By Seymour M. Hersh March 23, 2015
Seymour M. Hersh wrote his first piece for The New Yorker in 1971 and has been a regular contributor to the magazine since 1993. His journalism and publishing awards include a Pulitzer Prize, five George Polk Awards, two National Magazine Awards, and more than a dozen other prizes for investigative reporting. As a staff writer, Hersh won a National Magazine Award for Public Interest for his 2003 articles “Lunch with the Chairman,” “Selective Intelligence,” and “The Stovepipe.” In 2004, Hersh exposed the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in a series of pieces in the magazine; in 2005, he again received a National Magazine Award for Public Interest, an Overseas Press Club Award, the National Press Foundation’s Kiplinger Distinguished Contributions to Journalism Award, and his fifth George Polk Award, making him that award’s most honored laureate.
來自越南的信 犯罪現場
作者:西摩·赫什 2015 年 3 月 23 日
大屠殺發生時,美萊博物館館長範青功 (Pham Thanh Cong) 十一歲。 他的母親和四個兄弟姐妹...
美萊博物館館長範清功(Pham Thanh Cong)在大屠殺時十一歲。 他的母親和四個兄弟姐妹去世了。 他說:“我們原諒,但我們不會忘記。”攝影:Katie Orlinsky
美萊村有一條長長的水溝。 1968 年 3 月 16 日早上,這裏擠滿了死者的屍體——數十名婦女、兒童和老人,全部被年輕的美國士兵槍殺。 四十七年後的今天,美萊村的溝渠似乎比我在屠殺新聞照片中看到的還要寬:侵蝕和時間的作用。 越南戰爭期間,附近有一片稻田,但現在已將其鋪平,以使每年數以千計的遊客更容易到達美萊村,這些遊客會走過描述這一可怕事件的簡陋標記。 美萊村大屠殺是這場誤打誤撞的戰爭中的關鍵時刻:一支由大約一百名士兵組成的美國分遣隊,被稱為查理連,在收到糟糕的情報後,以為他們會遇到越共軍隊或同情者,結果在早餐時隻發現了一個和平的村莊。 。 然而,查理連的士兵強奸了婦女,燒毀了房屋,並將他們的 M-16 步槍轉向了美萊村手無寸鐵的平民。 這次襲擊的領導人之一是威廉·L·卡利中尉,他是一名從邁阿密大專退學的人。
到1969年初,查理公司的大部分成員都結束了旅行並返回家鄉。 當時我是華盛頓特區的一名三十二歲的自由記者。我決心了解年輕人——實際上是男孩——是如何做到這一點的,因此我花了數周時間追蹤他們。 在很多情況下,他們會公開地、大部分是誠實地與我交談,描述他們在美萊村所做的事情以及他們計劃如何帶著那段記憶生活。
在陸軍調查前的證詞中,一些士兵承認自己在溝渠裏,但聲稱他們違反了卡利的殺戮命令。 他們說,其中一名主要槍手以及卡利本人是一等兵保羅·米德洛。 真相仍然難以捉摸,但一名 G.I. 我後來了解到,他向我描述了他的大多數戰友都清楚地記得的一個時刻。 在卡利的命令下,米德羅等人向溝渠裏開了一槍又一槍,並扔了幾顆手榴彈。
隨後傳來一聲尖銳的哀鳴聲,聲音越來越大,一個渾身是泥和血的兩三歲男孩在屍體中爬行,爬向稻田。 他的母親很可能用她的身體保護了他。 據目擊者稱,卡利看到了發生的事情,並追趕孩子,把他拖回溝裏,把他扔進去,然後開槍射殺了他。
屠殺發生的第二天早上,米德洛在例行巡邏時踩到地雷,右腳被炸掉。 在等待直升機送往野戰醫院時,他譴責了卡利。 “上帝會因為你讓我做的事而懲罰你,”一名大兵說。 米德洛回憶道。
“把他帶上直升機!” 卡萊喊道。
米德洛一直咒罵卡利,直到直升機到達。
米德洛在印第安納州西部的農場長大。 經過很長一段時間,我把一毛錢投入公用電話,給全州的信息運營商打電話,終於在特雷霍特附近的小鎮新戈申找到了一個米德洛家族。 接電話的是一位女士,原來是保羅的母親默特爾。 我說我是一名記者,正在寫有關越南的事情。 我問保羅近況如何,並想知道第二天我是否可以過來和他談談。 她告訴我歡迎我嚐試。
米德洛斯一家住在一個搖搖欲墜的養雞場裏,有一棟帶有隔板壁板的小房子。 當我把租來的車停下來時,默特爾出來迎接我,並說保羅在裏麵,盡管她不知道他是否會說話,也不知道他會說什麽。 顯然他沒有告訴她太多關於越南的事情。 然後默特爾說了一句話,總結了一場我越來越討厭的戰爭:“我派給他們一個好孩子,他們卻把他變成了殺人犯。”
米德洛邀請我進去並同意談話。 他二十二歲。 他在前往越南之前結了婚,和妻子育有一個兩歲半的兒子和一個尚在繈褓中的女兒。 盡管受傷,他還是在工廠工作以養家糊口。 我請他給我看他的傷口並告訴我治療的情況。 他摘下假肢並描述了自己的經曆。 沒過多久,話題就轉向了美萊。 米德羅不停地說著,顯然迫切地想要重新獲得一些自尊。 他毫無感情地描述了卡利的殺戮命令。 他沒有為自己在美萊村所做的事情辯護,隻是說這些殺戮“確實減輕了我良心上的負擔”,因為“我們失去了朋友。 這隻是報複,僅此而已。”
米德洛講述了他的行為
乏味、令人震驚的細節。 “[美萊]本來應該有一些越共分子,我們開始對其進行掃蕩,”他告訴我。 “我們一到那裏就開始聚集人們。 。 。 開始把他們分成大群。 村子中央大概有四十、四十五個平民圍成一個大圈。 。 。 。 卡利讓我和其他幾個人去看他們。” 據他回憶,十分鍾後卡利回來告訴他:“接受吧。 我要他們死。” 米德洛說,卡利從大約十到十五英尺遠的地方“開始向他們射擊。 然後他告訴我開始拍攝它們。 。 。 。 我開始向他們開槍,但其他人不肯這麽做。 所以我們”——米德洛和卡利——“直接殺了他們。” 米德洛估計他已經殺了圈子裏的十五個人。 “我們都聽從命令,”他說。 “我們都認為我們正在做正確的事情。 當時這並沒有困擾我。” 有官方證詞顯示,米德洛實際上對卡利的命令感到極度痛苦。 查理連的一名士兵回憶道,在卡利讓他“照顧好這群人”後,米德洛和一名戰友“實際上是在和孩子們玩耍,告訴人們在哪裏坐下,並給孩子們糖果。” 當卡利回來並說他希望他們死時,士兵說:“米德洛隻是看著他,好像不敢相信。 他說,‘浪費它們?’”當卡利說是的時候,另一名士兵作證,米德洛和卡利“敞開心扉,開始開火。” 但隨後米德洛“開始哭泣”。
哥倫比亞廣播公司的邁克·華萊士對我的采訪很感興趣,米德洛同意在國家電視台上再次講述他的故事。 演出前一天晚上,我在 Meadlo 家裏的沙發上度過,第二天早上與 Meadlo 和他的妻子一起飛往紐約。 有時間交談,我了解到米德洛在日本的一家陸軍醫院花了數周時間進行康複治療。 回國後,他對自己在越南的經曆隻字不提。 一天晚上,他回來後不久,他的妻子在其中一間兒童房裏歇斯底裏的哭聲中醒來。 她衝進去,發現保羅正在猛烈地搖晃孩子。
華盛頓特區一位年輕的反戰律師傑弗裏·考恩 (Geoffrey Cowan) 向我透露了有關美萊村的消息。考恩幾乎沒有什麽具體信息,但他聽說一位不願透露姓名的大兵在 發瘋了,殺死了數十名越南平民。 三年前,當我為美聯社報道五角大樓時,從戰爭中歸來的軍官告訴我正在發生的越南平民被殺害的情況。 有一天,在追蹤考恩的線索時,我遇到了一位年輕的陸軍上校,我曾在五角大樓擊敗過他。 他在越南腿部受傷,在康複期間得知自己將晉升為將軍。 他現在在一個負責戰爭日常事務的辦公室工作。 當我問他對那個無名大兵了解多少時,他用尖銳而憤怒的眼神看著我,然後開始用手敲打膝蓋。 “那個男孩卡利沒有射出比這更高的球,”他說。
我有一個名字。 在當地的一家圖書館,我發現了《泰晤士報》中埋藏的一篇短篇故事,內容是關於一名卡利中尉被陸軍指控在南越謀殺了數量不詳的平民的故事。 我找到了卡利,他被陸軍藏在喬治亞州哥倫布本寧堡的高級軍官宿舍裏。 那時,軍隊裏有人允許我閱讀一份機密指控單並做筆記,指控卡利有預謀地謀殺了一百零九名“東方人”。
卡利看起來一點也不邪惡。 他是一個二十多歲的瘦小、緊張的男人,皮膚蒼白,幾乎半透明。 他努力讓自己看起來很堅強。 喝了很多啤酒後,他告訴我他和他的士兵如何在美萊村的一場激烈交火中與敵人交戰並殺死敵人。 我們聊了一夜。 有一次,卡利借口借口去洗手間。 他把門半開著,我可以看到他正在吐血。
1969 年 11 月,我寫了五篇關於卡利、米德洛和大屠殺的文章。 我去《生活與展望》雜誌沒有成功,所以我轉而求助於華盛頓的一家小型反戰通訊社——《特派新聞社》。 那是一個焦慮和不安日益加劇的時期。 理查德·尼克鬆 (Richard Nixon) 通過承諾結束戰爭贏得了 1968 年大選,但他真正的計劃是通過升級和秘密轟炸來贏得戰爭。 1969 年,每個月有多達 1500 名美國士兵被殺——幾乎與前一年持平。
霍默·比加特、伯納德·法爾、大衛·哈爾伯斯坦、尼爾·希恩、馬爾科姆·布朗、弗朗西斯·菲茨傑拉德、格洛麗亞·愛默生、莫利·塞弗和沃德·賈斯特等戰地記者從戰場上發出了無數的快訊,越來越清楚地表明這場戰爭在道德上毫無根據,在戰略上失敗了 ,與西貢和華盛頓的軍事和政治官員向公眾描述的情況完全不同。 1969年11月15日,兩日
在我發表第一篇美萊快訊後不久,華盛頓舉行了一場反戰遊行,吸引了五十萬人參加。 尼克鬆最信任的助手兼執行者 H. R. 霍爾德曼 (H. R. Haldeman) 在橢圓形辦公室做了筆記,這些筆記在 18 年後被公開。 他們透露,1969 年 12 月 1 日,在保羅·米德洛的揭露引發強烈抗議時,尼克鬆批準使用“肮髒的伎倆”來抹黑大屠殺的關鍵證人。 1971年,陸軍陪審團判定卡利犯有大規模謀殺罪,並判處他終身苦役,尼克鬆進行了幹預,下令將卡利從陸軍監獄釋放,並軟禁以等待審查。 尼克鬆卸任三個月後,卡利獲釋,並在接下來的幾年裏在他嶽父位於佐治亞州哥倫布的珠寶店工作,並為願意付費的記者提供自私的采訪。 最後,在 2009 年,他在基瓦尼斯俱樂部的一次演講中表示,“我無時無刻不在為美萊感到悔恨”,但他卻在執行命令——“我猜這是愚蠢的”。 卡利現年七十一歲。 他是唯一因參與美萊村大屠殺而被定罪的警官。
1970 年 3 月,陸軍調查對包括將軍和上校在內的 14 名軍官提出了從謀殺到玩忽職守等多項指控,指控他們掩蓋大屠殺。 除了卡利之外,隻有一名軍官最終麵臨軍事法庭,並被判無罪。
“現在給他們打電話已經太晚了——他們已經睡熟了。 他們住在康涅狄格州!”
幾個月後,在校園廣泛反戰抗議活動最激烈的時候——其中包括俄亥俄州國民警衛隊殺害了四名學生——我去了明尼蘇達州聖保羅的馬卡萊斯特學院,發表了一場反對戰爭的演講。 戰爭。 休伯特·漢弗萊曾是林登·約翰遜忠實的副總統,現在是該學院的政治學教授。 他在 1968 年的選舉中輸給了尼克鬆,部分原因是他無法將自己與林登·約翰遜的越南政策分開。 演講結束後,漢弗萊要求與我交談。 “我對你沒有意見,赫什先生,”他說。 “你正在做你的工作,而且做得很好。 但是,至於那些走來走去說‘嘿,嘿,L.B.J.,你今天殺了多少個孩子?’的孩子們?”漢弗萊的肉圓的臉漲紅了,他的聲音每說一句話就變得更大。 “我說,‘操他們,操他們,操他們。’”
幾個月前,我和家人第一次訪問了美萊村(美國陸軍對這個村莊的稱呼)。 回到案發現場對於一定年齡的記者來說已經是老生常談了,但我卻無法抗拒。 1970 年初,我曾向南越政府尋求許可,但當時五角大樓正在進行內部調查,該地區已不對外人開放。 我於 1972 年加入《泰晤士報》,並訪問了北越的河內。 1980 年,西貢淪陷五年後,我再次前往越南為一本書進行采訪,並為《泰晤士報》做更多報道。 我以為我知道有關大屠殺的全部或大部分內容。 當然,我錯了。
美萊村位於越南中部,距離連接河內和胡誌明市(現在的西貢)的 1 號高速公路不遠。 美萊博物館館長範清功(Pham Thanh Cong)是大屠殺的幸存者。 當我們第一次見麵時,叢是一個五十多歲的嚴肅、矮胖的男人,很少談論他的個人經曆,隻使用生硬、熟悉的短語。 他形容越南人是“熱情好客的人民”,並避免任何指責。 “我們原諒,但我們不會忘記,”他說。 後來,當我們坐在小博物館外的長凳上時,他描述了他記憶中的大屠殺。 那一年,叢十一歲。 他說,當美國直升機降落在村莊時,他和母親以及四個兄弟姐妹擠在茅草屋頂房屋內的一個原始掩體中。 美國士兵命令他們離開掩體,然後將他們推回掩體,向他們扔了一枚手榴彈,並用 M-16 開火。 聰的三個部位受傷——頭皮、軀幹右側和腿部。 他昏倒了。 當他醒來時,發現自己躺在一堆屍體中:他的母親、他的三個姐妹和他六歲的弟弟。 美國士兵一定以為叢也死了。 下午,當美國直升機離開時,他的父親和其他幾個前來埋葬死者的幸存村民找到了他。
後來,在與我和家人共進午餐時,叢說:“我永遠不會忘記那種痛苦。” 在他的工作中,他永遠不能拋下它。 叢告訴我,幾年前,一位名叫肯尼思·席爾 (Kenneth Schiel) 的退伍軍人曾在美萊村參觀過該博物館,他是當時唯一參觀過該博物館的查理公司成員,當時他是半島電視台電視紀錄片拍攝的參與者。 大屠殺四十周年。 席爾高中畢業後入伍參軍
奧爾,在密歇根州斯沃茨溪,弗林特附近的一個小鎮,經過隨後的調查,他被指控殺害了九名村民。 (指控被駁回。)
這部紀錄片講述了與叢的對話,叢被告知席爾是一名越戰老兵,但並沒有聽說他去過美萊村。 在視頻中,席爾對采訪者說:“我開槍了嗎? 我會說我開槍了,直到我意識到出了什麽問題。 我不會透露我是否射殺了村民。” 在得知他參與了大屠殺之後,他在與叢的談話中就更加不樂意了。 席爾一再表示他想“向美萊村的人民道歉”,但他拒絕進一步說明。 “我一直問自己為什麽會發生這種事。 我不知道。”
叢質問:“當你向平民開槍並被殺時,你感覺如何? 對你來說很難嗎?” 席爾說,他並不屬於射殺平民的士兵之一。 叢回答說:“所以也許你來到我家殺了我的親戚。”
博物館存檔的文字記錄包含了談話的其餘部分。 席爾說:“我現在唯一能做的就是為此道歉。” 聰的聲音聽起來越來越痛苦,他繼續要求席爾公開談論他的罪行,而席爾一直說:“對不起,對不起。” 當聰問席爾回到基地後能否吃上飯時,席爾開始哭泣。 “請不要再問我任何問題,”他說。 “我無法保持冷靜。” 然後席爾問叢是否可以參加紀念大屠殺周年的儀式。
聰拒絕了他。 “這太丟臉了,”他說,並補充道,“如果當地人知道你是參與屠殺的人,他們會非常憤怒。”
離開博物館之前,我問叢為什麽對席爾如此不讓步。 他的臉色變得嚴肅起來。 他說,他無意減輕一名美萊村退伍軍人的痛苦,因為他拒絕完全承認自己的所作所為。 康的父親曾為越共工作,大屠殺後與康住在一起,但他在 1970 年的戰鬥中被一支美國作戰部隊殺害。 叢去附近村莊的親戚那裏住,幫助他們養牛。 戰爭結束後,他終於能夠回到學校。
“我想我剛剛遇到了我的靈魂伴侶。”
從叢和博物館工作人員編製的綜合統計數據中可以了解更多信息。 死者的名字和年齡刻在一個陳列室上方的大理石牌上。 博物館的統計數字已無爭議,共有來自 247 個家庭的 504 名受害者。 二十四個家庭被消滅——三代人被殺害,無一幸存。 死者中有一百八十二名婦女,其中十七名懷孕了。 一百七十三名兒童被處決,其中包括五十六名嬰兒。 六十名老人死亡。 博物館的統計還包括另一個重要事實:那天大屠殺的受害者不僅在美萊(也稱為美萊 4),而且也在一個被美國人稱為美溪 4 的姊妹定居點。這個定居點,一英裏或一英裏 因此,在東邊的南中國海,遭到了另一支美國士兵布拉沃連的襲擊。 博物館列出了美萊 4 號的 407 名遇難者和美溪 4 號的 97 名遇難者。
傳達的信息很明確:美萊四號發生的事情並非單一事件,也不是異常現象; Bravo 公司也複製了它,但數量較少。 布拉沃與查理連隸屬於同一支部隊——巴克特遣隊。 這次襲擊是巴克特遣部隊所屬的美國師所有作戰部隊當天進行的最重要的行動。 該師的高級領導層,包括其指揮官塞繆爾·科斯特少將,全天飛進飛出該地區,檢查進展情況。
這有一個醜陋的背景。 到 1967 年,南越省份廣義省、廣南省和廣治省的戰爭形勢十分嚴峻,這些省份以獨立於西貢政府以及支持越共和北越而聞名。 廣治省是該國遭受轟炸最嚴重的省份之一。 美國戰機用包括橙劑在內的落葉化學品灑滿了這三個省份。
在我最近的旅行中,我在越南統一後的首都河內呆了五天。 那裏的退休軍官和共產黨官員告訴我,美萊村大屠殺通過支持美國國內的反戰異議,幫助北越贏得了戰爭。 我還一次又一次地被告知,美萊村的獨特之處僅在於其規模。 最直接的評價來自阮氏平 (Nguyen Thi Binh),她在越南被稱為平夫人 (Madame Binh)。 七十年代初,她擔任巴黎和談中民族解放陣線代表團團長,以直言不諱、美貌出眾而聞名。 平夫人,八十七歲,退休
在擔任兩屆越南副總統後,她於 2002 年退出公共生活,但仍然參與與戰爭有關的慈善事業,幫助橙劑受害者和殘疾人。
“我會誠實地告訴你,”她說。 “我的賴氏是在被美國人報道後才在美國變得重要的。” 大屠殺發生幾周後,北越駐巴黎發言人公開描述了這些事件,但這個故事被認為是宣傳。 “我記得很清楚,因為美國的反戰運動因此而發展,”平夫人用法語補充道。 “但在越南,不僅有一家美萊店,還有很多家。”
一天早上,在峴港這個擁有約 100 萬人口的海濱度假勝地和港口城市,我與 Vo Cao Loi 喝咖啡,他是 Bravo 公司在美溪 4 號襲擊事件中為數不多的幸存者之一。Loi 說,當時他十五歲。 口譯員。 當他的母親聽到直升機接近村莊時,她有一種“不好的預感”。 此前該地區曾開展過行動。 “這不像一些美國人會突然出現,”他說。 “在他們來之前,他們經常會開炮轟炸該地區,然後他們就會派出地麵部隊。” 美國和南越陸軍部隊多次經過該地區,沒有發生任何事件,但這一次,雷在襲擊發生前不久被他的母親趕出了村莊。 他的兩個哥哥正在與越共作戰,其中一人在六天前的戰鬥中喪生。 “我認為她很害怕,因為我幾乎是一個成年男孩了,如果我留下來,我可能會被毆打或被迫加入南越軍隊。 我走到河邊,大約五十米遠。 很近,足夠近了:我聽到了火焰和尖叫聲。” 雷一直躲到晚上才回家埋葬他的母親和其他親戚。
兩天後,越共軍隊將雷帶到了西部山區的一個總部。 他還太年輕,無法參加戰鬥,但他被帶到了在廣義省活動的越共作戰部隊麵前,描述了美國人在美溪所做的事情。 目的是激勵遊擊隊更加努力地戰鬥。 黎最終加入了越共,並在軍事指揮部服役直至戰爭結束。 美國偵察機和部隊不斷搜尋他的部隊。 “每當我們認為美國人已經逼近時,我們就會轉移總部,”洛伊告訴我。 “在總部工作的人都必須絕對忠誠。 裏麵分三圈:最外麵的一圈是供應商的,第二圈是維修和後勤人員的,最裏麵的一圈是指揮官的。 隻有師長才能留在內圈。 當他們離開總部時,他們會打扮成普通士兵,所以人們永遠不會知道。 他們走進了附近的村莊。 有時候美國人殺害了我們師的軍官,但他們不知道他們是誰。” 雷說,與美國陸軍一樣,越共軍官經常通過誇大他們殺死的敵方戰鬥人員的數量來激勵他們的士兵。
“春天? 我關心什麽? 我已經確定了。”
雷說,美萊和美溪的大屠殺雖然可怕,但卻動員了人們對反美戰爭的支持。 當被問及他是否能理解為什麽美國指揮部會容忍此類戰爭罪行時,雷說他不知道,但他對美國在越南中部的領導質量持悲觀態度。 “美國將軍必須對士兵的行為負責,”他告訴我。 “士兵們聽從命令,他們隻是在履行職責。”
雷說,他仍然為家人感到悲痛,並且經常做關於大屠殺的噩夢。 但是,與範清功不同的是,他幾乎立即找到了一個代理家庭:“越共愛我並照顧我。 他們養育了我。” 我告訴 Loi Cong 對 Kenneth Schiel 的憤怒,Loi 說:“即使別人對你做了可怕的事情,你也可以原諒它並走向未來。” 戰爭結束後,雷轉入越南正規軍。 他最終成為一名上校,並在服役三十八年後退休。 他和他的妻子現在在峴港擁有一家咖啡店。
越南近 70% 的人口年齡在 40 歲以下,盡管戰爭仍然是老一代人的主要問題,但美國遊客卻為經濟帶來了福音。 如果說美國大兵犯下了暴行,那麽法國人和中國人在其他戰爭中也犯下了暴行。 在外交上,美國被視為朋友,是對抗中國的潛在盟友。 1975 年,數千名在越南戰爭期間為美國人工作或與美國人一起工作的越南人逃往美國。他們的一些孩子回到了共產主義越南,這讓他們的父母感到困惑,盡管越南存在許多弊病,從猖獗的腐敗到嚴厲的政府審查製度。
五十七歲的作家兼記者 Nguyen Qui Duc 在河內經營一家頗受歡迎的酒吧和餐廳,後來逃到了越南
1975 年,埃麗卡 17 歲。 三十一年後,他歸來。 在舊金山,他是一位屢獲殊榮的記者和紀錄片製片人,但是,正如他告訴我的那樣,“我一直想回到越南生活。 十七歲離開家,在美國以另一個人的身份生活,我感覺自己還沒有完成。 我很感激美國的機會,但我需要一種社區意識。 我作為國家公共廣播電台記者第一次來到河內,就愛上了這裏。”
德告訴我,像許多越南人一樣,他已經學會接受美國在戰爭中的暴行。 “美國士兵犯下了殘暴的行為,但在戰爭中這樣的事情就會發生,”他說。 “事實上,越南人無法承認自己在戰爭中的暴行。 我們越南人有一種務實的態度:如果你能得到一個需要的朋友,最好忘記一個壞敵人。”
戰爭期間,德的父親阮文岱 (Nguyen Van Dai) 擔任南越副省長。 1968年,他被越共抓獲,一直被監禁到1980年。1984年,德在美國外交官的幫助下,成功向政府請願,允許他的父母移民到加利福尼亞州; 德克已經十六年沒有見過他的父親了。 他在機場等他時向我講述了他的焦慮。 他的父親在中國邊境附近的一所共產主義監獄裏與世隔絕,遭受了可怕的痛苦。 他經常無法移動四肢。 他會坐在輪椅上,還是精神不穩定? 杜克的父親在民主黨總統初選期間抵達加州。 他走下飛機,向兒子打招呼。 “傑西·傑克遜怎麽樣?” 他說。 他找到了一份社會工作者的工作,又活了十六年。
一些美國退伍軍人已返回越南生活。 查克·帕拉佐 (Chuck Palazzo) 在布朗克斯區亞瑟大道 (Arthur Avenue) 的一個陷入困境的家庭長大,高中輟學後,加入了海軍陸戰隊。 1970年秋,經過一年的訓練,他被分配到一支精銳偵察部隊,其任務是確認情報並在夜間伏擊敵方導彈陣地和作戰部隊。 他和他的手下有時會冒著炮火跳傘。 “我參與了與許多北越正規軍以及越共的激烈戰鬥,我失去了很多朋友,”帕拉佐在他現在生活和工作的峴港喝酒時告訴我。 “但是當我還在這裏的時候,熱情就消失了。 我開始閱讀和理解戰爭政治,我的一位軍官私下同意我的觀點,即我們在那裏所做的事情是錯誤且毫無意義的。 警官告訴我,‘小心點,趕緊離開這裏。’”
帕拉佐於 1970 年乘坐包機首次抵達峴港,飛機滑行時他可以看到戰場上排列著的棺材。“直到那時我才意識到自己正處於一場戰爭之中,”他說。 “十三個月後,我再次在峴港排隊,準備登上帶我回家的飛機,但我的名字沒有出現在乘客名單上。” 經過一番爭先恐後,帕拉佐說:“我被告知,如果我那天想回家,唯一的出路就是護送一批棺材乘坐 C-141 貨機飛往美國。” 所以他就是這麽做的。
離開海軍陸戰隊後,Palazzo 獲得了大學學位,並開始了 IT 職業生涯。 專家。 但和許多退伍軍人一樣,他帶著創傷後應激障礙“回到現實世界”,並與毒癮作鬥爭。 他的婚姻破裂了。 他失去了各種工作。 2006年,帕拉佐做出了一個“自私”的決定,返回胡誌明市。 “這一切都是關於我如何應對創傷後應激障礙(PTSD)。 並麵對我自己的鬼魂,”他說。 “我的第一次訪問就與越南人結下了不解之緣。” 帕拉佐希望為橙劑受害者盡其所能。 多年來,退伍軍人管理局以證據的不確定性為由,拒絕承認橙劑與許多接觸橙劑的人的疾病(包括癌症)之間的聯係。 “在戰爭中,連長告訴我們那是蚊子噴霧,但我們可以看到所有的樹木和植被都被摧毀了,”帕拉佐說。 “我突然想到,如果美國退伍軍人能得到一些東西、一些幫助和補償,為什麽越南人不能呢?” Palazzo 於 2007 年搬到峴港,現在是一名 I.T. 美國反戰非政府組織“退伍軍人和平”當地分支機構的顧問和領導人。 他仍然積極參與橙劑行動小組,該小組尋求國際支持以應對脫葉劑的持續影響。*
在河內,我遇到了查克·瑟西(Chuck Searcy),他是一位高個子、白發的男人,七十歲,在佐治亞州長大。 瑟西的父親在突出部戰役中被德國人俘虜,瑟西從未想過要避開越南。 “我認為約翰遜總統和國會知道我們在越南做什麽,”他告訴我。 1966年,瑟西從大學退學參軍。 他是一名情報分析員,在西貢機場附近的一個單位工作,負責處理和評估美國的分析和報告。
“三點之內
幾個月來,我作為一個愛國的佐治亞男孩的所有理想都破滅了,我開始質疑我們作為一個國家是誰,”瑟西說。 “我看到的情報是一個巨大的知識謊言。” 南越人顯然對美國人傳遞的情報不以為然。 有一次,一位同事在西貢的一個市場買了魚,發現它被包裹在他單位的一份機密報告中。 “1968 年 6 月,當我離開時,”瑟西說,“我感到憤怒和痛苦。”
瑟西結束了他的歐洲陸軍之旅。 他的回家是一場災難。 “我父親聽到我談論戰爭,他感到難以置信。 我變成共產黨員了嗎? 他說他和我母親“不再知道你們是誰了”。 你不是美國人。’然後他們叫我滾出去。” 瑟西後來從佐治亞大學畢業,並在佐治亞州雅典編輯了一份周報。 隨後,他開始了政治和公共政策的職業生涯,其中包括擔任佐治亞州民主黨國會議員威奇·福勒的助手。
1992 年,瑟西回到越南,並最終決定加入其他少數移居越南的退伍軍人的行列。 “1968 年,當我飛離越南時,我就知道有一天,我會以某種方式回來,希望是在和平時期。 甚至在那時我就覺得我正在拋棄越南人,讓他們陷入可怕的悲慘命運,而我們美國人對此負有主要責任。 這種情緒從未完全離開過我。” 瑟西參與了一個有關掃雷的項目。 美國在越南投放的炸彈數量(按重量計算)是二戰期間的三倍。 從戰爭結束到 1998 年,超過 10 萬越南平民(估計其中有 40% 是兒童)被未爆炸彈藥炸死或炸傷。 戰後二十多年來,美國拒絕為炸彈或橙劑造成的損害支付費用,盡管政府在 1996 年開始為掃雷提供少量資金。 2001年至2011年,越南退伍軍人紀念基金還資助了掃雷計劃。 “很多退伍軍人認為我們應該承擔一些責任,”瑟西說。 該計劃幫助越南人,特別是農民和兒童了解未爆炸武器造成的危險,傷亡人數已經減少。
瑟西說,他早期對戰爭的幻滅在戰爭結束前不久得到了證實。 他的父親打電話詢問他們是否可以喝咖啡。 自從他被命令離開家以來,他們就沒有說過話。 “他和我母親一直在說話,”瑟西說。 “他告訴我,‘我們認為你是對的,我們錯了。 我們希望你回家。”他說,他幾乎立刻就回家了,並一直和父母保持著親密的關係,直到他們去世。 瑟西曾兩次離婚,他在一封自嘲的電子郵件中寫道,“我拒絕了越南人讓我再次結婚的善意努力。”
越南還有很多東西值得學習。 到 1969 年初,查理連的大部分成員都回到了美國或被調往其他作戰部隊。 掩蓋工作正在發揮作用。 然而,那時,一位名叫羅納德·裏登霍爾(Ronald Ridenhour)的勇敢的退伍軍人已經寫了一封詳細的信,講述了這場“黑暗而血腥”的大屠殺,並將其副本郵寄給三十名政府官員和國會議員。 幾周之內,這封信就送到了美國駐越南軍事總部。
在我最近訪問河內時,一位政府官員要求我在驅車幾英裏前往美萊之前禮節性拜訪廣義省的省級辦事處。 在那裏,我收到了一本新出版的該省旅遊指南,其中詳細描述了戰爭期間發生在廣義省外長樂村的另一場據稱是美國大屠殺的事件。 據報道,1969 年 4 月 18 日早上 7 點,一個執行搜索和摧毀行動的陸軍排抵達長樂,此時距美萊村事件發生一年多一點。 士兵們把婦女和兒童從家裏救出來,然後放火燒毀了村莊。 報告稱,三小時後,士兵們返回長樂,殺害了 41 名兒童和 22 名婦女,僅留下 9 名幸存者。
美萊村事件發生後,情況似乎沒有發生什麽變化。
1998 年,美萊村大屠殺 30 周年紀念日之前幾周,五角大樓退休官員 W. 唐納德·斯圖爾特 (W. Donald Stewart) 給了我一份 1967 年 8 月一份未發表的報告副本,該報告表明大多數駐南越美軍並不理解 他們根據《日內瓦公約》承擔的責任。 斯圖爾特當時是五角大樓監察服務局調查部門的負責人。 他的報告是應肯尼迪總統和約翰遜總統領導下的國防部長羅伯特·麥克納馬拉的要求編寫的,其中涉及數月的旅行和數百次采訪。 斯圖爾特的報告稱,許多接受采訪的士兵“認為他們可以自由地替換自己的判斷”
公約的明確規定。 。 。 。 主要是年輕且缺乏經驗的部隊聲稱他們會虐待或殺害囚犯,盡管他們剛剛收到了國際法的指示。
麥克納馬拉於 1968 年 2 月離開五角大樓,該報告從未發布。 斯圖爾特後來告訴我,他理解為什麽這篇報道被壓製:“人們把他們十八歲的孩子送到那裏,我們不想讓他們發現他們正在割掉耳朵。 我從南越回來,認為事情已經失控了。 。 。 。 我非常理解卡利。”
“我愛水果。”
事實證明,羅伯特·麥克納馬拉也這麽做了。 1969 年底,當我報道美萊村時,我對斯圖爾特的研究一無所知,但我確實了解到,麥克納馬拉早在幾年前就已經注意到越南中部的血腥虐待事件。 我的第一篇《我的萊》故事出版後,《紐約客》的年輕作家喬納森·謝爾給我打電話,他曾於 1968 年為該雜誌發表了一篇關於廣義省和附近省份不斷發生的爆炸事件的毀滅性報道。 (謝爾去年去世。)他的文章後來成為一本書,《軍事的一半》,本質上表明,美國軍方相信越共在越南中部根深蒂固,並吸引了大力支持,因此幾乎不區分 包括美萊村在內的地區的戰鬥人員和非戰鬥人員。
1967 年,謝爾從南越回來,所見所聞讓他心碎不已。 他來自紐約的一個顯赫家庭,他的父親是一位華爾街律師和藝術讚助人,是約翰·F·肯尼迪總統前科學顧問傑羅姆·威斯納在瑪莎葡萄園島的鄰居。 時任麻省理工學院教務長的威斯納還與麥克納馬拉一起參與了一個建造電子屏障的項目,該屏障將阻止北越人沿著胡誌明小道向南運送物資。 (屏障從未完工。)謝爾告訴威斯納他在越南的所見所聞,威斯納也有同樣的沮喪,並安排他與麥克納馬拉交談。
不久之後,謝爾在華盛頓與麥克納馬拉討論了他的觀察結果。 謝爾告訴我,在寫文章之前向政府提交報告讓他感到不舒服,但他覺得必須這樣做。 麥克納馬拉同意他們的會麵將保持秘密,並表示他不會采取任何措施阻礙謝爾的工作。 他還在五角大樓為謝爾提供了一間辦公室,讓他可以在那裏聽寫筆記。 製作了兩份副本,麥克納馬拉表示,他將使用他的副本開始調查謝爾所描述的虐待行為。
謝爾的故事於明年初發表。 他沒有再聽到麥克納馬拉的任何消息,也沒有任何公開跡象表明政策有任何變化。 然後是我關於美萊的文章,謝爾給麥克納馬拉打了電話,麥克納馬拉後來離開了五角大樓,成為了世界銀行行長。 他提醒他,他給他留下了一份關於美萊地區暴行的詳細記錄。 現在,謝爾告訴我,他認為寫下他們的會麵很重要。 麥克納馬拉表示,他們已經同意不公開此事,並堅持要求謝爾履行承諾。 謝爾向我尋求建議。 當然,我希望他來寫這個故事,但告訴他,如果他真的與麥克納馬拉達成了非正式協議,他別無選擇,隻能遵守。
謝爾信守諾言。 2009 年,他在《國家》雜誌上一篇紀念麥克納馬拉的文章中描述了他對麥克納馬拉的訪問,但沒有提及他們達成的非凡協議。 謝爾寫道,會麵十五年後,他從合眾社國際**、《泰晤士報》和《紐約客》的出色戰地記者尼爾·希恩(Neil Sheehan)以及《光明的謊言》的作者那裏得知,麥克納馬拉向謝爾發送了 給美國駐西貢大使埃爾斯沃斯·邦克的筆記。 麥克納馬拉顯然不知道,西貢的目標不是調查謝爾的指控,而是抹黑他的報道,並盡一切可能阻止該材料的發表。
我在報紙上發表文章幾個月後,《哈潑斯雜誌》出版了我正在寫的一本書的摘錄,書名為《我的賴 4:關於大屠殺及其後果的報告》。 這段摘錄對所發生的事情進行了更為詳細的描述,強調了卡利中尉連隊的士兵在大屠殺前的幾個月裏是如何受到殘酷對待的。 麥克納馬拉二十歲的兒子克雷格反對戰爭,他打電話給我,說他在父親的客廳裏留下了一本雜誌。 後來他在壁爐裏發現了它。 麥克納馬拉離開公共生活後,他開展了反對核武器的運動,並試圖為自己在越南戰爭中所扮演的角色贏得赦免。 他在 1995 年的回憶錄《回顧:越南的悲劇和教訓》中承認,這場戰爭是一場“災難”,但他很少對給越南人民造成的傷害表示遺憾。
以及像保羅·米德洛這樣的美國士兵。 “我對自己的成就感到非常自豪,但我對在完成任務的過程中犯下的錯誤感到非常抱歉,”他在 2003 年上映的紀錄片《戰爭迷霧》中對電影製片人埃羅爾·莫裏斯說道。
麥克納馬拉在五角大樓任職期間的解密文件顯示,麥克納馬拉在給約翰遜總統的私人報告中多次表達了對這場戰爭的懷疑。 但他從未在公開場合表達過任何懷疑或悲觀情緒。 克雷格·麥克納馬拉告訴我,在他臨終前,他的父親“說他覺得上帝拋棄了他”。 悲劇不僅是他一個人的。
*本文的早期版本錯誤地描述了尼爾·希恩 (Neil Sheehan) 擔任記者的組織。
**帕拉佐對其兵役的描述受到質疑。
發表於 2015 年 3 月 30 日的印刷版。
Seymour M. Hersh 於 1971 年為《紐約客》撰寫了他的第一篇文章,並自 1993 年以來一直是該雜誌的定期撰稿人。
The Scene of the Crime
By Seymour M. Hersh March 23, 2015
Pham Thanh Cong, the director of the My Lai Museum, was eleven at the time of the massacre. His mother and four siblings died. “We forgive, but we do not forget,” he said.Photograph by Katie Orlinsky
There is a long ditch in the village of My Lai. On the morning of March 16, 1968, it was crowded with the bodies of the dead—dozens of women, children, and old people, all gunned down by young American soldiers. Now, forty-seven years later, the ditch at My Lai seems wider than I remember from the news photographs of the slaughter: erosion and time doing their work. During the Vietnam War, there was a rice paddy nearby, but it has been paved over to make My Lai more accessible to the thousands of tourists who come each year to wander past the modest markers describing the terrible event. The My Lai massacre was a pivotal moment in that misbegotten war: an American contingent of about a hundred soldiers, known as Charlie Company, having received poor intelligence, and thinking that they would encounter Vietcong troops or sympathizers, discovered only a peaceful village at breakfast. Nevertheless, the soldiers of Charlie Company raped women, burned houses, and turned their M-16s on the unarmed civilians of My Lai. Among the leaders of the assault was Lieutenant William L. Calley, a junior-college dropout from Miami.
By early 1969, most of the members of Charlie Company had completed their tours and returned home. I was then a thirty-two-year-old freelance reporter in Washington, D.C. Determined to understand how young men—boys, really—could have done this, I spent weeks pursuing them. In many cases, they talked openly and, for the most part, honestly with me, describing what they did at My Lai and how they planned to live with the memory of it.
In testimony before an Army inquiry, some of the soldiers acknowledged being at the ditch but claimed that they had disobeyed Calley, who was ordering them to kill. They said that one of the main shooters, along with Calley himself, had been Private First Class Paul Meadlo. The truth remains elusive, but one G.I. described to me a moment that most of his fellow-soldiers, I later learned, remembered vividly. At Calley’s order, Meadlo and others had fired round after round into the ditch and tossed in a few grenades.
Then came a high-pitched whining, which grew louder as a two- or three-year-old boy, covered with mud and blood, crawled his way among the bodies and scrambled toward the rice paddy. His mother had likely protected him with her body. Calley saw what was happening and, according to the witnesses, ran after the child, dragged him back to the ditch, threw him in, and shot him.
The morning after the massacre, Meadlo stepped on a land mine while on a routine patrol, and his right foot was blown off. While waiting to be evacuated to a field hospital by helicopter, he condemned Calley. “God will punish you for what you made me do,” a G.I. recalled Meadlo saying.
“Get him on the helicopter!” Calley shouted.
Meadlo went on cursing at Calley until the helicopter arrived.
Meadlo had grown up in farm country in western Indiana. After a long time spent dropping dimes into a pay phone and calling information operators across the state, I found a Meadlo family listed in New Goshen, a small town near Terre Haute. A woman who turned out to be Paul’s mother, Myrtle, answered the phone. I said that I was a reporter and was writing about Vietnam. I asked how Paul was doing, and wondered if I could come and speak to him the next day. She told me I was welcome to try.
The Meadlos lived in a small house with clapboard siding on a ramshackle chicken farm. When I pulled up in my rental car, Myrtle came out to greet me and said that Paul was inside, though she had no idea whether he would talk or what he might say. It was clear that he had not told her much about Vietnam. Then Myrtle said something that summed up a war that I had grown to hate: “I sent them a good boy and they made him a murderer.”
Meadlo invited me in and agreed to talk. He was twenty-two. He had married before leaving for Vietnam, and he and his wife had a two-and-a-half-year-old son and an infant daughter. Despite his injury, he worked a factory job to support the family. I asked him to show me his wound and to tell me about the treatment. He took off his prosthesis and described what he’d been through. It did not take long for the conversation to turn to My Lai. Meadlo talked and talked, clearly desperate to regain some self-respect. With little emotion, he described Calley’s orders to kill. He did not justify what he had done at My Lai, except that the killings “did take a load off my conscience,” because of “the buddies we’d lost. It was just revenge, that’s all it was.”
Meadlo recounted his actions in bland, appalling detail. “There was supposed to have been some Vietcong in [My Lai] and we began to make a sweep through it,” he told me. “Once we got there we began gathering up the people . . . started putting them in big mobs. There must have been about forty or forty-five civilians standing in one big circle in the middle of the village. . . . Calley told me and a couple of other guys to watch them.” Calley, as he recalled, came back ten minutes later and told him, “Get with it. I want them dead.” From about ten or fifteen feet away, Meadlo said, Calley “started shooting them. Then he told me to start shooting them. . . . I started to shoot them, but the other guys wouldn’t do it. So we”—Meadlo and Calley—“went ahead and killed them.” Meadlo estimated that he had killed fifteen people in the circle. “We all were under orders,” he said. “We all thought we were doing the right thing. At the time it didn’t bother me.” There was official testimony showing that Meadlo had in fact been extremely distressed by Calley’s order. After being told by Calley to “take care of this group,” one Charlie Company soldier recounted, Meadlo and a fellow-soldier “were actually playing with the kids, telling the people where to sit down and giving the kids candy.” When Calley returned and said that he wanted them dead, the soldier said, “Meadlo just looked at him like he couldn’t believe it. He says, ‘Waste them?’ ” When Calley said yes, another soldier testified, Meadlo and Calley “opened up and started firing.” But then Meadlo “started to cry.”
Mike Wallace, of CBS, was interested in my interview, and Meadlo agreed to tell his story again, on national television. I spent the night before the show on a couch in the Meadlo home and flew to New York the next morning with Meadlo and his wife. There was time to talk, and I learned that Meadlo had spent weeks in recovery and rehabilitation at an Army hospital in Japan. Once he came home, he said nothing about his experiences in Vietnam. One night, shortly after his return, his wife woke up to hysterical crying in one of the children’s rooms. She rushed in and found Paul violently shaking the child.
I’d been tipped off about My Lai by Geoffrey Cowan, a young antiwar lawyer in Washington, D.C. Cowan had little specific information, but he’d heard that an unnamed G.I. had gone crazy and killed scores of Vietnamese civilians. Three years earlier, while I was covering the Pentagon for the Associated Press, I had been told by officers returning from the war about the killing of Vietnamese civilians that was going on. One day, while pursuing Cowan’s tip, I ran into a young Army colonel whom I’d known on the Pentagon beat. He had been wounded in the leg in Vietnam and, while recovering, learned that he was to be promoted to general. He now worked in an office that had day-to-day responsibility for the war. When I asked him what he knew about the unnamed G.I., he gave me a sharp, angry look, and began whacking his hand against his knee. “That boy Calley didn’t shoot anyone higher than this,” he said.
I had a name. In a local library, I found a brief story buried in the Times about a Lieutenant Calley who had been charged by the Army with the murder of an unspecified number of civilians in South Vietnam. I tracked down Calley, whom the Army had hidden away in senior officers’ quarters at Fort Benning, in Columbus, Georgia. By then, someone in the Army had allowed me to read and take notes from a classified charge sheet accusing Calley of the premeditated murder of a hundred and nine “Oriental human beings.”
Calley hardly seemed satanic. He was a slight, nervous man in his mid-twenties, with pale, almost translucent skin. He tried hard to seem tough. Over many beers, he told me how he and his soldiers had engaged and killed the enemy at My Lai in a fiercely contested firefight. We talked through the night. At one point, Calley excused himself, to go to the bathroom. He left the door partly open, and I could see that he was vomiting blood.
In November, 1969, I wrote five articles about Calley, Meadlo, and the massacre. I had gone to Life and Look with no success, so I turned instead to a small antiwar news agency in Washington, the Dispatch News Service. It was a time of growing anxiety and unrest. Richard Nixon had won the 1968 election by promising to end the war, but his real plan was to win it, through escalation and secret bombing. In 1969, as many as fifteen hundred American soldiers were being killed every month—almost the same as the year before.
Combat reporters such as Homer Bigart, Bernard Fall, David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, Malcolm Browne, Frances FitzGerald, Gloria Emerson, Morley Safer, and Ward Just filed countless dispatches from the field that increasingly made plain that the war was morally groundless, strategically lost, and nothing like what the military and political officials were describing to the public in Saigon and in Washington. On November 15, 1969, two days after the publication of my first My Lai dispatch, an antiwar march in Washington drew half a million people. H. R. Haldeman, Nixon’s most trusted aide, and his enforcer, took notes in the Oval Office that were made public eighteen years later. They revealed that on December 1, 1969, at the height of the outcry over Paul Meadlo’s revelations, Nixon approved the use of “dirty tricks” to discredit a key witness to the massacre. When, in 1971, an Army jury convicted Calley of mass murder and sentenced him to life at hard labor, Nixon intervened, ordering Calley to be released from an Army prison and placed under house arrest pending review. Calley was freed three months after Nixon left office and spent the ensuing years working in his father-in-law’s jewelry store, in Columbus, Georgia, and offering self-serving interviews to journalists willing to pay for them. Finally, in 2009, in a speech to a Kiwanis Club, he said that there “is not a day that goes by that I do not feel remorse” for My Lai, but that he was following orders—“foolishly, I guess.” Calley is now seventy-one. He is the only officer to have been convicted for his role in the My Lai massacre.
In March, 1970, an Army investigation filed charges ranging from murder to dereliction of duty against fourteen officers, including generals and colonels, who were accused of covering up the massacre. Only one officer besides Calley eventually faced court-martial, and he was found not guilty.
“It’s too late to call them —they’ll be sound asleep. They live in Connecticut!”
A couple of months later, at the height of widespread campus protests against the war—protests that included the killing of four students by National Guardsmen in Ohio—I went to Macalester College, in St. Paul, Minnesota, to give a speech against the war. Hubert Humphrey, who had been Lyndon Johnson’s loyal Vice-President, was now a professor of political science at the college. He had lost to Nixon, in the 1968 election, partly because he could not separate himself from L.B.J.’s Vietnam policy. After my speech, Humphrey asked to talk to me. “I’ve no problem with you, Mr. Hersh,” he said. “You were doing your job and you did it well. But, as for those kids who march around saying, ‘Hey, hey, L.B.J., how many kids did you kill today?’ ” Humphrey’s fleshy, round face reddened, and his voice grew louder with every phrase. “I say, ‘Fuck ’em, fuck ’em, fuck ’em.’ ”
Ivisited My Lai (as the hamlet was called by the U.S. Army) for the first time a few months ago, with my family. Returning to the scene of the crime is the stuff of cliché for reporters of a certain age, but I could not resist. I had sought permission from the South Vietnamese government in early 1970, but by then the Pentagon’s internal investigation was under way and the area was closed to outsiders. I joined the Times in 1972 and visited Hanoi, in North Vietnam. In 1980, five years after the fall of Saigon, I travelled again to Vietnam to conduct interviews for a book and to do more reporting for the Times. I thought I knew all, or most, of what there was to learn about the massacre. Of course, I was wrong.
My Lai is in central Vietnam, not far from Highway 1, the road that connects Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, as Saigon is now known. Pham Thanh Cong, the director of the My Lai Museum, is a survivor of the massacre. When we first met, Cong, a stern, stocky man in his late fifties, said little about his personal experiences and stuck to stilted, familiar phrases. He described the Vietnamese as “a welcoming people,” and he avoided any note of accusation. “We forgive, but we do not forget,” he said. Later, as we sat on a bench outside the small museum, he described the massacre, as he remembered it. At the time, Cong was eleven years old. When American helicopters landed in the village, he said, he and his mother and four siblings huddled in a primitive bunker inside their thatch-roofed home. American soldiers ordered them out of the bunker and then pushed them back in, throwing a hand grenade in after them and firing their M-16s. Cong was wounded in three places—on his scalp, on the right side of his torso, and in the leg. He passed out. When he awoke, he found himself in a heap of corpses: his mother, his three sisters, and his six-year-old brother. The American soldiers must have assumed that Cong was dead, too. In the afternoon, when the American helicopters left, his father and a few other surviving villagers, who had come to bury the dead, found him.
Later, at lunch with my family and me, Cong said, “I will never forget the pain.” And in his job he can never leave it behind. Cong told me that a few years earlier a veteran named Kenneth Schiel, who had been at My Lai, had visited the museum—the only member of Charlie Company at that point to have done so—as a participant in an Al Jazeera television documentary marking the fortieth anniversary of the massacre. Schiel had enlisted in the Army after graduation from high school, in Swartz Creek, Michigan, a small town near Flint, and, after the subsequent investigations, he was charged with killing nine villagers. (The charges were dismissed.)
The documentary featured a conversation with Cong, who had been told that Schiel was a Vietnam veteran, but not that he had been at My Lai. In the video, Schiel tells an interviewer, “Did I shoot? I’ll say that I shot until I realized what was wrong. I’m not going to say whether I shot villagers or not.” He was even less forthcoming in a conversation with Cong, after it became clear that he had participated in the massacre. Schiel says repeatedly that he wants to “apologize to the people of My Lai,” but he refuses to go further. “I ask myself all the time why did this happen. I don’t know.”
Cong demands, “How did you feel when you shot into civilians and killed? Was it hard for you?” Schiel says that he wasn’t among the soldiers who were shooting groups of civilians. Cong responds, “So maybe you came to my house and killed my relatives.”
Cong rebuffs him. “It would be too shameful,” he says, adding, “The local people will be very angry if they realize that you were the person who took part in the massacre.”
Before leaving the museum, I asked Cong why he had been so unyielding with Schiel. His face hardened. He said that he had no interest in easing the pain of a My Lai veteran who refused to own up fully to what he had done. Cong’s father, who worked for the Vietcong, lived with Cong after the massacre, but he was killed in action, in 1970, by an American combat unit. Cong went to live with relatives in a nearby village, helping them raise cattle. Finally, after the war, he was able to return to school.
“I think I’ve just met my soul mate.”
There was more to learn from the comprehensive statistics that Cong and the museum staff had compiled. The names and ages of the dead are engraved on a marble plaque that dominates one of the exhibit rooms. The museum’s count, no longer in dispute, is five hundred and four victims, from two hundred and forty-seven families. Twenty-four families were obliterated—–three generations murdered, with no survivors. Among the dead were a hundred and eighty-two women, seventeen of them pregnant. A hundred and seventy-three children were executed, including fifty-six infants. Sixty older men died. The museum’s accounting included another important fact: the victims of the massacre that day were not only in My Lai (also known as My Lai 4) but also in a sister settlement known to the Americans as My Khe 4. This settlement, a mile or so to the east, on the South China Sea, was assaulted by another contingent of U.S. soldiers, Bravo Company. The museum lists four hundred and seven victims in My Lai 4 and ninety-seven in My Khe 4.
The message was clear: what happened at My Lai 4 was not singular, not an aberration; it was replicated, in lesser numbers, by Bravo Company. Bravo was attached to the same unit—Task Force Barker—as Charlie Company. The assaults were by far the most important operation carried out that day by any combat unit in the Americal Division, which Task Force Barker was attached to. The division’s senior leadership, including its commander, Major General Samuel Koster, flew in and out of the area throughout the day to check its progress.
There was an ugly context to this. By 1967, the war was going badly in the South Vietnamese provinces of Quang Ngai, Quang Nam, and Quang Tri, which were known for their independence from the government in Saigon, and their support for the Vietcong and North Vietnam. Quang Tri was one of the most heavily bombed provinces in the country. American warplanes drenched all three provinces with defoliating chemicals, including Agent Orange.
On my recent trip, I spent five days in Hanoi, which is the capital of unified Vietnam. Retired military officers and Communist Party officials there told me that the My Lai massacre, by bolstering antiwar dissent inside America, helped North Vietnam win the war. I was also told, again and again, that My Lai was unique only in its size. The most straightforward assessment came from Nguyen Thi Binh, known to everyone in Vietnam as Madame Binh. In the early seventies, she was the head of the National Liberation Front delegation at the Paris peace talks and became widely known for her willingness to speak bluntly and for her striking good looks. Madame Binh, who is eighty-seven, retired from public life in 2002, after serving two terms as Vietnam’s Vice-President, but she remains involved in war-related charities dealing with Agent Orange victims and the disabled.
“I’ll be honest with you,” she said. “My Lai became important in America only after it was reported by an American.” Within weeks of the massacre, a spokesman for the North Vietnamese in Paris had publicly described the events, but the story was assumed to be propaganda. “I remember it well, because the antiwar movement in America grew because of it,” Madame Binh added, speaking in French. “But in Vietnam there was not only one My Lai—there were many.”
One morning in Danang, a beach resort and port city of about a million people, I had coffee with Vo Cao Loi, one of the few survivors of Bravo Company’s attack at My Khe 4. He was fifteen at the time, Loi said, through an interpreter. His mother had what she called “a bad feeling” when she heard helicopters approaching the village. There had been operations in the area before. “It was not just like some Americans would show up all of a sudden,” he said. “Before they came, they often fired artillery and bombed the area, and then after all that they would send in the ground forces.” American and South Vietnamese Army units had moved through the area many times with no incident, but this time Loi was shooed out of the village by his mother moments before the attack. His two older brothers were fighting with the Vietcong, and one had been killed in combat six days earlier. “I think she was afraid because I was almost a grown boy and if I stayed I could be beaten up or forced to join the South Vietnamese Army. I went to the river, about fifty metres away. Close, close enough: I heard the fire and the screaming.” Loi stayed hidden until evening, when he returned home to bury his mother and other relatives.
Two days later, Vietcong troops took Loi to a headquarters in the mountains to the west. He was too young to fight, but he was brought before Vietcong combat units operating throughout Quang Ngai to describe what the Americans had done at My Khe. The goal was to inspire the guerrilla forces to fight harder. Loi eventually joined the Vietcong and served at the military command until the end of the war. American surveillance planes and troops were constantly searching for his unit. “We moved the headquarters every time we thought the Americans were getting close,” Loi told me. “Whoever worked in headquarters had to be absolutely loyal. There were three circles on the inside: the outer one was for suppliers, a second one was for those who worked in maintenance and logistics, and the inner one was for the commanders. Only division commanders could stay in the inner circle. When they did leave the headquarters, they would dress as normal soldiers, so one would never know. They went into nearby villages. There were cases when Americans killed our division officers, but they did not know who they were.” As with the U.S. Army, Loi said, Vietcong officers often motivated their soldiers by inflating the number of enemy combatants they had killed.
“Spring? What do I care? I’m fixed.”
The massacres at My Lai and My Khe, terrible as they were, mobilized support for the war against the Americans, Loi said. Asked if he could understand why such war crimes were tolerated by the American command, Loi said he did not know, but he had a dark view of the quality of U.S. leadership in central Vietnam. “The American generals had to take responsibility for the actions of the soldiers,” he told me. “The soldiers take orders, and they were just doing their duty.”
Loi said that he still grieves for his family, and he has nightmares about the massacre. But, unlike Pham Thanh Cong, he found a surrogate family almost immediately: “The Vietcong loved me and took care of me. They raised me.” I told Loi about Cong’s anger at Kenneth Schiel, and Loi said, “Even if others do terrible things to you, you can forgive it and move toward the future.” After the war, Loi transferred to the regular Vietnamese Army. He eventually became a full colonel and retired after thirty-eight years of service. He and his wife now own a coffee shop in Danang.
Almost seventy per cent of the population of Vietnam is under the age of forty, and although the war remains an issue mainly for the older generations, American tourists are a boon to the economy. If American G.I.s committed atrocities, well, so did the French and the Chinese in other wars. Diplomatically, the U.S. is considered a friend, a potential ally against China. Thousands of Vietnamese who worked for or with the Americans during the Vietnam War fled to the United States in 1975. Some of their children have confounded their parents by returning to Communist Vietnam, despite its many ills, from rampant corruption to aggressive government censorship.
Nguyen Qui Duc, a fifty-seven-year-old writer and journalist who runs a popular bar and restaurant in Hanoi, fled to America in 1975 when he was seventeen. Thirty-one years later, he returned. In San Francisco, he was a prize-winning journalist and documentary filmmaker, but, as he told me, “I’d always wanted to come back and live in Vietnam. I felt unfinished leaving home at seventeen and living as someone else in the United States. I was grateful for the opportunities in America, but I needed a sense of community. I came to Hanoi for the first time as a reporter for National Public Radio, and fell in love with it.”
Duc told me that, like many Vietnamese, he had learned to accept the American brutality in the war. “American soldiers committed atrocious acts, but in war such things happen,” he said. “And it’s a fact that the Vietnamese cannot own up to their own acts of brutality in the war. We Vietnamese have a practical attitude: better forget a bad enemy if you can gain a needed friend.”
During the war, Duc’s father, Nguyen Van Dai, was a deputy governor in South Vietnam. He was seized by the Vietcong in 1968 and imprisoned until 1980. In 1984, Duc, with the help of an American diplomat, successfully petitioned the government to allow his parents to emigrate to California; Duc had not seen his father for sixteen years. He told me of his anxiety as he waited for him at the airport. His father had suffered terribly in isolation in a Communist prison near the Chinese border; he was often unable to move his limbs. Would he be in a wheelchair, or mentally unstable? Duc’s father arrived in California during a Democratic Presidential primary. He walked off the plane and greeted his son. “How’s Jesse Jackson doing?” he said. He found a job as a social worker and lived for sixteen more years.
Some American veterans of the war have returned to Vietnam to live. Chuck Palazzo grew up in a troubled family on Arthur Avenue in the Bronx and, after dropping out of high school, enlisted in the Marines. In the fall of 1970, after a year of training, he was assigned to an élite reconnaissance unit whose mission was to confirm intelligence and to ambush enemy missile sites and combat units at night. He and his men sometimes parachuted in under fire. “I was involved in a lot of intense combat with many North Vietnamese regulars as well as Vietcong, and I lost a lot of friends,” Palazzo told me over a drink in Danang, where he now lives and works. “But the gung ho left when I was still here. I started to read and understand the politics of the war, and one of my officers was privately agreeing with me that what we were doing there was wrong and senseless. The officer told me, ‘Watch your ass and get the hell out of here.’ ”
Palazzo first arrived in Danang in 1970, on a charter flight, and he could see coffins lined up on the field as the plane taxied in. “It was only then that I realized I was in a war,” he said. “Thirteen months later, I was standing in line, again at Danang, to get on the plane taking me home, but my name was not on the manifest.” After some scrambling, Palazzo said, “I was told that if I wanted to go home that day the only way out was to escort a group of coffins flying to America on a C-141 cargo plane.” So that’s what he did.
After leaving the Marines, Palazzo earned a college degree and began a career as an I.T. specialist. But, like many vets, he came “back to the world” with post-traumatic stress disorder and struggled with addictions. His marriage collapsed. He lost various jobs. In 2006, Palazzo made a “selfish” decision to return to Ho Chi Minh City. “It was all about me dealing with P.T.S.D. and confronting my own ghosts,” he said. “My first visit became a love affair with the Vietnamese.” Palazzo wanted to do all he could for the victims of Agent Orange. For years, the Veterans Administration, citing the uncertainty of evidence, refused to recognize a link between Agent Orange and the ailments, including cancers, of many who were exposed to it. “In the war, the company commander told us it was mosquito spray, but we could see that all the trees and vegetation were destroyed,” Palazzo said. “It occurred to me that, if American vets were getting something, some help and compensation, why not the Vietnamese?” Palazzo, who moved to Danang in 2007, is now an I.T. consultant and the leader of a local branch of Veterans for Peace, an American antiwar N.G.O. He remains active in the Agent Orange Action Group, which seeks international support to cope with the persistent effects of the defoliant.*
In Hanoi, I met Chuck Searcy, a tall, gray-haired man of seventy who grew up in Georgia. Searcy’s father had been taken prisoner by the Germans in the Battle of the Bulge, and it never occurred to Searcy to avoid Vietnam. “I thought President Johnson and the Congress knew what we were doing in Vietnam,” he told me. In 1966, Searcy quit college and enlisted. He was an intelligence analyst, in a unit that was situated near the airport in Saigon, and which processed and evaluated American analyses and reports.
“Within three months, all the ideals I had as a patriotic Georgia boy were shattered, and I began to question who we were as a nation,” Searcy said. “The intelligence I was seeing amounted to a big intellectual lie.” The South Vietnamese clearly thought little of the intelligence the Americans were passing along. At one point, a colleague bought fish at a market in Saigon and noticed that it was wrapped in one of his unit’s classified reports. “By the time I left, in June of 1968,” Searcy said, “I was angry and bitter.”
Searcy finished his Army tour in Europe. His return home was a disaster. “My father heard me talk about the war and he was incredulous. Had I turned into a Communist? He said that he and my mother don’t ‘know who you are anymore. You’re not an American.’ Then they told me to get out.” Searcy went on to graduate from the University of Georgia, and edited a weekly newspaper in Athens, Georgia. He then began a career in politics and public policy that included working as an aide to Wyche Fowler, a Georgia Democratic congressman.
In 1992, Searcy returned to Vietnam and eventually decided to join the few other veterans who had moved there. “I knew, even as I was flying out of Vietnam in 1968, that someday, somehow, I would return, hopefully in a time of peace. I felt even back then that I was abandoning the Vietnamese to a terribly tragic fate, for which we Americans were mostly responsible. That sentiment never quite left me.” Searcy worked with a program that dealt with mine clearance. The U.S. dropped three times the number of bombs by weight in Vietnam as it had during the Second World War. Between the end of the war and 1998, more than a hundred thousand Vietnamese civilians, an estimated forty per cent of them children, had been killed or injured by unexploded ordnance. For more than two decades after the war, the U.S. refused to pay for damage done by bombs or by Agent Orange, though in 1996 the government began to provide modest funding for mine clearance. From 2001 to 2011, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund also helped finance the mine-clearance program. “A lot of veterans felt we should assume some responsibility,” Searcy said. The program helped educate Vietnamese, especially farmers and children, about the dangers posed by the unexploded weapons, and casualties have diminished.
Searcy said that his early disillusionment with the war was validated shortly before its end. His father called to ask if they could have coffee. They hadn’t spoken since he was ordered out of the house. “He and my mother had been talking,” Searcy said. “And he told me, ‘We think you were right and we were wrong. We want you to come home.’ ” He went home almost immediately, he said, and remained close to his parents until they died. Searcy is twice divorced, and wrote, in a self-deprecating e-mail, “I have resisted the kind efforts of the Vietnamese to get me married off again.”
There was more to learn in Vietnam. By early 1969, most of the members of Charlie Company were back home in America or reassigned to other combat units. The coverup was working. By then, however, a courageous Army veteran named Ronald Ridenhour had written a detailed letter about the “dark and bloody” massacre and mailed copies of it to thirty government officials and members of Congress. Within weeks, the letter found its way to the American military headquarters in Vietnam.
On my recent visit to Hanoi, a government official asked me to pay a courtesy call at the provincial offices in the city of Quang Ngai before driving the few miles to My Lai. There I was presented with a newly published guidebook to the province, which included a detailed description of another purported American massacre during the war, in the hamlet of Truong Le, outside Quang Ngai. According to the report, an Army platoon on a search-and-destroy operation arrived at Truong Le at seven in the morning on April 18, 1969, a little more than a year after My Lai. The soldiers pulled women and children out of their houses and then torched the village. Three hours later, the report alleges, the soldiers returned to Truong Le and killed forty-one children and twenty-two women, leaving only nine survivors.
Little, it seemed, had changed in the aftermath of My Lai.
In 1998, a few weeks before the thirtieth anniversary of the My Lai massacre, a retired Pentagon official, W. Donald Stewart, gave me a copy of an unpublished report from August, 1967, showing that most American troops in South Vietnam did not understand their responsibilities under the Geneva Conventions. Stewart was then the chief of the investigations division of the Directorate of Inspection Services, at the Pentagon. His report, which involved months of travel and hundreds of interviews, was prepared at the request of Robert McNamara, who was Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Stewart’s report said that many of the soldiers interviewed “felt they were at liberty to substitute their own judgment for the clear provisions of the Conventions. . . . It was primarily the young and inexperienced troops who stated they would maltreat or kill prisoners, despite having just received instructions” on international law.
McNamara left the Pentagon in February, 1968, and the report was never released. Stewart later told me that he understood why the report was suppressed: “People were sending their eighteen-year-olds over there, and we didn’t want them to find out that they were cutting off ears. I came back from South Vietnam thinking that things were out of control. . . . I understood Calley—very much so.”
“I love fruit.”
It turns out that Robert McNamara did, too. I knew nothing of the Stewart study while I was reporting on My Lai in late 1969, but I did learn that McNamara had been put on notice years earlier about the bloody abuses in central Vietnam. After the first of my My Lai stories was published, Jonathan Schell, a young writer for The New Yorker, who in 1968 had published a devastating account for the magazine of the incessant bombing in Quang Ngai and a nearby province, called me. (Schell died last year.) His article—which later became a book, “The Military Half”—demonstrated, in essence, that the U.S. military, convinced that the Vietcong were entrenched in central Vietnam and attracting serious support, made little distinction between combatants and noncombatants in the area that included My Lai.
Schell had returned from South Vietnam, in 1967, devastated by what he had seen. He came from an eminent New York family, and his father, a Wall Street attorney and a patron of the arts, was a neighbor, in Martha’s Vineyard, of Jerome Wiesner, the former science adviser to President John F. Kennedy. Wiesner, then the provost of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was also involved with McNamara in a project to build an electronic barrier that would prevent the North Vietnamese from sending matériel south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. (The barrier was never completed.) Schell told Wiesner what he had seen in Vietnam, and Wiesner, who shared his dismay, arranged for him to talk with McNamara.
Soon afterward, Schell discussed his observations with McNamara, in Washington. Schell told me that he was uncomfortable about giving the government a report before writing his article, but he felt that it had to be done. McNamara agreed that their meeting would remain secret, and he said that he would do nothing to impede Schell’s work. He also provided Schell with an office in the Pentagon where he could dictate his notes. Two copies were made, and McNamara said that he would use his set to begin an inquiry into the abuses that Schell had described.
Schell’s story was published early the next year. He heard nothing more from McNamara, and there was no public sign of any change in policy. Then came my articles on My Lai, and Schell called McNamara, who had since left the Pentagon to become president of the World Bank. He reminded him that he had left him a detailed accounting of atrocities in the My Lai area. Now, Schell told me, he thought it was important to write about their meeting. McNamara said that they had agreed it was off the record and insisted that Schell honor the commitment. Schell asked me for advice. I wanted him to do the story, of course, but told him that if he really had made an off-the-record pact with McNamara he had no choice but to honor it.
Schell kept his word. In a memorial essay on McNamara in The Nation, in 2009, he described his visit to McNamara but did not mention their extraordinary agreement. Fifteen years after the meeting, Schell wrote, he learned from Neil Sheehan, the brilliant war reporter for the United Press International**, the Times and The New Yorker, and the author of “A Bright Shining Lie,” that McNamara had sent Schell’s notes to Ellsworth Bunker, the American Ambassador in Saigon. Apparently unknown to McNamara, the goal in Saigon was not to investigate Schell’s allegations but to discredit his reporting and do everything possible to prevent publication of the material.
A few months after my newspaper articles appeared, Harper’s published an excerpt from a book I’d been writing, to be titled “My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath.” The excerpt provided a far more detailed account of what had happened, emphasizing how the soldiers in Lieutenant Calley’s company had become brutalized in the months leading up to the massacre. McNamara’s twenty-year-old son, Craig, who opposed the war, called me and said that he had left a copy of the magazine in his father’s sitting room. He later found it in the fireplace. After McNamara left public life, he campaigned against nuclear arms and tried to win absolution for his role in the Vietnam War. He acknowledged in a 1995 memoir, “In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam,” that the war had been a “disaster,” but he rarely expressed regrets about the damage that was done to the Vietnamese people and to American soldiers like Paul Meadlo. “I’m very proud of my accomplishments, and I’m very sorry that in the process of accomplishing things I’ve made errors,” he told the filmmaker Errol Morris in “The Fog of War,” a documentary released in 2003.
Declassified documents from McNamara’s years in the Pentagon reveal that McNamara repeatedly expressed skepticism about the war in his private reports to President Johnson. But he never articulated any doubt or pessimism in public. Craig McNamara told me that on his deathbed his father “said he felt that God had abandoned him.” The tragedy was not only his. ♦
*An earlier version of this article misstated the organization for which Neil Sheehan was a reporter.
**Doubt has been cast on Palazzo’s account of his military service.