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采訪烏克蘭武裝部隊總司令瓦列裏·紮盧日尼將軍
https://www.economist.com/zaluzhny-transcript
編輯了我們談話的要點
2022 年 4 月 24 日，烏克蘭基輔：烏克蘭武裝部隊總司令瓦列裏·紮盧日尼（左）出席與美國國務卿托尼·布林肯和美國國防部長勞埃德·奧斯汀的麵對麵會議。 由烏克蘭總統弗拉基米爾·澤連斯基於 2022 年 4 月 24 日在烏克蘭基輔主辦。 奧斯汀和布林肯是自俄羅斯入侵以來訪問基輔的美國最高級別官員。
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2022 年 12 月 15 日
這些是我們於 2022 年 12 月 3 日采訪瓦列裏·紮盧日尼 (Valery Zaluzhny) 將軍的采訪要點。他首先講述了他對戰爭的個人看法。 （您還可以閱讀我們對烏克蘭總統弗拉基米爾·澤倫斯基的采訪的編輯摘要。）
Valery Zaluzhny：對於我們、對於軍隊來說，戰爭始於 2014 年。對於我個人來說，戰爭始於 2014 年 7 月。我不知道 2014 年的戰爭到底是什麽。
我讀了很多書，我以金牌的身份從所有的學院畢業，我從理論上理解了一切，但我不明白戰爭的真正含義。 但在八年的戰爭中，直到2022年，我和像我這樣的人都非常清楚這一切。
當大規模侵略開始時，我們所做的不僅是運用我們在 2014 年已經擁有的知識，還有我們從那時起獲得的技能和經驗。 我們擁有的最重要的經驗以及我們幾乎像宗教一樣實踐的經驗是，俄羅斯人和任何其他敵人都必須被殺死，隻是被殺死，最重要的是，我們不應該害怕這樣做。 這就是我們正在做的事情。
2月24日發生的一切隻是規模的擴大。 在此之前，我們的戰線長403公裏，據點232個。 到 2 月 24 日，戰線長度已增至 2,500 公裏。 我們的力量相對較小，但我們參與了。 當然，我們也明白我們的實力還不夠。 我們的任務是分配我們的小部隊，以便使用非常規戰術來阻止進攻。
經濟學人：作為一名指揮官，您有何獨特之處？
VZ：蘇聯軍隊歡迎並強製執行一個概念：指揮官。 但當指揮官和當領導者是不一樣的。 恕我直言，蘇羅維金先生（俄羅斯駐烏克蘭軍隊的指揮官），如果你看他，你會發現他是彼得大帝時代的一位普通彼得羅維派指揮官，容我們說，一個德日莫達（果戈理《政府》中的殘酷的馬丁內特） 檢查員”]。
你看著他，明白要麽你完成任務，要麽你就完蛋了。 我們很早就意識到這是行不通的。 我們在 2014 年尤其意識到了這一點，當時 21 歲的中尉開始指揮 50 多歲和 60 多歲的士兵。 當然，我們有自己的德誌莫達，他們試圖用拳頭和二頭肌來維持秩序，但這在烏克蘭軍隊中並不是100%有效……一切都可能是正常的。 保持正常意味著在任何情況下都保持人性——這是最重要的。 保持人性，成為領導者。 變得更聰明，變得更強大，變得更有才華，在這種情況下，嚐試管理人員。 這是我信奉的宗教。
更多關於烏克蘭日益增長的威脅
• 烏克蘭高級士兵管理著一支與俄羅斯不同類型的軍隊
• 弗拉基米爾·澤連斯基的幕僚長談如何結束烏克蘭戰爭
• 弗拉基米爾·澤連斯基和他的將軍們接受《經濟學人》采訪
• 俄羅斯的攻勢迫在眉睫
TE：這是否意味著您會聽取官員的意見並鼓勵他們的主動性？
VZ：我信任我的將軍們。 自從戰爭開始以來，我解雇了其中十個人，因為他們無法勝任。 另一人開槍自殺。 我信任希爾斯基（烏克蘭陸軍司令亞曆山大·希爾斯基將軍）。 如果他告訴我他需要另一個旅，那就意味著他確實需要另一個旅。 我當然不認為我是這裏最聰明的人。 我必須並且確實聽取了現場人士的意見。 因為主動權就在那裏。
TE：誰是你的軍事榜樣？
VZ：把頭轉向左邊。 其中有一幅已故的亨納季·彼得羅維奇·沃羅比約夫（Hennadiy Petrovich Vorobyov）（2009 年至 2014 年烏克蘭地麵部隊司令）的肖像。 他是一個在軍隊中備受尊敬的人。 為什麽我這裏有它？ 當我放鬆的時候，當事情進展順利的時候，這張照片通常是麵朝下躺著的，我不需要看它。 當我對某件事有疑問時，我會直接提出來。 我轉身看著它，試圖弄清楚亨納迪·沃羅比約夫在這種情況下會做什麽。 這是一個已經成功的人。 這是一個過得很艱難的人，因為他幫助了所有人。 每個人。 他認識武裝部隊中的每個人，他們的妻子、孩子、侄子等等。
他認識武裝部隊中的每個人，他們的妻子、孩子、侄子等等。 這對他來說很難，但他扛起了這個沉重的擔子。 這就是模型。
TE：照片現在已經放上來了。
VZ：是的。 有很多疑問。
TE：什麽樣的？
VZ：我們通過多次行動已經認識到，最主要的是不要害怕這個敵人。 它可以戰鬥，而且必須在今天、此時此地戰鬥。 決不應該推遲到明天，因為會出現問題。 為了實現這一目標，您需要資源。 就像俄羅斯人一樣，當我們計劃某件事時，我們必須擁有實現它的資源。 然後，如果你的立場正確並且做出正確的決定，你就可以期待正確的結果。
俄羅斯人長期以來一直在積累資源。 據我推算，他們用了三年半或四年的時間，集中建造了人員、裝備、彈藥。 我認為他們有三個月的資源來實現他們的目標。 他們耗盡了這些資源，浪費了自己的潛力，卻幾乎沒有取得任何成果，這一事實表明他們的立場選擇是錯誤的。 他們現在必須重新思考如何擺脫這種困境。
他們想占領基輔。 從軍事上來說，這是正確的決定——實現他們目標的最簡單方法。 我也會這麽做的。 我很了解格拉西莫夫（俄羅斯武裝部隊總司令）（當然不是我個人）。 他已經沒有退路了。 他把注意力集中在頓巴斯，以保護他剩下的一切資源。 截至目前，頓巴斯的局勢並不輕鬆。 但從戰略上來說，這對俄羅斯軍隊來說是一個雙贏的局麵。
因此，他們很可能正在尋找停止[戰鬥]的方法，並以任何方式暫停：炮擊平民，讓我們的妻子和孩子凍死。 他們需要它的目的很簡單：他們需要時間來收集資源並創造新的潛力，以便他們能夠繼續實現他們的目標。
但他們同時在做另一項任務，他們正在盡一切可能不讓我們重新集結並攻擊自己。 這就是為什麽你會看到 1,500 公裏前線的戰鬥。 有的地方比較激烈，有的地方不太激烈，但他們限製我們的部隊，不讓我們重新集結。 當然，他們現在拚命戰鬥的事實是非常糟糕的。 但這並不能解決戰略問題。 它隻會削弱烏克蘭的武裝部隊。
這就是為什麽，就像第二次世界大戰期間一樣，我毫不懷疑，很可能在烏拉爾山脈之外的某個地方，他們正在準備新的資源。 他們100%做好了準備。
彈藥正在準備中，雖然不是很好的東西，但仍然如此。 這將不再是停火兩年後所能擁有的資源。 不會是那樣的。 那會很糟糕，戰鬥潛力會非常非常低，即使他像朱可夫（二戰時期的蘇聯高級指揮官）那樣，再征召100萬人去扔屍體，也不會帶來什麽好處。 無論如何想要的結果。
因此，我們麵臨的下一個問題首先是守住這條線，不要再失去任何陣地。 這很關鍵。 因為我知道解放它比不放棄它要困難十到十五倍。 所以我們現在的任務就是堅持下去。 我們的任務是在合作夥伴的幫助下非常清楚地監控那裏正在發生的事情以及他們正在準備的地方。 這是我們的戰略任務。
我們的第二個戰略任務是為這場可能在二月份發生的戰爭做好準備。 能夠用生力軍和後備軍發動戰爭。 我們的部隊現在都在戰鬥中，他們正在流血。 他們正在流血，隻有勇氣、英雄主義和指揮官控製局勢的能力才讓他們團結在一起。
第二個對我們來說非常重要的戰略任務是建立儲備並為戰爭做準備，戰爭可能發生在二月，最好是三月，最壞是一月底。 它可能不是從頓巴斯開始，而是從基輔方向、白俄羅斯方向開始，我也不排除南部方向。
我們已經做了所有的計算——我們需要多少輛坦克、大炮等等。 這是現在大家需要集中精力的事情。 請戰壕裏的士兵原諒，現在更重要的是集中精力積累資源，以應對明年可能開始的更持久、更激烈的戰鬥。 我將[今天晚些時候]與米利（美國最高士兵）談論此事。
我會告訴他它值多少錢，要花多少錢。 如果得不到，我們當然會戰鬥到底。 但正如一位電影角色所說，“我不保證後果。” 其後果並不難預見。 這是我們必須要做的。
對我們來說還有第三項非常重要的任務，即第三項戰略任務，不幸的是，它與第一項任務（堅守陣地和陣地）和第二項任務（積累資源）相關。 這就是導彈防禦和防空。 在我個人看來，我不是能源專家，但在我看來，我們正處於邊緣。 我們正在微妙地保持平衡。 如果[電網]被摧毀……士兵的妻子和孩子就會開始被凍僵。 這種情況是有可能發生的。 戰士們會是什麽樣的心情，你能想象嗎？ 沒有水、光、熱，還談什麽準備儲備繼續戰鬥？
TE：您需要進行另一波動員嗎？
VZ：我們已經在這樣做了。 我們人手夠多，我也能清楚地看到自己有什麽。 我已經夠了。 我不需要更多的幾十萬。
我們需要坦克，我們需要 apcs [裝甲運兵車]，步兵戰車。 我們需要彈藥。 請注意，我現在談論的不是 f-16。
TE：俄羅斯軍隊是否已經適應了himars（美國製造的多管火箭發射器）？
VZ：是的。 他們已經到達了希瑪無法到達的距離。 而且我們還沒有任何更遠距離的東西。
TE：我們能談談防空嗎？
VZ：現在我們的比率是0.76。 俄羅斯人在計劃攻擊時使用的是 0.76 的功效係數。 這意味著他們發射了 100 枚導彈，而不是 76 枚。其中 24 枚成功擊中目標。 兩枚導彈對發電站有何作用？ 兩年內不會起作用。 所以必須要建立起來。
北約專家知道一切，絕對一切，直到最後的細節。 計算已經完成，感謝上帝，一切都在繼續。 我們已經擁有一些 nasam（挪威-美國防空係統）。 還不夠，但是有一些。 iris-t [德國防空係統] 已經投入使用。 還不夠，但是有一些。 他們隻需要加強。 我們需要幾十個。
TE：你的盟友是否以任何方式阻止你向克裏米亞推進？
VZ：我無法回答他們是否有所保留的問題。 我簡單陳述一下事實。 為了到達克裏米亞邊境，截至今天，我們需要前往梅利托波爾 84 公裏的距離。 順便說一句，這對我們來說已經足夠了，因為梅利托波爾將為我們提供對陸地走廊的全麵火力控製，因為從梅利托波爾我們已經可以使用相同的希馬爾等向克裏米亞地峽開火。 我為什麽要對你說這些？ 因為這可以追溯到我之前關於資源的觀點。 我可以根據手頭的任務計算出需要什麽樣的資源來構建戰鬥能力。
我們正在談論第一次世界大戰的規模……這是安東尼·拉達金（英國最高士兵）告訴我的。 當我告訴他英國軍隊在第一次世界大戰中發射了 100 萬發炮彈時，他告訴我：“我們將失去歐洲。 如果你發射那麽多炮彈，我們就沒有活計了。” 當他們說“給你五萬顆炮彈”時，數錢的人都暈倒了。 最大的問題是他們真的沒有。
有了這種資源，我無法開展新的大型行動，盡管我們現在正在開展一項行動。 它正在路上，但你還沒有看到它。 我們使用的貝殼少了很多。
我知道我能打敗這個敵人。 但我需要資源。 我需要 300 輛坦克、600-700 輛步兵戰車、500 門榴彈炮。 然後，我認為 2 月 23 日的到來是完全現實的。 但我不能用兩個旅做到這一點。 我得到了我得到的，但比我需要的要少。 現在還不是像曼納海姆吸引芬蘭士兵那樣吸引烏克蘭士兵的時候。 我們可以而且應該占領更多的領土。
TE：您如何看待俄羅斯的動員？
VZ：俄羅斯的動員已經奏效。 並不是說他們的問題如此嚴重以至於這些人不會戰鬥。 他們會的。 沙皇告訴他們去打仗，他們就去打仗。 我研究過兩次車臣戰爭的曆史，都是一樣的。 他們的裝備可能不是那麽好，但他們仍然給我們帶來了問題。 我們估計他們有120萬-150萬人的後備力量……俄羅斯人正在準備大約20萬生力軍。 我毫不懷疑他們會在基輔再次嚐試。
An interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, head of Ukraine’s armed forces
https://www.economist.com/zaluzhny-transcript
Edited highlights of our conversation
These are edited highlights of our interview with General Valery Zaluzhny, on December 3rd 2022. He began with his personal view of the war. (You can also read edited highlights of our interview with Volodymyr Zelensky, president of Ukraine.)
Valery Zaluzhny: For us, for the military, the war began in 2014. For me personally in July 2014. And I had no idea what war really was in 2014.
I had read a lot of books, I had graduated from all the academies with a gold medal, I understood everything theoretically, but I did not understand what war really meant. But in eight years of war, until 2022, both I and people like me understood it all perfectly well.
All we did when the large-scale aggression started was to implement not only our knowledge, which we already had in 2014, but also the skills and the experience we have gained since then. And the most important experience we had and the one which we have practised almost like a religion is that Russians and any other enemies must be killed, just killed, and most importantly, we should not be afraid to do it. And this is what we are doing.
All that happened on February 24th was an increase in scale. Before then we had a front of 403km and 232 strongpoints. And by February 24th that front grew to 2,500 km. And we were a relatively small force, but we engaged. Naturally, we understood that we were not strong enough. Our task was to distribute our smaller forces in such a way as to use unconventional tactics to stop the onslaught.
The Economist: What distinguishes you as a commander?
VZ: The Soviet Army welcomed and enforced one concept: the commander. But being a commander and being a leader is not the same. With all due respect to Mr Surovikin [the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine], if you look at him, he is an ordinary Petrovite commander from Peter the Great’s time, shall we say, a derzhimorda [a brutal martinet in Gogol’s “The Government Inspector”].
You look at him and understand that either you complete the task or you’re fucked. And we had long realised that this does not work. And we had particularly realised this in 2014, when 21-year-old lieutenants came to command men who were in their 50s and 60s. Of course we had our own derzhimordas who tried to keep order with their fists and biceps, but it does not work 100% in the Ukrainian army… It is always possible to be normal. To be normal means to remain human in any situation—that is the most important thing. To remain human, to become a leader. To be smarter, to be stronger, to be more talented and in that case try to manage people. That is a religion I practised.
TE: Does this mean that you listen to your officers and encourage their initiative?
VZ: I trust my generals. Since the start of the war I fired ten of them because they were not up to it. Another one shot himself. I trust Syrsky [General Oleksandr Syrsky, commander of Ukraine’s land forces]. If he tells me he needs another brigade, it means that he really needs another brigade. I certainly don’t think I am the smartest one here. I must and do listen to those who are in the field. Because the initiative is there.
TE: Who is your military role model?
VZ: Turn your head to the left. There is a portrait of the late Hennadiy Petrovich Vorobyov [commander of Ukraine’s ground forces from 2009 to 2014]. He was a man who was enormously respected in the army. Why do I have it here? When I am at ease, when things are going well, this picture is usually lying face down, I don’t need to look at it. When I have doubts about something, I put it up straight. I turn around and look at it, trying to figure out what Hennadiy Vorobyov would do in this situation. This is a man who has been successful. This is a man who had a hard time, because he helped everyone. Everyone. He knew everyone in the Armed Forces, their wives, their children, their nephews and so on. It was hard for him, but he took that heavy burden and carried it. That’s the model.
VZ: Yes. There are a lot of doubts.
TE: What kind?
VZ: We have already realised through a number of operations that the main thing is not to be afraid of this enemy. It can be fought, it must be fought today, here and now. And in no way should that be postponed until tomorrow, because there will be problems. In order to achieve this, you need resources. Just like the Russians, when we are planning something we must have the resources to do it. Then, if your position is correct and you make the right decisions, you can expect the right result.
The Russians have been garnering their resources for a long time. According to my calculations it must have been three and a half or four years that they built them up intensively: people, equipment, ammunition. I think they had three months’ worth of resources to achieve their goals. The fact that they have exhausted these resources and wasted their potential without achieving practically any result, shows that their position was chosen incorrectly. They now have to think again about how to get out of this situation.
They wanted to take Kyiv. Militarily this was the right decision—the easiest way to achieve their goal. I would have done the same. I know Gerasimov [the head of Russia’s armed forces] well (not personally, of course). There was no way out for him. He concentrated on Donbas to preserve whatever resources he had left. As of today, the situation in Donbas is not easy. But strategically it is a no-win situation for the Russian army.
So most likely they are looking for ways to stop [fighting] and get a pause by any means: shelling civilians, leaving our wives and children to freeze to death. They need it for one simple purpose: they need time to gather resources and create new potential so they can continue to fulfil their goals.
But they are working on another task in parallel, they are doing everything possible not to let us regroup and strike ourselves. This is why you are seeing battles along the 1,500km frontline. In some places more intense, in some places less intense, but they are constraining our troops in order not to allow us to regroup. The fact that they are fighting hard now is very bad, of course. But it is not a solution to the strategic problem. It simply wears down the armed forces of Ukraine.
That’s why, just as during the second world war, I have no doubt about it, it is most likely that somewhere beyond the Urals, they are preparing new resources. They are 100% being prepared.
Ammunition is being prepared, not very good stuff, but still. It won’t be the same resources as it could have been in two years of ceasefire. It will not be like that. It will be lousy, and combat potential will be very, very low, even if he enlists a million more people in the army to throw bodies, like Zhukov [a senior Soviet commander during the second world war] did, it will not bring the desired result anyway.
So the next problem that we have is, first of all, to hold this line and not lose any more ground. It’s crucial. Because I know that it is ten to 15 times harder to liberate it than not to surrender it. So our task now is to hold on. Our task is to monitor very clearly with the help of our partners what is going on there, where they are getting ready. This is our strategic task.
The second, very important strategic task for us is to create reserves and prepare for the war, which may take place in February, at best in March, and at worst at the end of January. It may start not in Donbas, but in the direction of Kyiv, in the direction of Belarus, I do not rule out the southern direction as well.
We have made all the calculations—how many tanks, artillery we need and so on and so on. This is what everyone needs to concentrate on right now. May the soldiers in the trenches forgive me, it’s more important to focus on the accumulation of resources right now for the more protracted and heavier battles that may begin next year. I’ll be talking to Milley [America’s top soldier] about this [later today].
I will tell him how much it is worth, how much it costs. If we don’t get it, of course we will fight to the end. But as a movie character said, “I don’t vouch for the consequences.” The consequences are not hard to foresee. This is what we have to do.
There is also a third, very important task for us, a third strategic task, which, unfortunately, is connected with the first (holding the lines and positions) and with the second (accumulating resources). This is missile defence and air defence. In my personal opinion, I am not an energy expert but it seems to me we are on the edge. We are balancing on a fine line. And if [the power grid] is destroyed…that is when soldiers’ wives and children start freezing. And such a scenario is possible. What kind of mood the fighters will be in, can you imagine? Without water, light and heat, can we talk about preparing reserves to keep fighting?
TE: Do you need to conduct another wave of mobilisation?
VZ: We are already conducting it as it is. We have enough people, and I can clearly see what I have. I have enough. I don’t need hundreds of thousands more.
We need tanks, we need apcs [armoured personnel carriers], infantry fighting vehicles. And we need ammunition. Please note, I’m not talking about f-16s right now.
TE: Have the Russian forces adapted to himars [American-made multiple rocket launchers]?
VZ: Yes. They’ve gone to a distance the himars can’t reach. And we haven’t got anything longer-range.
TE: Can we talk about air defence?
VZ: Now we have a ratio of 0.76. Russians are using this 0.76 coefficient of efficacy when they plan their attacks. This means that instead of 76 missiles, they launch 100. And 24 get through and reach their target. And what do two missiles do to a power station? It won’t work for two years. So it has to be built up.
nato specialists know everything, absolutely everything, down to the last detail. Calculations are done and thank God it all has moved on. We already have some nasams [Norwegian-American air-defence systems]. Not enough, but some. iris-t [a German air-defence system] are already in use. Not enough, but some. They just need to be ramped up. We need dozens of those.
TE: Are your allies holding you back in any way from advancing on Crimea?
VZ: I can’t answer the question of whether they are holding back or not. I will simply state the facts. In order to reach the borders of Crimea, as of today we need to cover a distance of 84km to Melitopol. By the way, this is enough for us, because Melitopol would give us a full fire control of the land corridor, because from Melitopol we can already fire at the Crimean Isthmus, with the very same himars and so on. Why am I saying this to you? Because it goes back to my earlier point about resources. I can calculate, based on the task at hand, what kind of resource is needed to build combat capability.
We are talking about the scale of World War One…that is what Antony Radakin [Britain’s top soldier] told me. When I told him that the British Army fired a million shells in World War One, I was told, “We will lose Europe. We will have nothing to live on if you fire that many shells.” When they say, “You get 50,000 shells”, the people who count the money faint. The biggest problem is that they really don’t have it.
With this kind of resources I can’t conduct new big operations, even though we are working on one right now. It is on the way, but you don’t see it yet. We use a lot fewer shells.
I know that I can beat this enemy. But I need resources. I need 300 tanks, 600-700 ifvs, 500 Howitzers. Then, I think it is completely realistic to get to the lines of February 23rd. But I can’t do it with two brigades. I get what I get, but it is less than what I need. It is not yet time to appeal to Ukrainian soldiers in the way that Mannerheim appealed to Finnish soldiers. We can and should take a lot more territory.
TE: What do you make of Russia’s mobilisation?
VZ: Russian mobilisation has worked. It is not true that their problems are so dire that these people will not fight. They will. A tsar tells them to go to war, and they go to war. I’ve studied the history of the two Chechen wars—it was the same. They may not be that well equipped, but they still present a problem for us. We estimate that they have a reserve of 1.2m-1.5m people… The Russians are preparing some 200,000 fresh troops. I have no doubt they will have another go at Kyiv. ■
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