製造商需要麵對新一波的中國競爭

製造商需要麵對新一波的中國競爭

https://www.ft.com/content/9feb754c-d1c1-4b3b-8e4a-c09c240d1179

後疫情時代的發展步伐給西方企業敲響了警鍾 THOMAS HALE

大眾汽車在中國安徽省投資建立了一個研發中心 © Qilai Shen/彭博社

托馬斯·黑爾 2024 年 4 月 15 日

今年三月，當瑞典投資者和銀行家組成的訪問代表團自疫情以來首次經過中國的工廠和造船廠時，他們目睹了對他們的係統的震驚。

德國商業銀行首席股票策略師馬蒂亞斯·桑德林表示，在瑞典製造商長期存在的整個中國大陸，來自中國企業的競爭是“激烈的”，甚至是“可怕的”。 “他們在短短兩三年內趕上並發展的方式令我們震驚，”他說。“中國競爭的陳詞濫調形象是廉價複製品之一。 我認為這次旅行給我們敲響的警鍾是，情況已不再是這樣了。”

從高中考試到奶茶特許經營，激烈的國內競爭在中國各地普遍存在。現在，隨著電動汽車生產的擴大，這種競爭意識給國際企業帶來了越來越大的挑戰。

汽車隻是更廣泛的工業框架的一部分，在這個框架中，幾十年來，發達經濟體一直依賴中國作為廉價的協作製造中心。瑞典的企業包括世界領先的空氣壓縮機供應商阿特拉斯·科普柯和采礦設備製造商山特維克等巨頭。

合作的氣氛並沒有消失，尤其是在現在主要由中國公民組成的外國公司。但現在也伴隨著越來越大的競爭壓力。“普遍的看法是，如果你不是優質產品，那麽你絕對會受到打擊，”桑德林說。

在俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭並因疫情關閉邊境後，美國和歐洲各國政府高度重視“降低”供應鏈風險，遠離中國的必要性。 但內地競爭越激烈，國際產業參與者就越難離開。2020年底，大眾汽車在安徽省開設了研發中心，並擁有中國電池公司國軒高科的主要股權。

新老工業公司都一再強調進入中國進行研究並進入其廣闊市場的必要性。 Windrose Technology是一家電動卡車初創公司，迄今已生產13輛汽車，目標最終在美國上市，但目前依賴中國大陸合作夥伴（包括國有的安徽江淮汽車集團）進行製造。

Windrose 創始人韓文表示：“作為一家電動汽車製造商，如果你與中國沒有聯係，並且假裝自己是電動汽車領域世界上最好的卡車，那麽沒有人會相信你。”“如果我告訴人們我是一家澳大利亞電動汽車初創公司，人們可能不會相信我。 如果我告訴人們我是一家英國電動汽車初創公司，他們也不會相信我。”

盡管中國在某些方麵是競爭的溫床，但其產業模式的性質與美國和歐洲有很大不同。 所謂“高質量發展”是2025年“中國製造”政策中自上而下的一部分，也是習近平主席去年的主要口號。

本周，歐盟委員會更新了一份關於中國貿易扭曲的 2017 年政策文件，其中指出能源和金融等多個領域的國內競爭和任何希望擴張的外國企業都受到壓製。

但報告也談到了具有中國特色的競爭。 報告指出，在中國，"各省和主要城市之間似乎在爭奪在其地區擁有[電動汽車]生產商，以吸引就業、收入和中央政府的關注”。

中國政府的角色很難輕易地與西方經濟體中透明的規範相匹配。 中國企業通常不會回答有關其與政府關係的問題，但由於歐盟報告長達 700 多頁，這些關係是廣泛存在的。

如果與中國企業的競爭進一步加劇，對中國與國際貿易關係的政治審查也會加劇。 但是，在歐洲和美國，企業已經在急於提高對競爭本質的理解。

在瑞典之行中，大多數參與者甚至沒有直接投資中國，但由於持有國內股票市場，他們覺得有必要參加。

“北歐公司，尤其是製造業公司，直接或間接地擁有巨大的風險敞口，”桑德林說。 “我們一回來就 。 。 。 我們已經被各種對話和會議淹沒了。”

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Manufacturers need to face up to new wave of Chinese competition

https://www.ft.com/content/9feb754c-d1c1-4b3b-8e4a-c09c240d1179

Pace of post-pandemic development a wake-up call for western companies THOMAS HALE

Volkswagen has invested in a research and development centre in China’s Anhui province © Qilai Shen/Bloomberg 

Thomas Hale APRIL 15 2024

In March, as a visiting delegation of Swedish investors and bankers passed through China’s factories and shipyards for the first time since the pandemic, what they witnessed was a shock to their systems.

Across the mainland, where Sweden’s manufacturers have a long-standing presence, competition from Chinese firms was “ferocious”, even “monstrous”, according to Mattias Sundling, chief equity strategist at Handelsbanken. “The way they have caught up and developed in just two or three years was just stunning to us,” he said. “The cliched image of Chinese competition was one of cheap copies. I think the wake-up call for us when we were on this trip is that this is no longer the case.”

From high school examinations to bubble tea franchises, intense domestic competition is pervasive across China. Now, as embodied in expanding electric-vehicle production, that sense of competition poses a growing challenge to international businesses.

Autos are just one part of a wider industrial framework within which, for decades, developed economies have relied on China as an inexpensive and collaborative manufacturing hub. The Swedish presence includes giants such as Atlas Copco, the world’s leading provider of air compressors, and Sandvik, which makes mining equipment.

An air of collaboration, especially at foreign companies now largely staffed by Chinese nationals, has not disappeared. But it is now accompanied by mounting competitive pressure. “The general take is if you are not a premium product, you are getting absolutely hammered,” said Sundling.

Governments in the US and Europe have focused heavily on the need to “de-risk” supply chains away from China after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and border closures under the pandemic. But the more competitive the mainland becomes, the harder it is for international industrial players to leave. At the end of 2020 Volkswagen opened a research and development centre in Anhui province, and owns a major stake in Guoxuan, a Chinese battery firm.

Both old and new industrial companies repeatedly emphasise the need to be in China for research purposes as well as to access its vast market. Windrose Technology, an electric truck start-up that has so far produced 13 vehicles, aims to eventually list in the US but currently relies on mainland China partners, including state-owned Anhui Jianghuai Automobile Group, for manufacturing.

“As an EV maker, if you are not linked to China and you pretend to be the world’s best truck in the EV space, no one’s going to believe you,” said Wen Han, Windrose founder. “If I told people I was an Australian EV start-up, people would just probably not believe me. If I told people I’m a British EV start-up, they would also not believe me.”

While China is in some respects a hotbed of competition, the nature of its industrial model differs profoundly from the US and Europe. The need for so-called “high quality development” is part of a top-down approach set out in the 2025 “Made in China” policy and has become President Xi Jinping’s main refrain in the past year.

This week, the European Commission updated a 2017 policy document on Chinese trade distortions that identifies various areas, such as energy and finance, in which competition is suppressed both domestically and for any foreign firms hoping to expand.

But the report also touches on competition with Chinese characteristics. In China, it notes, “the provinces and the main cities appear to be in competition among them to have [electric-vehicle] producers in their area, in order to attract employment, revenues and the attention of the central government”.

The role of the state in China is difficult to easily map on to transparently-codified norms in western economies. Chinese companies do not typically engage with questions on their relationship to the government, but, as the EU report establishes over 700 pages, those relationships are widespread.

If competition with Chinese companies rises further, so will political scrutiny of China’s relationship with international trade. But, across Europe and the US, businesses are already rushing to upgrade their understanding of the nature of that competition.

On the Swedish trip, most of the participants did not even directly invest in China but felt they needed to attend because of their holdings on the domestic stock market.

“Nordic companies, particularly in manufacturing, have a huge exposure, directly or indirectly,” says Sundling. “The minute we got back . . . we’ve been absolutely swamped with conversations and meetings.”

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