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斷定中國金融末日 沒有現實

(2023-03-29 08:22:16) 下一個

為什麽“中國金融末日”沒有成為現實

陳誌武 2023年3月27日
 
香港——還記得恒大危機嗎?
 
一年多以前,中國房地產開發商恒大集團背負著超過3000億美元的債務,即將倒閉。有人警告,災難性的違約將波及中國經濟,甚至可能引發全球經濟蕭條。有人說,中國正麵臨“雷曼時刻”——2008年,這家曾經備受尊敬的華爾街投資銀行倒閉——當有企業出現類似的倒閉情況時,最終會迫使中國共產黨的政策製定者開始考慮係統性的金融缺陷。
不完全是這樣。恒大並沒有脫離困境,但在中國政府出手幫助,安排對其大部分債務進行重組後,一場災難性的內爆得以避免。在本月出現對全球金融秩序的新威脅——美國矽穀銀行倒閉——之前,恒大在很大程度上已經不再是大新聞。
 
恒大的麻煩並不是我們第一次聽到有關中國金融末日的預言。它們往往每隔幾年就會重新出現。但是重複該預言的華爾街、西方媒體和經濟學家們犯了一個根本性的錯誤,那就是把純粹的市場邏輯應用到中國經濟上,這種邏輯是行不通的。
盡管中國在2001年加入了世界貿易組織,進行了數十年的經濟改革,緩慢而穩步地融入全球金融體係,但它仍然不是一個完全的市場經濟國家。
 
這並不意味著中國可以無限期地挑戰經濟正統理論,而且其金融體係的債務水平已經高得驚人。但這種悲觀情緒通常被誇大了,因為中國政府擁有幾乎無限的權力,可以按照自己認為合適的方式引導資源——並且分配痛苦——來避免危機,通常是在事情失控之前,命令銀行和其他債權人以大局為重,接受損失。
恒大就是最好的例子。作為中國最大的房地產開發商之一,該公司為擴大業務而積累了巨額債務,它的許多競爭對手也是如此。但當中國政府出於對債務和房價飆升的擔憂,於2020年開始對房地產公司實施金融限製時,恒大被切斷了進一步融資的渠道,並於2021年12月正式違約。“雷曼時刻”的警告達到了頂峰。
但中國官員已經著手工作,召集恒大高管、債權人和潛在資產買家,開始重組該公司的債務。國內放貸者最終同意給恒大更多償還貸款的時間。據報道,解決恒大海外債務的協議也即將達成。
2008年,美國聯邦儲備委員會和財政部也在次貸危機期間介入,協調陷入困境的金融機構的重組工作。但是債權人和投資者的權利以及救助銀行的政治風險,限製了美國監管機構能做的事情;在與銀行和投資公司艱苦談判後,雙方才達成協議。而在中國,金融機構必須聽從政府的安排。
政府的手無處不在。中國最基本的資產——土地——由國家擁有或控製。中國貨幣人民幣的價值由政府管理,人們普遍認為監管機構會幹預中國股市的交易。
中國規模最大、實力最強的企業大部分都由國家所有,包括所有主要銀行,高管通常是共產黨員,而共產黨控製著企業高層的任命。公司內部的黨委進一步確保許多重要的商業決策與政府政策保持一致。即使是健康的、有影響力的民營企業,也可能被勒令進行痛苦的重組,或削減某些業務,政府從2020年開始對電子商務領導者阿裏巴巴和其他中國科技巨頭的打擊行動就表明了這一點。
歸根結底,所有這些都是為了維護社會穩定,這是黨的絕對優先事項;對於可能引發街頭示威的財務困境或重大企業倒閉,政府持零容忍態度。政府對商業部門的控製隻會越來越強
對監管機構來說,就連中國高債務水平的構成也有相對樂觀的部分。2022年9月,中國債務與國內生產總值的總比率接近300%(約52萬億美元),而美國為257%。但中國隻有不到5%的債務是外部債務,總計2.5萬億美元,是美國債務水平的十分之一。幾乎每一筆人民幣借款都是由中國債權人借給中國借款人,這讓監管機構對債務問題有了一定程度的控製,這是西方同行隻能夢想的場景。
在向現代工業經濟轉型的幾十年裏,中國也曾遭遇過金融危機,但監管機構利用其相當大的權力,多次阻止了災難的發生。1999年,中國國有商業銀行的不良貸款比例達到了驚人的30%(相比之下,美國的不良貸款比例幾十年來一直保持在個位數),當局成立了資產管理公司來接管這些不良貸款。在2008年金融危機期間,中國實施了大規模刺激計劃以保護其經濟。
盡管如此,有關中國金融災難的警告仍不時就會出現。2014年,當一家中國太陽能電池板製造商債券違約時,一些人說這可能是中國的“貝爾斯登時刻”,指的是2008年倒閉的另一家美國投資銀行。但現在還有人記得那家中國公司的名字嗎?(上海超日太陽能科技股份有限公司,如果有人想知道)。
但中國的恒大式修複方案雖然化解了短期危機,卻沒有引入改革來建立一個健康的、允許低效的企業倒閉的市場經濟,而是獎勵不負責任的行為,使過度借貸和浪費資金的現象長期存在,導致反複出現金融困境。
軟著陸可能變得更難實現。中國可能麵臨著自上世紀70年代末開始對外開放以來最嚴峻的一係列經濟挑戰:高額債務疲軟的房地產行業、長期經濟放緩失業率上升人口老齡化和萎縮,以及同美國的貿易和外交關係的惡化。
中國可能麵臨著與日本同樣的命運,這是一個非常現實的風險。日本仍在努力擺脫始於上世紀90年代的長期經濟停滯。該國的問題在一定程度上是由房地產泡沫破裂和金融部門的問題造成的,這些都與中國目前麵臨的問題類似。
中國監管部門的問題解決者們一次又一次地證明了金融末日預言者的錯誤。但他們最大的考驗可能還在前麵。

陳誌武是香港人文社會科學研究所所長、香港大學金融學講席教授。1999年至2017年間,他是耶魯大學的金融學教授。

翻譯:紐約時報中文網

How China Keeps Putting Off Its Lehman Moment

By Zhiwu Chen,  Mr. Chen is the director of the Hong Kong Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences and an expert on China’s financial system.

HONG KONG — Remember the Evergrande crisis?

It was little more than a year ago that Evergrande Group, the Chinese property developer, was about to collapse under more than $300 billion in debt. There were warnings of a catastrophic default that would ripple through China’s economy, maybe even set off a global depression. China, it was said, faced its Lehman Brothers moment — when a corporate failure like that which felled the once-venerable Wall Street investment bank in 2008 finally forces Chinese Communist Party policymakers to reckon with systemic financial weakness.

Not quite. Evergrande is not out of the woods, but a catastrophic implosion was avoided after the Chinese government stepped in to help arrange a restructuring of much of its debt. Well before a new threat to the global financial order emerged this month — the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank in the United States — Evergrande had largely fallen out of the headlines.

Evergrande’s troubles weren’t the first time we’ve heard predictions of Chinese financial doom. They tend to resurface every few years. But Wall Street, the Western media and economists who repeat them make the fundamental mistake of applying pure market logic to China’s economy, and it just doesn’t work that way.

China is still not a fully market economy, despite the country’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization, decades of economic reform and a slow but steady integration into the global financial system.

That doesn’t mean China can indefinitely defy economic orthodoxy, and debt levels in its financial system are alarmingly high. But the doom and gloom are usually overblown because the government has virtually unlimited power to head off crises by directing resources — and apportioning pain — as it sees fit, often by ordering banks and other creditors to accept losses for the greater good before things get out of hand.

Evergrande is a prime example. One of China’s largest real estate developers, it amassed huge debts to expand its business, as did many of its rivals. But when China’s government began imposing financial restrictions on property companies in 2020 out of concern over spiraling debt and home prices, Evergrande was cut off from further fund-raising and formally defaulted on its debts in December 2021. The “Lehman” warnings reached a crescendo.

But Chinese officials had already been at work corralling Evergrande executives, creditors and potential asset buyers to begin restructuring the company’s obligations. Domestic lenders eventually agreed to give Evergrande more time to repay loans. A deal to resolve Evergrande’s offshore debt also is reportedly imminent.

In 2008, the U.S. Federal Reserve and Treasury Department also stepped in during the subprime lending crisis to coordinate the restructuring of troubled institutions. But creditor and investor rights and the political risks of bailing out banks limited what American regulators can do; arrangements were reached only after hard bargaining with banks and investment houses. In China, financial institutions have to do what the government tells them.

The government’s hand is everywhere. The most fundamental asset in China — land — is owned or controlled by the state. The value of China’s currency, the renminbi, is government-managed and regulators are widely believed to intervene in trading on the country’s stock markets.

Most of China’s biggest and most powerful companies, including all of its major banks, are state-owned, and executives are usually members of the Communist Party, which controls top-level corporate appointments. Party committees within corporations further ensure that many important business decisions align with government policy. Even healthy and influential private companies can be ordered to undergo painful restructuring or curtail certain business operations, as a government crackdown on the e-commerce leader Alibaba and other Chinese tech giants that began in 2020 made clear.

Ultimately, all of this serves the party’s absolute priority of maintaining social stability; there is zero tolerance for financial distress or major corporate failures that could trigger street demonstrations. And government control of the business sector is only increasing.

Even the makeup of China’s high debt levels has a silver lining for regulators. China’s aggregate ratio of debt to gross domestic product was almost 300 percent (or around $52 trillion) in September 2022, compared to 257 percent for the United States. But less than 5 percent of China’s debt is external, amounting to $2.5 trillion, one-tenth of the U.S. level. When nearly every renminbi borrowed is domestic — lent by a Chinese creditor to a Chinese borrower — it gives regulators a degree of control over debt problems that their Western counterparts can only dream of.

China has encountered its share of financial distress during its decades-long transition to a modern industrial economy, but regulators have used their considerable powers to repeatedly prevent catastrophe. When the percentage of nonperforming loans at Chinese state-owned commercial banks hit an alarming 30 percent in 1999 (the U.S. rate, by comparison, has remained in single digits for decades), authorities formed asset management companies to take over those bad loans. During the 2008 financial crisis, China implemented a massive stimulus package to protect its economy.

Still, warnings of a Chinese financial reckoning resurface now and again. In 2014, when a Chinese solar-panel manufacturer defaulted on bonds, some intoned that this could be China’s “Bear Stearns moment,” referring to another U.S. investment bank that collapsed in 2008. But can anyone even remember the name of that Chinese company anymore? (Shanghai Chaori Solar Energy Science and Technology, for the record.)

But instead of introducing reforms to establish a healthy market-based economy in which inefficient businesses are allowed to fail, China’s Evergrande-style fixes — while defusing short-term crises — reward irresponsible behavior and perpetuate the excessive borrowing and wasteful use of funding that leads to recurring financial distress.

Soft landings may become harder to achieve. China faces perhaps its greatest array of economic challenges since it began reopening to the outside world in the late 1970s: high debt, an ailing real estate sector, a long-term economic slowdownrising unemployment, an aging and shrinking population and worsening trade and diplomatic relations with the United States.

There is a very real risk that China could suffer the same fate as Japan, which is still struggling to emerge from an extended period of economic stagnation that began in the 1990s. Japan’s troubles were caused, in part, by a burst real estate bubble and financial-sector problems similar to what China is now facing.

China’s regulatory troubleshooters have proved the financial doomsayers wrong again and again. But their biggest test may yet lie ahead.

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