風蕭蕭_Frank
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這位政治學家認為，北約的魯莽擴張激怒了俄羅斯
2022 年 3 月 19 日
烏克蘭戰爭是自 1962 年古巴導彈危機以來最危險的國際衝突。 如果我們要防止事情變得更糟，並找到一種方法來結束它，那麽了解其根本原因至關重要。
毫無疑問，弗拉基米爾·普京發動了這場戰爭，並對戰爭的進行負責。 但他為什麽這麽做則是另一回事了。 西方主流觀點認為，他是一個非理性、脫離現實的侵略者，一心想按照前蘇聯的模式建立一個更大的俄羅斯。 因此，他一個人對烏克蘭危機負有全部責任。
但這個故事是錯誤的。 西方，特別是美國，對2014年2月開始的這場危機負有主要責任。現在這場危機已經演變成一場戰爭，不僅有可能摧毀烏克蘭，而且有可能升級為俄羅斯與北約之間的核戰爭。
烏克蘭問題實際上始於2008年4月的北約布加勒斯特峰會，當時喬治·W·布什政府推動該聯盟宣布烏克蘭和格魯吉亞“將成為其成員”。 俄羅斯領導人立即做出憤怒回應，稱這一決定對俄羅斯構成生存威脅，並誓言予以阻止。 據一位受人尊敬的俄羅斯記者稱，普京“勃然大怒”，並警告說，“如果烏克蘭加入北約，克裏米亞和東部地區將被排除在外。” 它隻會崩潰。” 然而，美國無視莫斯科的紅線，並推動烏克蘭成為俄羅斯邊境的西方堡壘。 該戰略還包括另外兩個要素：讓烏克蘭更接近歐盟並使其成為親美的民主國家。
這些努力最終在 2014 年 2 月引發了敵對行動，起義（得到美國支持）導致烏克蘭親俄總統維克托·亞努科維奇逃離該國。 作為回應，俄羅斯從烏克蘭手中奪取了克裏米亞，並助長了烏克蘭東部頓巴斯地區爆發的內戰。
下一次重大對抗發生在 2021 年 12 月，並直接導致了當前的戰爭。 主要原因是烏克蘭正在成為北約事實上的成員。 這一進程始於 2017 年 12 月，當時特朗普政府決定向基輔出售“防禦武器”。 然而，什麽算作“防禦性”卻很難明確，而且這些武器對莫斯科及其在頓巴斯地區的盟友來說顯然是具有攻擊性的。 其他北約國家也加入了這一行動，向烏克蘭運送武器，訓練其武裝部隊，並允許其參加聯合空中和海上演習。 2021年7月，烏克蘭和美國在黑海地區共同舉辦了一次大型海軍演習，共有32個國家的海軍參加。 “海風”行動幾乎激怒了俄羅斯向一艘故意進入俄羅斯認為其領海的英國海軍驅逐艦開火。
在拜登政府領導下，烏克蘭和美國之間的聯係繼續加強。 這一承諾體現在一份重要文件中——《美國-烏克蘭戰略夥伴關係憲章》——該文件由美國國務卿安東尼·布林肯和烏克蘭國務卿德米特羅·庫萊巴於 11 月簽署。 其目的是“強調......對烏克蘭實施全麵融入歐洲和歐洲大西洋機構所必需的深入和全麵改革的承諾。” 該文件明確建立在“加強烏克蘭與美國關係的承諾之上”。 澤倫斯基總統和拜登總統的戰略夥伴關係”，並強調兩國將以“2008年布加勒斯特峰會宣言”為指導。
不出所料，莫斯科發現這種不斷變化的局勢無法容忍，並於去年春天開始在烏克蘭邊境調動軍隊，以向華盛頓表明其決心。 但這並沒有產生任何效果，拜登政府繼續向烏克蘭靠攏。 這導致俄羅斯在 12 月引發了全麵的外交僵局。 正如俄羅斯外交部長謝爾蓋·拉夫羅夫所說：“我們已經達到了沸點。” 俄羅斯要求烏克蘭提供書麵保證，保證烏克蘭永遠不會成為北約的一部分，並要求北約撤走其自 1997 年以來在東歐部署的軍事資產。隨後的談判失敗了，正如布林肯明確表示的那樣：“沒有任何改變。 不會有任何改變。” 一個月後，普京發動了對烏克蘭的入侵，以消除他所看到的來自北約的威脅。
這種解釋
這些事件與西方盛行的口號不一致，西方盛行的口號認為北約擴張與烏克蘭危機無關，而是歸咎於普京的擴張主義目標。 根據北約最近發給俄羅斯領導人的一份文件，“北約是一個防禦性聯盟，對俄羅斯不構成威脅。” 現有證據與這些說法相矛盾。 首先，當前的問題不是西方領導人所說的北約的目的或意圖是什麽；而是西方領導人所說的北約的目的或意圖。 這就是莫斯科如何看待北約的行動。
普京肯定知道，征服和占領東歐大片領土的成本對俄羅斯來說是難以承受的。 正如他曾經說過的：“誰不思念蘇聯，誰就沒有心。” 誰想拿回來，誰就沒有腦子。” 盡管他相信俄羅斯和烏克蘭之間的緊密聯係，但試圖奪回整個烏克蘭就像試圖吞下一隻豪豬一樣。 此外，包括普京在內的俄羅斯政策製定者幾乎沒有提及征服新領土以重建蘇聯或建設一個更大的俄羅斯。 相反，自2008年布加勒斯特峰會以來，俄羅斯領導人一再表示，他們認為烏克蘭加入北約是一種必須加以防止的生存威脅。 正如拉夫羅夫一月份指出的那樣，“一切的關鍵是保證北約不會東擴。”
很明顯，西方領導人在 2014 年之前很少將俄羅斯描述為對歐洲的軍事威脅。正如美國前駐莫斯科大使邁克爾·麥克福爾 (Michael McFaul) 指出的那樣，普京奪取克裏米亞的計劃並不長久； 這是針對推翻烏克蘭親俄領導人的政變而做出的衝動舉動。 事實上，在那之前，北約擴張的目的是將整個歐洲變成一個巨大的和平區，而不是遏製危險的俄羅斯。 然而，危機一旦爆發，美國和歐洲的政策製定者就無法承認是他們試圖將烏克蘭融入西方而引發了這場危機。 他們宣稱問題的真正根源是俄羅斯的複仇主義及其統治烏克蘭（如果不是征服烏克蘭的話）的願望。
鑒於自 20 世紀 90 年代末以來許多著名的美國外交政策專家就對北約擴張發出警告，我關於衝突原因的故事不應引起爭議。 在布加勒斯特峰會期間，美國國防部長羅伯特·蓋茨認識到“試圖將格魯吉亞和烏克蘭納入北約確實是太過分了”。 事實上，在那次峰會上，德國總理安格拉·默克爾和法國總統尼古拉·薩科齊都反對推動烏克蘭加入北約，因為他們擔心這會激怒俄羅斯。
我的解釋的結果是，我們正處於極其危險的境地，而西方政策正在加劇這些風險。 對於俄羅斯領導人來說，烏克蘭發生的事情與他們的帝國野心受挫沒有多大關係； 這是為了應對他們認為對俄羅斯未來構成直接威脅的問題。 普京可能誤判了俄羅斯的軍事能力、烏克蘭抵抗運動的有效性以及西方反應的範圍和速度，但人們永遠不應該低估當大國自以為陷入困境時的冷酷無情。 然而，美國及其盟友正在加倍努力，希望給普京帶來恥辱性的失敗，甚至可能引發他的下台。 他們正在增加對烏克蘭的援助，同時利用經濟製裁對俄羅斯進行大規模懲罰，普京現在認為此舉“類似於宣戰”。
美國及其盟友也許能夠阻止俄羅斯在烏克蘭取得勝利，但該國即使不被肢解，也將受到嚴重損害。 此外，烏克蘭以外地區還存在局勢升級的嚴重威脅，更不用說核戰爭的危險了。 如果西方不僅在烏克蘭戰場上挫敗莫斯科，而且還對俄羅斯經濟造成嚴重、持久的損害，那麽它實際上是在將一個大國推向崩潰的邊緣。 普京隨後可能會轉向核武器。
目前尚無法知道解決這場衝突的條款。 但是，如果我們不了解其深層原因，我們將無法在烏克蘭遭到破壞以及北約最終與俄羅斯發生戰爭之前結束它。
約翰·J·米爾斯海默 (John J. Mearsheimer) 是芝加哥大學政治學 R. 溫德爾·哈裏森 (R. Wendell Harrison) 傑出服務教授。
John Mearsheimer on why the West is principally responsible for the Ukrainian crisis
The political scientist believes the reckless expansion of NATO provoked Russia
THE WAR in Ukraine is the most dangerous international conflict since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Understanding its root causes is essential if we are to prevent it from getting worse and, instead, to find a way to bring it to a close.
There is no question that Vladimir Putin started the war and is responsible for how it is being waged. But why he did so is another matter. The mainstream view in the West is that he is an irrational, out-of-touch aggressor bent on creating a greater Russia in the mould of the former Soviet Union. Thus, he alone bears full responsibility for the Ukraine crisis.
But that story is wrong. The West, and especially America, is principally responsible for the crisis which began in February 2014. It has now turned into a war that not only threatens to destroy Ukraine, but also has the potential to escalate into a nuclear war between Russia and NATO.
The trouble over Ukraine actually started at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008, when George W. Bush’s administration pushed the alliance to announce that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members”. Russian leaders responded immediately with outrage, characterising this decision as an existential threat to Russia and vowing to thwart it. According to a respected Russian journalist, Mr Putin “flew into a rage” and warned that “if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.” America ignored Moscow’s red line, however, and pushed forward to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. That strategy included two other elements: bringing Ukraine closer to the eu and making it a pro-American democracy.
These efforts eventually sparked hostilities in February 2014, after an uprising (which was supported by America) caused Ukraine’s pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, to flee the country. In response, Russia took Crimea from Ukraine and helped fuel a civil war that broke out in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.
The next major confrontation came in December 2021 and led directly to the current war. The main cause was that Ukraine was becoming a de facto member of NATO. The process started in December 2017, when the Trump administration decided to sell Kyiv “defensive weapons”. What counts as “defensive” is hardly clear-cut, however, and these weapons certainly looked offensive to Moscow and its allies in the Donbas region. Other NATO countries got in on the act, shipping weapons to Ukraine, training its armed forces and allowing it to participate in joint air and naval exercises. In July 2021, Ukraine and America co-hosted a major naval exercise in the Black Sea region involving navies from 32 countries. Operation Sea Breeze almost provoked Russia to fire at a British naval destroyer that deliberately entered what Russia considers its territorial waters.
The links between Ukraine and America continued growing under the Biden administration. This commitment is reflected throughout an important document—the “us-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership”—that was signed in November by Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, and Dmytro Kuleba, his Ukrainian counterpart. The aim was to “underscore … a commitment to Ukraine’s implementation of the deep and comprehensive reforms necessary for full integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.” The document explicitly builds on “the commitments made to strengthen the Ukraine-u.s. strategic partnership by Presidents Zelensky and Biden,” and also emphasises that the two countries will be guided by the “2008 Bucharest Summit Declaration.”
Unsurprisingly, Moscow found this evolving situation intolerable and began mobilising its army on Ukraine’s border last spring to signal its resolve to Washington. But it had no effect, as the Biden administration continued to move closer to Ukraine. This led Russia to precipitate a full-blown diplomatic stand-off in December. As Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, put it: “We reached our boiling point.” Russia demanded a written guarantee that Ukraine would never become a part of NATO and that the alliance remove the military assets it had deployed in eastern Europe since 1997. The subsequent negotiations failed, as Mr Blinken made clear: “There is no change. There will be no change.” A month later Mr Putin launched an invasion of Ukraine to eliminate the threat he saw from NATO.
This interpretation of events is at odds with the prevailing mantra in the West, which portrays NATO expansion as irrelevant to the Ukraine crisis, blaming instead Mr Putin’s expansionist goals. According to a recent NATO document sent to Russian leaders, “NATO is a defensive Alliance and poses no threat to Russia.” The available evidence contradicts these claims. For starters, the issue at hand is not what Western leaders say NATO’s purpose or intentions are; it is how Moscow sees NATO’s actions.
Mr Putin surely knows that the costs of conquering and occupying large amounts of territory in eastern Europe would be prohibitive for Russia. As he once put it, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart. Whoever wants it back has no brain.” His beliefs about the tight bonds between Russia and Ukraine notwithstanding, trying to take back all of Ukraine would be like trying to swallow a porcupine. Furthermore, Russian policymakers—including Mr Putin—have said hardly anything about conquering new territory to recreate the Soviet Union or build a greater Russia. Rather, since the 2008 Bucharest summit Russian leaders have repeatedly said that they view Ukraine joining NATO as an existential threat that must be prevented. As Mr Lavrov noted in January, “the key to everything is the guarantee that NATO will not expand eastward.”
Tellingly, Western leaders rarely described Russia as a military threat to Europe before 2014. As America’s former ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul notes, Mr Putin’s seizure of Crimea was not planned for long; it was an impulsive move in response to the coup that overthrew Ukraine’s pro-Russian leader. In fact, until then, NATO expansion was aimed at turning all of Europe into a giant zone of peace, not containing a dangerous Russia. Once the crisis started, however, American and European policymakers could not admit they had provoked it by trying to integrate Ukraine into the West. They declared the real source of the problem was Russia’s revanchism and its desire to dominate if not conquer Ukraine.
My story about the conflict’s causes should not be controversial, given that many prominent American foreign-policy experts have warned against NATO expansion since the late 1990s. America’s secretary of defence at the time of the Bucharest summit, Robert Gates, recognised that “trying to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO was truly overreaching”. Indeed, at that summit, both the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, were opposed to moving forward on NATO membership for Ukraine because they feared it would infuriate Russia.
The upshot of my interpretation is that we are in an extremely dangerous situation, and Western policy is exacerbating these risks. For Russia’s leaders, what happens in Ukraine has little to do with their imperial ambitions being thwarted; it is about dealing with what they regard as a direct threat to Russia’s future. Mr Putin may have misjudged Russia’s military capabilities, the effectiveness of the Ukrainian resistance and the scope and speed of the Western response, but one should never underestimate how ruthless great powers can be when they believe they are in dire straits. America and its allies, however, are doubling down, hoping to inflict a humiliating defeat on Mr Putin and to maybe even trigger his removal. They are increasing aid to Ukraine while using economic sanctions to inflict massive punishment on Russia, a step that Putin now sees as “akin to a declaration of war”.
America and its allies may be able to prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine, but the country will be gravely damaged, if not dismembered. Moreover, there is a serious threat of escalation beyond Ukraine, not to mention the danger of nuclear war. If the West not only thwarts Moscow on Ukraine’s battlefields, but also does serious, lasting damage to Russia’s economy, it is in effect pushing a great power to the brink. Mr Putin might then turn to nuclear weapons.
At this point it is impossible to know the terms on which this conflict will be settled. But, if we do not understand its deep cause, we will be unable to end it before Ukraine is wrecked and NATO ends up in a war with Russia.
John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago.
