風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
外交部新聞稿：2010 年 7 月 13 日，外交部長楊榮文關於中國在全球舞台上重新崛起的講話
未來中國全球論壇問答環節的文字記錄
外交部長楊榮文在“未來中國全球論壇”上關於中國在全球舞台上重新崛起的講話，2010 年 7 月 13 日
過去兩天，我們就中國的內部發展和對外關係進行了很多討論。 我認為，在今天的演講中，我們退後一步，以正確的視角來看待中國。 世界上有很多人擔心中國的崛起； 他們想知道，在中國重新出現在世界舞台的過程中，他們是否會看到一個侵略性的、帝國主義的、統治性的、專橫的中國。 在官方演講中，人們會使用漂亮的言詞，但在內部委員會和較暗的房間裏，人們會表達真正的擔憂，有時也會采取行動。 這是人類社會的本質。
丘吉爾曾經說過，要展望未來，我們必須回顧過去。 為了試圖辨別中國在本世紀的重新崛起，重要的是要看到中國的早期形態。 對於我們東南亞人來說，中國深深地存在於曆史記憶中。 就在上周，我們從阿曼收到了一艘小型單桅帆船，這是一艘古代單桅帆船的複製品，這艘單桅帆船在唐代沉沒於距離新加坡 500 英裏的地方，船上載有來自中國許多窯爐的 65,000 件中國陶器，主要是長沙，但也來自其他地方，如 出色地。 而且陶器上有佛教圖案和伊斯蘭教圖案，因為那爛陀時代和阿拔斯時代也是如此。 即使在當時，這也是一筆巨大的貿易，給該地區帶來了巨大的繁榮。 在宋代，中國可能是全球經濟的重要組成部分，東南亞和南印度的王國為了對華貿易而相互競爭和爭鬥。 在其中一場戰爭中，一支來自印度南部的朱羅艦隊擊敗了三佛齊。
所以當我說重新出現時，有一個特殊的含義。 中國能夠在廣闊的地理範圍內一次又一次地重建自己，這對任何其他國家來說都是不同尋常的。 對我的歐洲朋友，我告訴他們，這就像羅馬帝國被摧毀和分裂後，直到今天又重建了四、五倍。 當然，這在歐洲從未發生過。 直到今天，歐洲各國都對部落有著深厚的忠誠。 我們在世界杯期間看到了這一點，並通過他們的語言、食物、葡萄酒和激情來表達。 中國的不同尋常之處在於，90%以上的人口是漢族，而且有一種他們屬於一個共同種族的感覺。 美國人由於其觀念的特殊性，相信成為美國人對世界上的每個人都有好處。 作為美國人，擁有美國價值觀對你有好處，那麽你會過得更好，世界也會變得更美好。 因此，美國人有一種天生的傳教精神，事實上，這種精神時不時地體現在美國的外交政策中。 對於漢族來說，情況就不同了。 漢族人有點像猶太人。 如果你不是天生的一員，那麽你就沒有必要成為一員。 我的意思是，是的，學習語言，了解習慣，享受食物，觀察細節； 但如果有一天一個非中國人說，看我要成為中國人，每個人都會感到有點尷尬，因為如果你不是生來就是中國人，你怎麽能成為中國人呢？ 就像那些皈依猶太教並宣稱自己是猶太人的人一樣。 從正式的角度來看，它們可能會被接受，但從深刻的情感角度來說，那就是另一回事了。 正因為如此，中國人對帝國這一西方術語的態度與歐洲在帝國主義時代創建的帝國有很大不同。 對於中國來說，決定性的是內部世界。 如果它連貫了，如果水道和灌溉渠修得很好，如果糧食可以自由流動，那麽內部市場就會爆炸，變得非常繁榮，這就需要中央權威和中央官僚機構。 但當這種情況崩潰時，一切都會崩潰，這種情況可能會持續數十年或數百年，當這種情況發生時，數百萬人會死亡。
因此，中國的執政者始終關注中國的內部發展。 很多時候，其外交政策實際上是為了確保穩定的環境，以便能夠集中精力進行內部發展。 在其曆史上，如果不解決外國威脅，如果不管理對外關係，那麽這就會成為一個國內問題。 如果國內問題不解決，國家就會陷入困境。 我不認為中國因此而天生具有侵略性。 但當然，如果你是韓國人、蒙古人或者
中亞或越南，嗯，你有時會說我們被中國入侵，甚至可能並入他們的帝國，我認為這是一個公平的觀點。 但如果你從中國的內部角度來看——確保邊境地區及其供應線的安全——這確實是防禦性的。 也許沒有什麽比從秦始皇時期開始重建中國的長城更能表達這一點了，甚至從戰國時期或戰國時期開始，一次又一次地在其 曆史，是為了保護內部環境，使國家能夠治理好。
所以當我們展望未來的中國時，中國當然會尋求影響邊境地區的發展，這裏的邊境地區包括整個東南亞。 但它的主要目標是內部的，而不是為了生存空間、遷移其人民並將其他人變成臣民而進行的侵略。 理解這種心理很重要，因為它創造了一種政治文化，使中國可以接受作為一個政體進行治理。 而且因為擔心地方官員會被當地民眾俘虜，所以從明朝開始就有規定，在距縣城四百裏之內，不能做大官，不能做高官。 你的出生地。 這種製度在中華人民共和國已經被重新建立——你不能在你出生的地方擔任高級官員，因為你無法逃避對家庭的忠誠和相互的義務。 所以今天如果你看看中國，省級領導，特別是黨委書記和省長，幾乎總是不是來自本省。 每個省的麵積相當於一個歐洲主要國家的大小。 我再次告訴我的歐洲朋友，按照慣例，按照規定，德國總理不能是德國人，法國總統不能是法國人，英國首相不能是英國人。 但在中國，這是可以接受的，因為這是很久以前的製度。
這是否意味著，走向未來，中國將能夠直線前進，沒有大的坎坷，沒有大的困難，成為地球上最強大的國家，盡管它可能自給自足，並確定 與外界的互動。 不會這麽簡單，因為今天中國內部的挑戰是巨大的，總是回到如何治理國家，以便有和平，以便有發展，以便他們的地區平衡，有製度，有記錄 、水路、道路，重新分配。
當今中國最大的問題是城市化——城市化的規模和速度是中國曆史上前所未見的。 這是新事物。 過去一直是農村社會，治國其實就是讓農村富有生產力。 如今，中國的城市化率達到40%。 毛澤東時代，城市化率達到20%。 有一天它會像台灣、韓國一樣，80%到90%都是城市。 這將創造一個全新的局麵，需要一套全新的技能。 當毛澤東從農村而非城市無產階級手中奪取權力，從而與布爾什維克決裂時，中國共產黨就取得了權力。 共產黨的所有技能、本能和技巧都是基於對農村、農民的控製。 但現在城市正在迅速發展，創造了一種新的情況：小家庭，通常是獨生子女，城市環境的匿名性，每個人都使用手機、即時消息和互聯網——而中國的互聯網用戶已經比其他任何國家都多。 地球上的國家 - 以及不斷增長的社會流動性。 這不僅是對共產黨的挑戰，也是對共產黨的挑戰。 這是對儒學本身的挑戰。 因為自漢朝以來一直將中國社會維係在一起的儒家思想需要一套公認的等級社會關係，而這些關係現在在現代世界中全部溶解為網絡。 因此，不知何故，我們在新加坡也麵臨這個問題，因為我們這裏有四分之三的華人，我們需要一種新的……我稱之為“城市儒學”。 這對中國社會來說將是一個新的挑戰，因為在此基礎上，共產黨將不得不根據這些深刻的社會變革來重塑自己。 如果中國成功做到這一點，我毫不懷疑它將再次成為地球上最大的經濟體和地球上最偉大的國家。 但這並不容易，因為這是一個新情況。 世界上沒有人真正能解決這個問題； 每個人都在掙紮，我們也在掙紮。
你注意到在亞洲，所有傳統政黨都陷入了困境。 日本有自民黨，台灣有國民黨。 在韓國，這個問題從未完全解決。 在泰國，曼穀和鄉村之間的緊張關係。 在馬來西亞，巫統曾經以農村為基礎，現在以城市為基礎，變成了
城市化。 在印度尼西亞，專業集團。 在印度，我們有國大黨。 現在，所有人都麵臨著不快樂的城市人口。 就好像發展得越多，城市人口就越多，他們對傳統政府就越不滿。 部分原因是近年來中國對新加坡的實驗非常著迷。
與中國相比，新加坡就像盆景； 它太小，不具有普遍意義，但有一些遺傳相似性。 因此，中國的研究人員和社會科學家有時會在研究新加坡時說：“哦，好吧，如果它在這裏可行，也許在那裏也可行。” 我們在多年來與中國的互動中發現，他們對新加坡實驗的興趣是間歇性的。 當它遇到問題並在世界範圍內尋找解決方案時，它會不時地關注新加坡的做法。 有時它喜歡它所看到的，有時它不喜歡它所看到的。 然後總結並總結相關教訓。 這當然使新加坡相對於中國處於一個相當有趣的位置。
我要表達的觀點是，當人們說中國將主宰世界時，他們擔心中國不僅會在經濟上變得非常強大，而且會尋求征服其他國家並迫使他們像中國人一樣行事。 我認為這種情況不會發生，因為這違背了中國曆史的規律。 多年來，中國的治國之道，其基本目標大多是防禦性的，一直是把外國人當作外國人對待； 明確區分內部和外部； 介於 nei（內）和 wai（外）之間。 還有非常複雜的方法來處理外部事物，使其不會對內部事物構成威脅。 我們在現行政策中一再看到這一點以現代術語表達。 所以說到世貿組織的貿易自由化，貿易是的，這個是的，那個是的，但是當它觸及核心結構——國家經濟的製高點、文化問題時，我認為中國，無論誰統治中國，都不會允許 外部世界決定國家內部的治理方式。 以最近與穀歌就如何在中國運營的問題發生的爭執為例。 中國人不希望它成為一個大問題，但穀歌自己卻想將其政治化。 當然，一旦將其政治化，中方就別無選擇，隻能堅持基本原則。 穀歌後來下台了，並決定，我們以務實的方式來處理這個問題，中國也準備以務實的方式來處理它。 在不影響其核心利益的情況下，可以采取靈活處理。 但如果確實如此，那就是另一回事了。
中國的金融機構也是如此。 19世紀鴉片戰爭後不久，中國就失去了對其金融體係的控製。 我記得幾年前一位自民黨高級政治家告訴我，日本人知道，當船隻登陸亞洲大陸時，他們將受到歐洲人而不是亞洲人的檢查。 日本知道，除非它迅速重建自己，否則它也會遭受中國的命運。 但不幸的是，日本認為解決辦法是成為一個競爭性的帝國主義，這導致了悲傷。 因此，中國在從國際金融體係中受益的同時，在允許自己的金融業開放的同時，在核心架構上，絕不會允許自己失去自主意識——媒體、金融、 文化政策、國家戰略產業。
在某種程度上，這或許可以追溯到漢語本身的本質，即它的表意特征。 小時候，讀漢字比讀字母更容易，因為漢字是圖畫。 所以兩三歲的小孩子能認識中文單詞，但看不懂字母單詞。成人後，字母單詞更方便。 因此，這種語言確實讓你作為一個成年人很難完全理解。 但如果你生來就是這樣，那麽它自然就會成為你的一部分。 一些學者將漢字係統描述為數字係統，因為它不是表音的，因此不會隨著時間的推移而改變——今天可以讀到與一千年前、兩千多年前相同的漢字。 然而如果你看看字母係統，這是不可能做到的。
展望21世紀，如果我們捫心自問，如果中國成功了，變得強大起來，影響力輻射到更廣闊的地區，世界會是什麽樣子？ 我認為世界不會成為“中國治下的和平”，因為世界太大了。 而中國太專注於內部事務，沒有真正渴望建立一個“中國治下的和平”。 我的意思是，中國對讓緬甸人民民主化或讓穆斯林信奉儒家不感興趣。 中國完全準備好接受世界的多樣性，隻要“你”不威脅“我”（中國）。 但
必須有一定的結構穩定性，因為這是政治權力的本質。 這將是一個多極世界。 在我們這個世界的一部分，在亞洲，簡化它，這當然是過度簡化，我認為將存在三個主要極點。 將會有中國，將會有印度，並且將會有美國。 正是這個三角關係以及它們之間的關係，真正決定了本世紀戰爭與和平的重大問題。 中美關係已經討論過了，我相信MM昨天晚上也談到了，美國大使（洪博培）也在場，所以我想我沒有必要再贅述了，你們已經很熟悉了，而且 你們中有些人比我知道得更多。
但我想談談印度，因為印度無論從麵積還是從文明年齡來看都可以與中國相媲美。 這兩個國家，實際上是兩個文明，由於喜馬拉雅山脈高聳和中亞大沙漠的緣故，除了 1962 年的邊境衝突之外，從未發生過戰爭。 是的，有僧侶，有商人——他們通過東南亞進行交流，都影響著東南亞國家，但他們從不打仗。 作為一個古老的民族，彼此之間有一定的深刻認識，也有一定的尊重。 中國人一直將印度視為佛教、功夫、天文學和數學知識的發源地。 喜馬拉雅山那邊的印度人一直都知道，那裏有一位偉大的皇帝，統治著廣闊的領土和豐富的市場。 在文化上他們並不接近。 事實上，在文化上，它們是非常不同的。 但存在一定的相互尊重，現在他們必須解決邊界問題，必須解決一些困難。 與19世紀一樣，中國已經是印度最大的貿易夥伴，而且貿易增長迅速。
幾年前，印度西裏古裏走廊和西藏之間的乃堆拉山口已經重新開放。 去年8月我在西藏時，我遇到的一位當地官員告訴我，西寧至拉薩的高原鐵路將延伸至日喀則。 他說，我們其實離乃堆拉山口很近，如果印度政府同意的話，我們可以直接接印度鐵路，加爾各答也就幾百公裏遠。 然後我們所有人都將更容易進入大海。 當我把這件事告訴印第安人時，他們看著我，有些擔心。 雖然今天大多數中國人並不知道 1962 年發生過一場戰爭，但大多數印度人都記得那場戰爭。 它深深地銘刻在他們的記憶中，成為一道尚未完全愈合的傷疤。 但我相信有一天這些問題都會得到解決，因為他們之間不存在天然的反感。 貿易和交流的好處是巨大的，邊界將開放。 將會有更多的聯係，每個人都可以使另一個人受益匪淺。
為此，我和其他人深入參與了這個複興古老那爛陀大學的項目，那爛陀大學在鼎盛時期是地球上最偉大的大學。 數百年來，鼎盛時期吸引了來自日本、韓國、中國、西藏、中亞、東南亞各國的上萬名學生，多年來接待了唐代偉大的高僧玄奘、易經。 （義淨）等。 直到今天，這一時期最好的記載是玄奘的記述《大唐西域記》，即《大唐西域史》。 那仍然是一千多年前印度在那段曆史時期的最好記錄。 因此，我們希望通過複興這所大學並使其成為一所國際大學，它可以將來自世界各地的亞洲人聚集在一起，以便每個人都知道他們的祖先曾經相互幫助，和平相處，進行貿易 ，與僧人跨越國界。 如果我們能夠在本世紀幫助重建一些這樣的情況，我們維護更大和平的可能性就會提高。
有人覺得也許他們也可以利用印度來製衡中國。 對我來說，這太簡單了。 是的，印度是世界上最大的民主國家，這常常被用來解釋為什麽印度和美國是天然的合作夥伴。 是的，在某些問題上，美國和印度是天然的合作夥伴。 在氣候變化等其他問題上，印度和中國是天然的合作夥伴。 我相信最終每個人都會根據自己的利益來計算。 印度太古老、太智慧、太精神、太世俗，隻能是它自己。 民主是一層，但還有很多層，綿延數公裏。
我認為是在《奧義書》中，在印度教萬神殿中，他們有 3.3 億神——3.3 億男神和女神。 這有點令人難以置信，不是嗎？ 當然，印度人也相信一種精神本質。 幾個世紀以來，人類狀況的各個方麵都是印第安人所不具備的。
沒有經曆過，沒有思考過，也沒有試圖解釋過。 它複雜的社會結構，根深蒂固的種姓製度，你隻需要看看周日報紙上的婚姻分類廣告就知道種姓製度有多活躍和好，就知道印度永遠是印度。 印度不會被任何人利用，除非是為了自身利益。 因此，將會出現三個極點。 每一個本身都是深刻而深刻的。
我不相信美國正在衰落，正如許多人所描述的那樣。 美國是新世界。 它創造了一種新的政治文化、社會結構，以自由個人的加入為基礎。 它有點像互聯網協議 TCP/IP。 如果你接受TCP/IP，你就可以加入美國。 所以你可以是中國人，你可以是猶太人，你可以是印度人，你可以是阿拉伯人； 你做出承諾，遵守他們的法律，你就是其中的一部分。 由於它是開放式的，它力求將其影響力擴展到全世界。 但如果你從另一個角度來看； 我們今天看到的全球化是美國式的全球化。 TCP/IP 是美國政治文化的核心，它實際上是將世界上的中國人、印度人、歐洲人和拉丁美洲人連接在一起的聯係，使我們能夠運營一個共同的貿易體係、一個共同的金融體係。
中國無法提供全球化軟件，因為中國永遠隻關注國內，對外部世界感興趣，這樣才能改善其內部管理，永遠處於自衛狀態。 中國沒有興趣創建“中國治下的和平”，也沒有興趣擁有自己的 TCP/IP 版本。 是的，它有孔子學院； 它希望你學習中文等等，但就像猶太人一樣，如果你不是天生的，非常感謝。 而美國的情況則不同。 是什麽將中國和印度聯係在一起？ 不是中國軟件，不是印度軟件； 它將是通過美國大學、通過英語、通過盎格魯-撒克遜貿易規則和金融標準的美國軟件。 我們正在進入一個有趣的多極世界； 一個正在強大地重新崛起的中國，一個也在增長但將成為自己的一極的印度，一個不僅是現實，而且是必然的美國。 謝謝。
2010 年 7 月 13 日在未來中國全球論壇上與外交部長楊榮文就中國在全球舞台上重新崛起問題進行問答的文字記錄
主持人 國會議員 Josephine Teo：部長，我想問一下我們的東盟鄰國的情況。 在您與他們的交往中，您感受到他們對中國的態度如何？ 當東盟領導人想到重新崛起的中國時，他們腦子裏浮現出的是什麽？
楊榮文部長：即使在中國衰落、經濟無足輕重的時候，東南亞所有國家，沒有一個國家對中國懷有某種深深的敬意，因為他們記得清朝的中國，他們記得鄭和下西洋。 Ö£ºÍ£©。 東南亞各地都有華人社區，他們的表現和能力提醒他們中國可以再次成為什麽樣的國家。 因此，中國的重新崛起對於東南亞國家來說並非完全出乎意料，隨著現實的衝擊，在貿易數量、訪問等方麵，有曆史依據的反應都回來了。 他們不想受中國支配，但他們想要中國的友誼。 他們小心翼翼地避免侵犯中國的核心利益，但同時，他們本能地希望實現多元化。 我舉個例子，就是緬甸。 由於西方禁運，緬甸不得不嚴重依賴中國。 中國在緬甸有很大的影響力。 但緬甸並不想成為中國領土的一部分。 它更願意留在東盟，盡管它知道在東盟每次我們見麵時都會受到批評。 但它準備忍受這一切，因為這給了他們一些發揮的空間。 印度也是緬甸的鄰國，不希望中國擁有排他性影響力，因此也保持邊境開放。 我最近很驚訝地讀到一篇報道，最近緬甸和印度之間決定修建一條從阿魯納恰爾邦到緬甸的公路。 我們知道中國聲稱對阿魯納恰爾邦擁有主權，但我認為緬甸政府已經決定為了自身利益而開放邊境地區，因為這將有助於其自身發展。 所以我想說，東南亞國家尊重中國，希望與中國友好，同時又希望多元化，希望結交四麵八方的朋友。
問：先生，下午好。 我叫陳誌興，是新加坡管理大學（SMU）法律係三年級學生。 您提到了 nei（Ú-內部）和 wai（Íâ-外部）元素。 我的追求
問題是：從中國的角度來看，決定什麽是“內”和“外”的指導原則是什麽？ 我們是否知道什麽對他們來說很重要，什麽是他們的核心利益，但他們決定某件事是內部還是外部的指導原則是什麽？ 謝謝。
部長：你知道，很難將其簡化為規則。 我認為我們這些作為中國人長大的人本能地感受到了這一點，並將其作為核心原則，從小就學習如何與與你不同的人打交道。 對待那些與你不同的人的方法就是對他們格外友善。 你對待陌生人總是比對待自己人好，因為你害怕陌生人。 所以最好的食物、最好的物品都是為陌生人保留的[笑聲]。 在你們中間，你們是第二好的，但是當一個外國人來的時候，總是用慷慨來贏得他，因為你們害怕他。 你如何定義它？ 是遺傳的嗎？ 這不是遺傳因素，因為漢族人的基因非常多樣化。 它是一套固定的文化規範嗎？ 但東北的規範與甘肅的規範有很大不同，與南方的規範也有很大的不同。 奇怪的是，即使是中國以外的中國人也經常對 nei（Ú）和 wai（Íâ）做出明確的區分。 如果你和印尼華人、馬來西亞華人交談，他們會非常清楚地區分這一點。 即使是那些在菲律賓和泰國被同化的人，這些區別也常常持續存在。 但我很難說——我認為這需要學者們對此進行研究——說看，這些是區分內部和外部的一百條規則。
主持人：嗯，甚至我們的祖父母也認為我們是內孫（外孫）或外孫（外孫）。 當我們作為外賓（Íâ±ö-外國遊客）訪問中國時，我們必須支付更高的入場費。 所以有時候，如果我們能逃脫懲罰的話，假裝成nei bin（Ú±ö-國內遊客）是可以的[笑聲]。 但是部長，我還有另一個問題想向您提出。 您之前非常簡短地說過，中國人對新加坡的興趣有一定程度的差異，有時他們喜歡在新加坡看到的東西，有時他們不喜歡他們在新加坡看到的東西 - 這讓我非常感興趣。 在你們的交往中，您發現哪些是中國人喜歡的方麵和不喜歡的方麵？
部長：你的意思是，他們喜歡我們什麽，不喜歡我們什麽？
主持人：是的。
部長：嗯，我認為因為新加坡很小，而且有著不同的曆史，所以新加坡模式對中國人來說是有限的。 但與此同時，內地領導人也知道，新加坡和中國之間有著深厚的曆史和文化聯係，可以追溯到清朝。 前幾天我討論過萬慶園（孫中山在新加坡時住的房子）。 他在那裏八次，他和他的情婦在這所房子裏住了六次，我認為中國的三四次起義是在新加坡組織的，錢是在新加坡收的。 事實上，同盟會在東京（東京）成立後，六個月後在新加坡成立，成為國民會的前身。 Dang（當）。 國民黨旗幟，也就是今天的台灣旗幟，是從四個不同的樣本中選出的，比賽在新加坡舉行。 當他們選擇模型時，平房的主人張永福（也就是我們國防部長的曾祖父）和他的妻子將這麵旗幟縫製在一起，而這麵旗幟的原件今天就在台北的國民黨博物館裏。 當時中國的抗日鬥爭中，新加坡是籌集資金、提供援助的主要基地。 誌願者來自東南亞各地，但新加坡是總部的總部。 許多討論是在怡和軒（Ee Hoe Hean Club）進行的，這是一家最近翻新的商務俱樂部，至今仍然存在。 日本皇軍在台灣製定入侵新加坡的計劃時，就已經列出了一份必須消滅新加坡數千名華人社區領袖的名單。 所以繼南京之後，發生最大屠殺的地方就是新加坡，這並非偶然。 再後來，中國發生的大曲折，都在新加坡有反映。 我想，一位想寫新加坡左翼運動曆史的學者，將社陣的衰落歸因於它對中國文化大革命政策的模仿，我認為是在今天的報紙上。 現實是他們在新加坡被擊敗了。 在毛澤東時代，接觸很少，但在毛澤東時代之後，當中國開放時，當鄧小平試圖為中國尋找新的前進道路時，
新加坡因其與中國的聯係而成為中國的靈感來源。 如果新加坡能成功，中國為什麽不能成功？ 因為中國有更多的人、更聰明的人、更值得驕傲的傳統。 因此，當經濟特區建立時，中國外交部長任命吳慶瑞博士為國務委員古牧的顧問。 此後，無論是經濟特區、工業區蘇州、天津等，時不時地，無論中國關注什麽，都去新加坡看看能不能吸取教訓，覺得可以就繼續走下去。 它已經學到了。 但我注意到近年來人們對城市政治的管理產生了極大的興趣，因為人民行動黨，即人民行動黨，可能是亞洲最成功的城市政黨，而中國人想知道其中的秘密是什麽 。 每年都有許多中國代表團訪問我們的選區，在國會議員舉行人民會議和政治診所時拜訪他們。 嗯，如果我們能為中國發揮幫助作用，我們就應該這樣做。 我們不需要付出什麽代價，一個強大的中國、一個富裕的中國，對新加坡來說是有好處的。 我們還希望，不僅僅是中國從我們的錯誤和失敗中吸取教訓； 我想我們也應該有理智、有智慧、有謙虛的態度，去學習中國的經驗和失敗，並在這個過程中不斷完善自己，保持我們自己模式的針對性。
主持人：關於這一點，部長，我有一個關於新加坡角色的問題。 將新加坡視為中國與世界的橋梁是不是有些牽強？ 如果我們可以做一件事來增強自己……？
部長：不，新加坡不能成為一座橋梁。 一座橋暗示著某種專有的溝通渠道。 我們處於一個網絡世界，有無數的、幾乎無限數量的旁路。 新加坡能做什麽...
主持人：所以說是橋而不是橋。
部長：可以是一個節點。 如果我們有創造力，如果我們有遠見，我們就可以擴大這個節點並增加它與其他節點的連通性。 但如果我們變得自滿或內向，那麽我們就會退縮，從而與他人變得不那麽相關。 但它正在成為一個網絡世界，每個人都有旁路。 沒有一個人是不可或缺的。
主持人：作為那個節點，我們可以做一件事來增強自己的實力？
部長：這有點自相矛盾，我們越想加強與中國的聯係，我們也應該這樣做，我們就越必須加強與世界其他地區的聯係。 因為如果你把它看作是大腦中具有許多突觸連接的節點，我們與印度、東南亞、歐洲、日本、非洲的聯係越緊密，我們與中國、中國人的聯係就越有價值 人們。 新加坡與中國保持良好關係的關鍵在於我們有能力與世界其他地區建立突觸聯係，特別是在全球化早期創建新加坡的地區。 在大英帝國的時代，印度人來到這裏，猶太人通過巴格達和加爾各答來到新加坡，印度尼西亞人和馬來西亞人、泰國人和越南人來到這裏，澳大利亞人和日本人也來到了這裏。 所有那些在 19 世紀創造了我們的聯係，現在我們應該複興，因為這些聯係將為我們在本世紀的所有生命提供養分，使其成長和繁榮。
主持人：女士們、先生們，雖然我們邀請了楊榮文部長來給我們講中國問題，但是從他知識的廣度和他對曆史的興趣，以及他對當今世界發生的一切的敏銳觀察中，你們可以看到。 世界上，你不僅僅會得到中國，你會得到突觸，你會得到TCP/IP，你會以最有趣、最刺激和最吸引人的方式得到與之相關的一切。 我謹請我們所有人向楊喬治先生表示感謝，感謝他如此慷慨地與我們分享。 太感謝了！
MFA Press Release: Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo on China's Re-Emergence on the Global Stage and transcript of the question & answer session at The Future China Global Forum, 13 July 2010
SPEECH BY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS GEORGE YEO ON CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE ON THE GLOBAL STAGE, THE FUTURE CHINA GLOBAL FORUM, 13 JULY 2010
In the last two days, we have discussed much about China's internal developments and its external relations. I thought for my presentation today, we take a step back and set China in perspective. There are many people in the world who fear the rise of China; who wonder whether in this re-emergence of China on the global stage, they will see a China that is aggressive, imperialistic, dominant and domineering. In official speeches, fine words are used but in the inner councils and in the darker rooms, real concerns are expressed and sometimes the fears are acted upon. That is in the nature of human society.
Churchill once said that to see far into the future, we must look far back into the past. To try and discern China's re-emergence in this century, it is important to see China in its earlier incarnations. For us in Southeast Asia, China is deep in the historical memory. Just last week, we had from Oman, a small dhow, a replica of an ancient dhow which sank 500 miles from Singapore during the Tang Dynasty, carrying 65,000 pieces of Chinese pottery from many kilns in China, principally Changsha but also from other places as well. And on the pieces of the pottery were Buddhist motifs and Islamic motifs, because that was also the age of Nalanda and the age of the Abbasids. Even then, it was a huge trade and it brought great prosperity to the region. During the Sung Dynasty, China was probably a large part of the global economy and the kingdoms in Southeast Asia and Southern India competed and fought each other over the China trade. And in one of those wars, a fleet from south India, the Cholas, defeated Srivijaya.
So when I say re-emergence, there is a particular meaning. Unusual for any other country, China has been able, over a wide geographical expanse, to reconstitute itself again and again. To my European friends, I tell them that it is like the Roman Empire after it was destroyed and broken up, reconstituting itself four, five times more till today. Of course, it never happened in Europe. And till today the nations of Europe have deep tribal loyalties. We see it during the World Cup, and it is expressed in their languages, in their food, in their wines and in their passions. China is unusual in that over 90% of its population consists of Han Chinese and there is a sense that they belong to a common race. The Americans, because of the exceptional nature of their conception, believe that it is good for everybody in the world to become American. It is good for you to be American, to have American values, then you would be better off and the world will be a better place. So there is a natural missionary spirit among Americans, and indeed which is expressed from time to time in American foreign policy. For the Han Chinese, it is different. The Han Chinese are a little like the Jews. If you are not born one, there is no need for you to become one. I mean yes, learn the language, understand the habits, enjoy the food, observe the niceties; but if one day a non-Chinese were to say, look I will become Chinese, everyone will feel a little awkward because if you are not born one, how can you be one? It is like those who convert to Judaism and proclaim themselves Jewish. In formal terms, they may be accepted but in deep emotional terms, that is a different story. And because of this, the Chinese attitude towards empire, which is really a western term, is very different from the empires created by Europe in the age of imperialism. For China it was the world inside which was decisive. If it coheres, if the waterways and irrigation canals are in good repair, if the grain can flow freely, the internal market explodes and becomes very prosperous, for which it requires central authority and a central bureaucracy. But when that breaks down, all hell breaks loose and it can go on for decades or centuries, and millions of people die when that happens.
For this reason, those who govern China are always preoccupied with its internal development. Very often, its foreign policy is really to secure an environment of stability so that it can concentrate on its internal development. All too often in its history, if foreign threats are not addressed, if foreign relations are not managed, then that becomes a domestic problem. And when domestic issues are not resolved, the country goes into difficulty. I do not think China is naturally aggressive for this reason. But of course, if you are Korean or Mongolian or Central Asian or Vietnamese, well, you will say from time to time we were invaded by China, maybe even incorporated into their empire, and I think that is a fair perspective. But if you look at it from the internal perspective of China - securing the border regions, its supply lines - it's really defensive. And nothing perhaps expresses it more than the rebuilding of the Great Wall of China from [the time of Emperor] Qin Shi Huang （秦始皇）- even from before that during the Zhan Guo （戰國）or Warring States period - again and again in its history, in order to protect the internal environment so that the country can be well-governed.
So when we look at China into the future, China will of course seek to influence developments in the border regions, and in this case the border regions include all of Southeast Asia. But its dominant objective is internal, not aggression for the sake of lebensraum, of migrating its people and turning others into subject populations. It is important to understand this psyche because that has created a political culture which makes it acceptable for China to be governed as one polity. And because of the fears that local officials will be captured by local populations, so from the time of the Ming Dynasty they had a rule that you cannot be a high official, cannot be a gao guan （高官）, within four hundred miles of the place of your birth. And the system has been recreated in the PRC - you cannot be a high official near where you were born because you cannot escape all the loyalties of family and mutual obligations. So today if you look at China, the provincial leaders, particularly the Party Secretary and the Governor, are almost always not from their own province. And each province is about the size of a major European country. Again I tell my European friends, it is as if by practice, by regulation, the Chancellor of Germany cannot be German, the French President cannot be French, and the British Prime Minister cannot be British. But in China, it is considered acceptable because this has been the system from a long time ago.
Does it mean, going into the future, that China will be able to progress on a straight line and without major hiccups, without major difficulty, become the greatest power on Earth, even though it may be self-contained, and determining the terms of interaction with the outside world. It will not be so simple because the challenges within China today are enormous, always going back to how to govern the country so that there is peace, so that there is development, so that their regions are in balance and there are the systems, records, the waterways, the roads, to redistribute.
The biggest issue in China today is urbanisation - urbanisation on a scale and at a speed never seen before in Chinese history. This is something new. It has always been a rural society in the past, and governing the country was really about making sure that the countryside was productive. Today China is 40% urban. During Mao, it was 20% urban. One day it will be like Taiwan, like Korea, it will be 80% - 90% urban. And this will create a whole new situation requiring a whole new set of skills. The Chinese Communist Party achieved power when Mao Zedong broke from the Bolsheviks by capturing power from the countryside, not from the urban proletariat. All the skills and instincts and techniques of the Communist Party are based on control of the countryside, of the peasantry. But now the cities are growing rapidly, creating a new situation: small families, very often one-child, the anonymity of city environments, everybody on handphones, instant messaging, on the Internet - and China has already has more internet users than any other country on earth - and growing social mobility. This is a challenge, not only for the Communist Party; this is a challenge for Confucianism itself. Because Confucianism, which is what has held Chinese society together from the time of the Han dynasty, requires a certain accepted set of hierarchical social relationships which is all dissolving now in the modern world into networks. So somehow, and we face that problem in Singapore too because we are three-quarters Chinese here, we need a new ... what I call "Urban Confucianism". And that will be a new challenge for Chinese society because upon that, the Communist Party will have to re-invent itself based upon these profound social changes. If China succeeds in doing this, I have no doubt it will once again be the biggest economy on earth and the greatest country on earth. But it is not going to be easy because it is a new situation. No one in the world really has a solution for it; everybody is grappling, we are grappling.
You notice in Asia, all the traditional political parties have come into trouble. We had the LDP in Japan, the KMT in Taiwan. In Korea it is never quite settled. In Thailand, the tension between Bangkok and the countryside. In Malaysia, UMNO which was rural-based, now becoming urban-based, becoming urbanised. In Indonesia, Golkar. In India, we had the Congress party. And all are now confronting urban populations which are not happy. It is almost as if the more you develop, the bigger urban populations become, the more disaffected they are with traditional government. And it is partly for this reason that in recent years, China has became quite fascinated with the Singapore experiment.
Compared to China, Singapore is like a bonsai; it is too small to be of general relevance but it has some genetic similarities. So from time to time, researchers and social scientists in China, they study Singapore and say: "Oh well, if it can work here, maybe it can work there." We found in our interaction with China over the years that their interest in the Singapore experiment is episodic. From time to time when it confronts issues and it scours the world for solutions, it looks at what Singapore does. Sometimes it likes what it sees, sometimes it does not like what it sees. And then it draws and abstracts the relevant lessons. This of course puts Singapore in a rather interesting position vis-a-vis China.
The point I am making is that when people say China is going to dominate the world, they worry that China is not only going to become very strong economically, but that it will seek to subjugate others and force them to behave like Chinese. I do not think that will happen because that goes against the grain of Chinese history. Chinese statecraft over the years, mostly defensive in its fundamental objectives, has always been to treat foreigners as foreigners; making a clear distinction between what is within and what is outside; between nei （內）and wai（外）. And very elaborate methods to handle what is outside so that it is not a threat to what is inside. We see this again and again expressed in modern terms in present policies. So when it comes to WTO trade liberalisation, trade yes, this yes, that yes, but when it impinges upon core structures - the commanding heights of the state economy, cultural issues, I do not think China, whoever governs China, will ever allow the world outside to determine how the country is governed within. You take say, the recent quarrel with Google over how it should operate in China. The Chinese did not want it to become a big problem but Google on its own wanted to politicise it. Of course once you politicise it, then China has no choice but to stick to its fundamental principles. Google has since stepped down, and decided, let's handle this in a pragmatic way, and China is prepared to handle it in a pragmatic way. That insofar as it does not impinge upon its core interests, they can be flexible. But if it does, well that is a separate matter.
So too for China's financial institutions. In the 19th century within a short period after the Opium War, China lost control of its financial system. I remember one senior LDP politician telling me some years ago that the Japanese knew that the moment ships landed on Asia's mainland, they would be inspected not by Asians but by Europeans. Japan knew that unless it quickly re-created itself, it too would suffer the fate of China. But unfortunately Japan thought the solution was to become a competing imperialism and that led to grief. For this reason, while China will benefit from the international financial system, while it will allow its own financial industry to be opened up, when it comes to core structures, it will never allow itself to lose its sense of autonomy - media, finance, cultural policy, strategic state industries.
In some way, this may go back to the nature of the Chinese language itself, its ideographic character. As a child, it's easier to read Chinese characters than alphabetic words because the Chinese characters are pictures. So little children of two - three years old can recognise Chinese words but they cannot read alphabetic words As an adult, alphabetic words are more convenient. So it is a language which really makes it difficult for you to fully access as an adult. But if you are born into it, then it becomes a part of you naturally. Some scholars have described the Chinese character system as a digital system because it is not phonetic, so it does not alter over time - the same characters can be read today as they were a thousand years ago, two thousand years ago. Whereas if you look at alphabetic systems, that cannot be done.
If we look into the 21st century and ask ourselves, let us say China succeeds and it becomes strong and powerful and its influence radiates into a much wider region - what will the world be like? I think the world will not become a Pax Sinica because the world is too big for that. And China is too internally preoccupied, to really have aspirations towards creating a Pax Sinica. I mean, China is not interested in making the Myanmar people democratic, or in making Muslims Confucianist. China is quite prepared to accept the world in all its diversity, so long as "you" do not threaten "me" (China). But there has to be a certain structural stability, for that it is in the nature of political power. And it will be a multi-polar world. In our part of the world, in Asia, to simplify it, and it is of course an over-simplification, I think there will be three major poles. There will be China, there will be India, and there will be the US. It is this triangle and how they relate to one another, which really will decide the big issues of war and peace in this century. Sino-US relations have already been discussed, I believe MM talked about it last night, the US Ambassador (Jon Huntsman) was here, so I think there is no need for me to go over ground which is already familiar to you, and which some of you know more about than I do.
But I will like to talk a little about India because India in terms of size and in terms of the age of its civilisation is comparable to China. And the two countries, really the two civilisations, because of the high Himalayas and the great deserts of Central Asia, except for the border skirmish in 1962, [have] never fought each other. Yes, there were monks, there were traders - they communicated through Southeast Asia, both influencing the countries of Southeast Asia, but they never fought. There is a certain deep recognition of each other as an ancient people, and a certain respect. The Chinese have always seen India as a source of Buddhism, of Kung Fu, of knowledge about astronomy and mathematics. The Indians on their side of the Himalayas, have always known that beyond there was a great emperor who ruled a vast realm with a rich market. Culturally they are not close. In fact culturally, they are very different. But there is a certain mutual respect and now they have got to settle their borders, they have got to work through some of their difficulties. As it was during the 19th century, China is already India's biggest trading partner and that trade is growing rapidly.
Few years ago, the mountain pass of Nathu La between the Siliguri corridor of India and Tibet, has been re-opened. When I was in Tibet last August, a local official whom I met, told me that the Gaoyuan Tielu （高原鐵路-the high railroad) from Xining to Lhasa, would be extended to Shigatse. He said that we are actually very close to the Nathu La pass and if the Indian government would agree, we could just link up to the Indian railroad, and Calcutta will only be a few hundred kilometres away. And then all of us will have much easier access to the sea. When I tell it to the Indians, they looked at me, they are a little worried. While most Chinese today are not aware there was a war in 1962, most Indians remember it. It is deeply etched in their memory, a scar not completely healed. But I believe one day these problems will be resolved because there is no natural antipathy between them. The benefits of trade and exchange are overwhelming, and the borders will be open. There will be more connections, and each can benefit the other hugely.
For this reason, I and others have been deeply involved in this project to revive the ancient University of Nalanda, which in its heyday was the greatest university on earth. Hundreds of years, attracting at its peak, 10,000 students from Japan, Korea, China, Tibet, Central Asia, all of Southeast Asia, and which received for many years, the great Tang dynasty monks, Xuan Zang （玄奘）, Yi Jing (義淨) and others. And till today, the best records of that period was the account by Xuan Zang, the Da Tang Xi Yu Ji （大唐西域記）, the Great Tang Western Region History. That is still the best record of India during that period of history more than a thousand years ago. So we are hoping that by reviving this university and making it an international university, it can bring together Asians from all over, so that each will know that their forefathers had once upon a time, helped one another, live together in peace, with trade, with monks crossing borders. And if we can help recreate some of that in this century, the likelihood that we will be able to preserve that larger peace will be improved.
There are people who feel that maybe they can also use India to counterbalance China. To me, that is much too simplistic. Yes, India is the world's biggest democracy and that is often trotted out as an explanation why India and America are natural partners. For certain issues, yes, America and India are natural partners. For other issues like climate change, India and China are natural partners. I believe each will, in the end, calculate upon its own interests. India is too old, too wise, too spiritual, too worldly, to be anything but itself. Democracy is one layer, but there are many layers, going down many kilometres.
I think it was in the Upanishads, in the Hindu pantheon, they have 33 crore gods - 330 million gods and goddesses. It is a bit mind boggling, isn't it? But of course, the Indians also believe in one spiritual essence. Over the centuries, there is no aspect of the human condition which the Indians have not experienced, or thought about, or tried to explain. Its complex social structures, the persistence of caste and you need only to look at the classified ads for marriages in the Sunday newspapers to know how alive and well caste is, to know that India will always be India. India is not going to be made use of by anybody, except in its own self interest. For this reason, there will be three poles. And each will be deep, profound unto itself.
I do not believe America is in decline, the way many people write about. America is the new world. It created a new political culture, social structure, based upon free individuals joining it. It is a little like the internet protocol, TCP/IP. If you accept TCP/IP, you can join America. So you can be Chinese, you can be Jewish, you can be Indian, you can be Arab; you take your pledge, adhere to their laws, you are part of it. And because it is open-ended, it seeks to extend its reach to the world. But if you look at it from another perspective; the globalisation that we see today, is an American globalisation. The TCP/IP which is at the heart of American political culture is really the connections now which is hyperlinking Chinese, and Indians, and Europeans, and Latinos together in the world, enabling us to operate a common trading system, a common financial system.
China cannot provide that globalisation software because China will always be internally preoccupied and to the extent that it is interested in the world outside, it is so that its internal management can be improved, and always in self-defence. China is not interested to create a Pax Sinica, or to have its own version of the TCP/IP. Yes it has Confucius Institutes; it wants you to learn Chinese and so on, but like the Jews, if you are not born one, thank you very much. Whereas, with America, it is different. What will link China and India together? Not Chinese software, not Hindu software; it will be American software through American universities, through the English language, through Anglo-Saxon rules of trade, of financial standards. This is an interesting multipolar world we are entering; a China which is re-emerging powerfully, an India which is also growing but which will be a pole unto itself and an America which is not only a reality, but also a necessity. Thank you.
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TRANSCRIPT OF QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS GEORGE YEO ON CHINA'S RE-EMERGENCE ON THE GLOBAL STAGE, AT THE FUTURE CHINA GLOBAL FORUM, 13 JULY 2010
Moderator MP Josephine Teo: Minister, I would like to ask you about our ASEAN neighbours. In your interactions with them, what do you sense as their attitude towards China? And what is it that consumes the minds of the leaders in ASEAN when they think of the re-emergent China?
Minister George Yeo: Even when China was down, when it was economically inconsequential, all the countries of Southeast Asia bar none had a certain deep respect for China because they remember the China of the Qing Dynasty, they remember the voyages of Zheng He £¨Ö£ºÍ£©. And all over Southeast Asia there are Chinese communities which by their performance and their abilities, are a reminder to them of what China can become again. For this reason the re-emergence of China is not completely unexpected among the countries in Southeast Asia and as the realities impinge upon them, in trade numbers, in visits and so on, the responses, which have historical antecedence, all come back. They do not want to be dominated by China but they want China¡¯s friendship. They are careful about impinging on China¡¯s core interests but at the same time, instinctively, they want diversification. I give you an example which is Myanmar. Myanmar, because of the western embargo has had to depend a lot on China. China has a lot of influence in Myanmar. But Myanmar does not want to be part of the Chinese realm. It prefers to remain in ASEAN even though it knows in ASEAN it gets criticised every time we meet. But it is prepared to bear with all that because it gives them some room to play. India, which is also a neighbouring country to Myanmar, doesn¡¯t want China to have exclusive influence so it keeps its border also open. And I was quite surprised recently to read a report that recently between Myanmar and India, they decided to build a road from Arunachal Pradesh into Myanmar. We know Arunachal Pradesh is claimed by China but I think that the Myanmar government had decided that it would act in its own self interest and open up the border region because it would help its own development. So I would say that you find countries of Southeast Asia respectful of China, wanting China¡¯s friendship and at that same time wanting diversification and wanting to have friends in all directions.
Question: Good afternoon, sir. My name is Chan Zhixing and I'm a third year law student from the Singapore Management University (SMU). You mentioned about elements of nei (ÄÚ-internal) and wai (Íâ-external). My question is: What are some of the guiding principles which determine what is nei and what is wai from a Chinese perspective? Do we know what is considered important to them, what is their core interest, but what is the guiding principle for them in deciding whether something is internal or external? Thank you.
Minister: You know, it's hard to reduce this into rules. I think those of us who are raised as Chinese instinctively feel it, and learn that as a core principle, learning as a young child how to deal with people who are not like you. And the way to treat those who are not like you is to be extra nice to them. You always treat strangers better than your own people because you are afraid of strangers. So the best food, the best items are reserved for strangers [Laughter]. Among yourselves you get the second best, but when a foreigner comes, always win him over by generosity because you are afraid of him. How do you define that? Is it genetic? It is not genetic because Han people are genetically very diverse. Is it a fixed set of cultural norms? But the norms in dong bei (¶«±±-the Northeast) are very different from the norms in gan su (¸ÊËà), very different from norms in the South. And strangely even the Chinese outside China often make this clear distinction between nei(ÄÚ) and wai (Íâ). If you talk to the Indonesian Chinese, the Malaysian Chinese, they make that distinction very clearly. And even those who are assimilated in the Philippines and Thailand, very often these distinctions persist. But I am hard put - I think it would require scholars to do research into this - to say look, these are the hundred rules by which you distinguish inside from outside.
Moderator: Well, even our grandparents think of us as nei sun (ÄÚËïpaternal grandson) or wai sun (ÍâËï-maternal grandson). When we visit China as wai bin (Íâ±ö-foreign visitor) we have to pay higher entrance fees. So sometimes if we can get away with it it's ok to pretend to be nei bin (ÄÚ±ö-domestic visitor) [Laughter]. But Minister, I have another question that I will like to pose to you. You said very briefly earlier that there are episodic levels of interest in Singapore from the Chinese and sometimes they like what they see in Singapore, sometimes they don't like what they see - that got me very interested. In your interactions, what have you uncovered as likeable aspects and not-so-likeable aspects, as far as the Chinese are concerned?
Minister: You mean, what they like of us and what they don't like of us?
Moderator: That's right.
Minister: Well, I think because Singapore is so small and has a different history, so there are limits to what the Singapore model can hold to the Chinese. But at the same time, the leaders in the mainland know that there are deep historical and cultural connections between Singapore and China going back to the Qing dynasty. I had a discussion about Wan Qing Yuan £¨ÍíÇçÔ° £©the other day which was the house which Sun Zhong Shan lived in when he was in Singapore. He was there eight times, he lived in the house six times with his mistress and I think three or four of the uprisings in China were organised in Singapore and the money was collected in Singapore. In fact the Tong Meng Hui £¨Í¬Ã˻ᣩafter it was established in Dong Jing £¨¶«¾©-Tokyo£©, six months later it was established in Singapore and that became the precursor to the Guo Min Dang£¨¹úÃñµ³£©. And the Guo Min Dang flag, which is the flag of Taiwan today, was chosen from four different specimens and the contest was held in Singapore. When they chose the model, the owner of the bungalow Teo Eng Hock, who was our Defence Minister¡¯s great grand uncle, his wife sewed together the flag and that original flag today is in the KMT Museum in Taipei. Then during the anti-Japanese struggle in China, Singapore was a major base for the raising of funds, to help. Volunteers went from throughout Southeast Asia but Singapore was the Zong Bu £¨×ܲ¿-headquarters£©. A lot of the discussions were held in the Yi He Xuan(âùºÍÐù - Ee Hoe Hean Club) which was the business club still existing today, refurbished recently. The Japanese Imperial Army, when they drew up their plans in Taiwan to invade Singapore, they had already drawn up a list of thousands of Chinese community leaders in Singapore who would have to be neutralised. So it was not an accident that after Nanjing, the place where the greatest slaughter took place was in Singapore. And then after that, the great twists and turns in China all had their reflections here in Singapore. I think a scholar who wants to write the history of the left wing movement in Singapore attributed, I think it was in today¡¯s newspapers, the decline of the Barisan Socialis to its aping of Cultural Revolution policies in China which was so out of line to reality in Singapore that they were defeated. Under Mao, the contacts were minimal, but after Mao, when China was opening up, when Deng Xiaoping was trying to find a new way forward for China, Singapore became an inspiration to China because of all the connections there. If Singapore could succeed, why can¡¯t China succeed? Because China has more people, cleverer people, a prouder tradition. So when the special economic zones were established, the Chinese Foreign Minister appointed Dr Goh Keng Swee as Adviser to the State Councillor Gu Mu. Since then, whether it was special economic zones, industrial estates Suzhou, Tianjin and so on, from time to time, whatever was China¡¯s focus - go to Singapore and see whether it could abstract lessons, and then moving on if it feels that it has learnt already. But I notice in recent years, a great interest in the management of urban politics, because the PAP, the People¡¯s Action Party, is probably the most successful urban political party in Asia, and the Chinese want to know what is the secret. And there are, every year, many Chinese delegations visiting our constituencies, visiting the Members of Parliament while they are holding their meet-the-people sessions, their political clinics. Well, if we can play a helpful role to China, we should. It costs us nothing, and a strong China, a wealthy China, is good for Singapore. We hope also that it is not just China learning from our mistakes and failures; I think we should also have the good sense and wisdom, the humility, to learn from China¡¯s experiences and failures, and in the process, also improve ourselves and keeping the relevance of our own model.
Moderator: On that note Minister, I have a question about the role of Singapore. Is it a farfetched idea to think of Singapore as a bridge between China and the world? If there is one thing we can do to strengthen ourselves¡?
Minister: No, Singapore cannot be a bridge. A bridge suggests a certain exclusive channel of communication. We are in a networked-world, there are numerous, almost infinite number of bypasses. What Singapore can do¡
Moderator: So a bridge rather than the bridge.
Minister: It can be a node. If we are creative, if we are far-seeing, we can enlarge this node and increase its connectivity to other nodes. But if we become self-satisfied or inward-looking, then we will shrink and then become less relevant to others. But it is becoming a networked-world, and everybody has bypasses. No one is indispensable.
Moderator: And the one thing we can do to strengthen ourselves as that node?
Minister: It is a little paradoxical, that the more we want to strengthen our links with China, and we should, the more we must strengthen our links to other parts of the world. Because if you look at it as a node in the brain with many synaptic connections, the more connected we are to India, to Southeast Asia, to Europe, to Japan, to Africa, the more valuable are our links to China, to the Chinese people. The key to Singapore¡¯s good relations with China is in our ability to grow synaptic connections to other parts of the world, in particular the parts of the world which in an earlier age of globalisation created Singapore. It was the age of the British Empire which brought Indians, which brought Jews through Baghdad and Calcutta into Singapore, which brought Indonesians and Malaysians, and Thais and Vietnamese, which brought Australians and Japanese here. All those links which created us in the 19th century, we should now revive because these are now the links which will give us all our life nutrients in this century to grow and to prosper.
Moderator: Well ladies and gentlemen, although we invited Minister George Yeo to speak to us on China, but you can see from the breadth of his knowledge and his interest in history, and also his keen observation of everything that¡¯s going around in the world, you do not get just China, you will get synapses, you will get TCP/IP, you will get everything else that is related to this in the most interesting, stimulating and engaging way. May I just ask all of us to just show our appreciation to Mr George Yeo for sharing with us so generously. Thank you so much!
