風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
普京和習近平揭露了資本主義的巨大幻想
除非美國及其盟國動員起來拯救它，否則全球化的第二個偉大時代即將災難性地結束。
作者：John Micklethwait 和 Adrian Wooldridge 2022 年 3 月 24 日
再見全球化？
1919 年出版的一本關於《和平的經濟後果》的書並不是理解當前烏克蘭戰爭的經濟後果的明顯起點。但值得花一點時間閱讀約翰·梅納德·凱恩斯(John Maynard Keynes) 對1913年倫敦上層中產階級悠閑生活的著名描述——就在第一次世界大戰改變一切之前：
凱恩斯隨後描述了這位倫敦人如何在市場上進行投機，並在沒有護照的情況下前往任何他想去的地方，也無需更換貨幣（金本位意味著他的錢在任何地方都可以使用）。然後，這位著名經濟學家通過深入倫敦特權人士的頭腦發出了致命一擊:
非常好的讀物。"除非美國及其盟國動員起來拯救它，否則全球化的第二個偉大時代即將災難性地結束。”
“1919 年出版的一本關於《和平的經濟後果》的書並不是理解當前烏克蘭戰爭的經濟後果的明顯起點。但值得花一點時間閱讀約翰·梅納德·凱恩斯 (John Maynard Keynes) 對烏克蘭當前戰爭的著名描述。 1913 年，倫敦上層中產階級的悠閑生活——就在第一次世界大戰改變一切之前：
倫敦居民(1913年), 可以在床上喝著早茶，通過電話訂購全世界的各種產品，數量按他認為合適的數量，並合理地期望這些產品早日送到他家門口；他可以同時以同樣的方式在世界任何地方的自然資源和新企業中冒險他的財富，並且不費力氣甚至不費力地分享它們的預期成果和優勢。
凱恩斯隨後描述了這位倫敦人如何在市場上進行投機，並在沒有護照的情況下前往任何他想去的地方，也無需更換貨幣（金本位意味著他的錢在任何地方都可以使用）。然後，這位著名經濟學家通過深入倫敦特權人士的頭腦發出了致命一擊：
[倫敦人]認為這種狀況是正常的、確定的和永久的，除非有進一步改進的方向，任何偏離這種狀況的行為都是異常的、可恥的和可以避免的。軍國主義和帝國主義、種族和文化競爭、壟斷、限製和排斥的計劃和政治，這些計劃和政治對這個天堂起到了蛇的作用，隻不過是他日報的娛樂而已，而且似乎幾乎沒有產生任何影響。社會和經濟生活的正常進程根本沒有發生過變化，其國際化實際上已接近完成。
凱恩斯筆下的大都會英國人完全沒有意識到全球化的第一個偉大時代即將在索姆河被打成碎片，他就像羅伯特·奧爾特曼的電影《戈斯福德公園》中嬉鬧的貴族一樣，這部電影講述了在一座宏偉的鄉村別墅裏度過周末的故事。 戰爭爆發之前。 我們中的一個人擁有一張1913年牛津最豪華的餐飲俱樂部布林登的照片：世界未來的統治者以冰冷的傲慢目光注視著我們。一年之內，他們中的大多數人都在戰壕裏。
浮誇的貴族並不是唯一沾沾自喜的人。知識分子也同意了。諾曼·安吉爾 (Norman Angell) 於 1909 年出版的愛德華時代暢銷書《大幻覺》認為，鑒於世界的相互聯係，戰爭是不可能發生的。歐洲和美國的偉大企業都是基於同樣的假設運作的。”
烏克蘭正在改變世界秩序，但這並非普京所希望的
https://www.universal-defence.com/blog/ukraine-is-changing-the-world-order-just-not-how-putin-hoped
彭博社 2022 年 4 月 4 日
弗拉基米爾·普京總統派遣武裝部隊進入烏克蘭兩天後，俄羅斯國家通訊社俄新社發表了一篇文章，認為勝利即將到來。 它慶祝了“一個新時代”，其標誌是西方統治的結束、美國與歐洲大陸之間聯係的切斷以及俄羅斯在世界上回歸其應有的“空間和地位”。
隨著戰爭的激烈進行，預示著一個俄羅斯世界的到來，將烏克蘭、白俄羅斯和俄羅斯聯合起來，看起來還為時過早。 俄新社很快就撤下了這篇文章。 但作者在一件事上是對的：普京的入侵決定似乎確實正在改變國際秩序，隻是不一定按照他計劃的方式改變。
從柏林到倫敦，再到塔林等波羅的海國家的首都，保衛歐洲的標準已經被撕毀。 大規模戰爭不再是不可想象的，各國正在重新考慮他們花什麽、買什麽以及他們需要如何作戰。
北約的歐洲成員國並沒有與美國分裂，而是與美國保持一致。 該聯盟並沒有像普京在入侵之前所要求的那樣縮小到 20 世紀 90 年代擴張前的規模，而是在其邊境部署了更多人員。 北約已向其東翼增派約3000名士兵，以及直升機、坦克和戰鬥機，以阻止克裏姆林宮擴大戰場的任何潛在決定。
“無論這場戰爭結果如何——盡管現在聽起來很憤世嫉俗——曆史學家都會說，普京對烏克蘭的攻擊給了歐洲恢複所需的時間，這樣歐洲就可以對抗俄羅斯，並進一步對抗中國，”將軍說。 理查德·巴倫斯（Richard Barrons），英國聯合部隊司令部前司令。 “烏克蘭正在付出高昂的代價來為我們爭取時間。”
對歐洲來說，最大的問題是它將如何度過這段時間。 德國承諾額外支出1000億歐元（1100億美元）隻是加強軍事行動的最明顯例子，這對歐洲內部以及與俄羅斯的力量平衡都有影響。
其他國家也在增加國防預算，其中包括三個波羅的海小國，它們長期以來一直對普京敲響警鍾。 他們還要求北約提供永久基地以及遠程防空係統，盡管目前還不清楚他們是否會得到這些。
所有這些都並不意味著歐洲恢複了穩定，而是承認了歐洲的失落。 美國國家安全委員會前歐洲和俄羅斯事務高級主任菲奧娜·希爾上周在丹佛大都會州立大學表示，普京入侵烏克蘭“是一次後帝國、後殖民時代的土地掠奪”。 “如果我們讓這種情況發生，我們就為未來樹立了先例。”
這些額外的數十億美元可以有效地使用，也可以不有效地使用。 隨著戰爭最初的衝擊和烏克蘭抵抗運動的鼓舞人心的影響不可避免地消退，北約的團結和決心也可能會消失。
觀點：普京和習近平揭露了資本主義的巨大幻想
普京或許仍能實現他的一些目標，而且種種跡象表明，他可能會選擇孤立俄羅斯——以及烏克蘭和歐洲的永久不穩定——而不是承認自己的錯誤。 失敗可能會使他的政治生存受到質疑。
“這仍然是一場競賽，”美國智庫蘭德公司高級國防研究員戴維·施拉帕克說。 “這是一場他們激勵我們開始跑步的比賽，但這仍然是一場雙方都沒有注定輸贏的比賽。 北約方麵仍然需要打很多牌來解決這個問題。”
什拉帕克負責 2014 年俄羅斯吞並克裏米亞後進行的蘭德兵棋推演，以預測如果俄羅斯入侵三個波羅的海國家會發生什麽。 結果成為新聞頭條，因為它們發人深省：俄羅斯軍隊將在 60 小時內到達愛沙尼亞、拉脫維亞和立陶宛首都。
在“既成事實”中，他們還將在其他較大的北約盟國做出反應之前關閉所謂的蘇瓦烏基缺口（Suwalki Gap）——一條從白俄羅斯邊境延伸到俄羅斯飛地加裏寧格勒的陸地走廊。
施拉帕克表示，在過去三周烏克蘭發生的事件之後，人們自然會對這種閃電襲擊表示懷疑，但根據蘭德兵棋推演中的假設來判斷這場戰爭將會發生什麽變化還為時過早。 俄羅斯領導人和指揮官肯定會以截然不同的方式攻擊北約。
盡管如此，俄羅斯軍隊仍受到重創，其精確製導導彈庫存也已耗盡。 美國參謀長聯席會議主席前特別助理邁克爾·馬紮爾 (Michael Mazarr) 表示，除非當前衝突發生災難性升級，否則俄羅斯未來與北約發生選擇戰爭的可能性將低於 2 月 24 日之前 。
他說，可以肯定的是，在三五年內，普京的將軍們將吸取教訓，重新集結和重新武裝，但他們將因限製獲得技術和資金的製裁而受到阻礙。 周二，美國國家安全顧問傑克·沙利文告訴記者，盟友將在本周晚些時候舉行會議時尋求收緊和擴大對俄羅斯的製裁。
馬紮爾表示，這就是歐洲安全秩序更令人擔憂的變化所在。他表示，大國之間的穩定取決於達成某種維持現狀的共同協議。 即使是 20 世紀 60 年代後的蘇聯也實現了這一目標，但普京領導下的俄羅斯卻從未實現過這一目標。 而且，無論北約在冷戰後的擴張有多麽明智，這樣的協議現在可能是不可能的。
馬紮爾表示，在烏克蘭事件之後，“克裏姆林宮的政權不會被視為地緣政治夥伴”。 “我們現在陷入了與一個日益受到羞辱、極端民族主義和危險的衰落大國的無限期對抗。”
華盛頓的擔憂主要集中在中國是否決定幫助俄羅斯逃避製裁和重新裝備，此舉將招致美國進一步製裁，並加速世界經濟和地緣政治集團的重新劃分。 中國否認莫斯科曾向中國尋求幫助，而且到目前為止，幾乎沒有具體跡象表明它會這樣做。
在北約前線國家，國防官員不太關注俄羅斯在烏克蘭的軍事混亂，而更多地關注普京可以根據錯誤假設采取行動的證據。
“俄羅斯希望在世界這一地區恢複這種蘇聯式的國家集團，”愛沙尼亞國防聯盟指揮官裏霍·烏特吉準將說，該聯盟是一個由 19,000 名成年人和 6,000 名學員組成的誌願預備隊。 “也許我們不是下一個——有摩爾多瓦，還有格魯吉亞，阿塞拜疆和亞美尼亞之間存在凍結的衝突，還有哈薩克斯坦——俄羅斯必須在很多地方采取行動。 但我們必須做好準備。”
烏特吉表示，自入侵烏克蘭以來，他已收到約 1000 份加入部隊的申請，其中一半是女性。 他還計劃購買更多烏克蘭人為此部署的反坦克武器和肩扛式防空導彈。
不過，最重要的是，烏特吉堅信，事實證明蘭德關於這場戰爭實際上將如何在波羅的海地區展開的假設是錯誤的。 毫無疑問，俄羅斯軍隊將迅速進駐首都，但戰爭將像烏克蘭一樣在俄羅斯後方和城市進行。 這不會是板上釘釘的事情。 “如果北約部隊需要一段時間才能到達，他們就不會來到被占領土，”烏特吉說。 “他們將來到戰區。”
Putin and Xi Exposed the Great Illusion of Capitalism
Unless the U.S. and its allies mobilize to save it, the second great age of globalization is coming to a catastrophic close.
A book published in 1919 on “The Economic Consequences of the Peace” isn’t the obvious starting place for understanding the economic consequences of the current war in Ukraine. But it’s worth taking a little time to read John Maynard Keynes’s famous description of the leisurely life of an upper-middle-class Londoner in 1913 — just before the Great War changed everything:
Keynes then describes how this Londoner could speculate on the markets and travel wherever he wanted without a passport or the bother of changing currency (the gold standard meant that his money was good everywhere). And then the famous economist delivers his coup de grace by going inside the privileged Londoner’s head:
"A book published in 1919 on “The Economic Consequences of the Peace” isn’t the obvious starting place for understanding the economic consequences of the current war in Ukraine. But it’s worth taking a little time to read John Maynard Keynes’s famous description of the leisurely life of an upper-middle-class Londoner in 1913 — just before the Great War changed everything:
The inhabitant of London [in 1913] could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages.
Keynes then describes how this Londoner could speculate on the markets and travel wherever he wanted without a passport or the bother of changing currency (the gold standard meant that his money was good everywhere). And then the famous economist delivers his coup de grace by going inside the privileged Londoner’s head:
[The Londoner] regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous and avoidable. The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions and exclusion, which were to play the serpent to this paradise, were little more than the amusements of his daily newspaper, and appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalization of which was nearly complete in practice.
Keynes’s cosmopolitan Briton, completely unaware that the first great age of globalization was about to be shot to pieces at the Somme, is the urban equivalent of the cavorting toffs in “Gosford Park,” Robert Altman’s movie about a weekend in a grand country house just before the outbreak of war. One of us possesses a photograph of the Bullingdon, Oxford’s poshest dining club, in 1913: The future rulers of the world stare out at us with frozen arrogance. Within a year most of them were in the trenches.
Foppish aristocrats weren’t the only ones who were complacent. Intellectuals agreed. Norman Angell’s “The Great Illusion,” the Edwardian bestseller published in 1909, argued that war was impossible given the interconnectedness of the world. The great businesses of Europe and the U.S. operated on the same assumption. "
Two days after President Vladimir Putin sent his armed forces into Ukraine, Russian state news agency RIA Novosti published an article that assumed imminent victory. It celebrated “a new era,” marked by the end of Western domination, the severing of bonds between the U.S. and continental Europe and the return of Russia to its rightful “space and place” in the world.
As the war rages on, heralding the arrival of a single Russian World to unite Ukraine with Belarus and Russia looks at best premature. RIA Novosti soon took the article down. But the author was right about one thing: Putin’s decision to invade does appear to be changing the international order, just not necessarily in the way he planned.
From Berlin to London and Baltic capitals like Tallinn, the metrics of defending Europe have been torn up. A large scale war is no longer unthinkable and nations are reconsidering what they spend, what they buy, and how they would need to fight.
Rather than split from the U.S., NATO’s European members have cleaved to it. Rather than shrink to its pre-expansion size of the 1990s — as Putin demanded before his invasion — the alliance is positioning more personnel on its frontiers. NATO has sent about an additional 3,000 troops to its eastern flank, as well as helicopters, tanks and fighter jets, to deter any potential Kremlin decision to expand the battlefield.
“No matter how this war turns out — and as cynical as it sounds now — historians will say that Putin’s attack on Ukraine gave Europe the time it needed to recover so it could confront Russia and, further down the road, China,” said General Richard Barrons, a former commander of the U.K.’s Joint Forces Command. “Ukraine is paying a high price to buy us time.”
The big question for Europe will be what it does with that time. Germany’s commitment to spend an additional 100 billion euros ($110 billion) is only the most obvious example of stepping up militarily, one that has implications for the balance of power within Europe, as well as with Russia.
Others are upping their defense budgets, too, including the three tiny Baltic States, which have long rung the alarm bell over Putin. They are also asking NATO for permanent bases, as well as long-range anti-aircraft systems, even if it’s less clear they’ll get them.
None of that suggests a return to stability in Europe, but a recognition of its loss. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine “is a post-imperial, post-colonial land grab,” Fiona Hill, the former senior director for European and Russian affairs on the U.S. National Security Council, said last week at the Metropolitan State University of Denver. “If we let this happen, we’re setting a precedent for the future.”
Those extra billions can be spent effectively, or not. As the initial shock of the war and inspirational impact of the Ukrainian resistance inevitably fades, NATO’s unity and determination may do so too.
From Opinion: Putin and Xi Exposed the Great Illusion of Capitalism
Putin may yet be able to achieve some of his goals and there’s every indication he may choose isolation for Russia — and permanent instability for Ukraine and Europe — over acknowledging his mistake. Defeat could call into question his political survival.
“It is still a race,” said David Shlapak, senior defense researcher at the Rand Corporation, a U.S. think tank. “It is a race where they have motivated us to start running, but it is still a competition that neither side is pre-ordained to win or lose. There are a lot of cards that still need to be played on the NATO side to figure that out.”
Shlapak was responsible for a war game Rand conducted after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, to predict what would happen if Russia were to invade the three Baltic states. The results made news headlines because they were sobering: Russian forces would reach the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian capitals in 60 hours.
In a “fait accompli,” they would also close the so-called Suwalki Gap — a land corridor that runs from the border of Belarus to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad — before other, larger NATO allies had time to respond.
It’s natural to be skeptical of such a lightning attack after the events in Ukraine over the past three weeks, but also too early to say what the war will change among the assumptions fed into Rand’s war game, said Shlapak. Russia’s leaders and commanders would surely go about an attack on NATO very differently.
Still, the Russian military has been mauled and its stock of precision guided missiles depleted. Barring a catastrophic escalation of the current conflict, that should make a Russian war of choice with NATO less likely in future than it was before Feb. 24, according to Michael Mazarr, a former special assistant to the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
For sure, in three or five years, Putin’s generals will have learned lessons, regrouped and rearmed, he said, but they’ll be hobbled by sanctions that limit access to technologies and finance. On Tuesday, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan told reporters that allies would seek to tighten and expand sanctions on Russia when they meet later this week.
That, said Mazarr, is where the more worrying change to Europe’s security order comes in. Stability between great powers depends on reaching some mutual agreement to maintain the status quo, he said. That was achieved even with the Soviet Union after the 1960s, but never with Putin’s Russia. And, whatever the wisdom of NATO’s post-Cold War expansion, such a deal may now be impossible.
After Ukraine, “there is no treating the kind of regime that’s in the Kremlin as a geopolitical partner,” said Mazarr. “We are now locked into an indefinite confrontation with an increasingly humiliated, hyper-nationalistic and dangerous great power in decline.”
Concern in Washington has focused on whether China decides to help Russia evade sanctions and reequip, a move that would invite further U.S. sanctions and accelerate the world’s redivision into economic and geopolitical blocs. China has denied Moscow even asked for help and so far there are few concrete signs that it will.
In front-line NATO states, defense officials are less focused on Russian military snafus in Ukraine and more on the evidence that Putin can act on false assumptions.
“Russia wants to restore this Soviet type bloc of states in this part of the world,” said Brigadier General Riho Ühtegi, commander of the Estonian Defense League, a volunteer reserve of 19,000 adults and 6,000 cadets. “Maybe we are not next – there is Moldova and still Georgia, there’s a frozen conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and there’s Kazakhstan — there are many places Russia has to do something. But we have to be ready.”
Ühtegi said he’s received about 1,000 applications to join his force since the invasion of Ukraine began, half from women. He’s also planning to buy more of the anti-tank weapons and shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles that the Ukrainians have deployed to such effect.
Most of all, though, Ühtegi is convinced that events have proved wrong Rand’s assumptions about how such a war would in fact play out in the Baltics. No doubt Russian forces would move quickly to the capitals, but the war would — as in Ukraine — be fought behind Russian lines and in cities. It would not be a done deal. “If NATO forces took a while to come they would not be coming to occupied territory,” said Ühtegi. “They would be coming to a war zone.”
