這句話來自哲學家康德，最近頻繁被引用。羅振宇老師在跨年演講中濃墨重彩地致敬了，羅翔老師、劉擎老師也分別在不同的節目中提到它。也許整個社會都到了要重溫這樣一個聲音的時期。
我也談一點心理學層麵的理解。
手段的意思，就是另有目的。手段隻有實現其目的才有價值。把人當成手段，就是把價值建立在通過「人」實現一點別的什麽上。那麽康德說：沒有別的，人成為「人」已經是終極的價值了。
心理學是基於現實的學科。相比這種對宏大價值的討論——比如人何以成為「人」——我們更關心的是： 它對於普通人的生活意義何在？事實證明，這個命題影響了大多數人的 生活體驗，它牽涉到我們在日常生活中的，一種時時刻刻的隱秘的自我拷問： 我是否還有比現在更值得的活法？
比如，多創造點價值，會不會更好？
聽上去是很積極的人生觀。可一旦接受它，也就要接受它的推論：創造的價值少了，人生就（相對）沒有意義。而無法創造價值的人，對這個世界就是可有可無的存在。這是必須警惕的觀念。
人可以創造價值，這隻是他工具性的一麵。 但人絕不等同於自己創造的價值。我花一小時賺100塊錢，而我這段時間並非隻值這100塊而已。否則，是否給我100塊，再把這一小時從我生命中抹掉，我沒有任何損失呢？——再推一步，是否給一個人足夠多的錢，就可以買斷他的生命呢？
結論當然很荒謬。荒謬的起點始於把人當成手段，簡化為交換某一個產出——100塊也好，造福世人也好——的籌碼。這必定導向人自身存在的危機：假如有人一小時掙2000塊，我該怎麽辦呢？是否他們同等的生命比我更有份量？假如我身邊就有這樣的人，我的人生是否就不值得一活？
這是一旦開始就不能回頭的歧途。
有一個關於登山的隱喻說：人為什麽要登山呢？就因為 山在那裏。——而不是山頂上有什麽榮譽或是秘寶。如果把登山的意義看成必須到達山頂， 假如不幸沒有到達呢（迷路了，路被堵死了，或者登上山頂發現什麽都沒有 ），整個旅途都將變得一文不值。所以，登山的意義隻能在於登山。
活著的意義也隻是活著，而非做到了什麽就會有額外的增值。活著就是活著本身，活著的同時順便做到一些事。多或者少，好或者壞，那些事當然可以被評價被比較，但不涉及到人的價值命題。
這不是從哲學的角度論證一套理想主義的說辭。而是站在心理學的立場，一個人要保持對生活的熱情（或者說得消極點，保持不那麽抑鬱），在沒什麽值得誇耀的豐功偉業時，隻能多用一用這種價值判斷。當然了，滿世界都是「你明明什麽都沒做，這話隻不過是給自己找借口」的噪音，在多大程度上能保持這種觀念不受影響，那是另一回事。
心理谘詢師考慮問題很實際。如果對整個「人生」保持這樣一種態度有些強人所難， 不妨從一個小時開始。每天拿出一個小時時間，其他時候你可以忙忙碌碌，用產出多少為時間定價。但這一個小時是屬於你的。這一小時是目的，不是手段。
你想怎麽用它就怎麽用。
這不等於要你什麽都不做，想做什麽隨便你 。隻是不用給你做的事標價，一旦標價就會一步一步落入前麵的陷阱：我用一個小時做谘詢可以賺幾百塊，卻用它寫了這篇文章，隻換到比如幾十塊錢的打賞，那這段時間就不劃算。更不用說拿來睡覺或是看風景，一毛錢產出都沒有。這樣推論下去，一秒鍾都浪費不起，總是能找到更有效率的方式安排眼前這一刻（哪怕連睡眠都應該很高效）。
人就把最後一點「人」的屬性也異化了。
收回來，不要標價。
隻要不標價，它就是無價的。度過這一小時本身是這一小時的主要目的，至於實現了什麽根本不重要。一個小孩趴在地上一小時，畫一幅自己也不甚滿意的塗鴉，然後漫不盡心地忘在腦後。但他度過的這段時間仍然充實且快樂。與一個把畫稿拍賣出天價的藝術家不分高下。再退一步，不充實不快樂又怎麽樣？那也是一個人度過一小時啊。
試試看，說不定在不追求做成什麽的心態下，沒有負擔，反而能不知不覺地做成一些事呢？
在無所用心時產出的結果，也許沒有價值，也可能價值不菲。但這個說法最好到此為止。否則，這段時間也會被當成「為達成某種意外驚喜而刻意布置」的手段。就像人們經常問的：「這樣做有什麽好處？」事實是未必有好處，但每個人仍然需要有一些時間像這樣活著。因為人畢竟是人。
Immanuel Kant. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals
伊曼紐爾·康德 道德形而上學的基礎
https://dbs-lin.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/personalitaet/index.php?cp=document&id=32
(1785)
Section Two
Transition from popular moral wisdom to the metaphysics of morals
第二節
從大眾道德智慧到道德形而上學的轉變
<...> Now I say: the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not just as a means for any use for this or that will, but must in all his be directed towards himself as well as towards others actions directed at rational beings can at all times also be regarded as ends. All objects of affection have only a conditional value; for if the affections and needs based on them were not there, their object would be worthless. But the inclinations themselves, as sources of want, have so little absolute worth to desire them themselves, that rather to be wholly free of them must be the common desire of every rational being.
現在我說：人類和一般意義上的每一個理性存在本身都是作為目的而存在的，而不僅僅是作為實現這個或那個意誌的任何用途的手段，而是必須在他的所有行為中都指向他自己以及指向他人的行為 理性存在者在任何時候都可以被視為目的。 所有感情對象都隻有一個有條件的價值； 因為如果基於它們的情感和需求不存在，它們的對象就毫無價值。 但是，作為匱乏之源的傾向本身並沒有什麽絕對價值去渴望它們本身，以致於完全擺脫它們必定是每一個有理性的人的共同願望。
Therefore the value of all objects to be acquired through our action is always conditioned. the beings, whose existence does not depend on our will but on nature, but if they are unreasonable beings they have only a relative value, as means, and are therefore called things, whereas rational beings are called persons because their nature already designates them as ends characterizes itself, ie as something that must not be used merely as a means, thus insofar as it limits all arbitrariness (and is an object of respect).
因此，通過我們的行動獲得的所有對象的價值總是有條件的。 存在者，其存在不取決於我們的意誌，而是取決於自然，但如果它們是非理性的存在者，那麽它們隻有相對價值，即手段，因此被稱為事物，而理性的存在者被稱為人，因為他們的本性已經將他們指定為 目的將自身特征化，即不能僅僅作為手段使用的東西，因此就它限製所有的任意性而言（並且是尊重的對象）。
These are not, therefore, merely subjective ends, the existence of which has value for us as the effect of our action; but objective ends, i.e. things whose existence is in itself an end, and such an end in place of which no other end can be set, which they should only serve as a means, because without this nothing of absolute value would be found anywhere become;
因此，這些不僅僅是主觀目的，它們的存在作為我們行動的結果對我們來說是有價值的； 但客觀目的，即其存在本身就是目的的事物，這種目的不能設置其他目的，它們隻能作為一種手段，因為沒有這個，任何地方都找不到絕對價值 ;
So if there is to be a supreme practical principle and a categorical imperative with regard to the human will, it must be one that derives from the conception of what is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, an objective constitutes the principle of the will, and can therefore serve as a general practical law. The reason for this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself.
This is how man necessarily imagines his own existence; so far, therefore, it is a subjective principle of human actions. In the same way, however, every other rational being imagines its existence according to the same rationale that also applies to me [2].; therefore it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical reason, all laws of the will must be able to be derived. The practical imperative will therefore be as follows: act in such a way that you use humanity both in your person and in the person of everyone else at all times as an end and never merely as a means. We want to see if this can be done.
這就是人必然想象自己存在的方式； 因此，到目前為止，它是人類行為的主觀原則。 然而，以同樣的方式，每一個其他有理性的人都根據同樣適用於我的基本原理來想象它的存在 [2]。 因此，它同時也是一個客觀原則，作為最高的實踐理性，所有意誌法則都必須能夠從中推導出來。 因此，實際的命令如下：以這樣一種方式行事，即您始終將人性和其他所有人的人性作為目的，而不僅僅是作為手段。 我們想看看這是否可以做到。
To stay with the previous examples, first of all, after the concept of the necessary duty to oneself, the one who deals with suicide will ask himself whether his action can coexist with the idea of ??humanity as an end in itself. If, in order to escape from a difficult condition, he destroys himself, he is using a person merely as a means of maintaining a tolerable condition until the end of life. But man is not a thing, and therefore not something that can only be used as a means, but must always be regarded as an end in himself in all his actions. Therefore I can dispose of nothing over the man in my person, to maim, to spoil, or to kill him. (The more detailed definition of this principle to avoid any misunderstanding, e.g. the amputation of limbs to save myself, the danger I expose my life to in order to save my life, etc., I must pass by here; it belongs to actual morality.)
Secondly, as far as the necessary or owed duty towards others is concerned, he who intends to make a lying promise towards others will immediately see that he only wants to use another person as a means, without the latter at the same time having the end in it abstain. Because the one whom I want to use for my intentions by such a promise cannot possibly agree with my way of proceeding against him and therefore himself contain the purpose of this action. This conflict with other people's principles becomes more apparent when examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others are cited. For then it is clear that the violator of the rights of men is minded to use the person of others merely as a means, without considering[3] .
其次，就對他人的必要或應盡的義務而言，有意向他人作出虛假承諾的人會立即看到他隻是想利用他人作為手段，而後者同時沒有目的 在其中棄權。 因為我想要通過這樣的承諾來實現我的意圖的那個人不可能同意我對他采取行動的方式，因此他自己包含了這個行動的目的。 當引用攻擊他人自由和財產的例子時，這種與他人原則的衝突變得更加明顯。 因為很明顯，侵犯人權者的意圖隻是將他人作為一種手段，而不考慮
Thirdly, with regard to the contingent (meritorious) duty to oneself, it is not enough that the action does not conflict with humanity in our person as an end in itself, it must also agree with it. Now there are in mankind dispositions for greater perfection, which belong to the purpose of nature in regard to mankind in our subject; to neglect this would at best be the preservation of mankind as an end in itself, but not the advancement of this end.
第三，關於對自己的偶然（功績）義務，行為本身不與我們人的人性衝突是不夠的，它還必須符合它。 現在，人類有追求更完美的傾向，這屬於我們主題中關於人類的自然目的； 忽視這一點充其量隻是將保護人類本身作為目的，而不是促進這一目的。
Fourth, in regard to meritorious duty to others, the natural end that all men have is their own happiness. Now mankind would be able to survive if nobody contributed anything to the happiness of others, but at the same time deliberately did not deprive it of anything; but this is only a negative and not a positive agreement with mankind as an end in itself, even if everyone does not try to promote the ends of others, as much as he is. For the subject, which is an end in itself, whose ends must also, as far as possible, be my ends if that idea is to have any effect on me.
第四，關於對他人的功勞，所有人的自然目的都是自己的幸福。 現在，如果沒有人為他人的幸福做出任何貢獻，但同時又不刻意剝奪任何東西，人類就能生存下去； 但這隻是消極而非積極地同意人類本身就是目的，即使每個人都不像他那樣努力促進他人的目的。 因為主題本身就是一個目的，如果那個想法要對我產生任何影響，它的目的也必須盡可能地成為我的目的。
This principle of humanity and of every rational nature in general, as an end in itself (which is the supreme limiting condition of the freedom of action of every human being) is not borrowed from experience: firstly because of its universality, since it applies to all rational beings in general goes, about which no experience is sufficient to determine something; Secondly, because in it mankind is not the goal of human beings (subjective), that is, as an object that one really makes one's own goal, but as an objective goal which, whatever goals we want, as law is the supreme limiting condition is supposed to make up all subjective ends, and consequently it must arise from pure reason. For the ground of all practical legislation lies objectively in the rule and the form of universality, which makes it capable of being a law (at most natural law) (according to the first principle), but subjectively in the purpose; but the subject of all ends is every rational being, as an end in itself (according to the second principle): from this now follows the third practical principle of the will, as the supreme condition of its agreement with universal practical reason, the idea of ??the will of every rational one Essence as a general legislative will.
這種人性和一般理性本性的原則，本身就是目的（這是每個人行動自由的最高限製條件），不是從經驗中借用的：首先是因為它的普遍性，因為它適用於 一般而言，所有有理性的人都會去，沒有經驗足以確定某事； 其次，因為人在其中並不是人的目標（主觀的），即作為一個客體而真正成為自己的目標，而是作為一個客觀的目標，無論我們想要什麽目標，作為法律是最高限製條件 應該構成所有主觀目的，因此它必須來自純粹理性。 因為所有實際立法的基礎客觀上在於規則和普遍性的形式，這使得它能夠成為法律（至多是自然法）（根據第一原則），但主觀上在於目的； 但是所有目的的主體是每一個有理性的存在，作為目的本身（根據第二原則）：由此得出意誌的第三實踐原則，作為意誌與普遍實踐理性一致的最高條件，理念 每一個理性的本質的意誌作為一般的立法意誌。
All maxims are rejected according to this principle which cannot coexist with the will's own general legislation. The will is therefore not only subjected to the law, but is so subjected that it must also be regarded as self-legislating and for that very reason it must be considered subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author).
所有格言都根據這一原則拒絕??，該原則無法與遺囑自己的一般立法共存。 遺囑不僅有法律，而且被認為是如此，因此必須將其視為自我立法，因此，它被視為遵守法律（可以將其視為作者的法律）。
The imperatives according to the previous mode of representation, namely the general lawfulness of actions similar to a natural order, or the general preference of rational beings in terms of their purpose, excluded from their commanding regard any admixture of any interest as a driving force, precisely because they were presented as categorical ; but they were only accepted as categorical, because one had to assume this if one wanted to explain the concept of duty. But that there are practical propositions that categorically command could not be proved in itself, just as it cannot be done here in this section; but one thing could have happened, namely: that the renunciation of all interest in wanting out of duty,
根據先前表示方式的命令，即類似於自然秩序的行為的普遍合法性，或理性存在者在其目的方麵的普遍偏好，排除在命令之外，將任何利益的任何混合物視為驅動力， 正是因為它們被呈現為絕對的； 但它們隻是被接受為絕對的，因為如果想解釋責任的概念，就必須假設這一點。 但是，有些實際命題無法直接證明，就像本節中無法證明一樣； 但是可能會發生一件事，即：放棄所有興趣而想逃避責任，
For if we think of such a thing, although a will which is under laws may still be bound by an interest to that law, yet a will which is itself supremely legislative cannot possibly depend so far from any interest; for such a dependent will would itself require another law, which would limit the interest in its self-love to the condition of validity as a general law.
因為如果我們想到這樣一件事，雖然受法律約束的意誌仍可能受法律利益的約束，但本身具有最高立法性的意誌不可能如此遠離任何利益； 因為這種從屬意誌本身將需要另一條法則，該法則將其自愛的興趣限製在作為一般法則的有效性條件。
Thus the principle of every human will, as a will that universally legislates through all its maxims [4], if only it were correct otherwise, to the categorical imperative in that it is not based on any interest for the sake of the idea of ??universal legislation and therefore can only be unconditional among all possible imperatives; or better still, by reversing the proposition: if there is a categorical imperative (i.e. a law for every will of a rational being), then it can only command everything to be done from the maxim of its will as such that it is at the same time itself as a general legislative object; for only then is the practical principle and the imperative, which he obeys, unconditional, because he cannot have any interest as a basis.
因此，每個人的意誌的原則，作為一種通過其所有格言普遍立法的意誌 [4]，隻要它在其他方麵是正確的，就絕對命令而言，因為它不是基於任何為了利益的想法而產生的利益。 普遍立法，因此在所有可能的命令中隻能是無條件的； 或者更好的是，通過顛倒命題：如果存在絕對命令（即針對理性存在者的每一個意誌的法則），那麽它隻能命令一切按照其意誌的準則來完成，即它處於 同時本身作為一般立法對象； 因為隻有這樣，他所遵守的實踐原則和命令才是無條件的，因為他不能以任何利益為基礎。
It is no wonder, when we look back at all previous efforts that have ever been made to discover the principle of morality, why they must all have failed. Man was seen as being bound by laws through his duty, but it did not occur to him that he was only subject to his own and yet general legislation, and that he was only bound in accordance with his own will, which according to the natural purpose is universally legislative act. For if one only thought of him as subject to a law (whatever it may be), then this had to carry some interest as a stimulus or compulsion, because it did not arise as a law from his will, but was legally compelled by something else to act in a certain way. Through this quite necessary conclusion, however, all the work of finding a supreme ground of duty was irretrievably lost. Because you never got duty, but necessity of the action out of a certain interest. This might now be one's own or someone else's interest. But then the imperative always had to be conditional and could not be used as a moral commandment. I will therefore call this principle the principle of the autonomy of the will in contrast to every other principle, which I therefore count among heteronomy. But then the imperative always had to be conditional and could not be used as a moral commandment. I will therefore call this principle the principle of the autonomy of the will in contrast to every other principle, which I therefore count among heteronomy. But then the imperative always had to be conditional and could not be used as a moral commandment. I will therefore call this principle the principle of the autonomy of the will in contrast to every other principle, which I therefore count among heteronomy.
難怪，當我們回顧以前為發現道德原則所做的所有努力時，為什麽他們一定都失敗了。 人被視為通過他的義務而受到法律的約束，但他沒有想到他隻受製於他自己的一般立法，他隻是按照他自己的意誌受到約束，而他的意誌是根據自然的 目的是普遍的立法行為。 因為如果一個人僅僅認為他受製於法律（無論它是什麽），那麽這就必須帶有某種刺激或強製的興趣，因為它不是作為法律從他的意誌中產生的，而是被某種東西合法地強製的 否則以某種方式行事。 然而，由於這個非常必要的結論，所有尋找責任的最高基礎的工作都無可挽回地失敗了。 因為你從來沒有義務，而是出於某種利益而采取行動的必要性。 這現在可能是自己或其他人的興趣。 但是命令總是必須是有條件的，不能用作道德誡命。 因此，我將把這個原則稱為意誌自主的原則，以與所有其他原則形成對比，因此我將其歸入他律。 但是命令總是必須是有條件的，不能用作道德誡命。 因此，我將把這個原則稱為意誌自主的原則，以與所有其他原則形成對比，因此我將其歸入他律。 但是命令總是必須是有條件的，不能用作道德誡命。 因此，我將把這個原則稱為意誌自主的原則，以與所有其他原則形成對比，因此我將其歸入他律。
The concept of every rational being, which must regard itself through all maxims of its will as universally legislative, in order to judge itself and its actions from this point of view, leads to a very fruitful concept attached to it, namely that of a kingdom of ends.
But by a kingdom I understand the systematic union of different rational beings through common laws. Because laws now determine the ends according to their general validity, if one abstracts from the personal difference between rational beings and all the content of their private ends, a whole of all ends (both of rational beings as ends in themselves and of their own ends, which each one may set itself) in a systematic connection, ie a realm of ends, can be thought of, which is possible according to the above principles.
為了從這個角度判斷自己及其行為，每個理性存在者的概念都必須通過其意誌的所有準則將自己視為普遍立法者，這導致了一個非常富有成果的概念，即王國的概念 目的。
但是，對於一個王國，我理解不同的理性存在者通過普通法的係統聯合。 因為法律現在根據它們的普遍有效性來決定目的，如果一個人從理性存在者和他們私人目的的所有內容之間的個人差異中抽象出來，所有目的的整體（作為目的的理性存在者和他們自己的目的） ，每個人都可以自己設定）在一個係統的聯係中，即一個目的領域，可以被認為是根據上述原則是可能的。
For rational beings are all subject to the law that each of them should never treat themselves and all others as mere means, but always at the same time as ends in themselves. But this gives rise to a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, that is, a kingdom which, because these laws aim at the relationship of these beings to one another as ends and means, can be called a kingdom of ends (of course only an ideal).
A rational being, however, belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends if it is indeed generally legislative therein, but is also subject to these laws themselves. It belongs to it as supreme if, as legislative, it is not subject to any will of another. The rational being must always regard itself as legislative in a realm of ends made possible by freedom of will, whether it be as a member or as the head. However, it cannot claim the place of the latter merely through the maxim of its will, but only when it is a completely independent being without need and limitation of its ability adequate to its will. <...>
因為所有有理性的人都服從這樣的法則，即他們每個人都不應將自己和所有其他人視為純粹的手段，而應始終同時作為自己的目的。 但這通過共同的客觀法則產生了理性存在者的係統聯合，也就是說，一個王國，因為這些法則旨在將這些存在者作為目的和手段彼此之間的關係，可以稱為目的王國（的 當然隻是一個理想）。
然而，如果一個理性的存在確實在其中普遍立法，那麽它作為目的王國的成員屬於其中，但也服從於這些法律本身。 如果作為立法機構，它不受任何其他人的意誌支配，那麽它就屬於至高無上的。 理性存在者必須始終將自己視為意誌自由使之成為可能的目的領域中的立法者，無論它是作為成員還是作為首腦。 然而，它不能僅僅通過其意誌的準則來要求後者的位置，而隻有當它是一個完全獨立的存在而無需和限製其足以滿足其意誌的能力時。
[1] I. Kant: Collected Writings. Academy edition. Volume IV. Berlin 1903, pp. 428-434.
[2] I present this sentence here as a postulate. The reasons for this will be found in the last section.
[3] Don't think that the trivial: quod tibi non vis fieri etc. can serve as a guide or principle here. For it is derived only from that, though with various qualifications; it cannot be a general law, for it does not contain the basis of duties towards oneself, not of loving duties towards others (since many would gladly accept that others should not do him good, if only he could feel embarrassed to do them good show), finally not of the duties owed to one another; for the criminal would argue against his punishing judges for this reason, etc.
[4] I may be at arrogant here to cite examples to illustrate this principle, for those which first explained the categorical imperative and its formula can all serve the same purpose here.
Last change: 11:25 11.10.2005
