個人資料
正文

任何領導人的外交政策都會考慮國內政治

(2023-07-09 08:29:11) 下一個

任何領導人在做出外交政策決定時都不會不考慮國內政治

 
Renewing American Statecraft
This commentary series from the Carnegie Endowment’s American Statecraft Program offers space for fresh ideas and alternative points of view on major questions of U.S. foreign policy.
 
AARON DAVID MILLER By APRIL 10, 2023
If location is the most important factor in shaping U.S. worldview, then the past decade’s events have strengthened—and muddled—that interplay.
 
By MATTHEW DUSS  MARCH 22, 2023
Biden has signaled he would sign the repeal of the Iraq AUMFs. The war on terror should be next.
 
By JENNIFER KAVANAGH  FEBRUARY 08, 2023
Despite Tokyo’s significant commitments to increased spending, its transition may be too slow to affect U.S. military planning or to reduce the U.S. regional defense burden.
 
By JENNIFER KAVANAGH  NOVEMBER 28, 2022
It responds to an increasingly challenging security environment not by growing the DOD’s responsibilities, but by refining and focusing its commitments.
 
亞倫·大衛·米勒 (Aaron David Miller) 2023 年 1 月 18 日 亞倫·大衛·米勒 (Aaron David Miller) 是卡內基國際和平基金會的高級研究員,主要研究美國外交政策。
 
摘要: 政治是民主的必要組成部分,但往往是不方便的部分。
 
相關媒體和工具
 
讓我們嚐試一個小實驗。 詢問五十位現任或前任美國外交官或外交政策學者(尤其是現實主義者),外交政策是否應該受到國內政治的重大影響。 我敢打賭大多數人不會隻是說不,而是絕對不。 他們認為,國家外交政策的製定實在是太重要了,不能交給那些沒有畢生致力於國際關係複雜性的實踐和研究的人,尤其是政客——其中一些人是黑客或黑客。 思想家和所有這些人都成為了人質,尤其是在當今,受製於政黨的基礎。
 
我明白了。 但這裏有一個快訊要告訴你:認為美國外交政策可以在一個與世隔絕的實驗室裏,由臨床精確的創始人根據許多經常不方便的現實,特別是國內政治製定的期望是錯誤的。 政治是民主的命脈。 它們是交易中必要且不可避免的一部分,盡管有時會帶來極大的不便。 原因如下。
 
我相信宇宙中存在著一種叫做國家利益的東西。 確定這一點應主要基於什麽對美國國家安全和外交政策利益有利,不受國內事務和其他非外交政策優先事項的汙染、束縛和玷汙。 它淩駕於政治之上。 就像《星際迷航》中物質和反物質的混合一樣,當政治和外交政策混合在一起時,災難就會隨之而來。 根本不應該允許它們占據宇宙中的同一空間。
 
假設你對某個問題有強烈的感受——例如以色列-巴勒斯坦和平,或美國對華政策。 你認為美國的利益正在受到損害,因為前者對以色列太過溺愛,而後者對北京采取本能的強硬立場,這似乎排擠了其他可能緩解衝突並符合美國利益的做法。 如果不是那些熱衷於支持以色列和攻擊中國的該死的政客,我們會過得更好,對吧?
 
更重要的是,國家利益太重要了,不能交給政客、遊說者或公眾——他們中沒有人真正關心或了解足夠的信息來做出正確的決定。
 
相反,它應該委托給國務院或前國家安全界成員,他們是外交政策專家,知道什麽對美國最有利,或者委托給總統,他們應該做出艱難且希望是正確的決定。 人們期望這些決定將基於最有利於國家利益的決定,而不管國內政治、國會和公眾輿論的影響如何。
 
但事情並不總是這樣。 世界上沒有一個領導人,無論是民主領導人還是獨裁領導人,在製定外交政策時都會考慮國內政治。 領導者常常受到政治的驅動,並受到相互競爭的優先事項的限製。 如今,民主黨和共和黨在關鍵外交政策挑戰方麵達成了相當多的共識:我們需要對中國采取強硬態度,對伊朗采取真正強硬態度,並大力支持烏克蘭對抗俄羅斯。 這些不僅僅是頭條新聞,而且是可能會持續很長一段時間的趨勢線。
 
當總統們麵對高度兩極分化、黨派之爭、外交政策上罕見的兩黨合作的美國時,他們該怎麽辦?
 
此外,現實是外交政策和國內政策現在比以往任何時候都更加緊密地聯係在一起。 美國民主的倒退重新讓人們關注關注美國製度的重要性,外交政策精英們逐漸認識到,我們經濟的韌性、工業基礎以及創新和競爭能力是我們海外實力的關鍵。 這位國家安全顧問談到了讓美國外交政策為中產階級服務,並在確定總統喬·拜登在上任頭兩年使經濟更具彈性的關鍵成就時首先列出了這一點,這絕非巧合。
 
但祝你好運,試圖將所謂的國家利益與總統本人的個性、公眾形象、個人世界觀以及變幻莫測的事件和福爾圖納分開。 對美國有利的因素往往與對總統有利的因素混在一起,包括他自己的優先事項和傾向、相互競爭的國內政策選擇、選舉現實以及影響當前外交政策問題的國際限製。
 
美國的製度遠非完美。 創始人擔心特殊利益,而媒體、金錢和遊說團體的結合對美國政治產生了腐敗的影響。 但正如政治學家愛德華·科文(Edward Corwin)所觀察到的那樣,美國的製度,無論好壞,都在公開邀請人們進行鬥爭——不僅在政府的三個部門之間,而且在遊說團體、公共利益團體和政府之間。
 
組織、競爭並盡力而為——這就是美國方式。 但不要為此發牢騷和抱怨。 並且不要僅僅因為這樣就認為你有資格在外交政策領域為所欲為。
 
聽到我的一些國務院同事抱怨國會施加的限製,我感到非常惱火。 一位國務院高級官員曾憤怒地大發雷霆:國會對希諾拉的美國外交政策一無所知。 這可能是真的。 但認為國務院擁有所有答案的想法也是荒謬的。 我不希望國務院完全控製美國的外交政策,就像我不希望國會負責一樣。
 
沒有什麽比聽我的外國對話者,尤其是來自獨裁國家的對話者,不斷談論我們功能失調的體係更讓我感到不舒服的了。 一位非常高級的沙特官員曾經告訴我,在他看來,國會就是小議會,而比我願意數的更多歐洲和阿拉伯外交官隻是假設白宮是以色列占領的領土。 沙特領導人隻希望美國的親阿拉伯社區能夠像親以色列社區一樣有影響力。
 
總統的聲音是外交政策中最重要的聲音,無論是作為一個實際問題,還是作為美國憲法規定的權力的結果。 此外,與國會或最高法院不同的是,總統是政府的 24/7 Energizer Bunny,不會參加和休會,但他也沒有也不應該擁有自由支配的權力。 在美國的民主政體中,他領導著一個喧鬧的競爭性體係,在這個體係中,各種因素相互爭鬥,要麽表達自己的觀點,要麽限製他的觀點。
 
卡內基的相關分析
 
新國防戰略與其前任戰略有微妙但重大的區別
 
政治——無論是與總統選舉有關的政治,還是與其他國內優先事項有關的政治——都不是在暗室裏醞釀的邪惡陰謀。 它們是國內和外交政策中自然而然、不可避免的貨幣。
 
聰明的總統有技巧、任性且幸運——尤其是在世界上的困難地區(如中東)——可以找到一種方法來完成任務、克服國內遊說、管理國內政治並進一步推動國家發展。 對這一過程的興趣(參見理查德·尼克鬆和喬治·H·W·布什)。 其他人則沒有那麽幸運(參見喬治·W·布什關於伊拉克的問題)。
 
但是,就像牛頓的萬有引力定律一樣,沒有一位總統能夠逃脫統治美國體係的政治規則。 國內政治就像蘋果派一樣古老、不可避免、美國化。 有升必有降。 有時,美國總統能做的最好的事情就是確保蘋果不會砸到他的頭上。
 

No Leader Makes Foreign Policy Decisions Without Considering Domestic Politics

https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/18/no-leader-makes-foreign-policy-decisions-without-considering-domestic-politics-pub-88820

Aaron David Miller  January 18, 2023 Aaron David Miller is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, focusing on U.S. foreign policy.
 
 
Summary:  Politics are a necessary and often inconvenient part of democracy.
Related Media and Tools

Let’s try a little experiment. Ask fifty current or former U.S. diplomats or foreign policy academic types (especially realists) whether foreign policy should be influenced significantly by domestic politics. I’m betting the majority wouldn’t just say no, but hell no. They would argue that the formulation of the nation’s foreign policy is simply too important to be left in the hands of anyone who hasn’t devoted a lifetime of practice and study to the complexities of international relations, especially politicians—some of whom are hacks or ideologues and all of whom are hostage, especially these days, to a party’s base.

I get all that. But here’s a news flash for you: the expectation that U.S. foreign policy can somehow be made in an heremetically sealed lab with clinical precision founders on any number of often inconvenient realities, especially domestic politics, is false. Politics are democracy’s lifeblood. They are a necessary and inevitable, if at times hugely inconvenient, part of the deal. And here’s why. 

I believe that there exists in the universe something called the national interest. And determining it should be based primarly on what is good for American national security and foreign policy interests untainted, untethered, and unsullied by domestic matters and other non-foreign-policy priorities. It’s above politics. And like mixing matter and anti-matter in a Star Trek episode, when politics and foreign policy intermingle, disaster follows. They simply shouldn’t be allowed to occupy the same space in the universe. 

Say you feel strongly about an issue—Israeli-Palestinian peace, for example, or U.S. policy toward China. You think U.S. interests are being harmed because in the first there’s far too much coddling of Israel and on the second there’s a reflexive get-tough position toward Beijing that seems to crowd out other approaches that might just ameliorate conflict and serve U.S. interests. If it wasn’t for those damn politicians who love supporting Israel and bashing China, we’d be a whole lot better off, right?

Even more crucially, the national interest is simply too important to be left to the politicians, the lobbyists, or the public—none of whom really care enough or know enough to make the right decisions. 

Instead, it should be entrusted to the Department of State or ex-members of the national security community who are foreign policy experts and know what’s best for America, or to the president, who is supposed to make the tough and hopefully right calls. The expectation is that those decisions will be based on what’s best for the national interest, regardless of the pull of domestic politics, Congress, and public opinion. 

But it doesn’t always work that way. No leader in the world—democratic or authoritarian—makes foreign policy without taking domestic politics into account. Leaders are often driven by politics and constrained by competing priorities. And it just so happens these days that there’s a fair amount of consensus between Democrats and Republicans when it comes to key foreign policy challenges: we need to be tough on China, really tough on Iran, and very supportive of Ukraine against Russia. These aren’t headlines only but trend lines that are likely to hang around for a good long while.

What are presidents to do when they’re confronted with a highly polarized and partisan America with a rare amont of bipartisanship in foreign policy?

Then there’s the reality that foreign policy and domestic policy are now more inextricably linked than ever before. U.S. democratic backsliding has renewed focused  on the importance of tending to American institutions, and it’s dawned on the foreign policy elite that the resilience of our economy, industrial base, and capacity to innovate and compete are key to our strength abroad. It can’t be a coincidence that the national security adviser talks about making American foreign policy work for the middle class and lists first in identifying President Joe Biden’s key accomplishment in his first two years making the economy more resilient.

But good luck in trying to separate the so-called national interest from the president’s own personality, public persona, personal worldview, and the vagaries of events and Fortuna. What’s good for the United States is often mixed together with what’s good for a president, including his own priorities and inclinations, competing domestic policy choices, election realities, and international constraints that bear on the foreign policy matter at hand. 

The U.S. system is far from perfect. The founders feared special interests, and the marriage of media, money, and lobbies has had a corrupting influence on American politics. But as political scientist Edward Corwin observed, the U.S. system, for better or worse, is an open invitation to struggle—not just among the three branches of government but among lobbies, public interest groups, and the government. 

Organize, compete, and take your best shot—that’s the American way. But don’t whine and complain about it. And don’t think that you’re somehow entitled to have your way in the foreign policy arena just because. 

It annoyed me to no end to hear some of my State Department colleagues complain about the constraints imposed by the Hill. Exasperated, a very senior State Department official once exploded: Congress doesn’t know shit from Shinola about U.S. foreign policy. That might be true. But the notion that the State Department has all the answers is ludicrous too. I would no more want the department to have complete control of U.S. foreign policy any more than I’d want Congress in charge.

And nothing offends me more to listen to my foreign interlocutors, especially the ones from authoritarian countries, go on and on about our dysfunctional system. A very senior Saudi official once told me that in his view, Congress was the Little Knesset, and more European and Arab diplomats than I care to count just assume that the White House is Israeli-occupied territory. Saudi leaders only wish the pro-Arab community in America were as influential as the pro-Israeli one. 

The president’s voice is the most important one on foreign policy, both as a practical matter and as a consequence of the powers laid out in the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, unlike the Congress or the Supreme Court, the president is the 24/7 Energizer Bunny of government and doesn’t go in and out of session—but he doesn’t and shouldn’t have a free hand either. In America’s democratic polity, he presides over a cacophonous, competitive system in which various elements fight to make their case or constrain his. 

And politics—both those that pertain to the election of presidents and to their other domestic priorities—aren’t evil conspiracies hatched in dark rooms. They are the natural, inevitable currency in which business is done in both domestic and foreign policy. 

Smart presidents who are skillful, willful, and lucky—particularly when it comes to tough regions of the world (see the Middle East)—can find a way to get stuff done, overcome domestic lobbies, manage their domestic politics, and further the national interest in the process (see Richard Nixon and George H.W. Bush). Others aren’t so lucky (see George W. Bush on Iraq).

But, like Newton’s law of universal gravitation, no president escapes the political rules that govern the American system. Domestic politics are as old, inevitable, and American as apple pie. What goes up must come down. And sometimes, the best an American president can do is to make sure the apple doesn’t hit him on the head.

This piece is part of the Renewing American Statecraft series.

End of document

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

[ 打印 ]
閱讀 ()評論 (0)
評論
目前還沒有任何評論
登錄後才可評論.