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經濟和政治潮流是否正在從美國轉向中國？
Are economic and political tides turning away from America and toward China?
作者：威廉·莫洛尼 William Moloney，2023 年 4 月 20 日
有趣的是，當今世界軍事院校中研究最廣泛的戰爭專著之一是由一位生活在 27 世紀前的中國將軍撰寫的。 孫子（公元前 544-496 年）《孫子兵法》中最著名的引述是：“最高的兵法是不戰而屈人之兵”，但還有許多其他格言值得我們遵循。 那些能夠預測中國意圖並將該國戰略與美國戰略進行對比的人的利益。 特別重要的是，“誰想贏，首先要考慮成本”及其推論，“沒有一個國家從長期戰爭中受益的例子”。
自朝鮮戰爭結束以來，中國已有70年沒有派出軍隊參戰。 相比之下，美國在同一時期幾乎一直直接或通過代理人處於戰爭狀態。 除了極少數例外，中國和俄羅斯一樣，曆來隻在與其有長期種族和/或文化聯係的邊境地區展示軍事實力。 美國與其帝國前身英國一樣，經常尋求將其軍事意誌強加於世界偏遠角落。
美國再次像其英國前輩一樣，憑借其巨大的經濟實力，長期以來一直能夠發揮非凡的全球影響力，而直到最近，中國——在現代從來不是一個富裕或經濟占主導地位的國家——一直更加謹慎 ，更喜歡搖動它的軍刀而不是使用它們。
如今，正當中國經濟和軍事實力突飛猛進、全球影響力迅速擴大之際，美國卻日益受到長期戰爭累積效應的拖累，並被英國曆史學家保羅·肯尼迪在1987年描述的“帝國主義”所削弱。 過度伸展。”
中國實力的增強和美國實力的衰落並沒有被忽視，美國的敵人和盟友最近都采取了大膽的獨立舉措，這在幾年前似乎是不可想象的。 中國成功地促成了伊朗和沙特阿拉伯之間的和解，隨後俄羅斯又讚助了沙特與另一個宿敵敘利亞之間的會談，這擾亂了美國建立打擊伊朗支持的恐怖主義共同戰線的努力。 在心存不安的美國盟友中，日本為了維護自己的國家利益，直言不諱地拒絕履行對俄羅斯的能源製裁，這令華盛頓震驚；法國總統馬克龍在訪問中國時發表講話，暗示北約在加強防務方麵可能沒有統一戰線 台灣的。
美國兩黨政界人士對馬克龍言論過度表達憤慨，卻無視了這樣一個事實：法國總統表達的情緒可能是許多歐洲公民的共同觀點，歐洲外交關係委員會 2019 年的一項民意調查顯示，受訪者顯示，法國總統表達的情緒可能是許多歐洲公民的共同觀點。 當時他們堅信，他們的國家應該在美國和中國之間的任何衝突中保持中立。 顯然，團結歐洲人反對曆史上對鄰近國家構成威脅的俄羅斯是一回事，但為與遙遠的中國發生潛在的軍事衝突爭取支持則是完全不同的主張，因為中國與中國沒有侵略曆史，而且對歐洲經濟至關重要。 每個歐洲國家。
值得注意的是，歐洲對美國領導力的質量和可靠性日益懷疑，特別是考慮到最近對美國從阿富汗災難性撤軍的做法沒有征求意見、措手不及的痛苦記憶。 因此，如果一些歐洲人在美國人身上看到的不僅僅是一絲傲慢，他們認為自己應該忠誠地、毫無疑問地跟隨美國卷入另一場亞洲衝突——這一次麵對的是比塔利班強大得多的對手，這也不是沒有道理的。
美國的長期朋友們還擔心的是，今天的美國似乎是一個被日益惡性的自相殘殺政治深深困擾的國家——用亞伯拉罕·林肯的永恒名言來說，“一個內部分裂的家庭”——因此對與盟友進行合理的對話不太敏感 看得更清楚一點。 馬克龍可能就是這樣一位值得尊重而不是譴責的朋友。
威廉·莫洛尼是科羅拉多基督教大學百年學院保守派思想高級研究員，曾就讀於牛津大學和倫敦大學，並在哈佛大學獲得博士學位。 他是前科羅拉多州教育專員。
Are economic and political tides turning away from America and toward China?
by William Moloney, 04/20/23
It is interesting that one of the most widely studied treatises on war in the world’s military academies today was written by a Chinese general who lived 27 centuries ago. The best-known quotation from “The Art of War” by Sun Tzu (544-496 BC) is, “[The] supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting,” but there are many other maxims that should merit the interest of those who would divine the intentions of China and contrast the strategy of that country with that of the United States. Of particular relevance is,“Who wishes to win must first consider the cost” and its corollary, “There is no instance of a nation benefiting from prolonged war.”
China has not sent its armies to war in 70 years, since the end of the Korean War. In contrast, the United States, over the same period, has been at war directly or by proxy almost constantly. With rare exception, China, like Russia, has historically flexed its military muscle only in areas on its borders with which it has longstanding ethnic and/or cultural ties. The United States, like its imperial predecessor, Great Britain, has regularly sought to impose its will militarily in far-flung corners of the world.
The United States, again like its British forebear, has long been able to exert extraordinary global leverage owing to the immense might of its economy, whereas until quite recently, China — never in modern times a wealthy or economically dominant nation — has been more cautious, preferring to rattle its sabers rather than use them.
Now, at the very moment when China’s economic and military might is surging and its global influence rapidly expanding, the United States is increasingly being weighed down by the cumulative effect of prolonged war and weakened by what British historian Paul Kennedy described in 1987 as “imperial overstretch.”
The waxing of Chinese power and the waning of America’s has not gone unnoticed and U.S. enemies and allies alike have recently undertaken bold independent initiatives that would have seemed unthinkable just a few years ago. China’s success in brokering a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia — soon followed by Russia’s sponsoring talks between Saudis and another longtime foe, Syria — has unhinged U.S. efforts to build a common front against Iran-backed terrorism. Among disquieted U.S. allies, Japan stunned Washington by asserting its own national interest by bluntly refusing to honor energy sanctions against Russia, and then French President Emmanuel Macron made remarks while visiting China that signaled there may be no united NATO front in efforts to bolster the defense of Taiwan.
The intemperate expressions of indignation over Macron’s remarks by U.S. politicians of both parties blithely overlooks the fact that the French president is voicing sentiments likely shared by the many European citizens, as revealed by a 2019 poll done by the European Council on Foreign Relations that showed respondents strongly believed then that their countries should remain neutral in any conflict between the United States and China. Clearly, it is one thing to rally Europeans against a nearby and historically threatening Russia, but an entirely different proposition to enlist support for potential military conflict with distant China, with whom there is no history of aggression and which is vitally important to the economies of every European country.
It is pertinent to note the context of growing European doubts about the quality and reliability of American leadership, particularly in light of the recent painful memory of being unconsulted and blindsided regarding the disastrous withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Accordingly, it is hardly unreasonable if some Europeans see more than a touch of arrogance in Americans who think they should loyally and unquestioningly follow the United States into yet another Asian conflict — this time against an adversary vastly more formidable than the Taliban.
Also of concern to America’s longtime friends is the United States today appears as a nation deeply distracted by its increasingly vicious internecine politics — in Abraham Lincoln’s timeless phrase, “A house divided against itself” — and thus less responsive to reasoned discourse with allies who might see the world a little more clearly. Macron may be one such friend deserving of respect, not condemnation.
William Moloney is a senior fellow in conservative thought at Colorado Christian University’s Centennial Institute who studied at Oxford and the University of London and received his Doctorate from Harvard University. He is a former Colorado Commissioner of education.
