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進攻性現實主義 Offensive realism
https://www.britannica.com/topic/offensive-realism
約翰·J·米爾斯海默（John J. Mearsheimer）的觀點被他稱為“進攻性現實主義”，他認為對安全的需要以及最終對生存的需要使國家成為侵略性權力最大化者。 除了臨時聯盟之外，各國不會合作，而是不斷尋求削弱競爭對手的力量並增強自己的力量。
In John J. Mearsheimer View, which he called “offensive realism,” holds that the need for security, and ultimately for survival, makes states aggressive power maximizers. States do not cooperate, except during temporary alliances, but constantly seek to diminish their competitors’ power and to enhance their own.
約翰·米爾斯海默和他的進攻性現實主義
John Mearsheimer & his offensive realism
2024 年 2 月 27 日
出生：1947年12月14日，美國紐約州紐約（76歲）
研究科目： 國際關係
https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Mearsheimer#ref1206062
約翰·米爾斯海默深受新現實主義國際關係學派創始人肯尼思·瓦爾茲的影響。 漢斯·摩根索等古典現實主義者將國際衝突歸因於政治領導人尋求增加權力的自然傾向，而瓦爾茲等新現實主義者（或結構現實主義者）則將戰爭的原因歸咎於國際關係結構。 在沃爾茲的模型中，缺乏高於國家的權威（無政府狀態）迫使它們結成聯盟，以遏製競爭對手構成的威脅。 換句話說，國際秩序是由國家之間的力量平衡決定的。 出於安全的需要，各國傾向於維持現狀並對競爭對手采取防禦立場。
米爾斯海默的相反觀點被他稱為“進攻性現實主義”，他認為對安全的需要以及最終對生存的需要使國家成為侵略性權力最大化者。 除了臨時聯盟之外，各國不會合作，而是不斷尋求削弱競爭對手的力量並增強自己的力量。
米爾斯海默的理論基於五個核心假設：（1）國際體係是無政府主義的（不存在高於國家的權威來仲裁其衝突），（2）所有國家都擁有一定的軍事能力（無論多麽有限），（3） 國家永遠無法完全確定其他國家的意圖，（4）國家將生存看得高於一切，（5）國家是尋求促進自身利益的理性行為者。
米爾斯海默認為，這些條件“為各國相互采取侵略性行為創造了強大的動力。” 他的結論是，由於各國無法確切地了解其他國家當前或未來的意圖，因此當其核心安全利益受到威脅時，它們嚐試通過增強軍事實力並采取強硬立場來預防可能的侵略行為是合理的。
盡管米爾斯海默承認戰爭是一種合法的治國手段，但他並不認為戰爭總是正當的。 事實上，他對伊拉克戰爭（2003-11）以及他認為美國試圖監管世界的行為持高度批評態度。 在美國外交政策上，他主張“全球平衡”戰略，而不是“全球霸權”戰略。 他認為，像美國這樣的超級大國不應試圖將其統治強加於所有大陸，而應僅在另一個大國威脅統治具有戰略重要性的地區時進行幹預。
米爾斯海默因此判斷美國參與第二次世界大戰是完全適當的，因為納粹德國和日本帝國都試圖統治各自的地區。 然而，他批評冷戰後美國的外交政策高估了該國的軍事實力及其隨意投射軍事力量的能力。 米爾斯海默特別主張從歐洲撤出所有美軍，認為美軍在歐洲的存在是不合理的，因為目前沒有國家威脅要主宰歐洲大陸。
2007 年，米爾斯海默與斯蒂芬·沃爾特 (Stephen M. Walt) 合著了一本暢銷書，但備受爭議，《以色列遊說與美國外交政策》(2007)。 它認為，強大的遊說團體通過確保對以色列的無條件支持，扭曲了美國的外交政策，損害了美國的國家利益。 一些人譴責這部作品是陰謀論或事實薄弱，而另一些人則稱讚其作者有勇氣提出重要的政策問題。
米爾斯海默的其他著作包括《傳統威懾》（1983）、《利德爾·哈特與曆史的重量》（1988）、《領導人為何撒謊：國際政治中謊言的真相》（2011）、《偉大的錯覺：自由夢想與國際現實》（2018）以及 在學術期刊上發表文章數十篇。 他還經常向《紐約時報》和其他全國性報紙發表評論文章，參與公開辯論。 2003年，他當選為美國藝術與科學學院院士。
John Mearsheimer & his offensive realism
Feb 27, 2024
Born: December 14, 1947, New York, New York, U.S. (age 76)
Subjects Of Study: international relations
https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Mearsheimer#ref1206062
John Mearsheimer was deeply influenced by Kenneth Waltz, the founder of the school of international relations known as neorealism. Whereas classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau had traced international conflicts to the natural propensity of political leaders to seek to increase their power, neorealists (or structural realists) such as Waltz located the cause of war in the structure of international relations. In Waltz’s model the absence of an authority above states (the condition of anarchy) forces them to make alliances in order to contain the threats posed by rival powers. The international order, in other words, is determined by the balance of power between states; the need for security leads states to favour the status quo and to adopt a defensive position toward their competitors.
Mearsheimer’s contrasting view, which he called “offensive realism,” holds that the need for security, and ultimately for survival, makes states aggressive power maximizers. States do not cooperate, except during temporary alliances, but constantly seek to diminish their competitors’ power and to enhance their own.
Mearsheimer based his theory on five core assumptions: (1) the international system is anarchic (there is no authority that exists above the states to arbitrate their conflicts), (2) all states have some military capability (however limited), (3) states can never fully ascertain the intentions of other states, (4) states value survival above all else, and (5) states are rational actors that seek to promote their own interests.
Those conditions, according to Mearsheimer, “create strong incentives for states to behave aggressively toward each other.” Because states cannot know with certainty the present or future intentions of other states, he concluded, it is rational for them to attempt to preempt possible acts of aggression by increasing their military might and adopting an assertive position whenever their core security interests are at stake.
Although Mearsheimer recognized war as a legitimate instrument of statecraft, he did not believe that it was always justified. In fact, he was highly critical of the Iraq War (2003–11) and what he saw as an attempt by the United States to police the world. With regard to U.S. foreign policy, he advocated a strategy of “global balancing” rather than “global hegemony.” A superpower such as the United States, he argued, should not try to impose its rule on all continents but should intervene only when another major power threatens to rule a region of strategic importance.
Mearsheimer thus judged U.S. participation in World War II to have been entirely appropriate, since Nazi Germany and imperial Japan sought to dominate their respective regions. However, he criticized post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy for overestimating the country’s military power and its capacity to project that power at will. Mearsheimer notably advocated the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Europe, arguing that their presence there was irrational, as no state currently threatened to dominate the continent.
In 2007 Mearsheimer coauthored with Stephen M. Walt a best-selling but highly controversial book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (2007). It contended that a powerful lobby skews U.S. foreign policy against the country's national interests by securing unconditional nal Politics (2011), The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018), and scores of articles published in academic journals. He also frequently participated in public debates by contributing op-ed articles to the The New York Times and other national newspapers. In 2003 he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
進攻性現實主義 Offensive realism
進攻性現實主義是國際關係中的一種結構理論，是政治學者約翰·米爾斯海默針對防禦性現實主義提出的。
進攻性現實主義認為，國際體係的無政府性質是促進國際政治中侵略性國家行為的原因。 該理論與防禦性現實主義有著根本的區別，它將大國描述為權力最大化的修正主義者，推崇推卸責任和自我推銷，而不是製衡戰略，其一貫目標是主導國際體係。 該理論為國際關係的研究和理解帶來了重要的替代貢獻，但仍然受到批評。
Offensive realism is a structural theory in international relations and was put forward by the political scholar John Mearsheimer in response to defensive realism.
Offensive realism holds that the anarchic nature of the international system is responsible for the promotion of aggressive state behavior in international politics. The theory fundamentally differs from defensive realism by depicting great powers as power-maximizing revisionists privileging buck-passing and self-promotion over balancing strategies in their consistent aim to dominate the international system. The theory brings important alternative contributions for the study and understanding of international relations but remains the subject of criticism.
約翰·約瑟夫·米爾斯海默和他的思想
2024 年 2 月 27 日
出生：1947年12月14日，美國紐約州紐約（76歲）
研究科目： 國際關係
https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Mearsheimer#ref1206062
與同時代的大多數國際關係學者一樣，米爾斯海默深受新現實主義國際關係學派創始人肯尼思·沃爾茲的影響。 漢斯·摩根索等古典現實主義者將國際衝突歸因於政治領導人尋求增加權力的自然傾向，而瓦爾茲等新現實主義者（或結構現實主義者）則將戰爭的原因歸咎於國際關係結構。 在沃爾茲的模型中，缺乏高於國家的權威（無政府狀態）迫使它們結成聯盟，以遏製競爭對手構成的威脅。 換句話說，國際秩序是由國家之間的力量平衡決定的。 沃爾茲認為，安全的需要導致各國傾向於維持現狀並對競爭對手采取防禦立場。
米爾斯海默的相反觀點被他稱為“進攻性現實主義”，他認為對安全的需要以及最終對生存的需要使國家成為侵略性權力最大化者。 除了臨時聯盟之外，各國不會合作，而是不斷尋求削弱競爭對手的力量並增強自己的力量。
米爾斯海默的理論基於五個核心假設：（1）國際體係是無政府主義的（不存在高於國家的權威來仲裁其衝突），（2）所有國家都擁有一定的軍事能力（無論多麽有限），（3） 國家永遠無法完全確定其他國家的意圖，（4）國家將生存看得高於一切，（5）國家是尋求促進自身利益的理性行為者。
米爾斯海默認為，這些條件“為各國相互采取侵略性行為創造了強大的動力。” 他的結論是，由於各國無法確切地了解其他國家當前或未來的意圖，因此當其核心安全利益受到威脅時，它們嚐試通過增強軍事實力並采取強硬立場來預防可能的侵略行為是合理的。
盡管米爾斯海默承認戰爭是一種合法的治國手段，但他並不認為戰爭總是正當的。 事實上，他對伊拉克戰爭（2003-11）以及他認為美國試圖監管世界的行為持高度批評態度。 在美國外交政策上，他主張“全球平衡”戰略，而不是“全球霸權”戰略。 他認為，像美國這樣的超級大國不應試圖將其統治強加於所有大陸，而應僅在另一個大國威脅統治具有戰略重要性的地區時進行幹預。 米爾斯海默因此判斷美國參與第二次世界大戰是完全適當的，因為納粹德國和日本帝國都試圖統治各自的地區。 然而，他批評冷戰後美國的外交政策高估了該國的軍事實力及其隨意投射軍事力量的能力。 米爾斯海默特別主張從歐洲撤出所有美軍，認為美軍在歐洲的存在是不合理的，因為目前沒有國家威脅要主宰歐洲大陸。
2007 年，米爾斯海默與斯蒂芬·沃爾特 (Stephen M. Walt) 合著了一本暢銷書，但備受爭議，《以色列遊說與美國外交政策》(2007)。 它認為，強大的遊說團體通過確保對以色列的無條件支持，扭曲了美國的外交政策，損害了美國的國家利益。 一些人譴責這部作品是陰謀論或事實薄弱，而另一些人則稱讚其作者有勇氣提出重要的政策問題。
米爾斯海默的其他著作包括《傳統威懾》（1983）、《利德爾·哈特與曆史的重量》（1988）、《領導人為何撒謊：國際政治中謊言的真相》（2011）、《偉大的錯覺：自由夢想與國際現實》（2018）以及 在學術期刊上發表文章數十篇。 他還經常向《紐約時報》和其他全國性報紙發表評論文章，參與公開辯論。 2003年，他當選為美國藝術與科學學院院士。
John Joseph Mearsheimer & his thoughts
Feb 27, 2024
Born: December 14, 1947, New York, New York, U.S. (age 76)
Subjects Of Study: international relations
https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-Mearsheimer#ref1206062
Like most international relations scholars of his generation, Mearsheimer was deeply influenced by Kenneth Waltz, the founder of the school of international relations known as neorealism. Whereas classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau had traced international conflicts to the natural propensity of political leaders to seek to increase their power, neorealists (or structural realists) such as Waltz located the cause of war in the structure of international relations. In Waltz’s model the absence of an authority above states (the condition of anarchy) forces them to make alliances in order to contain the threats posed by rival powers. The international order, in other words, is determined by the balance of power between states. According to Waltz, the need for security leads states to favour the status quo and to adopt a defensive position toward their competitors.
Mearsheimer’s contrasting view, which he called “offensive realism,” holds that the need for security, and ultimately for survival, makes states aggressive power maximizers. States do not cooperate, except during temporary alliances, but constantly seek to diminish their competitors’ power and to enhance their own.
Mearsheimer based his theory on five core assumptions: (1) the international system is anarchic (there is no authority that exists above the states to arbitrate their conflicts), (2) all states have some military capability (however limited), (3) states can never fully ascertain the intentions of other states, (4) states value survival above all else, and (5) states are rational actors that seek to promote their own interests.
Those conditions, according to Mearsheimer, “create strong incentives for states to behave aggressively toward each other.” Because states cannot know with certainty the present or future intentions of other states, he concluded, it is rational for them to attempt to preempt possible acts of aggression by increasing their military might and adopting an assertive position whenever their core security interests are at stake.
Although Mearsheimer recognized war as a legitimate instrument of statecraft, he did not believe that it was always justified. In fact, he was highly critical of the Iraq War (2003–11) and what he saw as an attempt by the United States to police the world. With regard to U.S. foreign policy, he advocated a strategy of “global balancing” rather than “global hegemony.” A superpower such as the United States, he argued, should not try to impose its rule on all continents but should intervene only when another major power threatens to rule a region of strategic importance. Mearsheimer thus judged U.S. participation in World War II to have been entirely appropriate, since Nazi Germany and imperial Japan sought to dominate their respective regions. However, he criticized post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy for overestimating the country’s military power and its capacity to project that power at will. Mearsheimer notably advocated the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Europe, arguing that their presence there was irrational, as no state currently threatened to dominate the continent.
In 2007 Mearsheimer coauthored with Stephen M. Walt a best-selling but highly controversial book, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (2007). It contended that a powerful lobby skews U.S. foreign policy against the country's national interests by securing unconditional support for Israel. Some decried the work as conspiratorial or factually weak, whereas others applauded its authors for having the courage to raise an important policy issue.
Mearsheimer’s other works included Conventional Deterrence (1983), Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (1988), Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (2011), The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (2018), and scores of articles published in academic journals. He also frequently participated in public debates by contributing op-ed articles to the The New York Times and other national newspapers. In 2003 he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
進攻性現實主義
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offective_realism
進攻性現實主義是一種國際關係結構理論，屬於新現實主義學派，是政治學者約翰·米爾斯海默[1]針對防禦性現實主義提出的。 進攻性現實主義認為，國際體係的無政府性質是促進國際政治中侵略性國家行為的原因。 該理論與防禦性現實主義有著根本的區別，它將大國描述為權力最大化的修正主義者，推崇推卸責任和自我推銷，而不是製衡戰略，其一貫目標是主導國際體係。 該理論為國際關係的研究和理解帶來了重要的替代貢獻，但仍然受到批評。
理論淵源
進攻性現實主義是現實主義學派中突出而重要的國際關係理論，其中包括以羅伯特·吉爾平、蘭德爾·施韋勒、埃裏克·拉布斯、法裏德·紮卡裏亞等代表學者的不同觀點為特征的各種次趨勢。 2][3][4] 然而，迄今為止，繼肯尼斯·沃爾茲（Kenneth Waltz）的防禦性新現實主義之後發展起來的進攻性新現實主義最重要的變體是約翰·J·米爾斯海默（John J. Mearsheimer）的變體，在他 2001 年的著作《大國政治的悲劇》中得到了充分發展。 [5]
雖然米爾斯海默的進攻性新現實主義理論確實重申並建立在古典現實主義者闡述的某些假設的基礎上，但它完全背離了這一分支，因為它使用實證主義作為科學哲學，並在國際政治中的國家行為研究中添加了一種以係統為中心的方法。 國際體係的結構。[6][7][8] 因此，他的進攻性新現實主義與防禦性現實主義等其他結構理論一起屬於新現實主義的分支。 [9]
主要原則
該理論基於五個中心假設，類似於肯尼思·沃爾茲的防禦性新現實主義的核心假設。 它們是：[10][11]
大國是世界政治的主要參與者，國際體係是無政府主義的
所有國家都擁有一定的進攻性軍事能力
國家永遠無法確定其他國家的意圖
各國以生存為首要目標
國家是理性的行為者，有能力製定合理的戰略，最大限度地提高其生存前景
與防禦性新現實主義一樣，進攻性現實主義提出了一個無政府主義的國際體係，在這個體係中，理性大國在不確定其他國家意圖並有能力進行軍事進攻的情況下努力生存。 [12][13] 盡管米爾斯海默的進攻性新現實主義最初是從與防禦性新現實主義類似的主張發展而來，但它對國際政治中的大國行為提出了截然不同的預測。
主要是，它與防禦性新現實主義的不同之處在於國家需要積累權力以確保其安全，以及國家為達到令人滿意的安全水平而製定的戰略。 最終，米爾斯海默的進攻性新現實主義描繪了一幅更為悲觀的國際政治圖景，其特點是危險的國家間安全競爭可能導致衝突和戰爭。 [16][17]
現狀與權力最大化國家
約翰·米爾斯海默的進攻性新現實主義旨在糾正肯尼思·沃爾茲的防禦性新現實主義的“現狀偏見”。 [18][19] 雖然兩種新現實主義派別都認為國家主要關心的是最大化其安全，但他們對這一過程所需的權力大小存在分歧。 與防禦性新現實主義相反，防禦性新現實主義認為國家是維持現狀的國家，隻尋求通過維持現有的權力平衡來維持各自在國際體係中的地位，[20][21]進攻性新現實主義聲稱國家實際上是權力最大化 修正主義者懷有侵略意圖。 事實上，在進攻性新現實主義中，國際體係為大國提供了采取進攻性行動的強烈動機，以增強其安全並確保其生存。 [21][22]
以無政府狀態（缺乏能夠執行規則和懲罰侵略者的中央權威）為特征的國際體係以及國家意圖和可用進攻性軍事能力的不確定性，導致各國不斷相互恐懼，並訴諸自助機製來滿足自己的需要。 生存。[23] 為了減輕彼此對侵略的恐懼，各國總是尋求最大化自己的相對實力（以物質能力來定義）。 正如米爾斯海默所說：“他們尋找機會通過以犧牲潛在競爭對手為代價獲得額外的權力增量來改變權力平衡”，[24]因為“一個國家相對於其他國家的軍事優勢越大，該國的軍事優勢就越強”。
[25] 國家尋求增強軍事實力，損害體係內其他國家的利益，以霸權——成為國家體係中唯一的大國——為最終目標。 [26]
約翰·米爾斯海默將這一觀點總結如下：“大國認識到，確保自身安全的最佳途徑就是現在就實現霸權，從而消除任何其他大國挑戰的可能性。隻有被誤導的國家才會放棄獲得霸權的機會。” [27]”相應地，米爾斯海默等進攻性新現實主義者認為，一個國家增加其相對實力以達到霸權的最佳戰略是依靠進攻性戰術 。 如果它們的侵略行為是理性的，大國很可能會奉行擴張主義政策，這將使它們更接近霸權。 [28][29]
由於受到跨洋力量投射和報複力量的限製，全球霸權幾乎不可能實現，因此國家所能希望達到的最佳最終狀態是成為一個地區霸主，統治自己的地理區域。 [28][29] 這種對權力的不懈追求本質上產生了一種“持續的安全競爭，戰爭的可能性總是在幕後”的狀態。 [30] 隻有實現地區霸權，大國才會成為維持現狀的國家。
平衡與推卸責任[編輯]
進攻性新現實主義強調霸權作為國家的最終目標，這與防禦性新現實主義的信念形成鮮明對比，後者認為國家的生存可以在遠非霸權的某個時刻得到保證。 在防禦性新現實主義思維中，權力積累帶來的安全增量最終會經曆邊際收益遞減，成本最終超過收益。 [31] 防禦性新現實主義認為，在無政府狀態下，國家有強烈的平衡傾向——國家負有維持現有權力平衡的直接責任——以對抗威脅性的權力尋求國家，這反過來可能成功地“危及”國家的利益。 最大化狀態的生存”。[32] 這一論點也適用於針對國際體係中最強大國家的國家行為，因為防禦性新現實主義者指出，權力過度集中會弄巧成拙，引發平衡性的反擊。 [33][34][35]
米爾斯海默對這些主張提出了質疑，他提出這樣的論點：在沒有霸權的情況下，很難估計國家何時達到令人滿意的權力量，而且由於集體行動問題，廣泛依賴製衡作為有效的權力檢查方法的成本高昂。 [36] [37] 他認為，當一個大國發現自己處於防禦姿態，試圖阻止對手以犧牲自己為代價獲得權力時，它可以選擇平衡或通過推卸責任的方式進行幹預——將采取行動的責任轉移給其他國家，同時保留自己的權力。 在場邊。
為了確定大國按照其中一種或另一種行為的環境，米爾斯海默在華爾茲的防禦性新現實主義的基礎上，在權力分配的同時納入了第二個變量——地理。 一方麵，平衡與推卸之間的選擇取決於無政府國際體係是兩極、平衡還是不平衡的多極架構。 另一方麵，國家在邊界共享和製水能力方麵的地理位置也影響著大國的戰略偏好。 結合起來，這兩個變量使他能夠確定，與防禦性新現實主義的預測相反，大國傾向於在所有多極化實例中推卸平衡責任，但那些包含潛在霸主的實例除外。 [38][39][ 40]
針對防禦性新現實主義者對國際體係中最強大國家的國家行為立場，米爾斯海默認為，受到威脅的國家將不情願地參與製衡潛在霸權的活動，但不太可能形成製衡聯盟來對抗已實現地區霸權的大國。 [41] 這種缺乏平衡的最好解釋是區域霸主新獲得的現狀立場，這是由於其力量投送能力受到地理限製而產生的。 [42][43] 地區霸主發現自己處於防禦地位，而不是依靠進攻行動，試圖通過阻止其他地區任何同等競爭對手的崛起來避免對其霸權地位的威脅。 因此，它將充當離岸平衡者，將責任轉嫁給潛在霸主的當地鄰國，並僅將平衡作為最後的手段。 [29]
貢獻與批評[編輯]
米爾斯海默的進攻性新現實主義代表了對國際關係理論的重要貢獻，但也引起了重要的批評。 雖然下麵的輸入和批評提供了該理論的一個很好的例子
考慮到其貢獻和反對它的論點，該清單在任何情況下都不應被視為詳盡無遺。
理論輸入[編輯]
首先，一些學者認為米爾斯海默的進攻性新現實主義為華爾茲的防禦性新現實主義提供了另一種補充。 該理論補充了防禦性新現實主義者的論點，即國際體係的結構限製了國家行為。 進攻性新現實主義認為，無政府狀態也可以激勵國家最大化其權力份額，從而糾正與防禦性新現實主義有關的現狀偏見，進攻性新現實主義解決了華爾茲理論未能解釋的一些異常現象。 該理論主要能夠對國際體係中國家之間發生的衝突數量提供解釋。 正如斯奈德所說，米爾斯海默的進攻性新現實主義“通過為修正主義國家的行為提供理論依據，擴大了新現實主義理論的範圍”。 [44]
此外，這種互補性可能意味著交替解釋國家行為的兩種理論之間的理論相互關係，從而允許“更完整的結構現實主義理論，可以更準確地解釋防禦性和進攻性國家行為”。 [45] 其次，這些學者堅持認為米爾斯海默的進攻性新現實主義對外交政策理論和聯盟理論做出了重大貢獻。 更具體地說，米爾斯海默的理論比結構防禦現實主義更進一步，成功地理論化了國際政治和外交政策。
與沃爾茲拒絕防禦性新現實主義作為一種能夠解釋國際政治之上的外交政策的理論相反，[46][47]進攻性新現實主義包括對與分析的係統層麵和個體國家行為有關的國際結果的解釋。 [48] [49] 此外，在權力分配的同時納入地理等新變量，增強了進攻性新現實主義對國家追求侵略行動並訴諸製衡和推卸責任做出具體假設的潛力。 [50]
理論缺陷[編輯]
一些學者指出了米爾斯海默進攻性新現實主義的邏輯問題。 斯奈德駁斥了米爾斯海默關於安全困境的觀點，稱其為“進攻性現實主義的概括性陳述”。 [51][52] 他認為，進攻性新現實主義將所有國家視為修正主義者，消除了整個安全困境概念所依據的中心命題——其他國家意圖的不確定性。 侵略性大國為最大化其安全而采取的措施威脅其他國家，這導致國家之間真正合理的安全競爭，而不是基於假設威脅的不必要的競爭。 [53]
彼得·托夫特認為進攻性新現實主義的分析水平存在缺陷。 他認為，納入非結構性地理變量來解釋大國行為，將該理論的分析焦點從係統範圍的動態轉移到了區域動態。 考慮到該理論的地區安全分析，他進一步認為，進攻性新現實主義未能明確定義什麽是一個“理所當然的歐洲或東北亞等實體”的地區，為學術界的反對留下了空間。 [54]
Christopher Layne 進一步強調了與地理變量相關的問題。 他批評了米爾斯海默的推理，即“水的阻止力”阻止了大國實現全球霸權，因為這種限製似乎不適用於新興對手在其鄰國之外施加影響力的情況。 正如萊恩所說，“顯然，水阻止了美國將其權力強加於遙遠地區的其他國家，但它並不能阻止他們威脅美國在西半球的主導地位”。 [55] 此外，他發現進攻性現實主義將地區霸主歸類為維持現狀的國家，這與該理論強調大國是無情的權力最大化者的說法很難調和。 從這個意義上說，萊恩質疑水資源限製是否有能力將權力最大化的國家轉變為維持現狀的國家，並與米爾斯海默相矛盾，他認為地區霸權仍然受到安全追求的影響，從而努力實現全球霸權。 [56] ]
第二組批評涉及進攻性新現實主義的限製性焦點問題。 米爾斯海默的理論因未能考慮國內政治而受到批評。 新興大國的內部政治運作、經濟或社會不受關注，而這些在國家決策過程中發揮著作用，進而影響其在國際政治中的行為。 [57][58] 此外，斯奈德認為，沒有考慮恐怖主義等跨國威脅，米爾斯海默對安全的強調使他忽視了國家的非
-意識形態、國家統一和人權等安全利益與權力競爭一起成為國際政治的重要方麵。 [59]
此外，托夫特指出，米爾斯海默對軍事能力和國家征服領土能力的關注“意味著他的分析可能會忽略許多其他獲得和行使影響力的方式”。 [60] 同樣，主要關注國際衝突討價還價模型的政治學家指出，進攻性新現實主義忽視了戰爭代價高昂的事實。 [61]
由於這些成本反過來又使戰爭效率低下，國家（即使是那些沒有霸權的國家）也有動力通過討價還價達成和解。 例如，在一個 70% 到 30% 的電力崩潰的兩極世界中，各國寧願選擇類似比例的資源崩潰，也不願在戰鬥過程中摧毀其中一些資源。 由於這種低效率——戰爭的低效率之謎——米爾斯海默提出的持續戰鬥實際上會使國家變得更不安全，因為反複的戰鬥成本最終會耗盡該國家的所有權力。
最重要的是，該理論的經驗有效性和預測能力一直受到質疑，這反過來又會對進攻性新現實主義對國際政治中國家行為的規定的有效性產生負麵影響。 除了提到該理論未能解釋日本20世紀的領土獲取、北約的延續或德國在冷戰後時代未能實現地區霸權之外，[58][62]批評者還對進攻性新現實主義觀點表示嚴重懷疑 關於中國崛起和美國地區霸權的問題。 他們認為，沒有理由相信中國作為一個想要確保自身生存的理性大國會尋求霸權而不是依賴合作機製。 [63][64] 他們同樣反駁了米爾斯海默關於美國的論點。 首先，美國地區霸權地位的獨特性是由反對力量弱或製衡效率低下而非地理限製來解釋的。[65][66]
托夫特和萊恩更進一步斷言，米爾斯海默錯誤地將美國視為從事離岸平衡的地區霸主。 這些學者認為，實證數據表明，美國謀求並實現全球霸權，而不是成為一個以稱霸西半球、同時阻止歐洲和東北亞同行競爭對手崛起為戰略目標的地區霸主。 反過來，米爾斯海默對美國未來戰略行為的預測存在偏差，主要是在海外軍事介入方麵。[67][68]
另見
兩害相權取其輕原則
進攻性崇拜
Offensive realism
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offensive_realism
Offensive realism is a structural theory in international relations that belongs to the neorealist school of thought and was put forward by the political scholar John Mearsheimer[1] in response to defensive realism. Offensive realism holds that the anarchic nature of the international system is responsible for the promotion of aggressive state behavior in international politics. The theory fundamentally differs from defensive realism by depicting great powers as power-maximizing revisionists privileging buck-passing and self-promotion over balancing strategies in their consistent aim to dominate the international system. The theory brings important alternative contributions for the study and understanding of international relations but remains the subject of criticism.
Theoretical origins[edit]
Offensive realism is a prominent and important theory of international relations belonging to the realist school of thought, which includes various sub-trends characterised by the different perspectives of representative scholars such as Robert Gilpin, Randall Schweller, Eric J. Labs and Fareed Zakaria.[2][3][4] Yet, to date, the most important variant of offensive neorealism, developed after Kenneth Waltz's defensive neorealism, is that of John J. Mearsheimer as fully developed in his 2001 book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.[5]
While Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism theory does reiterate and build on certain assumptions elaborated by classical realists, it departs completely from this branch by using positivism as a philosophy of science and by adding a system-centric approach to the study of state behaviour in international politics based on the structure of the international system.[6][7][8] Accordingly, his offensive neorealism pertains to the sub-branch of neorealism alongside other structural theories such as defensive realism.[9]
Main tenets[edit]
The theory is grounded on five central assumptions similar to the ones that lie at the core of Kenneth Waltz's defensive neorealism. These are:[10][11]
- Great powers are the main actors in world politics and the international system is anarchical
- All states possess some offensive military capability
- States can never be certain of the intentions of other states
- States have survival as their primary goal
- States are rational actors, capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival
Like defensive neorealism, offensive realism posits an anarchic international system in which rational great powers uncertain of other states' intentions and capable of military offensive strive to survive.[12][13] Although initially developed from similar propositions to those of defensive neorealism, Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism advances drastically different predictions regarding great power behaviour in international politics.[14][15]
Mainly, it diverges from defensive neorealism in regards to the accumulation of power a state needs to possess to ensure its security and the issuing of strategy states pursue to meet this satisfactory level of security. Ultimately, Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism draws a much more pessimistic picture of international politics characterised by dangerous inter-state security competition likely leading to conflict and war.[16][17]
Status quo v. power-maximizing states[edit]
John Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism intends to fix the "status quo bias" of Kenneth Waltz's defensive neorealism.[18][19] While both neorealist variants argue that states are primarily concerned with maximising their security, they disagree over the amount of power required in the process. To the contrary of defensive neorealism according to which states are status quo powers seeking only to preserve their respective positions in the international system by maintaining the prevailing balance of power,[20][21] offensive neorealism claims that states are in fact power-maximising revisionists harbouring aggressive intentions. Indeed, in offensive neorealism, the international system provides great powers with strong incentives to resort to offensive action in order to increase their security and assure their survival.[21][22]
The international system characterised by anarchy (the absence of a central authority capable of enforcing rules and punishing aggressors) and uncertainty as to state intentions and available offensive military capabilities leads states to constantly fear each other and resort to self-help mechanisms to provide for their survival.[23] In order to alleviate this fear of aggression each holds of the other, states always seek to maximise their own relative power, defined in terms of material capabilities. As Mearsheimer puts it: "they look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals",[24] since "the greater the military advantage one state has over other states, the more secure it is".[25] States seek to increase their military strength to the detriment of other states within the system with hegemony—being the only great power in the state system—as their ultimate goal.[26]
John Mearsheimer summed up this view as follows: "great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to be the hegemon in the system because it thought it already had sufficient power to survive.[27]" Accordingly, offensive neorealists such as Mearsheimer believe that a state's best strategy to increase its relative power to the point of achieving hegemony is to rely on offensive tactics. Provided that it is rational for them to act aggressively, great powers will likely pursue expansionist policies, which will bring them closer to hegemony.[28][29]
Since global hegemony is nearly impossible to attain due to the constraints of power projection across oceans and retaliation forces, the best end game status states can hope to reach is that of a regional hegemon dominating its own geographical area.[28][29] This relentless quest for power inherently generates a state of "constant security competition, with the possibility of war always in the background".[30] Only once regional hegemony is attained do great powers become status quo states.
Balancing v. buck-passing[edit]
The emphasis offensive neorealism puts on hegemony as states' end aim stands in sharp contrast to defensive neorealism's belief that state survival can be guaranteed at some point well short of hegemony. In a defensive neorealist mindset, security increments by power accumulation end up experiencing diminishing marginal returns where costs eventually outweigh benefits.[31] Defensive neorealism posits that under anarchy there is a strong propensity for states to engage in balancing—states shouldering direct responsibility to maintain the existing balance of power—against threatening power-seeking states, which may in turn succeed in "jeopardiz[ing] the very survival of the maximizing state".[32] This argument also applies to state behavior towards the most powerful state in the international system, as defensive neorealists note that an excessive concentration of power is self-defeating, triggering balancing countermoves.[33][34][35]
Mearsheimer challenges these claims by making the argument that it is rather difficult to estimate when states have reached a satisfactory amount of power short of hegemony and costly to rely extensively on balancing as an efficient power-checking method due to collective action issues.[36][37] According to him, when a great power finds itself in a defensive posture trying to prevent rivals from gaining power at its expense, it can choose to engage in balancing or intervene by favoring buck-passing—transferring the responsibility to act onto other states while remaining on the sidelines.
In order to determine the circumstances in which great powers behave according to one or the other, Mearsheimer builds on Waltz's defensive neorealism by including a second variable—geography—alongside the distribution of power. On one hand, the choice between balancing and buck-passing depends on whether the anarchic international system is of a bipolar, balanced, or unbalanced multipolar architecture. On another hand, state geographic location in terms of border sharing and stopping power of water also influences great powers' strategy preference. Combined, these two variables allow him to establish that great powers tend to favor—to the contrary of defensive neorealism predictions—buck-passing over balancing in all instances of multipolarity except for those that include a potential hegemon.[38][39][40]
Responding to defensive neorealists' posture on state behaviour towards the most powerful state in the international system, Mearsheimer believes that threatened states will reluctantly engage in balancing against potential hegemons but that balancing coalitions are unlikely to form against a great power that has achieved regional hegemony.[41] This lack of balancing is best explained by the regional hegemon's newly acquired status quo stance, which follows from the geographical constraints on its power projection capability.[42][43] Instead of relying on offensive actions, a regional hegemon finds itself in a defensive position seeking to avert threats to its hegemonic status by preventing the rise of any peer competitors in other areas. As such it will behave as an offshore balancer, passing the buck to local neighbours of the potential hegemon and engaging in balancing only as a last resort.[29]
Contributions and criticism[edit]
Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism represents an important contribution to international relations theory yet also generated important criticism. While the inputs and critics below provide a good sample of the theory's contributions and the kind of arguments that have been addressed against it, the listing should in no case be considered as exhaustive.
Theoretical inputs[edit]
Firstly, some scholars believe that Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism provides an alternative complement to Waltz's defensive neorealism. The theory adds to defensive neorealists' argument that the structure of the international system constrains state behaviour. Setting to rectify the status quo bias pertaining to defensive neorealism by arguing that anarchy can also generate incentives for states to maximize their share of power, offensive neorealism solves some anomalies that Waltz's theory fails to explain. Mainly, the theory is able to provide an explanation for the amount of conflict occurring among states in the international system. As Snyder states, Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism "enlarges the scope of neorealist theory by providing a theoretical rationale for the behaviour of revisionist states".[44]
Moreover, this complementarity could signify theoretical interrelation with the two theories working in alternation to explain state behaviour, thereby allowing for a "more complete structural realist theory that can more accurately account for both defensive and offensive state behaviour".[45] Secondly, these scholars uphold the argument that Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism significantly contributes to foreign policy theory and alliance theory. More specifically, Mearsheimer's theory goes a step further than structural defensive realism by successfully theorising both international politics and foreign policy.
Contrary to Waltz's rejection of defensive neorealism as a theory capable of explaining foreign policy on top of international politics,[46][47] offensive neorealism includes explanations of both international outcomes pertaining to the systemic level of analysis and individual state behaviour.[48][49] Additionally, the inclusion of new variables such as geography alongside the distribution of power enhances offensive neorealism's potential to make specific assumptions about states' pursuit of aggressive actions and resort to balancing and buck-passing.[50]
Theoretical flaws[edit]
Some scholars have pointed out logical issues with Mearsheimer's offensive neorealism. Snyder rejects Mearsheimer's view of the security dilemma as "a synoptic statement of offensive realism".[51][52] He argues that offensive neorealism's positing of all states as revisionists removes the central proposition—uncertainty about other states' intentions—on which the whole concept of security dilemma is grounded. Aggressive great powers' measures to maximize their security threaten others which leads to an actual justified security competition between states rather than an unnecessary one based on hypothetical threats.[53]
Peter Toft argues that there are flaws in offensive neorealism's level of analysis. According to him, the inclusion of the non-structural geography variable to explain great power behaviour shifts the theory's focal point of analysis from system-wide dynamics to regional ones. Considering the theory's regional security analyses, he further argues that offensive neorealism fails to clearly define what constitutes a region with "entities like Europe or North-East Asia (taken) for granted", leaving room for scholarly disapproval.[54]
Christopher Layne further highlights problems associated with the geographic variable. He criticizes Mearsheimer's reasoning according to which the "stopping power of water" prevents a great power from achieving global hegemony as this constraint does not seem to apply to the case of an emerging rival's capacity to exercise influence beyond its own neighbourhood. As Layne states, "apparently water stops the United States from imposing its powers on others in distant regions, but it does not stop them from threatening American primacy in the Western Hemisphere".[55] Moreover, he finds offensive realism's classification of regional hegemons as status quo powers difficult to reconcile with the theory's emphasis on great powers as relentless power-maximizers. In this sense, Layne questions the ability of the water constraint to transform a power-maximizing state into a status quo power and contradicts Mearsheimer by arguing that a regional hegemon remains subjected to the quest for security, thereby striving to attain global hegemony.[56]
A second group of criticisms addresses the issue of offensive neorealism's restrictive focuses. Mearsheimer's theory has been criticised for failing to take into account domestic politics. No attention is paid to a rising power's internal political functioning, its economy or society, which play a role in a state's decision-making process, in turn influencing its behaviour in international politics.[57][58] Moreover, Snyder argues that no consideration is given to transnational threats such as terrorism, and that Mearsheimer's emphasis on security makes him ignore states' non-security interests such as ideology, national unification and human rights as an essential aspect of international politics alongside power competition.[59]
Additionally, Toft points out that Mearsheimer's concentration on military capabilities and issuing state capacity for territorial conquest "implies a risk that his analyses miss a host of other ways of gaining and exercising influence".[60] Similarly, political scientists whose primary focus is bargaining models of international conflict note that offensive neorealism ignores the fact that war is costly.[61]
Since those costs in turn make war inefficient, states (even those who do not have hegemony) have incentive to construct bargained settlements. For instance, in a bipolar world with a 70%-to-30% power breakdown, states would prefer an analogously proportioned breakdown in resources rather than having some of those resources destroyed over the course of fighting. Due to this inefficiency—war's inefficiency puzzle—the constant fighting Mearsheimer proposes would actually make states less secure because the repeated costs of fighting eventually deplete all of that state's power.
Most importantly, there have been questions about the theory's empirical validity and prediction ability, which in turn can negatively affect the validity of offensive neorealism's prescriptions for state behaviour in international politics. In addition to mentioning the theory's failure to account for Japan's 20th century territorial acquisitions, NATO's continuation or Germany's non-achievement of regional hegemony in the post-Cold war era,[58][62] critics have also expressed serious doubts regarding offensive neorealist views on China's rising power and U.S. regional hegemony. According to them, there is no reason to believe that China as a rational power which wants to ensure its survival will seek hegemony rather than rely on cooperative mechanisms.[63][64] They similarly contradict Mearsheimer's arguments regarding the United States. Firstly, weak opposition or balancing inefficiencies rather than geographical constraints are taken as explanations for the uniqueness of the United States' regional hegemonic position.[65][66]
Toft and Layne go a step further by asserting that Mearsheimer misjudges the United States as a regional hegemon engaged in offshore balancing. Instead of being a regional hegemon with the strategic aim of dominating the Western hemisphere while preventing the rise of peer competitors in Europe and Northeast Asia, these scholars believe that empirical data points to the fact that the United States has sought and achieved global hegemony, which in turn biases Mearsheimer's predictions regarding future U.S. strategic behavior, mainly in terms of its military involvement overseas.[67][68]
