風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
The doctrines made US ruining world
- American imperialism
- Monroe Doctrine
- Truman Doctrine
- Carter Doctrine
- Clinton Doctrine
- Jus ad bellum
- Military intervention
- Obama Doctrine
- Powell Doctrine
- Reagan Doctrine
- Foreign policy of the Donald Trump administration
- The One Percent Doctrine
- United States Presidential doctrines
- War on Terrorism
- Weinberger Doctrine
- Wolfowitz Doctrine
布什主義 Bush Doctrine
布什主義指的是美國第 43 任總統喬治·W·布什的多項相互關聯的外交政策原則。 這些原則包括單邊主義、先發製人的戰爭和政權更迭。
查爾斯·克勞薩默 (Charles Krauthammer) 於 2001 年 6 月首次使用該短語來描述布什政府“單方麵退出反導條約並拒絕京都議定書”。[1] 9/11 襲擊後，該短語描述了美國有權采取的政策 以確保自己免受窩藏或向恐怖組織提供援助的國家的侵害，這被用來為 2001 年入侵阿富汗辯護。[1][2] 布什主義與布什政府2003年入侵伊拉克的決定密切相關。[3][4][5]
不同的專家對布什主義賦予了不同的含義。 它被用來描述具體的政策要素，包括“先發製人”的戰略，以防禦當前或感知到的未來對美國安全的威脅。 這一政策原則特別適用於中東，以打擊國際恐怖組織並為入侵伊拉克辯護。[需要引用]
一般來說，布什主義被用來表示願意單方麵追求美國的經濟利益。[6][7][8] 其中一些政策已編入國家安全委員會 2002 年 9 月 20 日發布的題為《美國國家安全戰略》的文本中。 [9]
布什政府成員很少使用“布什主義”一詞。 不過，副總統迪克·切尼在 2003 年 6 月的一次演講中至少使用過一次這個表達方式，他在演講中說道：“如果當今世界上有人懷疑布什主義的嚴肅性，我會敦促那個人 考慮一下阿富汗塔利班和伊拉克薩達姆·侯賽因政權的命運。”[10]
美國國家安全戰略[編輯]
布什主義的主要內容在2002年9月17日發布的《美國國家安全戰略》文件中進行了闡述。 [11] 該文件經常被引用為該學說的明確聲明。[12][13][14] 2006 年更新後，它指出：[15][16]
美國今天麵臨的安全環境與以往截然不同。 然而，美國政府的首要職責仍然是一如既往：保護美國人民和美國利益。 美國的一項持久原則是，這項義務要求政府有義務在威脅造成嚴重損害之前利用國家力量的所有要素來預測和應對威脅。 威脅越大，不采取行動的風險就越大 — — 即使敵人攻擊的時間和地點仍然存在不確定性，采取預期行動來保衛自己的理由也就越充分。 沒有什麽比大規模殺傷性武器的恐怖襲擊更大的威脅了。 為了製止或防止我們的對手采取這種敵對行動，美國將在必要時先發製人地行使我們固有的自衛權。 美國不會在所有情況下訴諸武力來先發製人地應對新出現的威脅。 我們傾向於非軍事行動取得成功。 任何國家都不應以先發製人為借口進行侵略。
組件[編輯]
布什主義被定義為“戰略原則、實際政策決定以及指導美國外交政策的一套基本原理和想法的集合。”[17] 其中一些是從 1992 年的沃爾福威茨主義草案中重新出現的，該草案曾被 布什第一屆政府泄露並否認； 沃爾福威茨作為國防部副部長，是新布什政府戰略規劃的核心。 [18] 該學說確定了兩個主要支柱：1.）對潛在敵人進行先發製人的打擊，2.）促進民主政權更迭。[17][19]
喬治·W·布什政府聲稱美國陷入了全球戰爭； 一場意識形態戰爭，其敵人因共同的意識形態和對民主的共同仇恨而團結在一起。[17][20][21][22][23][24]
在國家安全戰略中，強調了四個要點作為布什主義的核心：1.）先發製人，2.）軍事主導，3.）新多邊主義，以及4.）民主的傳播。 [25] 該文件強調先發製人，指出“美國現在受到的征服國家的威脅比失敗國家的威脅要小。我們受到的威脅不是艦隊和軍隊，而是少數人手中的災難性技術”，並要求“保衛美國” 各州、美國人民以及我們在國內外的利益，在威脅到達我們的邊境之前識別並摧毀它。”[26]
國防部長唐納德·拉姆斯菲爾德 (Donald Rumsfeld) 在 2006 年發表的一份反映其觀點的聲明中如此說道
該主義的功效：“如果我進行評級，我會說我們作為一個國家可能應該得到 D 或 D+，因為我們在正在發生的思想之戰中做得很好。我並不認為這很容易 ，但我們還沒有找到作為一個國家的公式。”[23]
布什總統在 2010 年的回憶錄《決策點》中闡述了他對布什主義的離散概念。 他表示，他的學說由四個“方麵”組成，其中三個是實踐性的，一個是理想主義的。 他們是：（用他的話來說）
“不要區分恐怖分子和窩藏恐怖分子的國家，並追究兩者的責任。”
“在海外敵人再次攻擊我們國內之前，先與他們戰鬥。”
“在威脅完全實現之前應對它們。”
“推進自由和希望，以替代敵人的鎮壓和恐懼意識形態。”
單邊主義[編輯]
在布什擔任總統初期，單邊因素就很明顯。 創造“布什主義”一詞的保守派查爾斯·克勞薩默在2001年2月使用“單邊主義”來指代布什在外交政策上日益增強的單邊主義，特別是關於他退出反導條約的決定。 [27][28]
有證據表明，布什願意讓美國采取單方麵行動的意願更早。 《國際和平研究雜誌》2003 年文章“布什政府的歐洲形象：從矛盾到僵化”指出：[29]
共和黨在2000年總統選舉中的綱領為政府在這個問題上定下了基調。 它呼籲北約不僅在東歐（包括波羅的海國家、羅馬尼亞、保加利亞和阿爾巴尼亞）大幅擴張，而且最重要的是在中東、高加索和中亞擴張。 目的是在北約內部發展更密切的合作，應對從中東到歐亞大陸的地緣政治問題。 因此，該計劃對歐洲采取了廣泛而相當模糊的看法。
在現階段說布什政府在與俄羅斯打交道時已經徹底改變了心意並放棄了根深蒂固的反應還為時過早。
在談到歐洲的未來時，美國人和歐洲人在關鍵問題上存在分歧。 這些差異似乎指向支撐布什政府歐洲形象的三個基本價值觀。 第一個是單邊主義，導彈防禦係統就是一個特別明顯的例子。 美國的立場與歐洲基於反導會談和多邊主義的做法背道而馳。 歐洲主要國家和美國之間的對立正在形成，歐洲主要國家希望通過司法手段處理此事，而美國則希望推動此事並造成既成事實。
攻擊藏匿恐怖分子的國家[編輯]
時長：34分18秒。34:18
在國會聯席會議上，布什總統承諾捍衛美國的自由，抵禦恐怖主義的恐懼。 2001 年 9 月 20 日（僅音頻）
作為 9 月 11 日襲擊事件後行政部門的回應，這一原則得到了更全麵的發展。 這些襲擊對外交政策提出了挑戰，因為發動襲擊的不是阿富汗，而且沒有證據表明他們對這些襲擊有任何預知。 [30] 在 9 月 11 日晚向全國發表的講話中，布什宣布解決這一問題，他宣稱：“我們不會區分實施這些行為的恐怖分子和窩藏這些行為的恐怖分子。”[31] 他在 2001 年 9 月 20 日向國會聯席會議發表的講話中更加積極地重申了這一原則：[32]
我們將追捕向恐怖主義提供援助或庇護所的國家。 每個國家、每個地區現在都需要做出決定。 要麽你和我們站在一起，要麽你和恐怖分子站在一起。 從今天起，任何繼續窩藏或支持恐怖主義的國家都將被美國視為敵對政權。
白宮新聞秘書阿裏·弗萊舍爾後來在該演講的自傳中寫道：“在一次受到媒體和民主黨讚揚的演講中，[總統]宣布了後來被稱為‘布什主義’的內容”。 [33] 9/11 襲擊後首次公開提及反恐原則，出現在 9 月 30 日政治學家尼爾·科茨 (Neal Coates) 的一篇專欄文章中。 [34]
這項政策被用來為 2001 年 10 月入侵阿富汗辯護，[2] 此後一直應用於美國針對巴基斯坦西北部基地組織營地的軍事行動。[需要引用]
先發製人的打擊[編輯]
布什於2002年6月1日在美國軍事學院（西點軍校）向學員發表講話，明確了先發製人的戰爭將在美國外交政策和國防的未來中發揮的作用：[35]
我們不能通過抱有最好的希望來保衛美國和我們的朋友。 我們不能相信暴君的話，他們莊嚴地簽署了不擴散條約，然後又係統地破壞它們。 如果我們等待威脅完全實現
e，我們已經等得太久了——我們的安全需要改變你將領導的軍隊——一支必須隨時準備對世界任何黑暗角落發動襲擊的軍隊。 我們的安全將要求所有美國人具有前瞻性和堅定性，做好在必要時采取先發製人行動的準備，以捍衛我們的自由和生命。
布什政府的立場是，在全世界範圍內傳播民主的嚴厲措施是不可避免和有效的，例如，解放伊拉克將在該地區種植民主，並使其在中東其他地區蓬勃發展。 [36]
關於如何處理伊拉克、伊朗和朝鮮等國家（所謂的“邪惡軸心”[37]國家），布什政府中出現了兩種截然不同的思想流派。 國務卿科林·鮑威爾和國家安全顧問康多莉紮·賴斯以及美國國務院專家主張美國現行外交政策本質上應該繼續下去。 這些政策是冷戰後製定的，旨在建立多邊行動共識（可能采取對問題國家日益嚴厲的製裁的形式，概括為遏製政策）。 副總統迪克·切尼、國防部長唐納德·拉姆斯菲爾德以及保羅·沃爾福威茨和理查德·珀爾等一些有影響力的國防部政策製定者提出了相反的觀點，他們認為直接和單邊行動既是可能的也是合理的，美國應該接受 作為唯一剩餘的超級大國的地位提供了民主和安全的機會。
民主政權更迭[編輯]
布什在2001年底至2002年的多次演講中闡述了他對美國外交政策和全球幹預的看法，宣稱美國應積極支持世界各地的民主政府，特別是中東的民主政府，以此作為應對威脅的戰略。 恐怖主義，國家必須為了自身的安全利益而單方麵采取行動，而無需得到聯合國等國際機構的批準。[6][7][8] 這代表著對杜魯門主義和鮑威爾主義、克林頓主義等冷戰後哲學的威懾和遏製政策的背離。
布什在 2003 年國情谘文中宣稱：[38]
美國人是一個自由的民族，他們知道自由是每個人的權利，也是每個國家的未來。 我們珍視的自由不是美國送給世界的禮物，而是上帝送給人類的禮物。
布什第二次就職後，2006年1月在國防大學發表演講時表示：“捍衛自由需要推進自由。”
新保守派和布什主義認為，對西方和美國的仇恨之所以特別存在，並不是因為美國的行為，而是因為恐怖分子產生的國家社會混亂，沒有享受到與生俱來的自由。 民主的一部分。[17][23] 布什主義認為，美國的敵人利用恐怖主義作為針對國家的意識形態戰爭。 美國的責任是保護自己，在恐怖分子所在地推行民主，破壞恐怖活動的基礎。 [17][23] 埃及、黎巴嫩和巴勒斯坦的選舉是這一倡議的結果，從某種意義上說，兄弟會、真主黨和哈馬斯都被允許參與其中。
對布什主義的影響[編輯]
新保守派[編輯]
該學說的發展受到新保守主義意識形態的影響，[39][40]，被認為是距裏根主義政治現實主義的一步。[39][41] 直到冷戰結束、比爾·克林頓就任美國總統之前，裏根主義一直被認為是美國外交政策的關鍵。 裏根主義被認為是反共產主義的，反對蘇聯的全球影響力，但後來談到冷戰結束時的和平紅利以及國防開支減少帶來的經濟利益。 裏根主義受到新保守派的強烈批評[41][42][43]，他們也對海灣戰爭的結果[39][40]和比爾·克林頓領導下的美國外交政策感到不滿，[40][44 ] 激發他們通過支持積極幹預和民主和平理論來呼籲變革，以實現全球穩定[40][45]。 [44] 喬治·W·布什政府顧問中的幾位核心人物認為自己是新保守主義者或強烈支持他們的外交政策理念。 [40][46][47][48][49][50]
眾所周知，新保守派長期以來一直支持伊拉克推翻薩達姆·侯賽因，1998 年 1 月 26 日，新美國世紀計劃 (PNAC) 向時任總統比爾·克林頓發出公開信，指出：
因此，在不久的將來，我們將成為您
無法以任何合理的置信度確定伊拉克是否擁有此類武器。 這種不確定性本身就會對整個中東產生嚴重的不穩定影響。 幾乎不需要補充的是，如果薩達姆確實獲得了運載大規模殺傷性武器的能力（如果我們繼續沿著目前的道路前進，他幾乎肯定會這樣做），那麽該地區的美國軍隊以及我們的朋友和盟友的安全 以色列和溫和的阿拉伯國家以及世界石油供應的很大一部分都將麵臨危險。 主席先生，正如你正確地宣稱的那樣，21世紀上半葉世界的安全將在很大程度上取決於我們如何應對這一威脅。
PNAC原始校長聲明的簽署人包括喬治·H·W·布什的副總統丹·奎爾、喬治·W·布什的國防部長唐納德·拉姆斯菲爾德、副國防部長保羅·沃爾福威茨、副總統迪克·切尼和他的兄弟傑布·布什。 [40]
PNAC成員、國防政策委員會谘詢委員會（DPBAC）主席、新保守派理查德·珀爾後來對入侵伊拉克表示遺憾，並最終將入侵歸咎於喬治·W·布什總統。 [51]
其他被認為采用新保守主義外交政策思維的布什內閣成員包括副總統迪克·切尼和國務卿康多莉紮·賴斯。 [52]
布什主義與長期以來的新保守主義思想相一致，認為美國卷入了一場全球思想戰爭，一方麵是西方的自由價值觀，另一方麵是試圖摧毀這些價值觀的極端主義； 美國必須承擔安全責任並在世界上發揮領導作用，積極尋找敵人並改變那些支持敵人的國家。 [17][23][24][53]
布什主義和新保守主義推理認為，裏根現實政治下對敵人的遏製是行不通的，美國的敵人必須在攻擊前先發製人地消滅——使用美國所有可用的手段， 這樣做的資源和影響力。[17][23][24]
美國軍事學院西點軍校反恐中心詹姆斯·福裏斯特博士在《贏得反恐戰爭》一書中評論道：“雖然西方在與好戰的伊斯蘭黑暗軍隊的鬥爭中麵臨著不確定性，但我們確實沒有 盡管我們確切地知道它將如何結束，但已經非常清楚的是，由於西方靈活、民主的製度及其無所不包的自由意識形態，世界將成功擊敗好戰的伊斯蘭教。”[24]
納坦·夏蘭斯基[編輯]
更多信息：民主和平理論
布什主義的另一部分知識基礎是 2004 年由以色列政治家兼作家納坦·夏蘭斯基 (Natan Sharansky) 和以色列駐美國經濟事務部長羅恩·德默 (Ron Dermer) 合著的書《民主案例》，布什稱這本書對他的思想產生了影響。 [54] 該書認為，用民主政府取代獨裁政權不僅在道義上是合理的，因為它可以為這些國家的公民帶來更大的自由，而且在戰略上也是明智的，因為民主國家比獨裁國家更和平，也更少滋生恐怖主義。
擴大美國影響力[編輯]
普林斯頓大學研究員喬納森·蒙特恩博士在其2005年《國際安全》期刊文章《布什主義的根源：美國戰略中的權力、民族主義和民主促進》[55]中將布什政府積極推進民主的推動歸因於兩個主要因素 ：物質能力的擴張，以及民族主義國內意識形態的存在。 他聲稱布什政府認為布什主義在國外促進民主對於美國“反恐戰爭”的成功至關重要。 這也是政府擴大美國國際政治和經濟影響力的宏偉戰略的一個關鍵目標。 他研究了長期促進民主的兩種相互競爭的方法：“榜樣主義”，即以身作則的領導，以及“平反主義”，即直接運用美國的力量，包括使用強製力。 盡管範例主義在 20 世紀盛行，但平反主義一直是布什政府的首選做法。
批評與分析[編輯]
布什主義引起了批評和爭議。[29][56] 作為國家安全委員會的工作人員，負責布什國家安全戰略的彼得·D·費弗(Peter D. Feaver)表示，他統計過多達七種不同的布什主義。 美國國家安全戰略（通常被錯誤地稱為“布什主義”）的起草者之一反對賦予該聲明太多分量。 “其實我從來沒有想過
“如果有布什主義的話，”後來擔任國務卿康多莉紮·賴斯領導下的國務院顧問的菲利普·D·澤利科 (Philip D. Zelikow) 說道。 吉米·卡特的國家安全顧問茲比格涅夫·布熱津斯基表示，他認為沒有“一張紙”可以代表布什主義。 [57]
地緣政治戰略專家指出，哈爾福德·麥金德在《曆史的地理支點》中關於“心髒地帶”和世界資源控製的理論在今天仍然有效。[58][59][60]
羅伯特·G·考夫曼 (Robert G. Kaufman) 在 2007 年出版的《捍衛布什主義》一書中，[17] 寫道：“沒有人比哈爾福德·麥金德更好地理解這一轉變的邏輯或含義。他的先見之明的理論首先在《曆史的地理支點》中提出， 麥金德於 1904 年出版的《美國戰略》正確地塑造了美國自二戰以來的大戰略，他警告說，任何一個主宰歐亞大陸（他稱之為“世界島”）的國家都有可能主宰世界，包括美國。 [61] 考夫曼是一位政治學家、公共政策教授和影子金融監管委員會成員。 他在接受關於這本書的采訪時說：“我寫這本書是因為我堅信布什主義具有比人們意識到的更令人信服的邏輯和曆史血統。”[20]
布什主義在國內和國際上都出現了兩極分化。 [62] 2008年，民意調查顯示，反美情緒比布什政府形成布什主義之前更加強烈； 這一增長可能（至少部分是）布什主義和保守外交政策實施的結果。[63][64]
外國幹涉主義[編輯]
主條目：喬治·W·布什政府的外交政策
布什主義的外交政策在美國和國際上都引起爭議。[29][55]
約翰·米爾斯海默 (John J. Mearsheimer) 在他的著作《大錯覺：自由主義夢想與國際現實》中指出，像布什主義這樣的自由主義霸權政策無法有效實現其既定的最終目標，並且注定會導致更多的戰爭、反美主義和 全球民主倒退。
這些政策的一些批評者對美國越來越願意單方麵使用軍事力量表示懷疑。 [65][66]
羅伯特·W·塔克和大衛·C·亨德裏克森認為，這反映了對國際法的背棄，標誌著美國在外交事務中合法性的終結。 [67]
其他人則表示，這可能導致其他國家訴諸大規模殺傷性武器的生產或恐怖活動。 [68] 這一學說被認為與正義戰爭理論相悖，將構成侵略戰爭。 [69][70] 帕特裏克·J·布坎南 (Patrick J. Buchanan) 寫道，2003 年入侵伊拉克與 1996 年新保守主義政策文件《徹底決裂：保衛王國的新戰略》有顯著相似之處。 [71]
政治學家凱倫·科維亞特科斯基 (Karen Kwiatkowski) 2007 年在她的文章《理解布什主義》中寫道：
你看，我們出於自衛和為了世界的利益而殺害恐怖分子。 我們正在接管外國，讓我們最喜歡的傀儡“負責”他們，控製他們的經濟、他們的行動、他們的著裝規範、他們的防禦項目和他們的夢想，僅僅是因為我們愛他們，而且顯然無法生存 沒有他們。[72]
徹底背離[編輯]
布坎南等人認為，布什主義與美國以前的外交政策截然不同，是新保守主義意識形態根源的延續。 [39][73][74][75][76][77]
最初，對美國的支持率很高，[77]但到布什政府結束時，經過七年的戰爭，反美情緒高漲，對布什主義的批評也很普遍；[77][78]盡管如此， 該學說仍然得到一些美國政治領導人的支持。 [78]
著名新保守主義者的代表及其對布什主義的影響在美國公眾中一直備受爭議。 [41][52][78][79]
批評者，如《正確的國家》一書中的約翰·米克爾思韋特，聲稱布什是被新保守派欺騙才采取他們的政策的。 [52][80][81]
極化[編輯]
反戰批評者聲稱，布什主義在國內造成了強烈的兩極分化，疏遠了美國的盟友，[72]並且違背了布什所宣稱的成為“團結者，而不是分裂者”的願望。 [62]
慈悲信仰和宗教影響[編輯]
布什經常談到他對富有同情心的保守主義的信仰[82][83]，並將自由視為“上帝的禮物”。 [38] 查爾斯·R·凱斯勒 (Charles R. Kesler) 在克萊蒙特研究所的文章《民主與布什主義》中，[76] 寫道：“在開始第二個任期時，總統及其顧問必須重新認真審視布什主義。在許多方麵，它 是出口版本
富有同情心的保守主義。”
社會心理學策略和影響[編輯]
還有人批評布什主義的做法與其社會心理影響有關，稱它們創造了一種恐懼文化。 [84][85][86][87]
內奧米·克萊因在她的《休克主義》一書中提到了一個反複出現的休克隱喻，她在接受采訪時聲稱，布什政府繼續利用“在休克狀態下打開的機會之窗”，隨後給出了一個令人欣慰的理由： 公眾，作為社會控製的一種形式。[88]
民主化[編輯]
一些評論家認為，布什主義的目的不是支持由當地人民推動的真正的民主政權，而是由代表美國的外交官建立的對美國友好的政權，其目的隻是為了讓美國選民看起來是民主的。 [89] 例如，就阿富汗而言，有人認為議會民主被美國淡化，權力集中在美國盟友阿富汗總統哈米德·卡爾紮伊手中。 [90] 卡爾紮伊的當選被描述為美國政府和美國決策者哈利勒紮德操縱的結果。 與此同時，這些評論員提請人們注意一些不受歡迎（但對美國友好）的軍閥在美國選舉監督下取得“合法”地位。 一些評論員將選民投票率數據解讀為“大規模舞弊”的證據。 [91] 索納利·科爾哈特卡和詹姆斯·英格爾斯寫道：“美國決策者是否會允許任何接近民主的事情在阿富汗爆發並幹擾他們的計劃，還有待觀察。”[92]
對於阿富汗的選舉，阿富汗前婦女事務部長西瑪·薩馬爾表示：“這不是民主，而是橡皮圖章。一切都已經由有權勢的人決定了。”[93]
大多數關於美國幹預的研究都對美國輸出民主的曆史持悲觀態度。 John A. Tures 使用自由之家的數據檢查了 1973 年至 2005 年美國幹預的 228 個案例。 [94] 雖然在 63 個案例中，一個國家確實變得更加民主，但在 69 個案例中，該國變得不那麽民主 - 並且多元化的幹預措施 96 並未導致該國的民主發生任何變化。 [94]
Bush Doctrine
The Bush Doctrine refers to multiple interrelated foreign policy principles of the 43rd President of the United States, George W. Bush. These principles include unilateralism, preemptive war, and regime change.
Charles Krauthammer first used the phrase in June 2001 to describe the Bush administration's "unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM treaty and rejecting the Kyoto protocol."[1] After the 9/11 attack, the phrase described the policy that the United States had the right to secure itself against countries that harbor or give aid to terrorist groups, which was used to justify the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan.[1][2] The Bush Doctrine became strongly associated with the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003.[3][4][5]
Different pundits have attributed different meanings to the Bush Doctrine. It was used to describe specific policy elements, including a strategy of "preemptive strikes" as a defense against an immediate or perceived future threat to the security of the United States. This policy principle was applied particularly in the Middle East to counter international terrorist organizations and to justify the invasion of Iraq.[citation needed]
Generally, the Bush Doctrine was used to indicate a willingness to unilaterally pursue U.S. economic interests.[6][7][8] Some of these policies were codified in a National Security Council text entitled the National Security Strategy of the United States published on September 20, 2002.[9]
The phrase "Bush Doctrine" was rarely used by members of the Bush administration. The expression was used at least once, though, by Vice President Dick Cheney, in a June 2003 speech in which he said, "If there is anyone in the world today who doubts the seriousness of the Bush Doctrine, I would urge that person to consider the fate of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq."[10]
National Security Strategy of the United States[edit]
The main elements of the Bush Doctrine were delineated in a document, the National Security Strategy of the United States, published on September 17, 2002.[11] This document is often cited as the definitive statement of the doctrine.[12][13][14] As updated in 2006, it states:[15][16]
Components[edit]
The Bush Doctrine is defined as "a collection of strategy principles, practical policy decisions, and a set of rationales and ideas for guiding United States foreign policy."[17] Some of these had reemerged from the 1992 draft Wolfowitz Doctrine, which had been leaked and disavowed by the first Bush administration; Wolfowitz, as deputy secretary of defense, was at the center of the new Bush administration's strategic planning.[18] Two main pillars are identified for the doctrine: 1.) preemptive strikes against potential enemies and 2.) promoting democratic regime change.[17][19]
The George W. Bush administration claimed that the US was locked in a global war; a war of ideology, in which its enemies are bound together by a common ideology and a common hatred of democracy.[17][20][21][22][23][24]
Out of the National Security Strategy, four main points are highlighted as the core to the Bush Doctrine: 1.) Preemption, 2.) Military Primacy, 3.) New Multilateralism, and 4.) the Spread of Democracy.[25] The document emphasized preemption, stating, "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few", and required "defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders."[26]
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld remarked thus in 2006, in a statement taken to reflect his view of the Doctrine's efficacy: "If I were rating, I would say we probably deserve a D or D+ as a country as how well we're doing in the battle of ideas that's taking place. I'm not going to suggest that it's easy, but we have not found the formula as a country."[23]
In his 2010 memoir Decision Points, President Bush articulates his discrete concept of the Bush Doctrine. He stated that his doctrine consisted of four "prongs", three of them practical, and one idealistic. They are the following: (In his words)
- "Make no distinction between terrorists and the nations that harbor them — and hold both to account."
- "Take the fight to the enemy overseas before they can attack us again here at home."
- "Confront threats before they fully materialize."
- "Advance liberty and hope as an alternative to the enemy's ideology of repression and fear."
Unilateralism[edit]
Unilateral elements were evident early in Bush's presidency. Conservative Charles Krauthammer, who coined the term "Bush Doctrine", deployed "unilateralism", in February 2001 to refer to Bush's increased unilateralism in foreign policy, specifically regarding his decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty.[27][28]
There is some evidence that Bush's willingness for the US to act unilaterally came even earlier. The International Journal of Peace Studies 2003 article "The Bush administration's image of Europe: From ambivalence to rigidity" states:[29]
Attacking countries that harbor terrorists[edit]
The doctrine was developed more fully as an executive branch response following the September 11 attacks. The attacks presented a foreign policy challenge, since it was not Afghanistan that had initiated the attacks, and there was no evidence that they had any foreknowledge of them.[30] In an address to the nation on the evening of September 11, Bush stated his resolution of the issue by declaring that, "We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."[31] The President made an even more aggressive restatement of this principle in his September 20, 2001 address to a Joint Session of Congress:[32]
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer later wrote in an autobiographical account of that address, "In a speech hailed by the press and by Democrats, [the President] announced what became known as the 'Bush Doctrine'".[33] The first published reference after the 9/11 attacks to the terror-fighting doctrine appeared September 30 in an op-ed by political scientist Neal Coates.[34]
This policy was used to justify the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001,[2] and has since been applied to American military action against Al Qaeda camps in North-West Pakistan.[citation needed]
Pre-emptive strikes[edit]
Bush addressed the cadets at the U.S. Military Academy (West Point) on June 1, 2002, and made clear the role pre-emptive war would play in the future of American foreign policy and national defense:[35]
The stance of the Bush administration was that the harsh measures to spread the democracy worldwide are inevitable and efficacious, in which for instance, liberating Iraq will plant democracy in the area and enable it to flourish in the rest of the Middle East.[36]
Two distinct schools of thought arose in the Bush administration regarding how to handle countries such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea (the so-called "Axis of Evil"[37] states). Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, as well as U.S. Department of State specialists, argued for what was essentially the continuation of existing U.S. foreign policy. These policies, developed after the Cold War, sought to establish a multilateral consensus for action (which would likely take the form of increasingly harsh sanctions against the problem states, summarized as the policy of containment). The opposing view, argued by Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and a number of influential Department of Defense policy makers like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, held that direct and unilateral action was both possible and justified and that America should embrace the opportunities for democracy and security offered by its position as sole remaining superpower.
Democratic regime change[edit]
In several speeches between late 2001 and 2002, Bush expanded on his view of the US foreign policy and global intervention, declaring that the US should actively support democratic governments around the world, especially in the Middle East, as a strategy for combating the threat of terrorism, and that the nation had to act unilaterally in its own security interests, without approval of international bodies like the United Nations.[6][7][8] This represented a departure from the Cold War policies of deterrence and containment under the Truman Doctrine and post–Cold War philosophies such as the Powell Doctrine and the Clinton Doctrine.
In his 2003 State of the Union Address, Bush declared:[38]
After his second inauguration, in a January 2006 speech at National Defense University, Bush said: "The defense of freedom requires the advance of freedom."
Neoconservatives and the Bush Doctrine held that the hatred for the West and the United States particularly exists not because of actions perpetrated by the US, but rather because the countries from which terrorists emerge are in social disarray and do not experience the freedom that is an intrinsic part of democracy.[17][23] The Bush Doctrine holds that enemies of the US use terrorism as a war of ideology against the nation. The responsibility of the US is to protect itself by promoting democracy where the terrorists are located so as to undermine the basis for terrorist activities.[17][23] The Elections in Egypt, Lebanon, and Palestine happened as a result of this initiative in the sense that Brotherhood, Hezbollah, and Hamas were allowed to participate in it.
Influences on the Bush Doctrine[edit]
Neoconservatives[edit]
The development of the doctrine was influenced by neoconservative ideology,[39][40] and it was considered to be a step from the political realism of the Reagan Doctrine.[39][41] The Reagan Doctrine was considered key to American foreign policy until the end of the Cold War, just before Bill Clinton became president of the United States. The Reagan Doctrine was considered anti-Communist and in opposition to Soviet Union global influence, but later spoke of a peace dividend towards the end of the Cold War with economic benefits of a decrease in defense spending. The Reagan Doctrine was strongly criticized[41][42][43] by the neoconservatives, who also became disgruntled with the outcome of the Gulf War[39][40] and United States foreign policy under Bill Clinton,[40][44] sparking them to call for change towards global stability[40][45] through their support for active intervention and the democratic peace theory.[44] Several central persons in the counsel to the George W. Bush administration considered themselves to be neoconservatives or strongly support their foreign policy ideas.[40][46][47][48][49][50]
Neoconservatives are widely known to long have supported the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and on January 26, 1998, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) sent a public letter to then-President Bill Clinton stating:
Among the signatories to PNAC's original statement of Principals is George H. W. Bush's Vice President Dan Quayle, George W. Bush's defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, his deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz, his Vice President Dick Cheney, and his brother Jeb Bush.[40]
PNAC member and the chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee (DPBAC), Neoconservative Richard Perle, later expressed regret over the Iraq invasion and ultimately put the blame for the invasion on President George W. Bush.[51]
Other Bush cabinet members who are thought to have adopted neoconservative foreign policy thinking include Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.[52]
The Bush Doctrine, in line with long-standing neoconservative ideas, held that the United States is entangled in a global war of ideas between the western values of freedom on the one hand, and extremism seeking to destroy them on the other; a war of ideology where the United States must take responsibility for security and show leadership in the world by actively seeking out the enemies and also change those countries who are supporting enemies.[17][23][24][53]
The Bush Doctrine, and neoconservative reasoning, held that containment of the enemy as under the realpolitik of Reagan did not work, and that the enemy of United States must be destroyed pre-emptively before they attack—using all the United States' available means, resources and influences to do so.[17][23][24]
On the book Winning the War on Terror Dr. James Forest, U.S. Military Academy Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, comments: "While the West faces uncertainties in the struggle against militant Islam's armies of darkness, and while it is true that we do not yet know precisely how it will end, what has become abundantly clear is that the world will succeed in defeating militant Islam because of the West's flexible, democratic institutions and its all-encompassing ideology of freedom."[24]
Natan Sharansky[edit]
Another part of the intellectual underpinning of the Bush Doctrine was the 2004 book The Case for Democracy, written by Israeli politician and author Natan Sharansky and Israeli Minister of Economic Affairs in the United States Ron Dermer, which Bush has cited as influential in his thinking.[54] The book argues that replacing dictatorships with democratic governments is both morally justified since it leads to greater freedom for the citizens of such countries, and strategically wise, since democratic countries are more peaceful, and breed less terrorism than dictatorial ones.
Expanding United States influence[edit]
Princeton University research fellow Dr. Jonathan Monten, in his 2005 International Security journal article "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy",[55] attributed the Bush administration's activist democracy promotion to two main factors: the expansion of material capabilities, and the presence of a nationalist domestic ideology. He claims that the Bush Doctrine's promotion of democracy abroad was held as vital by the Bush administration to the success of the United States in the "war on terror". It was also a key objective of the administration's grand strategy of expanding the political and economic influence of the United States internationally. He examines two contending approaches to the long-term promotion of democracy: "exemplarism", or leadership by example, and "vindicationism", or the direct application of United States power, including the use of coercive force. Whereas exemplarism largely prevailed in the 20th century, vindicationism has been the preferred approach of the Bush administration.
Criticism and analysis[edit]
The Bush Doctrine resulted in criticism and controversy.[29][56] Peter D. Feaver, who worked on the Bush national security strategy as a staff member on the National Security Council, said he has counted as many as seven distinct Bush doctrines. One of the drafters of the National Security Strategy of the United States, which is commonly mistakenly referred to as the "Bush Doctrine", demurred at investing the statement with too much weight. "I actually never thought there was a Bush doctrine", said Philip D. Zelikow, who later served as State Department counselor under Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. "Indeed, I believe the assertion that there is such a doctrine lends greater coherence to the administration's policies than they deserve." Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, said he thought there was no "single piece of paper" that represents the Bush Doctrine.[57]
Experts on geopolitical strategy note that Halford Mackinder's theories in "The Geographical Pivot of History" about the "Heartland" and world resource control are still as valid today as when they were formulated.[58][59][60]
In his 2007 book In the Defense of the Bush Doctrine,[17] Robert G. Kaufman wrote: "No one grasped the logics or implications of this transformation better than Halford Mackinder. His prescient theories, first set forth in Geographical Pivot of History, published in 1904, have rightly shaped American grand strategy since World War II. Mackinder warned that any single power dominating Eurasia, "the World Island", as he called it, would have the potential to dominate the world, including the United States."[61] Kaufman is a political scientist, public policy professor and member of The Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee. He said in an interview about the book: "I wrote this book because of my conviction that the Bush Doctrine has a more compelling logic and historical pedigree than people realize."[20]
The Bush Doctrine was polarizing both domestically and internationally.[62] In 2008, polls showed there was more anti-Americanism than before the Bush administration formed the Bush Doctrine; this increase was probably, at least partially, a result of implementing the Bush Doctrine and conservative foreign policy.[63][64]
Foreign interventionism[edit]
The foreign policy of the Bush Doctrine was subject to controversy both in the United States and internationally.[29][55]
John J. Mearsheimer argues in his book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities that a liberal hegemonic policy like the Bush Doctrine is ineffective at achieving its stated end goals and is doomed to lead to more war, anti-Americanism, and a global retreat in democracy.
Some critics of the policies were suspicious of the increasing willingness of the United States to use military force unilaterally.[65][66]
Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson argued that it reflects a turn away from international law, and marks the end of American legitimacy in foreign affairs.[67]
Others have stated that it could lead to other states resorting to the production of WMDs or terrorist activities.[68] This doctrine is argued to be contrary to the just war theory and would constitute a war of aggression.[69][70] Patrick J. Buchanan wrote that the 2003 invasion of Iraq had significant similarities to the 1996 neoconservative policy paper A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.[71]
Political scientist Karen Kwiatkowski in 2007 wrote in her article "Making Sense of the Bush Doctrine":
Radical departure[edit]
According to Buchanan and others, the Bush Doctrine was a radical departure from former United States foreign policies, and a continuation of the ideological roots of neoconservatism.[39][73][74][75][76][77]
Initially, support for the United States was high,[77] but by the end of the Bush administration, after seven years of war, anti-Americanism was high and criticism of the Bush Doctrine was widespread;[77][78] nonetheless the doctrine still had support among some United States political leaders.[78]
The representation of prominent neoconservatives and their influences on the Bush Doctrine had been highly controversial among the American public.[41][52][78][79]
Critics, like John Micklethwait in the book The Right Nation, claim that Bush was deceived by neoconservatives into adopting their policies.[52][80][81]
Polarization[edit]
Anti-war critics have claimed that the Bush Doctrine was strongly polarizing domestically, had estranged allies of the United States,[72] and belied Bush's stated desire to be a "uniter, not a divider".[62]
Compassionate belief and religious influence[edit]
Bush often talked about his belief in compassionate conservatism[82][83] and liberty as "God's gift".[38] In his Claremont Institute article Democracy and the Bush Doctrine,[76] Charles R. Kesler wrote, "As he begins his second term, the president and his advisors must take a hard, second look at the Bush Doctrine. In many respects, it is the export version of compassionate conservatism."
Sociopsychological strategy and effects[edit]
There is also criticism on Bush Doctrine practices related to their sociopsychological effects saying they create a culture of fear.[84][85][86][87]
Naomi Klein wrote in her book The Shock Doctrine about a recurrent metaphor of shock, and she claimed in an interview that the Bush administration continued to exploit a "window of opportunity that opens up in a state of shock", followed by a comforting rationale for the public, as a form of social control.[88]
Democratization[edit]
Some commentators argue that the Bush Doctrine has not aimed to support genuine democratic regimes driven by local peoples, but rather US-friendly regimes installed by diplomats acting on behalf of the United States and intended only to seem democratic to U.S. voters.[89] For example, in the case of Afghanistan, it is argued that parliamentary democracy was downplayed by the US and power concentrated in the hands of the Afghan president Hamid Karzai, a US ally.[90] The election of Karzai has been described as the result of manipulation on the parts of the US government and US policy maker Zalmay Khalilzad. At the same time, these commentators draw attention to the number of unpopular (but US-friendly) warlords achieving "legitimating" positions under US supervision of the elections. Some commentators interpreted voter turnout figures as evidence of "large-scale fraud".[91] Sonali Kolhatkar and James Ingalls have written, "It remains to be seen if U.S. policymakers will ever allow anything approaching democracy to break out in Afghanistan and interfere with their plans."[92]
Of the elections in Afghanistan, Sima Samar, former Afghan Minister for Women's Affairs, stated, "This is not a democracy, it is a rubber stamp. Everything has already been decided by the powerful ones."[93]
Most studies of American intervention have been pessimistic about the history of the United States exporting democracy. John A. Tures examined 228 cases of American intervention from 1973 to 2005, using Freedom House data.[94] While in 63 cases a country did become more democratic, in 69 instances the country became less democratic - and the plurality of interventions, 96, caused no change in the country's democracy.[94]
