風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
真正促使美國發動伊拉克戰爭的原因是什麽
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/01/fear-power-and-hubris-bush-and-iraq-war/672759/
恐懼、權力和傲慢的致命結合
作者：Melvyn P. Leffler 2023 年 1 月 23 日
9/11 下午，在五角大樓，大火仍在燃燒，救護車鳴響，國防部長唐納德·拉姆斯菲爾德從煙霧繚繞的庭院返回他的辦公室。 他最親密的助手、副國務卿斯蒂芬·坎博恩（Stephen Cambone）神秘地記錄了國務卿對薩達姆·侯賽因和烏薩馬（或烏薩馬）·本·拉登的想法：“同時打擊 S. H.； 不僅是UBL； 近期目標需求——大規模——掃蕩一切——需要這樣做才能實現任何有用的目標。”
總統沒有同意。 當晚，當喬治·W·布什返回華盛頓時，他主要關心的是安撫全國人民的心、減輕人民的痛苦、激發希望。 當得知基地組織很可能對這次襲擊負責時，他沒有把重點放在伊拉克。 第二天，在國家安全委員會會議上，拉姆斯菲爾德和國防部副部長保羅·沃爾福威茨主張對薩達姆·侯賽因采取行動。 由於阿富汗沒有好的目標，也沒有驅逐塔利班的戰爭計劃，國防部官員認為伊拉克可能是展示美國決心和韌性的最佳機會。 他們的論點沒有引起在場任何人的共鳴。
然而，第二天晚上，布什總統在白宮戰情室外遇到了即將離任的反恐專家理查德·克拉克和其他幾名助手。 據克拉克說，總統說：“我希望你盡快回顧一切，一切。 看看薩達姆有沒有這麽做。 看看他是否有任何聯係。” 克拉克承諾他會這樣做，但堅稱應對此事負責的是基地組織，而不是侯賽因。 然後他對助手們低聲說道：“沃爾福威茨找到了他。”
梅爾文·P·萊夫勒即將出版的書《對抗薩達姆·侯賽因》的封麵
本文改編自萊弗勒即將出版的新書。
沒有真正的證據表明沃爾福威茨確實接觸過布什。 總統可能在 9 月 14 日星期五與英國首相托尼·布萊爾的談話中談到了襲擊伊拉克的問題。但是當沃爾福威茨周末在戴維營再次提出這個問題時，布什明確表示，他認為侯賽因與 9/11，阿富汗是第一要務。他的副總統、國家安全顧問和中央情報局局長都同意。
摘自209年1月/2月號：喬治·W·布什時代
布什入侵伊拉克的決定既不是先入為主的，也不是不可避免的。 這與民主無關，也與石油無關。 這並不是為了糾正1991年美國未能推翻侯賽因的決定，也不是為了對1993年這位獨裁者試圖刺殺布什的父親喬治·H·W·布什進行報複。相反，布什和他的顧問們的動機是 他們對美國安全的擔憂。 他們迫切希望阻止任何其他可能針對美國人的攻擊，並決心阻止侯賽因使用大規模殺傷性武器來製止美國未來在中東行使權力的能力。
布什在經曆了數個月的高度焦慮之後才決定入侵伊拉克，在此期間，辛勤工作（盡管有些過分熱心）的官員試圖解析不完整且不可靠的情報。 他們對伊拉克的過度恐懼與對美國實力的過度關注相匹配。 在 9/11 事件令人震驚地揭露了一個難以想象的脆弱性之後，他們感到國家的信譽正在受到侵蝕，從而感到不安。
在 9/11 事件後第一周布什的重要講話中，他沒有詳細討論伊拉克問題。 當記者問總統是否有什麽特別的信息要傳達給薩達姆·侯賽因時，布什籠統地說道：“任何窩藏恐怖分子的人都需要害怕美國……向每個國家傳達的信息是，將會有一場打擊恐怖活動的運動，一場全球性的運動。” ”。 當美軍中東司令湯米·弗蘭克斯將軍建議布什開始針對伊拉克的軍事計劃時，總統指示他不要這樣做。
拉姆斯菲爾德和他的高級顧問仍然更擔心伊拉克——國防部副部長道格拉斯·費斯 9 月 18 日寫道，這個政權“參與並支持恐怖主義，並以其他方式威脅美國的切身利益”。 但即使他們也不主張全麵入侵。 相反，沃爾福威茨傾向於在南部煽動什葉派叛亂，建立飛地或解放區來組織臨時政府，並否認侯賽因對該地區石油的控製。 沃爾福威茨告訴我：“如果我們有能力在阿富汗發起抵抗蘇聯的行動，那麽我們本來也有能力在阿拉伯地區發起抵抗。”
布什並非完全不讚同這種做法，但拉姆斯菲爾德和沃爾福威茨都無法說服他將注意力從阿富汗和更廣泛的反恐戰爭上轉移。 沃爾福威茨聽從了布什的優先事項，最終幫助製定了推翻阿富汗塔利班的戰略。 但他、費斯和他們在五角大樓的文職同事並沒有放棄伊拉克政權更迭的想法。 侯賽因對 9/11 襲擊的幸災樂禍激怒了他們。 他們確信他是危險的。
直到秋天，布什的注意力才轉向伊拉克，當時炭疽孢子通過美國郵件傳播，殺死了幾名郵政工作人員，並出現在參議院辦公樓和處理白宮郵件的設施中。 10 月 18 日，白宮內的傳感器向工作人員發出致命毒素的警報； 這是一場虛驚，但卻加劇了人們對生物或化學武器襲擊的擔憂。
布什和他的顧問們對他們自認為對伊拉克的了解感到不安，盡管評估侯賽因的意圖和能力很困難。 1998年，伊拉克獨裁者驅逐了國際檢查員，導致中央情報局無法收集信息。 但分析人士確信，不能相信侯賽因已經銷毀了他以前擁有的所有大規模殺傷性武器。 當一名伊拉克叛逃者聲稱伊拉克已經建立了移動生物武器生產工廠並且現在擁有“超越海灣戰爭前時代的能力”時，他們的懷疑更加強烈。
摘自 2004 年 1 月/2 月號：間諜、謊言和武器：出了什麽問題
總統的中央情報局簡報員邁克爾·莫雷爾（Michael Morell）向我堅稱，有人重新審視當時現有的證據，仍然會得出結論：侯賽因“擁有化學武器能力，他儲存了化學武器，他擁有生物武器生產能力”。 ，他正在重啟核計劃。 今天你會根據桌子上的內容做出判斷。” 但莫雷爾告訴我，擺在桌麵上的內容是間接且可疑的，其中大部分來自該政權的伊拉克庫爾德人。 莫雷爾承認他應該說：“先生。 總統先生，這就是我們的想法……但你真正需要知道的是，我們對這一判斷信心不足，原因如下。” 相反，莫雷爾告訴總統，侯賽因“有一個化學武器計劃。 他有生產生物武器的能力。”
布什和他的高級顧問傾向於認為侯賽因擁有大規模殺傷性武器。 不僅政府中的鷹派如此。 國務卿科林·鮑威爾和國家安全顧問康多莉紮·賴斯認為侯賽因擁有大規模殺傷性武器。 國務院分析師以及中央情報局和國家安全局的同行也是如此。 他們對鋁管的用途以及伊拉克獲取鈾黃餅的看法存在分歧，並且他們意識到，一旦薩達姆政權再次開始研製核武器，侯賽因將需要五到七年的時間來研製核武器。 然而，他們認為他們知道伊拉克擁有生物武器和化學武器，或者可以迅速開發這些武器，而且侯賽因渴望重建核計劃。
外國情報合作夥伴對此表示同意。 托尼·布萊爾和他最信任的顧問也有同樣的感覺。 沒有人告訴布什侯賽因沒有大規模殺傷性武器。
侯賽因因製裁和檢查人員的存在而受到嚴重阻礙。 但現在檢查人員走了，製裁也消失了。 美國政策製定者麵臨的難題是，如果製裁製度結束且聯合國監察員沒有返回，如何遏製侯賽因。 “我並不擔心他在 2001 年會做什麽，”沃爾福威茨告訴我。 “我擔心如果現有的遏製……崩潰的話，他在 2010 年會做什麽。”
侯賽因並沒有采取太多措施來減輕美國人的恐懼。 他利用自己的石油收入來爭取法國、中國和俄羅斯的支持，以結束聯合國的製裁。 他沒有停止為科威特和沙特阿拉伯的恐怖活動提供支持，其中一些活動針對的是美國援助人員。 關於他在伊拉克境內普遍鎮壓的報道仍然存在。
閱讀：英國對伊拉克戰爭的清算
與此同時，侯賽因將其不斷增長的財政儲備投資於加強伊拉克的軍工綜合體並獲取可用於化學和生物武器的材料。 據英國情報機構稱，伊拉克人仍在隱瞞有關31,000件化學彈藥、4,000噸可用於武器的化學品以及大量可用於生產生物武器的材料的信息。
此類評估整個冬天都在進行。 英國聯合情報委員會於 2002 年 2 月總結道：“伊拉克繼續推行其大規模殺傷性武器計劃。如果尚未這樣做，伊拉克可能會在決定實施大規模殺傷性武器計劃後的幾天內生產出大量的生物戰劑，並在幾周內生產出大量的化學戰劑。” 這樣做。”
2001 年秋天，布萊爾寫信給布什，“我毫不懷疑我們需要對付薩達姆”。但布萊爾警告說，如果我們“現在就打擊伊拉克”，“我們將失去阿拉伯世界、俄羅斯，可能會失去一半的國家”。 歐盟和我擔心的是這對巴基斯坦的影響。” 最好是安靜地審議並避免公開辯論，“直到我們確切地知道我們想做什麽； 以及我們如何做到這一點。” 布什同意了。
拉姆斯菲爾德隨後寫道：“布什總統認為，與薩達姆外交成功的關鍵是采取可信的軍事行動威脅。 我們希望，將越來越多的美軍調往可以攻擊伊拉克的位置，這一過程可能會說服伊拉克人結束他們的反抗。” 正如布什第一任期內的副國家安全顧問斯蒂芬·哈德利告訴我的那樣：“我們認為這會迫使他……按照國際社會的要求去做，要麽摧毀大規模殺傷性武器，要麽向我們展示你摧毀了它。 就是這樣。 要麽去做，要麽，如果你已經做到了，那就展示出來，證明它。”
布什希望利用武力威脅恢複檢查，並讓人們相信伊拉克不擁有大規模殺傷性武器，這些武器可能會落入恐怖分子手中，或在未來被用來敲詐美國。 但他也想用武力威脅將侯賽因趕下台。 他真的不知道這些目標中哪個優先。 他從未清楚地理清這些重疊而又相互衝突的衝動，盡管每一個衝動似乎都變得更加引人注目。
切尼在他的回憶錄《我的時代》中寫道：“讓薩達姆遵守聯合國要求的最好方法就是說服他我們會使用武力。” 著名的民主黨人並沒有表示不同意見。 2002年2月上旬，外交關係委員會民主黨主席、參議員約瑟夫·拜登就國務院2003年預算要求舉行聽證會。 鮑威爾國務卿強調，反恐戰爭是他的第一要務。 鮑威爾說，有些政權不僅支持恐怖活動，而且還在發展大規模殺傷性武器。 他們“可以向恐怖組織提供必要的資金，利用這些手段來對付我們。”
拜登詢問這是否意味著總統正在宣布一項新的先發製人政策，正如外國盟友所認為的那樣。 在鮑威爾否認這一指控後，拜登表達了他對大規模殺傷性武器擴散的擔憂，特別是在伊拉克。 “我碰巧認為薩達姆必須以某種方式下台，而且很可能需要美國出動武力才能讓他下台，”他說。 “在我看來，問題是如何去做，而不是是否做。”
接下來幾個月的情報報告並沒有緩解布什的焦慮。 令總統感到震驚的是，基地組織正在尋找生物和化學武器的新信息，以及伊拉克擁有並使用這些武器的信息。
2002 年 5 月下旬，分析人士報告說，基地組織成員正在進入巴格達，其中包括高級聖戰分子阿布·穆薩卜·紮卡維。 美國國務院情報辦公室負責人告訴鮑威爾，“與基地組織有聯係的其他人正在巴格達活動，並與同事保持聯係，而這些同事可能更直接地參與襲擊計劃。” 自9/11以來，伊拉克幾乎沒有基地組織活動，專家們對伊拉克獨裁者與奧薩馬·本·拉登之間關係的性質也存在分歧。 幾乎沒有人認為伊拉克與 9/11 事件有任何關係，但是，根據戰後參議院的一項調查，“有十多份可靠性各異的報告提到伊拉克或伊拉克國民參與了基地組織獲取情報的努力”。 ”化學戰和生物戰訓練。
摘自 2006 年 7 月/8 月號：阿布·穆薩布·紮卡維短暫而暴力的一生
紮卡維是一位著名的恐怖分子，他是一名約旦人，曾在阿富汗作戰，會見了本·拉登，並在赫拉特管理著自己的訓練營。 他已經因其強硬、激進和野蠻而臭名昭著，他渴望對美國人進行報複。 關於紮卡維在伊拉克存在的報道是在美國政策製定者收到有關伊拉克采購代理在澳大利亞活動的信息之前不久發布的。 據稱，該特工正在尋求購買 GPS 軟件，以便該政權繪製美國城市地圖。 伊拉克獨裁者可能正在策劃在美國境內發動大規模殺傷性武器襲擊嗎？
紮卡維還與伊斯蘭輔助者組織合作，該組織是一個伊斯蘭極端組織，正在與主流庫爾德政黨爭奪伊拉克東北部的控製權。 中央情報局的一個小型小組已滲透到庫馬爾市附近的地區，並於 7 月報告說，紮卡維已開始試驗恐怖分子可以將其放入通風係統的生物和化學製劑。 據一名中央情報局特工稱，“他們對生物戰和化學戰進行了全麵研究……他們在驢、兔子、老鼠和其他動物身上進行了大量測試。”
在華盛頓，參謀長聯席會議讚成在庫爾馬爾采取軍事行動。 切尼、拉姆斯菲爾德和沃爾福威茨也是如此。 他們不相信，如果沒有獨裁者的默許，基地組織不會出現在伊拉克——即使是不受侯賽因控製的地區。 當有消息稱紮卡維和其他基地組織戰士在巴格達時，他們的懷疑更加強烈。 駐伊拉克的中央情報局特工沒有看到任何證據表明基地組織特工與侯賽因有聯係，但與他們交談的每個人都相信侯賽因擁有大規模殺傷性武器。
布什表示，他將“深思熟慮”地采取行動，隻利用最好的情報。 但情報含糊不清，導致評估存在爭議、判斷相互矛盾、建議不確定。 有時，總統誇大了他所掌握的證據。 2002 年 11 月，布什告訴記者團，侯賽因是一個威脅，“因為他正在與基地組織打交道。” 雖然這有些誇張，但布什確實知道紮卡維曾在巴格達，與基地組織有聯係，並且正在試驗生物武器和化學武器。 他知道侯賽因支持自殺式爆炸並慶祝他們的“烈士”。
布什選擇不授權在庫爾馬爾采取軍事行動。 7月31日，他告訴布萊爾，他還沒有決定發動戰爭，他可能會給伊拉克獨裁者再一次機會，讓他遵守允許檢查和銷毀大規模殺傷性武器的承諾。 然而，與此同時，總統指示弗蘭克斯將軍繼續他的戰爭計劃。
盡管布什尚未決定是否要解除伊拉克獨裁者的武裝或推翻伊拉克獨裁者，但他動員了公眾和國會支持他的政策。 10 月，眾議院以 296 票對 133 票通過了一項授權他使用軍事力量的決議，參議院也以 77 票對 23 票的結果批準了一項決議。 華盛頓的政治努力與紐約的外交努力相匹配。 11月8日，聯合國安理會通過第1441號決議，要求進行核查，並規定伊拉克政權已經違反了以往的決議。 美國政府認為，這為美國選擇采取單邊行動提供了理由。
布什實行的是強製外交，希望通過恐嚇來達到目的。 “我們給了薩達姆最後一個選擇，”他的英國政策夥伴布萊爾在 2011 年解釋道。如果侯賽因表現出頑抗，總統的信譽以及美國的信譽將麵臨風險，在這種情況下，強製外交將不得不結束 軍事幹預。 然而，該幹預的成本尚未計算。
布什確實希望，如果他訴諸軍事行動，就會出現一個自由、民主的伊拉克，但他幾乎沒有花時間討論將伊拉克的解放轉化為其公民更好的生活所需的機構、政策和支出。 在與弗蘭克斯將軍會麵時，布什問道：“我們能贏嗎？”
“是的，先生，”弗蘭克斯說。
“我們能除掉薩達姆嗎？” 總統再次問道。
“是的，長官，”他的將軍說道。
總統沒有問：“然後呢？”
在入侵變成一場混亂、功能失調的占領並且伊拉克所謂的大規模殺傷性武器沒有被發現之後，布什指示他的中央情報局局長喬治·特尼特建立一個名為伊拉克調查組的特別任務，以調查這些致命武器的下落。 該組織的第一任主任戴維·凱 (David Kay) 於 2004 年 1 月 28 日出現在參議院軍事委員會麵前：“讓我開始吧，”他承認，“我們對伊拉克大規模殺傷性武器計劃的看法幾乎全錯了”。 盡管因對伊拉克能力的誤讀而受到懲罰，但凱並不認為情報分析師在根本威脅問題上誤導了政策製定者。 “我認為，隨著薩達姆·侯賽因的失蹤和倒台，世界變得更加安全。”
閱讀：任務蔓延：當一切都是恐怖主義時
2003 年 12 月，美軍抓獲薩達姆·侯賽因後，該調查小組的第二任負責人查爾斯·杜爾弗 (Charles Duelfer) 監督了對薩達姆·侯賽因的部分審訊。杜爾弗詳細闡述了薩達姆·侯賽因的“控製性存在”。 杜爾弗強調說，侯賽因“不是動畫片”。 “他以一種黑暗、陰險的方式極其才華橫溢，才華橫溢”，很像侯賽因最想效仿的領導人約瑟夫·斯大林。 他的願望很明確：挫敗伊朗、擊敗以色列並主宰該地區。 為了實現這些目標，侯賽因渴望獲得大規模殺傷性武器。
這是杜爾弗在 2004 年 9 月提交調查小組最終綜合報告時得出的結論。 證據似乎是確鑿的：伊拉克沒有大規模殺傷性武器庫存，也沒有任何活躍的計劃。 但杜爾弗後來在他的回憶錄《捉迷藏：尋找伊拉克的真相》中寫道，“很明顯，薩達姆遵守聯合國裁軍限製隻是一種策略。” 調查小組確認，侯賽因的首要目標是結束製裁並繼續確保大規模殺傷性武器的安全。 “幾乎”沒有任何伊拉克高級領導人“相信薩達姆已經永遠放棄了大規模殺傷性武器。” 侯賽因拒絕了自己被行刑隊處決的願望，於2006年12月30日在監獄中被絞死。
布什最初決定對抗侯賽因，而不是入侵伊拉克。 總統擔心另一次襲擊可能比 9/11 更可怕。 布什擔心，像伊拉克這樣的流氓國家可能會與恐怖分子分享世界上最致命的武器，這些恐怖分子迫切希望給美國帶來痛苦，刺破美國不可戰勝的空氣，破壞美國的機構，讓美國人懷疑自己自由的價值。
然而，恐懼本身並不能影響總統的戰略。 布什對美國實力的信心同樣重要。 從他執政伊始，他就致力於擴大美國的軍事能力，而美國的軍事能力已經遠遠超過任何其他國家。 2001年利用空中力量、特種部隊和新技術將塔利班逐出喀布爾，這增強了他的力量感。 美國的影響力似乎是無限的。 他認為，華盛頓不能被阻止幫助其朋友並保護其利益，特別是在擁有重要原材料和能源儲備的地區。 美國有能力這樣做，並且需要證明這一點。
狂妄自大加劇了恐懼和權力。 布什堅持認為，所有人都希望按照美國價值觀生活——自由地說自己想說的話，自由祈禱。 如果美國推翻了一個殘暴的獨裁者，美國官員會因為知道他們正在豐富他愚昧的臣民的生活而感到滿意。
在恐懼、對美國實力日益增長的信心以及道德感的刺激下，布什擁抱了強製外交。 這一戰略很有吸引力，因為布什周圍的幾乎每個人都相信，侯賽因的反抗不會停止，除非他麵對優勢武力。 但該戰略的實施並沒有明確的目標——政權更迭或消除大規模殺傷性武器。
閱讀：美國的信譽在伊拉克受到打擊
入侵後，當這些武器沒有被發現時，布什轉向了更具意識形態的話語。 “伊拉克民主的失敗，”他警告說，“將會助長世界各地的恐怖分子……成功將傳遞出這樣的消息，從大馬士革到德黑蘭——自由可以成為每個國家的未來。” 當美國陷入叛亂鬥爭、伊斯蘭原教旨主義興起時，布什的目標和戰略似乎都沒有意義。 他的批評者嘲笑他的天真，指責他不誠實，並嘲笑他的民主狂熱。
這些批評者低估了布什的品質並誤解了他的思想。 布什的失敗並不是因為他是一個軟弱的領導人、一個天真的理論家或一個善於操縱的騙子。 他始終全麵掌控政府的伊拉克政策，並不急於發動戰爭。 他發動戰爭不是為了讓伊拉克民主，而是為了鏟除一名凶殘的獨裁者，後者打算重新啟動他的武器計劃，支持自殺任務，並與恐怖組織（即使實際上不是基地組織）建立聯係。
布什成功地實現了這些狹隘的目標。 美國領土上沒有發生另一次襲擊，他確實消滅了一個殘暴、反複無常、危險的暴君。 但他並沒有以可接受的成本實現這一目標。 這場戰爭對伊拉克來說是災難性的。 在接下來的幾年裏，超過 20 萬伊拉克人因戰爭、叛亂和內亂而喪生，超過 900 萬人（約占戰前人口的三分之一）在國內流離失所或逃往國外。
這次幹預還給美國造成了幾乎沒有人預見到的人員、財政、經濟和心理損失。 這場戰爭增強了伊朗在波斯灣的實力，轉移了人們對阿富汗境內持續鬥爭的注意力和資源，分裂了美國的歐洲盟友，並為中國的崛起和俄羅斯的複仇主義提供了更多機會。 這場衝突玷汙了美國的聲譽並加劇了反美主義。 它加劇了穆斯林的不滿情緒，加劇了人們對美國傲慢的看法，使反恐鬥爭變得複雜，並挫傷了中東阿拉伯人和猶太人對民主與和平的希望。 總統和他的顧問們在卸任時並沒有傳播自由，而是目睹了世界範圍內自由的衰退。
恐懼、權力和傲慢解釋了美國在伊拉克發動戰爭的原因。 如果我們不這麽想，通過簡化故事並相信隻要我們有更誠實的官員、更強大的領導人和更現實的政策製定者，一切都會好起來，我們就是在欺騙自己。 悲劇的發生並不是因為我們的領導人天真、愚蠢、腐敗。 當認真負責的官員竭盡全力讓美國變得更安全，最終卻讓事情變得更糟時，悲劇就會發生。 我們需要問為什麽會發生這種情況。 我們需要認識到，當恐懼過多、權力過大、傲慢自大以及不夠審慎時，就會潛藏著危險。
本文改編自《對抗薩達姆·侯賽因：喬治·W·布什和入侵伊拉克》。
What Really Took America to War in Iraq
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/01/fear-power-and-hubris-bush-and-iraq-war/672759/
A fatal combination of fear, power, and hubris
At the pentagon on the afternoon of 9/11, as the fires still burned and ambulances blared, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld returned from the smoke-filled courtyard to his office. His closest aide, Undersecretary Stephen Cambone, cryptically recorded the secretary’s thinking about Saddam Hussein and Osama (or Usama) bin Laden: “Hit S. H. @same time; Not only UBL; near term target needs—go massive—sweep it all up—need to do so to hit anything useful.”
The president did not agree. That night, when George W. Bush returned to Washington, his main concern was reassuring the nation, relieving its suffering, and inspiring hope. Informed that al-Qaeda was most likely responsible for the attack, he did not focus on Iraq. The next day, at meetings of the National Security Council, Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz advocated action against Saddam Hussein. With no good targets in Afghanistan and no war plans to dislodge the Taliban, Defense officials thought Iraq might offer the best opportunity to demonstrate American resolve and resilience. Their arguments did not resonate with anyone present.
The following evening, however, President Bush encountered his outgoing counterterrorism expert, Richard Clarke, and several other aides outside the Situation Room in the White House. According to Clarke, the president said, “I want you, as soon as you can, to go back over everything, everything. See if Saddam did this. See if he’s linked in any way.” Clarke promised he would but insisted that al-Qaeda, not Hussein, was responsible. Then he muttered to his assistants, “Wolfowitz got to him.”
This article is adapted from Leffler’s forthcoming book.
There is no real evidence that Wolfowitz did get to Bush. The president may have talked about attacking Iraq in a conversation with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on Friday, September 14. But when Wolfowitz raised the issue again at Camp David over the weekend, Bush made it clear that he did not think Hussein was linked to 9/11, and that Afghanistan was priority No. 1. His vice president, national security advisers, and CIA director were all in agreement.
From the January/February 209 issue: The George W. Bush years
Bush’s decision to invade Iraq was neither preconceived nor inevitable. It wasn’t about democracy, and it wasn’t about oil. It wasn’t about rectifying the decision of 1991, when the United States failed to overthrow Hussein, nor was it about getting even for the dictator’s attempt to assassinate Bush’s father, George H. W. Bush, in 1993. Rather, Bush and his advisers were motivated by their concerns with U.S. security. They urgently wanted to thwart any other possible attack on Americans, and they were determined to foreclose Hussein’s ability to use weapons of mass destruction to check the future exercise of American power in the Middle East.
Bush resolved to invade Iraq only after many months of high anxiety, a period in which hard-working, if overzealous, officials tried to parse intelligence that was incomplete and unreliable. Their excessive fear of Iraq was matched by an excessive preoccupation with American power. And they were unnerved, after 9/11’s shocking revelation of an unimagined vulnerability, by a sense that the nation’s credibility was eroding.
In bush’s key speeches during the first week after 9/11, he did not dwell on Iraq. When reporters asked the president if he had a special message for Saddam Hussein, Bush spoke generically: “Anybody who harbors terrorists needs to fear the United States … The message to every country is, there will be a campaign against terrorist activity, a worldwide campaign.” When General Tommy Franks, the commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East, suggested to Bush that they begin military planning against Iraq, the president instructed him not to.
Rumsfeld and his top advisers remained more concerned about Iraq—a regime, wrote Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith on September 18, “that engages in and supports terrorism and otherwise threatens US vital interests.” But even they weren’t advocating a full-scale invasion. Instead, Wolfowitz favored seeding a Shia rebellion in the south, establishing an enclave or a liberation zone for organizing a provisional government, and denying Hussein control over the region’s oil. “If we’re capable of mounting an Afghan resistance against the Soviets,” Wolfowitz told me, “we could have been capable of mounting an Arab resistance.”
Bush was not entirely unsympathetic to this approach, but neither Rumsfeld nor Wolfowitz could persuade him to divert his attention from Afghanistan and the broader War on Terror. Wolfowitz deferred to Bush’s priority, ultimately helping devise the strategy that toppled the Taliban in Afghanistan. But he, Feith, and their civilian colleagues at the Pentagon did not relinquish the idea of regime change in Iraq. They were incensed by Hussein’s gloating over the 9/11 attack. And they were convinced that he was dangerous.
Bush’s attention did not gravitate to Iraq until the fall, after anthrax spores circulated through the U.S. mail, killing several postal workers, and turned up in a Senate office building and at a facility handling White House mail. On October 18, sensors inside the White House alerted staff to the presence of a deadly toxin; it was a false alarm, but one that intensified worries about an attack with biological or chemical weapons.
Bush and his advisers were troubled by what they thought they knew about Iraq, though assessing Hussein’s intentions and capabilities was difficult. The Iraqi dictator had expelled international inspectors in 1998, leaving the CIA unable to collect information. But analysts were convinced that Hussein could not be trusted to have destroyed all of the weapons of mass destruction he’d previously possessed. Their suspicions were reinforced when an Iraqi defector claimed that Iraq had established mobile biological-weapons-production plants and now possessed “capabilities surpassing the pre–Gulf War era.”
From the January/February 2004 issue: Spies, lies, and weapons: what went wrong
Michael Morell, the president’s CIA briefer, insisted to me that someone reexamining the available evidence at the time would still conclude that Hussein “had a chemical-weapons capability, that he had chemical weapons stockpiled, that he had a biological-weapons-production capability, and he was restarting a nuclear program. Today you would come to that judgment based on what was on that table.” But what was on the table, Morell told me, was circumstantial and suspect, much of it coming from Iraqi Kurdish foes of the regime. Morell acknowledged that he should have said, “Mr. President, here is what we think … But what you really need to know is that we have low confidence in that judgment and here is why.” Instead, Morell was telling the president that Hussein “had a chemical-weapons program. He’s got a biological-weapons-production capability.”
Bush and his top advisers were predisposed to think that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. This was true not only of the hawks in the administration. Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice believed that Hussein possessed WMDs. So did State Department analysts and their counterparts in the CIA and at the National Security Agency. They disagreed about the purpose of aluminum tubes and about Iraq’s acquisition of uranium yellowcake, and they were aware that Hussein would need five to seven years to develop a nuclear weapon once the regime began working on it again. Nevertheless, they thought they knew that Iraq had biological and chemical weapons, or could develop them quickly, and that Hussein aspired to reconstitute a nuclear program.
Foreign-intelligence partners concurred. Tony Blair and his most trusted advisers felt the same way. Nobody told Bush that Hussein did not have WMDs.
Hussein had been seriously hampered by sanctions and the presence of inspectors. But now the inspectors were gone, and the sanctions were disappearing. The conundrum facing U.S. policy makers was how to contain Hussein if the sanctions regime ended and if United Nations monitors did not return. “I wasn’t worried about what he would do in 2001,” Wolfowitz told me. “I was worried about what he would do in 2010 if the existing containment … collapsed.”
Hussein was not doing much to allay American fears. He was using his oil revenues to leverage support from France, China, and Russia to end UN sanctions. He had not ceased providing support for terrorist activity in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, some of which targeted American aid workers. And reports of his pervasive repressions inside Iraq persisted.
Read: Britain’s Iraq war reckoning
At the same time, Hussein was investing his growing financial reserves in strengthening Iraq’s military-industrial complex and acquiring materials that could be used for chemical and biological weapons. According to British intelligence, the Iraqis were still concealing information about 31,000 chemical munitions, 4,000 tons of chemicals that could be used for weapons, and large quantities of material that could be employed for the production of biological weapons.
Such assessments held through the winter. “Iraq continues to pursue its WMD programmes,” concluded the British Joint Intelligence Committee in February 2002. “If it has not already done so, Iraq could produce significant quantities of biological warfare agents within days and chemical warfare agents within weeks of a decision to do so.”
“I have no doubt we need to deal with Saddam,” Blair had written to Bush in the fall of 2001. But if we “hit Iraq now,” Blair had warned, “we would lose the Arab world, Russia, probably half the EU and my fear is the impact on Pakistan.” Far better to deliberate quietly and avoid public debate “until we know exactly what we want to do; and how we can do it.” Bush agreed.
“President bush believed,” Rumsfeld subsequently wrote, “that the key to successful diplomacy with Saddam was a credible threat of military action. We hoped that the process of moving an increasing number of American forces into a position where they could attack Iraq might convince the Iraqis to end their defiance.” As Stephen Hadley, the deputy national security adviser during Bush’s first term, told me: “We thought it would coerce him … to do what the international community asked, which is either destroy the WMD or show us that you destroyed it. That was it. Either do it or, if you’ve already done it, show it, prove it.”
Bush wanted to use the threat of force to resume inspections and gain confidence that Iraq did not possess WMDs that might fall into the hands of terrorists or be used to blackmail the U.S. in the future. But he also wanted to use the threat of force to remove Hussein from power. He did not really know which of these goals had priority. He never clearly sorted out these overlapping yet conflicting impulses, even as each seemed to become more compelling.
“The best way to get Saddam to come into compliance with UN demands,” wrote Cheney in his memoir, In My Time, “was to convince him we would use force.” Prominent Democrats did not disagree. In early February 2002, Senator Joseph Biden, the Democratic chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, held hearings dealing with the State Department’s request for the 2003 budget. Secretary Powell emphasized that the War on Terror was his No. 1 priority. There were regimes, Powell said, that not only supported terror but were developing WMDs. They “could provide the wherewithal to terrorist organizations to use these sorts of things against us.”
Biden asked whether this meant that the president was announcing a new policy of preemption, as foreign allies thought he was doing. After Powell denied this allegation, Biden proclaimed his own fears about the proliferation of WMDs, especially in Iraq. “I happen to be one that thinks that one way or another Saddam has got to go and it is likely to be required to have U.S. force to have him go,” he said. “The question is how to do it, in my view, not if to do it.”
Intelligence reports over the following months did not ease Bush’s anxieties. What alarmed the president was new information that al-Qaeda was seeking biological and chemical weapons, alongside the knowledge that Iraq had had them and used them.
In late May 2002, analysts reported that al-Qaeda operatives were moving into Baghdad, including the high-ranking jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. “Other individuals associated with al-Qaida,” the head of the State Department’s intelligence office informed Powell, “are operating in Baghdad and are in contact with colleagues who, in turn, may be more directly involved in attack planning.” Since 9/11, there had been little al-Qaeda activity in Iraq, and experts disagreed about the nature of the relationship between the Iraqi dictator and Osama bin Laden. Hardly anyone thought Iraq had anything to do with 9/11, but, according to a postwar Senate investigation, there were “a dozen or so reports of varying reliability mentioning the involvement of Iraq or Iraqi nationals in al-Qa’ida’s efforts to obtain” chemical- and biological-warfare training.
From the July/August 2006 issue: The short, violent life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
Al-Zarqawi was a known terrorist, a Jordanian who had fought in Afghanistan, met with bin Laden, and managed his own training camps in Herat. Already notorious for his toughness, radicalism, and barbarity, he lusted to wreak revenge on Americans. Reports of al-Zarqawi’s presence in Iraq came shortly before U.S. policy makers received information about an Iraqi procurement agent’s activity in Australia. Allegedly, this agent was seeking to buy GPS software that would allow the regime to map American cities. Might the Iraqi dictator be plotting a WMD attack inside the United States?
Al-Zarqawi was also collaborating with Ansar al-Islam, an Islamist extremist group that was battling a mainline Kurdish party for control of northeastern Iraq. A small CIA team had infiltrated the region near the city of Khurmal and reported in July that al-Zarqawi had begun experimenting with biological and chemical agents that terrorists could put in ventilation systems. According to one of the CIA agents, “they were full-bore on biological and chemical warfare … They were doing a lot of testing on donkeys, rabbits, mice, and other animals.”
In Washington, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored military action in Khurmal. So did Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz. They did not believe that al-Qaeda would be in Iraq—even a part not controlled by Hussein—without the dictator’s acquiescence. Their suspicions grew when information placed al-Zarqawi and other al-Qaeda fighters in Baghdad. The CIA agents in Iraq saw no evidence that the al-Qaeda operatives were linked to Hussein, but everyone they spoke with believed that Hussein had WMDs.
Bush said he would act with “deliberation,” employing only the best intelligence. But the intelligence was murky, leading to contentious assessments, conflicting judgments, and uncertain recommendations. Sometimes, the president overstated the evidence he had. Hussein’s a threat, Bush told the press corps in November 2002, “because he is dealing with al-Qaeda.” Although this was an exaggeration, Bush did know that al-Zarqawi had been in Baghdad, had links to al-Qaeda, and was experimenting with biological and chemical weapons. And he knew that Hussein supported suicide bombings and celebrated their “martyrs.”
Bush chose not to authorize military action in Khurmal. On July 31, he told Blair that he had not yet decided on war—that he might give the Iraqi dictator one more chance to abide by his promises to allow inspections and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, however, the president instructed General Franks to proceed with his war planning.
Although Bush had not resolved whether he meant to disarm or depose the Iraqi dictator, he mobilized public and congressional support for his policies. In October, the House approved a resolution authorizing him to use military force, by a vote of 296–133, and the Senate did the same, 77–23. The political effort in Washington was matched by a diplomatic one in New York. On November 8, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1441, which demanded inspections and stipulated that the Iraqi regime was already in breach of past resolutions. In the administration’s view, this provided justification for the U.S. to take unilateral action if it chose to do so.
Bush was practicing coercive diplomacy, hoping to achieve his goals through intimidation. “We were giving Saddam one final choice,” his British partner in this policy, Blair, explained in 2011. If Hussein proved recalcitrant, the president’s credibility—and America’s—would be at risk, in which case coercive diplomacy would have to end with a military intervention. The costs of that intervention, however, had not been calculated.
Bush did want a free, democratic Iraq to emerge if he resorted to military action, but he had spent little time discussing the institutions, policies, and expenditures that would be required to translate the liberation of Iraq into a better life for its citizens. In a meeting with General Franks, Bush asked, “Can we win?”
“Yes, sir,” said Franks.
“Can we get rid of Saddam?” the president asked again.
“Yes, sir,” said his general.
The president did not ask, “What then?”
After the invasion turned into a chaotic, dysfunctional occupation and Iraq’s alleged WMDs were not found, Bush instructed his director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, to establish a special mission named the Iraq Survey Group to investigate what had happened to these deadly armaments. The group’s first director, David Kay, appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2004: “Let me begin,” he admitted, “by saying that we were almost all wrong” about Iraqi WMD programs. Though chastened by the misreading of Iraqi capabilities, Kay did not think that intelligence analysts had misled policy makers about the fundamental threat. “I think the world is far safer with the disappearance and removal of Saddam Hussein.”
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The survey group’s second chief, Charles Duelfer, oversaw part of the interrogation of Saddam Hussein after U.S. forces captured him in December 2003. Duelfer dwelled on Hussein’s “controlling presence.” Hussein “was not a cartoon,” Duelfer emphasized. “He was catastrophically brilliant and extremely talented in a black, insidious way,” much like Joseph Stalin, the leader whom Hussein most wanted to emulate. And his aspirations were clear: to thwart Iran, defeat Israel, and dominate the region. To achieve these goals, Hussein yearned to acquire WMDs.
That was Duelfer’s conclusion when, in September 2004, he delivered the final, comprehensive report of the survey group. The evidence appeared conclusive: Iraq did not have WMD stockpiles, nor any active programs. But “it was very clear,” Duelfer later wrote in his memoir, Hide and Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq, “that Saddam complied with UN disarmament restrictions only as a tactic.” Hussein’s overriding objectives, the survey group affirmed, were to bring sanctions to an end and to move ahead with securing WMDs. “Virtually” no senior Iraqi leader “believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever.” Denied his desire to be executed by firing squad, Hussein was hanged in prison on December 30, 2006.
Bush decided, initially, to confront Hussein—not invade Iraq. The president feared another attack, one perhaps even more dire than 9/11. Rogue states like Iraq, Bush worried, might share the world’s deadliest weapons with terrorists who desperately wanted to inflict pain on America, puncture its air of invincibility, undermine its institutions, and make Americans doubt the value of their freedoms.
Yet fear alone did not shape the president’s strategy. Bush’s faith in American might was equally important. From the outset of his administration, he aimed to expand American military capabilities, which already far exceeded those of any other nation. The use of airpower, special forces, and new technologies to expel the Taliban from Kabul in 2001 reinforced his sense of strength. America’s reach appeared to have no bounds. Washington, he felt, must not be dissuaded from helping its friends and protecting its interests, especially in regions harboring crucial raw materials and energy reserves. The U.S. had the power to do so and needed to demonstrate it.
Fear and power were reinforced by hubris. Bush insisted that all people wanted to live by American values—to be free to say what they pleased and pray as they wished. If the United States overthrew a brutal dictator, American officials could take satisfaction in knowing that they were enriching the lives of his benighted subjects.
Spurred by fear, growing confidence in American power, and a sense of moral virtue, Bush embraced coercive diplomacy. The strategy was appealing because almost everyone surrounding Bush believed that Hussein’s defiance would not cease until he was confronted by superior force. But the strategy was adopted without a clear goal—regime change or WMD elimination.
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When, after the invasion, those weapons were not found, Bush shifted to a more ideological discourse. “The failure of Iraq democracy,” he warned, “would embolden terrorists around the world … Success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran—that freedom can be the future of every nation.” When the U.S. got locked in an insurrectionary struggle and Islamic fundamentalism surged, neither Bush’s goals nor his strategy appeared to make sense. His critics mocked his naivete, accused him of dishonesty, and ridiculed his democratic zealotry.
These critics underestimated Bush’s qualities and misconstrued his thinking. Bush failed not because he was a weak leader, a naive ideologue, or a manipulative liar. He was always fully in charge of the administration’s Iraq policy, and he did not rush to war. He went to war not to make Iraq democratic but to remove a murderous dictator who intended to restart his weapons programs, supported suicide missions, and cultivated links with terrorist groups (even if not, actually, al-Qaeda).
In those narrow aims, Bush succeeded. Another attack on American soil did not occur and he did eliminate a brutal, erratic, and dangerous tyrant. But he did not achieve that at an acceptable cost. The war proved catastrophic for Iraq. Over the ensuing years, more than 200,000 Iraqis perished as a result of the war, insurrection, and civic strife, and more than 9 million people—about a third of the prewar population—were internally displaced or fled abroad.
The intervention also exacted a human, financial, economic, and psychological toll on the United States that hardly anyone had foreseen. The war enhanced Iranian power in the Persian Gulf, diverted attention and resources from the ongoing struggle inside Afghanistan, divided America’s European allies, and provided additional opportunity for China’s rise and Russia’s revanchism. The conflict besmirched America’s reputation and heightened anti-Americanism. It fueled the sense of grievance among Muslims, accentuated perceptions of American arrogance, complicated the struggle against terrorism, and dampened hopes for democracy and peace among Arabs and Jews in the Middle East. Rather than having spread liberty, the president and his advisers left office witnessing the worldwide recession of freedom.
Fear, power, and hubris explain America’s march to war in Iraq. By thinking otherwise, by simplifying the story and believing that all would be well if we only had more honest officials, stronger leaders, and more realistic policy makers, we delude ourselves. Tragedy occurs not because our leaders are naive, stupid, and corrupt. Tragedy occurs when earnest and responsible officials try their best to make America safer and end up making things much worse. We need to ask why this happens. We need to appreciate the dangers that lurk when there is too much fear, too much power, too much hubris—and insufficient prudence.
This article is adapted from Confronting Saddam Hussein: George W. Bush and the Invasion of Iraq.
