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新的外交政策：超越美國例外論
https://www.amazon.ca/New-Foreign-Policy-American-Exceptionalism/dp/023118848X
作者：國際發展中心 Jeffrey D Sachs 2018 年 10 月 2 日
美國世紀始於1941年，結束於2017年1月20日。雖然美國仍然是軍事大國，仍然是經濟強國，但它不再像以前那樣主導世界經濟或地緣政治。 當前外交政策轉向民族主義和“美國優先”單邊主義不會讓美國變得偉大。 相反，它代表著我們在麵對嚴重的環境威脅、政治動蕩、大規模移民和其他全球挑戰時放棄責任。
在這本深刻而有力的書中，傑弗裏·D·薩克斯為新的外交政策提供了藍圖，該政策擁抱全球合作、國際法和對全球繁榮的渴望，而不是民族主義和過去輝煌的虛幻夢想。 他認為，美國對世界的態度必須從軍事實力和選擇戰爭轉向致力於可持續發展的共同目標。 我們對首要地位的追求使我們卷入了不明智且無法獲勝的戰爭，現在是從戰爭轉向締造和平的時候了，是時候擁抱國際合作提供的機會了。 新的外交政策探討了“美國優先”思維的危險和新的前進道路的可能性，提出了及時且可實現的計劃，以促進全球經濟增長、為二十一世紀重新配置聯合國以及建立多極世界 一個繁榮、和平、公平、有活力的世界。
新的外交政策：超越美國例外論
2019 年秋季 • 卡托期刊卷。 39號 3
作者：約翰·格拉澤 (John Glaser)，《電源問題》播客主持人
美國例外論對不同的人有不同的含義。 由於這個術語在我們的政治詞典中使用，它至少有四個不同的版本，每個版本都以某種方式與另一個版本融為一體。 傳統版本讓人回想起 1630 年馬薩諸塞灣殖民地總督約翰·溫思羅普 (John Winthrop) 的著名勸告，即“我們將成為山上之城”，“所有人的目光”都會注視著我們。 溫思羅普最初的目的更多的是鼓勵遵守當時清教徒所解釋的基督教教義，但溫思羅普的語言在政治世代中傳遞了不同的含義：我們是例外的，因為美國是一個受上帝普羅維登斯指導的國家，是一個榜樣。 世界。
另一個相關版本讚揚了美國的建國原則，並將我們的例外論定位於我們獨特的開端，作為第一個擺脫殖民主義鎖鏈並建立基於啟蒙思想的政府的國家。 還有一個在二戰後時代成熟的版本，也許羅納德·裏根最雄辯地闡述了這一點：我們是地球上人類最後最好的希望，是暴政世界中民主和自由的避風港。
還有最新版本的美國例外論。 盡管它在我們的曆史中有著悠久的曆史，但它的鼎盛時期卻是在冷戰後時代到來的——即所謂的單極時刻，美國沒有遇到能夠與我們的實力和影響力相媲美的地緣政治敵人。 這個版本說，我們的特殊之處在於，我們在全球治理方麵擁有其他國家所不具備的專屬特權和特殊責任。
這個版本的傀儡不是約翰·溫思羅普，而是比爾·克林頓總統1997年至2001年的國務卿馬德琳·奧爾布賴特。正如她所說，“如果我們必須使用武力，那是因為我們是美國；如果我們必須使用武力，那是因為我們是美國；如果我們必須使用武力，那是因為我們是美國。” 我們是不可或缺的國家。 我們昂首挺胸，比其他國家看得更遠。” 根據這一學說，我們不僅僅是國家中的一個國家。 我們對於全球和平與安全不可或缺，為了履行這些責任，我們有權采取其他人會因此受到懲罰和譴責的方式行事。
這些在某種程度上都是非曆史的民族主義神話。 大多數時候，這樣的敘事被用來灌輸一定的愛國熱情，滿足人們增強國家實力的願望，並創造一種歸屬感和使命感。 但以奧爾布賴特傲慢言論為代表的例外論已經以更為具體的方式體現出來，特別是在美國外交政策的實施中。 世界秩序要求美國經常在海外使用武力，以免霍布斯式的混亂降臨到國際社會，這種想法似乎占據了整個華盛頓。
這就是世界著名哥倫比亞大學經濟學家傑弗裏·薩克斯在其最新著作《新外交政策：超越美國例外論》中所瞄準的例外論。 薩克斯認為，對美國外交政策影響最大的美國例外論起源於華盛頓的二戰後製度建設，當時“美國領導人認為，美國是與眾不同的，最終是例外的，擁有創造和破壞美國的固有權利”。 國際遊戲規則。” 薩克斯認為，這種自以為是的想法已經將美國的外交政策推向了國際虛偽和無情軍事幹預主義的極端，浪費了資源，製造了新的敵人，並錯失了和平合作的機會。 在特朗普時代，它變得尤其具有威脅性。
薩克斯寫道：“唐納德·特朗普的‘美國優先’外交政策代表了一種新的、粗俗的美國例外論。” 它仍然優先考慮“美國無與倫比的軍事優勢”來維護“全球穩定”，但也夾雜著對國際法和國際準則的更加惡毒的漠視，並且不時夾雜著幼稚的經濟保護主義。
薩克斯的書是一本麵向外行的外交政策論文。 他簡化了國際關係領域關於美國在世界上適當角色的更為激烈的辯論。 有時，這會導致缺乏細微差別。 例如，他對現實主義學派的理解是“一場新的軍備競賽是保持權力平衡和維護美國安全所必須付出的必要和不可避免的代價”，這是一種相當膚淺的理解。 他還提出了一些笨拙的論戰——譴責科赫兄弟的惡意黑錢影響，盡管他們自己明顯不滿美國的軍事行動。 但薩克斯知道的足夠多，足以違背華盛頓特區外交政策界的專家共識和總體主旨
薩克斯的案例既符合常識又令人信服。
薩克斯認為，美國應該利用其財富、權力和安全優勢，奉行國家間的合作外交，而不是扮演世界警察，不斷幹涉其他主權國家的事務，並習慣性違反國際法的準則。 我們經常懲罰違反規則和規範的人。 薩克斯批評冷戰後北約的擴張背叛了其最初的戰略目的，並且不必要地對抗俄羅斯。 他毫不留情地譴責伊拉克戰爭，並將奧巴馬政府幹預利比亞的理由斥為“宣傳”。 他解釋了為什麽美國在朝鮮半島局勢方麵並非無可指責，並大膽地指出了在華盛頓仍然存在爭議的明顯現實，即我們應該願意“接受一個被威懾的擁有核武器的朝鮮”，而不是 “冒著一場美國領導的選擇戰爭的風險。”
薩克斯還指責特朗普政府的主要外交政策文件《國防戰略》和《國家安全戰略》誇大了對美國利益的威脅，並繼續堅持將軍事主導地位作為首要目標。 這些官方文件中提出的世界日益危險的觀點“過於確定性和悲觀”並且“與事實不符”。 薩克斯認為，他們將俄羅斯和中國的大國競爭描述為對世界秩序和美國國家安全的主要威脅，這隻是例外主義傾向的例證。
薩克斯抱怨道，雖然“美國安全國家指責中國和俄羅斯破壞全球體係”，但美國“在沒有必要的聯合國支持的情況下發動了災難性的‘政權更迭’戰爭”。 美國“在近四分之一世紀的時間裏未能批準聯合國支持的條約”，並一再采取不符合國際法和規範的外交政策。 正是美國“在 2002 年單方麵放棄了《反彈道導彈條約》，從而破壞了美俄核合作”，特朗普政府效仿了這一錯誤，退出了中程核力量（INF）。 ) 2019 年條約。
同樣，官方將中國描述為“一個危險的擴張主義國家”，忽視了這樣一個事實：美國“在軍費上比中國多出二比一”，而且美國“在不間斷的海外戰爭和政權更迭中一直是一個公開的修正主義超級大國”。 幾十年來的運營”，與中國更加規避風險的安全政策形成鮮明對比。 薩克斯冷靜地指出：“雖然中國在南海的領土主張值得擔憂，但到目前為止，這些海洋主張似乎主要是為了確保中國的貿易路線，而不是阻礙鄰國。”
因此，來自俄羅斯和中國的更直接的危險源於美國對它們的強硬政策創造“自我實現的預言”的風險。 薩克斯警告說，一邊與俄羅斯和中國為敵，一邊堅持全球軍事主導地位和維持世界治安的特權，不太可能滿足缺乏安全感、憤憤不平的俄羅斯，也不太可能遏製崛起的中國。 相反，結果可能是“對美國來說是一場巨大的失敗，對世界來說是一個潛在的威脅”。 薩克斯認為，盡管俄羅斯、中國和其他對手“確實在反擊美國的主導地位”，但這並不意味著他們是係統破壞者。 華盛頓不應該假設我們必須在軍事上對抗堅決的修正主義，而應該容納這些國家並將其納入現有的國際秩序——這種做法隻有在沒有好戰的美國例外論的情況下才能成功。
薩克斯在底線上表現出了令人欽佩的清晰：“有一個外交政策目標比其他所有目標都重要，那就是讓美國遠離一場新的戰爭。” 為了讓美國做到這一點，薩克斯提出了幾項改革。 首先，美國必須從阿富汗、伊拉克、敘利亞、也門、索馬裏、利比亞、尼日爾等地的選擇性戰爭中撤出當前的敵對行動。 薩克斯建議重組中央情報局，將重點放在情報上，而不是充當“總統不負責任的秘密軍隊”。 他呼籲國會“重建其對戰爭與和平的決策權”。 過度保密使得行政部門秘密地將美國卷入海外戰爭，也必須加以遏製。 最後，美國必須調整其外交政策，將締造和平、外交和經濟合作置於使用武力之上。
薩克斯的診斷和他的處方都非常適合關於美國大戰略未來的新興爭論。 思想之爭本質上分為兩個陣營。 有人認為，我們當前的大戰略（首要地位）仍然是
全球和平、繁榮和民主的必要性，對特朗普時代戰略混亂的正確回應是加倍甚至擴大美國的海外軍事承諾。 另一種主張采取另一種克製的大戰略，即美國取消其全球軍事承諾，更狹隘地界定其國家利益，並重新賦予外交作為外交政策主要工具的地位。
然而，這位著名經濟學家的處方的一個主要內容是大力推動分配美國援助和經濟發展援助的計劃。 薩克斯對美國援助計劃的有效性比他在外交政策上的自由主義盟友更有信心，但他至少是市場經濟和跨境自由貿易的倡導者，盡管他是中左派。 在某種程度上，特朗普總統的孤立主義衝動對新的軍事幹預產生了（高度選擇性的）厭惡，他對關稅的渴求保護主義使他成為反對軍事行動主義但了解市場和貿易的自由主義者的相對較差的權宜之計。 豐富世界和平國際政治。 薩克斯進一步證明，存在著一個多元化的知識分子聯盟，他們理解美國緊縮開支的必要性，但也拒絕某些其他意識形態陣營中日益惡化的反移民和反貿易偏見。
戰略的改變至關重要。 美國近20年來一直處於持續戰爭狀態。 數萬億納稅人的錢被浪費在無法獲勝和不必要的戰爭上。 數百萬人的無辜生命被卷入風暴之中。 在國內，美國人麵臨著不斷膨脹的國債、政府權力的不祥增長以及對公民自由和憲法製衡構成持續威脅的國家安全狀態。
但美國不必完全放棄其令人垂涎的獨特感。 事實上，美國例外論的一種派係，即已在曆史中很大程度上消失的例外論的另一種形式，認為美國隻有在抵製全球統治誘惑的情況下才能例外，即與其他國家不同。 約翰·昆西·亞當斯 (John Quincy Adams) 在 1821 年宣稱，美國“尊重其他國家的獨立，同時主張並維護自己的獨立”。 “即使是因為她所堅持的原則而發生衝突，她也不會幹涉他人的擔憂”，這恰恰說明了她的與眾不同。
19世紀末，當美國與西班牙開戰並吞並新領土作為戰利品時，當時的反帝國主義者為美國例外論的喪失而哀悼。 當時的曆史學家羅伯特·貝斯納解釋說，美國“肆意放棄了她的孤立避難所，陷入了歐洲競爭和衝突的陷阱”。 反帝國主義者認為，“美國無法再作為世界上最受青睞的國家閃耀光芒，在衝突中保持超然的、不受玷汙的特殊地位。”
A New Foreign Policy: Beyond American Exceptionalism
https://www.amazon.ca/New-Foreign-Policy-American-Exceptionalism/dp/023118848X
by Center for International Development Jeffrey D Sachs Oct. 2 2018
The American Century began in 1941 and ended on January 20, 2017. While the United States remains a military giant and is still an economic powerhouse, it no longer dominates the world economy or geopolitics as it once did. The current turn toward nationalism and "America first" unilateralism in foreign policy will not make America great. Instead, it represents the abdication of our responsibilities in the face of severe environmental threats, political upheaval, mass migration, and other global challenges.
In this incisive and forceful book, Jeffrey D. Sachs provides the blueprint for a new foreign policy that embraces global cooperation, international law, and aspirations for worldwide prosperity--not nationalism and gauzy dreams of past glory. He argues that America's approach to the world must shift from military might and wars of choice to a commitment to shared objectives of sustainable development. Our pursuit of primacy has embroiled us in unwise and unwinnable wars, and it is time to shift from making war to making peace and time to embrace the opportunities that international cooperation offers. A New Foreign Policy explores both the danger of the "America first" mindset and the possibilities for a new way forward, proposing timely and achievable plans to foster global economic growth, reconfigure the United Nations for the twenty-first century, and build a multipolar world that is prosperous, peaceful, fair, and resilient.
A New Foreign Policy: Beyond American Exceptionalism
https://www.cato.org/cato-journal/fall-2019/new-foreign-policy-beyond-american-exceptionalism-jeffrey-d-sachs
FALL 2019 • CATO JOURNAL VOL. 39 NO. 3
Another related version lauds the principles of the American Founding and locates our exceptionalism in our peculiar beginnings as the first country to throw off the chains of colonialism and establish a government based on enlightenment ideas. There is also a version that came of age in the post‐?WWII era, perhaps articulated most eloquently by Ronald Reagan, that we are the last best hope of man on earth, a haven of democracy and freedom in a world of tyranny.
And then there’s the most recent version of American exceptionalism. Though it has antecedents deep in our history, its heyday arrived in the post‐?Cold War era — the so‐?called unipolar moment in which America faced no geopolitical enemy that could hold a candle to our power and influence. This version says that we are exceptional in that we have exclusive prerogatives and special responsibilities for global governance that no other country possesses.
The figurehead of this version is not John Winthrop, but Madeline Albright, President Bill Clinton’s Secretary of State from 1997 to 2001. As she put it, “If we have to use force, it is because we are America; we are the indispensable nation. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future.” We are not just a nation among nations, according to this doctrine. We’re indispensable for global peace and security and, to carry out these responsibilities, we have the right to act in ways that others would be punished and condemned for.
These are all ahistorical nationalist myths to one extent or another. Most of the time, such narratives are used to inculcate a certain patriotic fervor, to feed the population’s desire to aggrandize the nation, and to create a sense of belonging and purpose. But the version of exceptionalism epitomized by Albright’s hubristic rhetoric has manifested in far more tangible ways, particularly in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The idea that world order requires the United States to regularly use force abroad lest a Hobbesian chaos descend upon international society seems to possess all of Washington.
This is the exceptionalism at which world‐?renowned Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs takes aim in his latest book A New?Foreign Policy: Beyond American Exceptionalism. According to Sachs, the American exceptionalism that most infects U.S. foreign policy had its origins in Washington’s post‐?WWII institution‐?building, when “American leaders held the view that America was different, ultimately exceptional, with the inherent right to make and break the international rules of the game.” This self‐?righteous idea, Sachs argues, has driven U.S. foreign policy to the extremes of international hypocrisy and unrelenting military interventionism, wasting resources, creating new enemies, and missing opportunities for peaceful cooperation. And it has acquired an especially menacing quality in the Trump era.
“Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy represents a new and vulgar strain of American exceptionalism,” Sachs writes. It still prioritizes “unrivaled U.S. military superiority” to maintain “global stability,” but it is mixed with an even more virulent disregard for international laws and norms and it is punctuated by naïve economic protectionism.
Sachs’s book is a foreign policy treatise for the layman. He simplifies a much denser debate in the field of international relations over the proper U.S. role in the world. Occasionally, this produces a lack of nuance. His understanding of the realist school as committed to “a new arms race [as] the necessary and inevitable price to pay to keep the balance of power and preserve U.S. security” is a rather shallow one, for example. He also offers a few clumsy polemics — condemning the malicious dark money influence of the Koch brothers despite their own apparent displeasure with U.S. military activism. But Sachs knows enough to buck the expert consensus of Washington, D.C.‘s foreign policy community, and the general thrust of Sachs’s case is both commonsensical and compelling.
Sachs argues that the United States should take advantage of its wealth, power, and security to pursue cooperative diplomacy as a nation among nations, rather than play policeman of the world, constantly intervene in the affairs of other sovereign countries, and habitually violate the very rules and norms we often punish others for transgressing. Sachs criticizes post‐?Cold War NATO expansion as a betrayal of its original strategic purpose and needlessly antagonistic toward Russia. He is unsparing in his denunciation of the Iraq War and dismisses the Obama administration’s justification for intervening in Libya as “propaganda.” He explains why America is not blameless when it comes to the situation on the Korean peninsula and boldly states the plain reality, still controversial in D.C., that we should be willing to “accept a nuclear‐?armed North Korea that is deterred” rather than “risk a U.S.-led war of choice.”
Sachs also takes aim at the Trump administration’s major foreign policy documents, the National Defense Strategy and the National Security Strategy, for inflating threats to U.S. interests and continuing to insist on military dominance as a first‐?order objective. The view put forward in these official documents that the world is increasingly dangerous is “far too deterministic and pessimistic” and “belied by the facts.” Their depiction of great power competition from Russia and China as a major threat to world order and U.S. national security, according to Sachs, merely exemplifies the exceptionalist orientation.
While “the US security state is pointing the finger at China and Russia as undermining the global system,” Sachs complains, it is the United States that “launched catastrophic wars of ‘regime change’ without requisite UN backing.” The United States has “failed to ratify a UN‐?backed treaty in nearly a quarter‐?century” and has repeatedly adopted foreign policies inconsistent with international laws and norms. It was the United States that “was the first to undermine U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation by unilaterally abandoning the Anti‐?Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002,” a misstep the Trump administration emulated by backing out of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019.
Likewise, official depictions of China as “a dangerously expansionist power” ignore the fact that the United States “outspends China on the military by more than two to one” and that America has been an openly revisionist superpower “in nonstop overseas wars and regime change operations for decades,” much in contrast to China’s more risk‐?averse security policies. “While there’s room to be concerned about China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea,” Sachs soberly points out, “so far those maritime claims seem mainly designed to secure China’s trade routes rather than to impede the neighboring countries.”
The more immediate danger from Russia and China, therefore, is born of the risk that America’s hardline policies against them create “a self‐?fulfilling prophecy.” Making enemies of Russia and China while insisting on global military dominance and special privileges in policing the world, Sachs warns, is not likely to satiate an insecure, aggrieved Russia or to stifle a rising China. Instead, the results could be “a huge debacle for the United States and a potential threat for the world.” Although Russia, China, and other adversaries “are indeed pushing back against U.S. assertions of dominance,” Sachs argues, “that does not make them system breakers.” Rather than assume a determined revisionism that we must confront militarily, Washington should accommodate and incorporate these states into the existing international order — an approach that can only succeed in the absence of a belligerent American exceptionalism.
Sachs exhibits admirable clarity on the bottom line: “There is one foreign policy goal that matters above all the others, and that is to keep the United States out of a new war.” For the United States to do this, Sachs proposes several reforms. First, the United States must withdraw from active hostilities in elective wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Niger, and beyond. Sachs recommends restructuring the CIA to focus on intelligence instead of serving as “an unaccountable secret army of the president.” He calls on Congress “to reestablish its decision‐?making authority over war and peace.” Excessive secrecy, which has allowed the executive branch to covertly involve the United States in overseas wars, must be reined in too. Finally, the United States must reorient its foreign policy to prioritize peace‐?making, diplomacy, and economic cooperation over the use of force.
Both Sachs’s diagnosis and his prescription fit nicely within an emerging debate about the future of U.S. grand strategy. The contest of ideas essentially splits into two camps. One argues that our current grand strategy, primacy, is still imperative for global peace, prosperity, and democracy and that the proper response to the strategic confusion of the Trump era is to double down on, and even expand, America’s overseas military commitments. The other argues for an alternative grand strategy of restraint in which America rolls back its global military commitments, defines its national interests more narrowly, and reenergizes diplomacy as the primary tool of foreign policy.
A major element of the prominent economist’s prescription, however, is a massive boost to programs that distribute U.S. aid and economic development assistance. Sachs is much more confident in the effectiveness of U.S. aid programs than his libertarian allies on foreign policy, but he is at least an advocate, albeit a left‐?of‐?center one, for market economies and free trade across international borders. To the extent that President Trump’s isolationist impulses produce a (highly selective) aversion to new military interventions, his tariff‐?hungry protectionism makes him a comparatively poor ally‐?of‐?convenience for libertarians who oppose military activism but understand that markets and trade enrich the world and pacify international politics. Sachs is further proof that there is a diverse coalition of intellectuals who understand the need for U.S. retrenchment but who also reject the anti‐?immigrant and anti‐?trade biases that fester within certain other ideological camps.
A change in strategy is of paramount importance. The United States has been in a constant state of war for almost 20 years. Trillions of taxpayer dollars have been wasted on unwinnable and unnecessary wars. Millions of innocent lives have been caught in the storm. At home, Americans are faced with a ballooning national debt, an ominous growth of government power, and a national security state that is a constant threat to civil liberties and constitutional checks and balances.
But America need not entirely abandon its coveted sense of distinction. Indeed, one strain of American exceptionalism, another version of exceptionalism that’s been largely lost to history, held that the United States could be exceptional — that is, different from the rest — only insofar as it resisted the temptations of global dominion. America, John Quincy Adams proclaimed in 1821, “respected the independence of other nations while asserting and maintaining her own.” That “she has abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when conflict has been for principles to which she clings” spoke precisely to what made her exceptional.
At the close of the 19th century, as the United States fought a war with Spain and gobbled up new territories as the spoils of victory, anti‐?imperialists, as they were then called, mourned the loss of that American exceptionalism. America “had wantonly relinquished her refuge of isolation to enter the enmeshing trap of European rivalry and conflict,” explains Robert Beisner, a historian of the period. “The United States,” anti‐?imperialists felt, “could no longer shine as the world’s favored nation, detached and unstained in her special place above the fray.”
