一些澳大利亞人對 AUKUS 越來越持懷疑態度

一些澳大利亞人對 AUKUS 越來越持懷疑態度

https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/04/11/some-australians-are-increasingly-sceptical-of-aukus

政府需要更加努力地推銷其突破性的安全協議

2024 年 4 月 11 日
澳大利亞、美國和英國於 2021 年 9 月達成的名為 aukus 的防務協議是一個龐大的項目。 但這是為了應對更大的問題。 中國決心按照自己的意願重塑印太地區，必要時使用武力，特別是針對台灣。

該協議的核心是承諾幫助澳大利亞利用英國設計和美國技術建造至少八艘核動力攻擊潛艇。 這些潛艇將於 2040 年之後開始服役。作為權宜之計，從 2027 年左右開始，美國將通過西澳大利亞斯特靈海軍基地輪換最多四艘弗吉尼亞級潛艇。 澳大利亞本身將在 2030 年代初期購買三到五艘弗吉尼亞級潛艇。 它們快速而隱秘，將把電力投射到遠離澳大利亞海岸的地方。 然而，這筆交易不僅涉及潛艇，還涉及量子傳感和高超音速導彈等技術方麵的合作。

因此，長達數十年的承諾代價高昂——僅潛艇一項預計就將花費澳大利亞高達 3680 億美元。 作為回報，奧庫斯將澳大利亞的安全與美國的安全更緊密地聯係在一起，澳大利亞希望將美國更安全地與印度太平洋地區聯係起來。 4月8日，這三個國家的國防部長發表了一份謹慎的聲明，稱他們也在“考慮與日本合作”。

並非所有澳大利亞人都對此感到滿意。 事實上，一支奧庫斯尷尬的隊伍，有著不同的政治主張和各種並不總是一致的不滿情緒，正在放棄一位奧庫斯支持者所稱的“異議深水炸彈”。 批評者包括兩位前總理保羅·基廷和馬爾科姆·特恩布爾、前外交部長加雷斯·埃文斯和戰略家休·懷特。

批評始於實際情況——最重要的是，美國能否交付弗吉尼亞級潛艇。 它正在努力提高產量，三月份五角大樓要求國會隻資助一艘新潛艇，而不是預期的兩艘。 特恩布爾先生表示，澳大利亞可能不會看到“弗吉尼亞”號，“僅僅是因為美國海軍無法饒恕它們”。 這隻會讓澳大利亞變得更不安全，而不是更安全。

其他人則質疑對英國國防能力的依賴，因為英國在按時、按成本或達標交付方麵的記錄不佳。 與此同時，懷特先生認為，澳大利亞將陷入補貼其他兩個成員國國防工業的困境。 他說，盡管這三個國家之間都在談論國防一體化，但在國防采購一體化的政治化世界中，美國和英國承包商比澳大利亞承包商更有可能受益。

再加上唐納德·特朗普可能重返白宮的風險。 埃文斯認為，如果特朗普認為美國為澳大利亞的利益花錢，他可能會否決整件事。 他指出，澳大利亞沒有 b 計劃。 但對奧庫斯最強烈的批評與主權機構的喪失有關——正如特恩布爾先生所認為的那樣，澳大利亞的命運被一個越來越不可靠的超級大國所束縛，或者如埃文斯先生所說的那樣，一個有責任將澳大利亞拖入台灣問題戰爭的超級大國。 這違背了澳大利亞的利益。

目前，兩黨對 aukus 的支持仍然強勁。 然而，該協議在未來幾年內幾乎不會產生具體成果。 風險在於，所有的抱怨都將開始削弱公眾的信心。 從一開始，aukus 的支持者就沒有給出足夠坦率的理由。 該交易是秘密談判的。 時任反對黨領袖安東尼·阿爾巴內斯 (Anthony Albanese) 隻得到了幾個小時的時間來表達支持。 現在擔任總理的他將奧庫斯主要描繪成一個就業計劃，而不是一個具有重大威懾作用的項目。

相反，工黨和保守反對派應該更好地強調迄今為止取得的進展。 這包括使斯特林號成為友方潛艇的有用停靠站，以及美國和澳大利亞新撥款用於建設潛艇工業基地。

最重要的是，他們應該談論中國雄心所帶來的挑戰。 他們應該更清楚澳大利亞對威懾貢獻的重要性。 他們應該坦率地說明財務成本，更嚴峻的是，人力成本。

如果澳大利亞政界人士不坦白並以誠實的方式尋求對奧庫斯的支持，懷疑論者很可能會削弱對此的共識。 這也對澳大利亞自身的安全造成嚴重後果。 因為如果威懾的目的是為了防止一場戰爭，那麽你就必須讓別人看到你已經做好了打仗的準備。

Some Australians are increasingly sceptical of AUKUS

https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/04/11/some-australians-are-increasingly-sceptical-of-aukus

The government needs to sell its ground-breaking security pact much harder

Apr 11th 2024

The defence pact known as aukus and reached in September 2021 between Australia, America and Britain is a huge project. But it is intended to counter an even bigger one. China is bent on reshaping the Indo-Pacific region on its own terms, using force if necessary, notably against Taiwan.

At the pact’s heart is a promise to help Australia build at least eight nuclear-powered attack submarines using British designs and American technology. These will start to come into service after 2040. As a stop-gap, from around 2027 America will rotate up to four of its Virginia-class submarines through hmas Stirling, a naval base in Western Australia. Australia itself will buy three to five Virginia-class subs in the early 2030s. Fast and stealthy, they will project power far from Australia’s shores. However, the deal is not only about subs, but also collaboration on technology such as quantum sensing and hypersonic missiles.

A decades-long commitment, then, with a big price tag—the subs alone are expected to cost Australia up to $368bn. In return, aukus ties Australia’s security more closely to America’s and, Australia hopes, ties America more securely into the Indo-Pacific region. On April 8th the defence ministers of the three countries released a cautious statement saying they were “considering co-operation” with Japan, too.

Not everyone in Australia is pleased. Indeed an aukus awkward squad, with varied political persuasions and an assortment of not always cohering grievances, is dropping what one aukus backer calls “depth charges of dissent”. The critics include Paul Keating and Malcolm Turnbull, two former prime ministers, Gareth Evans, a former foreign minister, and Hugh White, a strategist.

Criticisms start with practicalities—above all, whether America can deliver the Virginia-class subs. It is struggling to ramp up production, and in March the Pentagon asked Congress to fund just one new sub rather than an expected two. Mr Turnbull says Australia may see no Virginias “simply because the us Navy won’t be able to spare them”. That would leave Australia less secure, not more.

Others question reliance on Britain’s defence capacity, with its underwhelming record for delivering on time, at cost or up to standard. Meanwhile, Mr White contends, Australia will get suckered into subsidising the other two members’ defence industries. For all the talk of defence integration among the three countries, he says, in the politicised world of defence procurement integration American and British contractors are more likely to benefit than Australian ones.

Add to that the risk of Donald Trump’s possible return to the White House. If Mr Trump saw America as spending money on Australian interests, Mr Evans argues, he could nix the whole thing. Australia, he points out, has no plan b. But the strongest criticisms of aukus have to do with a loss of sovereign agency—hitching Australia’s fortunes to an ever-less dependable superpower, as Mr Turnbull sees it, or one liable, as Mr Evans argues, to drag Australia into a war over Taiwan that is counter to Australia’s interests.

For now bipartisan support for aukus remains strong. Yet the pact will have few concrete results to show for years to come. The risk is that all the griping will start to erode public confidence. From the start aukus’s backers have not made a frank enough case for it. The deal was negotiated in secrecy. Anthony Albanese, then leader of the opposition, was given only hours to throw his support behind it. Now prime minister, he paints aukus chiefly as a jobs scheme rather than as a project of vital deterrence.

Rather, Labor and the conservative opposition should better highlight the progress made so far. This includes making hmas Stirling a useful pit-stop for friendly subs, and new American and Australian money being allocated to building up a submarine industrial base.

Above all, they should talk of the challenge posed by Chinese ambitions. They should be clearer about the importance of Australia’s contribution to deterrence. And they should be upfront both about the financial costs and, more grimly, the human ones.

If Australia’s politicians do not come clean and seek support for aukus on honest terms, the sceptics may well erode the consensus for it. That also poses grave consequences for Australia’s own security. For if the point of deterrence is to prevent a war, then you have to be seen to be ready to fight one.