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美國對華新大戰略
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/wake-america-china-must-be-contained-12616
很簡單，美中關係的根本問題涉及亞洲的力量平衡。
作者：羅伯特·D·布萊克威爾 阿什利·J·泰利斯 2015 年 4 月 13 日
美國需要從根本上改變對華大戰略。
隻要看看最近的亞洲基礎設施投資銀行（AIIB）的慘敗，我們就能明白中國的崛起是如何挑戰美國的全球影響力的。中國領導的國際金融機構準備削弱美國領導的世界銀行和國際貨幣基金組織的影響力，同時將中國在亞太地區的地緣經濟脅迫製度化。意大利、法國、英國、德國、韓國、丹麥和澳大利亞已簽約成為亞投行成員，泰國甚至台灣也計劃加入。 與此同時，美國仍處於局外觀望狀態，因為其影響力受到中國崛起的直接挑戰。
除了亞投行之外，中國還在推行一係列其他舉措，以擴大其在亞洲及其他地區的戰略影響力。 中國宣布了推進亞太自由貿易區（FTAAP）和區域全麵經濟夥伴關係（RCEP）的計劃，這些貿易協定將中國、日本、印度和東南亞國家的經濟聯係起來。
北京同時正在推動建設新絲綢之路，該道路將開辟穿越中亞的貿易路線以及環繞東南亞和南亞的海上路線，更好地將中國與不斷增長的亞洲經濟體在地緣政治上連接起來，並通過它們與中東和歐洲連接起來。 除了這些項目之外，巴西、俄羅斯、印度、中國和南非之間正在討論建立新的金磚國家開發銀行。
中國三十多年來經濟的持續成功，使其積聚了強大的實力，成為最有能力稱霸亞洲大陸的國家。 北京的經濟崛起令人震驚；35年來，其經濟每年以10%的速度增長，國內生產總值 (GDP) 從1979年的1,470億美元猛增到2013年的9.24萬億美元。
盡管中國的人均收入仍然落後於美國，中國經濟的飛速增長已經為北京提供了挑戰亞洲鄰國安全和華盛頓在亞洲影響力所需的資源，並帶來潛在的危險後果。盡管中國GDP總體增長大幅放緩，但在可預見的未來，其相對增長率可能會高於美國。
在強勁經濟的支持下，北京開始對中國人民解放軍進行協調一致的現代化，目的是積聚軍事力量，既能夠擊敗當地對手，又能夠阻止美國在危機中出手防禦。1997年中國的軍事預算僅為100億美元，1998年至2007年間年均增長15.9%。
今年，中國宣布將國防預算增加10.1%，即軍費開支約1450億美元。然而，這個總數並不能說明全部情況。 如果算上武器進口、軍事研發以及解放軍戰略力量的支出，中國的軍費開支可能比去年增長40%至55%。中國新興的軍事能力增強了其在亞太地區投射力量的能力，旨在限製美國進入該地區。
很簡單，美中關係的根本問題涉及亞洲的力量平衡。正如亨利·基辛格所說：“最終，和平隻能通過霸權或均勢才能實現。”由於曆史、意識形態、戰略文化、國內政治等方麵的巨大差異，中美兩國對亞洲未來力量平衡的認知截然相反、互不相容。
中國對美大戰略很明確：取代美國成為亞洲主要戰略參與者； 削弱美國在該地區的聯盟體係； 削弱亞洲國家對美國信譽、可靠性和持久力的信心； 利用中國的經濟實力讓亞洲國家更接近北京的地緣政治政策偏好； 提高中國軍事能力，加強對美國軍事幹預的威懾； 對美國經濟模式提出質疑； 確保美國的民主價值觀不會削弱中國共產黨對國內權力的控製； 並避免在未來十年與美國發生重大對抗。
在第二次世界大戰最激烈時期出版的經典著作《現代戰略的製定者：從馬基雅維利到希特勒的軍事思想》中，編輯愛德華·米德·厄爾定義了大戰略
作為“控製和利用一個國家資源的藝術……以有效促進和保護其切身利益，對抗實際的、潛在的或僅僅是假定的敵人。”
對於美國來說，大戰略長期以來一直專注於獲取並保持對各種競爭對手的卓越實力。 然而，麵對崛起的中國，美國未能將這一長達數百年的國家安全方針付諸實施。
相反，在與中國打交道時，華盛頓決策者可以采用一係列的政策選擇和言辭。 人們談論華盛頓和北京之間的二國集團（G2）關係，鼓勵中國成為“負責任的利益相關者”，以及最近在北京出現的“新型大國關係”概念。
這些政策選擇都不足以強化21世紀美國對華大戰略的主旨——維持美國在亞洲的戰略主導地位。 因此，華盛頓迫切需要在該地區采取一係列新的行動，重點是平衡中國實力的崛起，而不是繼續協助其崛起。
由於全球化的現實，美國新的對華大戰略不能像之前限製蘇聯實力的努力那樣建立在遏製的基礎上。 它也不意味著突然放棄美國長期以來將中國融入國際體係的努力。 相反，它必須對華盛頓現行政策進行重大改變，以限製中國的地緣經濟、軍事和外交擴張對美國在亞洲和全球的國家利益構成的危險。
美國需要將其政策集中在五個不同的目標上：振興美國經濟以維持不對稱的經濟優勢； 在美國朋友之間創造新的、有意識地將中國排除在外的優惠貿易安排； 與美國盟友重建技術控製製度，阻止中國獲得先進的軍事和戰略能力； 共同增強美國在中國周邊的盟友和朋友的能力； 提高美國軍隊在亞太地區有效投送力量的能力。 所有這些目標必須在繼續以符合美國國家利益的多種方式與中國合作的同時實現。
在所有國家中—在大多數可以想象的情況下—中國現在是、未來幾十年仍將是美國最重要的競爭對手。 中國的崛起正在給美國的力量投射、美國的亞洲盟友和朋友以及美國領導的國際秩序帶來越來越多的地緣政治、軍事、經濟和意識形態挑戰。
華盛頓目前對北京的態度，有利於中國在經濟和政治上融入自由國際體係，而犧牲美國的全球主導地位和亞洲主導地位，正在削弱美國在整個亞洲及其他地區的影響力。
羅伯特·布萊克威爾 (Robert D. Blackwill) 是外交關係委員會美國外交政策亨利·基辛格高級研究員。 阿什利·J·泰利斯 (Ashley J. Tellis) 是卡內基國際和平基金會南亞項目的高級研究員。 他們是外交關係委員會新報告《修訂美國對華大戰略》的合著者，該報告可在 CFR.org 上在線獲取。
A New U.S. Grand Strategy towards China
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/wake-america-china-must-be-contained-12616
The fundamental problem in U.S.-China relations concerns, quite simply, the balance of power in Asia.
The United States needs to fundamentally change its grand strategy toward China.
One need look no further than the recent Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) debacle to understand how China's ascent is aimed at challenging American global reach. The China-led international financial institution is poised to undermine the influence of the U.S.-led World Bank and International Monetary Fund while institutionalizing China’s geoeconomic coercion in the Asia-Pacific. Italy, France, Britain, Germany, South Korea, Denmark, and Australia have signed on as members of the AIIB, with Thailand and even Taiwan eyeing imminent entry. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains on the outside looking in as its influence is directly challenged by China’s rise.
Along with the AIIB, China is also pursuing a number of additional initiatives to expand its strategic reach in Asia and beyond. China has announced plans to advance a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—trade agreements that link the economies of China, Japan, and India along with Southeast Asian countries.
Beijing is simultaneously promoting the creation of a New Silk Road, which would open trade routes through Central Asia and maritime routes around Southeast and South Asia, better connecting China geopolitically to growing Asian economies and, through them, to the Middle East and Europe. Add to these projects the ongoing discussions over the creation of a new BRICS Development Bank between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
China’s sustained economic success over the last thirty-odd years has enabled it to aggregate formidable power, making it the nation most capable of dominating the Asian continent. Beijing’s economic rise has been staggering; its economy has grown at 10 percent annually for 35 years, and overall gross domestic product (GDP) has exploded from just $147 billion in 1979 to $9.24 trillion in 2013.
The meteoric growth of the Chinese economy, even if PRC per capita income remains behind that of the United States, has already provided Beijing with the resources necessary to challenge the security of both its Asian neighbors and Washington’s influence in Asia, with potentially dangerous consequences. Even as China’s overall GDP growth slows considerably, its relative growth rates are likely to be higher than those of the United States for the foreseeable future.
Backed by this robust economy, Beijing has embarked on a concerted modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with the intention to amass military power capable of both defeating local adversaries and deterring the United States from coming to their defense in a crisis. China’s military budget, which was just $10 billion in 1997, saw an average annual increase of 15.9 percent between 1998 and 2007.
This year, China has announced that it will increase its defense budget by 10.1 percent, or roughly $145 billion in military spending. That total, however, doesn’t tell the full story; when weapons imports, military research and development, and spending on PLA strategic forces are included, China’s military spending could see an increase of 40 to 55 percent from last year. China’s emerging military capabilities enhance its ability to project power in the Asia-Pacific with the goal of limiting U.S. access to the region.
The fundamental problem in U.S.-China relations concerns, quite simply, the balance of power in Asia. As Henry Kissinger has put it, “In the end, peace can be achieved only by hegemony or by balance of power.” Because of profound differences in history, ideology, strategic culture, and domestic politics, the United States and China have diametrically opposed and mutually incompatible perceptions regarding the future balance of power in Asia.
China’s grand strategy toward the United States is clear: to replace the United States as the primary strategic actor in Asia; to weaken the U.S. alliance system in the region; to undermine the confidence of Asian nations in U.S. credibility, reliability, and staying power; to use China’s economic power to pull Asian nations closer to Beijing’s geopolitical policy preferences; to increase Chinese military capability to strengthen deterrence against U.S. military intervention; to cast doubt on the U.S. economic model; to ensure American democratic values do not diminish the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on domestic power; and to avoid a major confrontation with the United States in the next decade.
In a classic work published at the height of the Second World War, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, editor Edward Meade Earle defined grand strategy as “the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation…to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed.”
For the United States, grand strategy has long focused on acquiring and maintaining preeminent power over various rivals. In the face of a rising China, however, the United States has failed to apply this centuries long approach to its national security.
Instead, a gamut of policy options and rhetoric has emerged for Washington policymakers to employ when it comes to dealing with China. There’s talk of a Group of Two (G2) relationship between Washington and Beijing, of encouraging China to become a “responsible stakeholder,” and—most recently—the emergence in Beijing of the concept of “a new type of great power relations.”
None of these policy alternatives are adequate to reinforce what should be the main thrust of U.S. grand strategy toward China in the 21st century—to maintain American strategic primacy in Asia. Thus, Washington urgently needs a new set of actions in the region that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.
A new U.S. grand strategy toward China cannot be built on a bedrock of containment, as the previous effort to limit Soviet power had been, because of the realities of globalization. Nor can it involve abruptly jettisoning the long time U.S. effort of integrating China into the international system. Rather, it must involve crucial changes to current Washington policies in order to limit the dangers that China’s geoeconomic, military and diplomatic expansion pose to U.S. national interests in Asia and globally.
The United States needs to focus its policy on five distinct objectives: revitalizing the American economy to sustain asymmetric economic advantages; creating new preferential trading arrangements among U.S. friends that consciously exclude China; recreating a technology-control regime with U.S. allies to prevent China from acquiring advanced military and strategic capabilities; concertedly building up the capacities of U.S. allies and friends on China’s periphery; and improving the capability of U.S. military forces to effectively project power in the Asia-Pacific region. All of these objectives must be accomplished while continuing to work with China in the diverse ways that are consistent with U.S. national interests.
Of all nations—and in most conceivable scenarios—China is and will remain the most significant competitor to the United States for decades to come. China’s rise is producing increased geopolitical, military, economic and ideological challenges to U.S. power projection, to America’s Asian allies and friends, and to the U.S.-led international order.
Washington’s current approach toward Beijing, one that favors China’s economic and political integration into the liberal international system at the expense of the United States’ global preeminence and Asian primacy, is weakening U.S. influence throughout Asia and beyond.
Robert D. Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Ashley J. Tellis is Senior Associate in the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. They are co-authors of a new Council on Foreign Relations report, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China,” available online at CFR.org.
