interoperability will this deliver what what who are the sort of Partners we
wish to be to if you think of it and break it down in those terms it makes it a bit easier to think about the issues
which are being presented than if it's simply a black or white yes or no issue do we or do we not uh do do we or do we
not sign up the final point I wish to make is simply that um we uh you know
we're not actually alone in the world in this uh apart from the fact that we have our friends across the Tasman which is a
very interesting relationship and a very significant one and a very important one and likely to become more important I Su
speak as as as we move ahead we also have to think of the people in Southeast Asia uh and the other people that you
described who sit in that area of zone between the emerging great Powers
everybody in that area including ourselves has to figure out how are we going to operate in this new world where
maybe things are not quite what they have been in the past and while that you know in a sense