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非洲的新加坡夢
為什麽盧旺達總統將自己定位為李光耀的繼承人。
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/02/africas-singapore-dream-rwanda-kagame-lee-kuan-yew/
作者：《民主實驗室》前編輯克裏斯蒂安·卡裏爾 (Christian Caryl)，由外交政策與列格坦研究所 (Legatum Institute) 合作出版。
盧旺達總統卡加梅7次痛斥西方新殖民主義 | 非洲新聞
2015 年 4 月 2 日下午 1:24
這些天盧旺達人對他們總統的未來非常想知道。 保羅·卡加梅（Paul Kagame）（如上圖所示）的第二個任期即將結束，根據憲法，這意味著他將無法參加定於 2017 年舉行的該國下一次全國選舉。他是否會改變規則，允許 自己留下來嗎？
這些天盧旺達人對他們總統的未來非常想知道。 保羅·卡加梅（Paul Kagame）（如上圖所示）的第二個任期即將結束，根據憲法，這意味著他將無法參加定於 2017 年舉行的該國下一次全國選舉。他是否會改變規則，允許 自己留下來嗎？
在最近的采訪中，57 歲的卡加梅小心翼翼地避免透露自己的意圖，並表示決定不取決於他：“我再說一遍，2017 年是人民的事。” 但最後有一個有趣的暗示，采訪者談到了最近去世的新加坡政治家李光耀，並詢問卡加梅是否將李視為榜樣：
顯然，是一種靈感。 一個偉大的人，以偉大的原則為動力，以小國成就了偉大的事業。 李光耀改變了新加坡及其人民的生活。 這也是我們在盧旺達正在做的事情。
李作為該國最高政治家的任期非常長——首先擔任總理（1959-1990），然後擔任高級部長（1990-2004），最後擔任部長導師（2004-2011）。 因此，卡加梅對這位新加坡人的盛讚高度暗示了他自己的意圖。
然而卡加梅的言論也引發了一個更大的問題：為什麽非洲領導人會以新加坡人為榜樣？ 李為他的國家打造的僵化專製和自由市場資本主義的奇特結合通常被認為是東亞特有的東西。 李本人有時會提到他所謂的“亞洲價值觀”的核心地位，這是一種基於尊重教育、企業家精神和權威的儒家思想。 從中國的鄧小平到馬來西亞的馬哈蒂爾·穆罕默德，該地區的領導人都是他的鐵杆粉絲。
卡加梅看起來並不是俱樂部的自然成員。 盧旺達坐落在中非山區，從表麵上看，盧旺達與李將其打造為世界偉大商業強國之一的國家沒有什麽共同之處。 新加坡是世界上最繁忙的海上航道之一上的一個島嶼，其經濟自然傾向於貿易； 盧旺達是一個偏遠的內陸國家，幾乎沒有明顯的自然優勢。
盡管新加坡在 1965 年獲得獨立時麵臨著華人、印度人和馬來人之間的一些嚴重緊張關係，但它從未遇到過像盧旺達 1994 年種族滅絕那樣的問題，那次種族滅絕奪走了多達 100 萬盧旺達人的生命，並摧毀了經濟。 這種嚴峻的背景對於理解卡加梅的強硬外交政策至關重要，該政策毫不猶豫地使用軍事手段來實現其目的。 盧旺達已在鄰國剛果部署軍隊並讚助代理部隊，並指責剛果窩藏參與種族滅絕的遊擊隊。 相比之下，新加坡在與世界其他國家打交道時表現出非對抗性的態度。
然而，也有一些有趣的連續性。 兩國都是相對較小的國家：盧旺達人口為 1200 萬，略多於新加坡人口的兩倍。 兩者都是從低起點開始的。 1965 年獨立時新加坡的人均 GDP 為 516 美元（根據當前美元價值調整）； 2013年，盧旺達的這一數字為638美元。 由於這兩個國家都沒有特別豐富的自然資源，因此重視貿易和服務是有道理的。
卡加梅多年來一直將兩國進行比較。 他將盧旺達稱為“非洲的新加坡”。 他培養了新加坡的專業知識，涉及從城市規劃到警察的各個方麵。 他甚至成功地複製了新加坡人對整潔的重視。 第一次來到首都基加利的遊客總是會對這裏一塵不染的道路、秩序井然的交通以及明顯沒有垃圾的情況感到驚訝。 （雖然卡加梅還沒有遵守李的禁令，禁止隨地吐痰或嚼口香糖，但他已經宣布塑料袋為非法。）
這些並不是唯一的相似之處。 盧旺達企業家和官員在宣揚該國的營商理念時，表現出了明顯的新加坡式的支持精神。 盡管盧旺達從 1922 年到 1962 年一直處於比利時統治之下，但卡加梅已經放棄使用法語和英語。
擁抱英語。 他甚至推動自己的國家加入英聯邦，使其成為該組織中僅有的兩個不屬於前英國屬地的國家之一——是的，新加坡也是其成員。 （李在劍橋學習法律期間被稱為“哈利·李”，即使在獨立後仍保留了英國法律體係的許多方麵。）
和李一樣，卡加梅為他的國家製定了基於貿易、金融和服務業的嚴格發展戰略。 和李一樣，他一心一意地追求自己的計劃，將有限的資源集中在教育、健康和信息技術上。 卡加梅的目標是利用網絡空間來克服該國地理位置偏遠的問題，他已經用光纜網絡覆蓋了該國。 2000年，根據政府統計，盧旺達的互聯網用戶數量約為5000人。 如今，這一數字已達 320 萬，占總人口的四分之一。
盧旺達也追隨新加坡的腳步，在遏製腐敗和培育法治方麵取得了成功——這與法院和法官名聲不佳的鄰國形成鮮明對比。 與許多其他表麵上的非洲成功故事不同，盧旺達的進步似乎並不是以不平等加劇為代價的。 政府的政策帶來了穩定的增長——2001 年至 2013 年間平均增長約 8%——這也讓貧窮的盧旺達人受益。
這些成就使卡加梅成為一些非洲同行的尊敬對象，就像李受到東亞同事的尊敬一樣。 不難看出原因。 李和他這一代人麵臨的問題與他們今天的非洲同行所麵臨的問題並沒有太大不同。 後殖民時期的亞洲必須應對深刻的宗教和政治分歧、痛苦的種族衝突以及腐敗和管理不善的削弱影響。 李的新加坡在處理這項工作時，毫不留情地專注於最大限度地發展； 對於李來說，意識形態（和人權）讓位於經濟效率。
卡加梅對新加坡模式的改編可能會在未來幾年變得更加有影響力。 在許多觀察家看來，非洲現在正準備實現經濟高速增長，這可能會複製亞洲在過去五十年中的顯著崛起。 根據一些預測，到本世紀中葉，非洲 GDP 總額（2013 年為 2.6 萬億美元）可能會增長十倍。
非洲能否成功實現經濟穩健增長，很大程度上取決於治理質量。 亞洲人已經花了幾十年的時間爭論新加坡家長式模式的優點和缺點，這種模式強調廉潔政府，卻以犧牲公民自由為代價。 今天的盧旺達也體現了同樣的權衡，正在非洲人中引發類似的討論。
關鍵問題之一是人格的作用。 專製君主通常不會因允許潛在對手崛起而聞名。 批評人士指出，盧旺達現任總統無情地清除了任何可能成為繼任者的人。 今天，李在鎔在許多方麵受到崇拜，很大程度上是因為他是一個罕見的獨裁者，他成功地建立了比他更長壽的製度。 卡加梅能否做出同樣的主張？
Africa's Singapore Dream
Why Rwanda's president styles himself as the heir to Lee Kuan Yew.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/02/africas-singapore-dream-rwanda-kagame-lee-kuan-yew/
By Christian Caryl, the former editor of Democracy Lab, published by Foreign Policy in partnership with Legatum Institute.
kagame photo cropped
Rwandans are wondering a lot about their president’s future these days. Paul Kagame (shown above) is nearing the end of his second term in office, and according to the constitution that means he won’t be able to compete in the country’s next national election, scheduled for 2017. Will he bend the rules to allow himself to stay on?
Rwandans are wondering a lot about their president’s future these days. Paul Kagame (shown above) is nearing the end of his second term in office, and according to the constitution that means he won’t be able to compete in the country’s next national election, scheduled for 2017. Will he bend the rules to allow himself to stay on?
In his latest interview, the 57-year-old Kagame is careful to avoid revealing his intentions, saying that the decision is not up to him: “2017, I repeat, is the people’s business.” But there’s an intriguing hint right at the end, where the interviewer touches upon the recent death of Singaporean statesman Lee Kuan Yew, and asks Kagame whether he regards Lee as a model:
Evidently, an inspiration. A great man, driven by great principles and who achieved great things with a small country. Lee Kuan Yew has transformed Singapore and the lives of his people. This is also what we are doing in Rwanda.
Lee enjoyed an exceptionally long tenure as his country’s top politician — first as prime minister (1959-1990), then as senior minister (1990-2004), and finally as minister mentor (2004-2011). So Kagame’s fulsome praise for the Singaporean offers a highly suggestive hint about his own intentions.
Yet Kagame’s remark also begs a larger question: Why would an African leader seize upon a Singaporean as his model? The peculiar combination of rigid autocracy and free-market capitalism that Lee crafted for his country is often regarded as something deeply specific to East Asia. Lee himself sometimes alluded to the centrality of what he liked to call “Asian Values,” a Confucian-inflected mindset based on respect for education, entrepreneurship, and authority. Leaders from the region, ranging from China’s Deng Xiaoping to Malaysia’s Mahatir Mohamad, have been among his diehard fans.
Kagame doesn’t seem like a natural member of the club. Nestled in the mountains of Central Africa, on the surface Rwanda has little in common with the country that Lee turned into one of the world’s great business powerhouses. Singapore is an island on one of the world’s busiest sea lanes, its economy naturally predisposed to trade; Rwanda is a remote, land-locked state with little in the way of obvious natural advantages.
And though Singapore faced some serious tensions among its Chinese, Indian, and Malay citizens when it achieved independence in 1965, it never had to deal with anything like Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, which took the lives of up to 1 million Rwandans and devastated the economy. That grim background is crucial to understanding Kagame’s muscular foreign policy, which doesn’t hesitate to use military means to achieve its ends. Rwanda has deployed troops and sponsored proxy forces in neighboring Congo, which it accuses of harboring guerrillas complicit in the genocide. Singapore, by contrast, is ostentatiously non-confrontational in its dealings with the rest of the world.
Yet there are also intriguing continuities. Both are relatively small countries: Rwanda’s population of 12 million is a bit more than twice that of Singapore’s. Both have started from low bases. Singapore’s per capita GDP at independence in 1965 was $516 (adjusted for current dollar values); in 2013, the figure for Rwanda was $638. Since neither country is particularly well endowed with natural resources, an emphasis on trade and services makes sense.
Kagame has been drawing parallels between the two countries for years. He refers to Rwanda as the “Singapore of Africa.” He cultivates Singaporean expertise, on everything from urban planning to the police. And he has even managed to replicate the Singaporean emphasis on tidiness. First-time visitors to Kigali, the capital, are invariably surprised by the spotless roads, the carefully ordered traffic, and the conspicuous absence of trash. (While Kagame hasn’t gone so far as to follow Lee’s bans on spitting or chewing gum, he has outlawed plastic bags.)
Nor are these the only similarities. Rwandan entrepreneurs and officials display a distinctly Singaporean boosterism as they tout their country’s business-friendly philosophy. And though Rwanda was under Belgian rule from 1922 to 1962, Kagame has renounced the use of French and embraced English. He’s even pushed his country into membership in the Commonwealth, making it one of the only two states in the organization that aren’t former British possessions — and yes, Singapore, too, is a member. (Lee, who was known as “Harry Lee” during his time studying law at Cambridge, maintained many aspects of the British legal system even after independence.)
Like Lee, Kagame has laid out a rigorous development strategy for his country based on trade, finance, and services. And like Lee he has pursued his plan with extraordinary single-mindedness, focusing limited resources on education, health, and information technology. Kagame, who aims to leverage cyberspace to overcome his country’s physical remoteness, has covered the country with a network of fiber optic cables. In 2000, according to government statistics, the number of Internet users in Rwanda was around 5,000. Today the number is 3.2 million, a quarter of the population.
Rwanda also follows in Singapore’s footsteps with its success in curbing corruption and cultivating the rule of law — in stark contrast to its neighbors, where courts and judges have miserable reputations. And unlike many other ostensible African success stories, Rwanda doesn’t seem to have made its progress at the cost of widening inequality. The government’s policies have produced steady growth — averaging about 8 percent between 2001 and 2013 — that has also benefited poor Rwandans.
These achievements have made Kagame a figure of esteem among some of his African peers — just as Lee was venerated by his East Asian colleagues. And it’s not hard to see why. The problems that faced Lee and his generation weren’t all that different from what their African counterparts confront today. Post-colonial Asia had to cope with deep religious and political divides, traumatic ethnic conflicts, and the sapping effects of corruption and mismanagement. Lee’s Singapore tackled the job with a ruthless focus on maximizing development; for Lee, ideology (and human rights) took a back seat to economic efficiency.
Kagame’s adaptation of the Singapore model could become even more influential in the years ahead. Africa, in the view of many observers, is now poised for a surge of economic growth that could replicate Asia’s remarkable rise over the past fifty years. According to some predictions, total African GDP ($2.6 trillion in 2013) could increase tenfold by the middle of this century.
Whether Africa can succeed in achieving solid economic growth depends largely on the quality of governance. Asians have already spent decades arguing the virtues and drawbacks of Singapore’s paternalistic model, which stressed clean government at the expense of civil liberties. Today’s Rwanda, which exemplifies the same trade-offs, is prompting similar discussion among Africans.
One of the key questions turns on the role of personality. Despots aren’t generally known for allowing the rise of potential rivals to their power; critics note that Rwanda’s current president has relentlessly purged anyone who might figure as a possible successor. Lee is lionized in so many quarters today largely because he was the rare example of an autocrat who succeeded in building institutions that outlived him. Will Kagame be able to make the same claim?
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