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與中國的冷戰 玩不轉

(2023-03-29 08:16:13) 下一個

與中國的冷戰將顛覆一切

DAVID BROOKS 2023年3月24日
 
所以,我想我們正處於一場新的冷戰之中。兩黨領導人都成了對華鷹派。風傳台灣將會發生戰爭。習近平發誓要主宰這個世紀。
 
我不禁思忖:這場冷戰會是什麽樣子?這一次冷戰會像上一次冷戰那樣改變美國社會嗎?
關於這場冷戰,我注意到的第一件事是軍備競賽和經濟競賽融合在了一起。到目前為止,衝突的一個主要焦點是微芯片,這種小玩意兒不僅能驅動你的汽車和手機,還能引導導彈,對訓練人工智能係統也是必要的。誰主導了芯片製造,誰就主導了市場和戰場。
 
其次,地緣政治不同。正如克裏斯·米勒在他的《芯片戰爭》一書中指出的那樣,微芯片行業由少數非常成功的企業主導。90%以上最先進的芯片都是由台灣一家公司生產。一家荷蘭公司生產製造尖端芯片所需的所有光刻機。位於加州聖克拉拉的兩家公司壟斷了圖形處理單元的設計,這種部件對在數據中心運行人工智能應用程序至關重要。
 
這些瓶頸對中國來說是不可容忍的。如果西方能阻止中國獲得尖端技術,那麽它就能阻止中國。因此,中國的意圖是實現芯片自給自足。美國的意圖是在芯片方麵比現在更加自給自足,並建立一個排除中國的全球芯片聯盟。
 
美國的外交政策已經沿著這些路線迅速重新調整。在過去兩屆政府中,美國積極采取行動,阻止中國獲得製造最先進芯片所需的軟件技術和設備。拜登政府切斷的不隻是中國軍工企業,而是所有中國企業。這看上去是一種合乎常理的預防措施,但是換個角度來看又有些誇張:美國的官方政策是讓一個擁有近15億人口的國家變得更貧窮。
 
更讓我驚訝的是新冷戰對國內政治的重新安排。從亞曆山大·漢密爾頓1791年的《製造業報告》開始,一直有美國人支持產業政策——利用政府來加強私營經濟部門。但這種治理方式通常處於邊緣地位。
 
現在,當涉及到綠色技術和芯片時,它成了美國政治的中心。去年,國會通過了《芯片法案》,為鼓勵美國芯片生產提供了520億美元的撥款、稅收抵免和其他補貼。這一產業政策會讓漢密爾頓瞠目結舌,為之鼓掌。
 
在接下來的幾年和幾十年裏,中國將在一係列尖端技術領域,向自己的產業政策項目投入大量資金。戰略與國際研究中心的一位分析師估計,中國在工業項目上支出的GDP已經是美國的12倍以上
 
在未來幾年裏,美國領導人必須弄清楚這些支出的效果如何,以及如何應對。這場冷戰的主力軍將是技術精英,甚至比上一場冷戰更甚。雙方可能都將在他們受教育程度最高的公民身上投入大量資金——在民粹主義怨恨的時代,這是一種危險的局麵。
 
你已經可以開始看到一係列新的政治分歧。位於中心的是那些支持《芯片法案》的新漢密爾頓主義者——包括拜登政府和17名反特朗普派的共和黨人,他們在參議院與民主黨人一起投票支持該法案。
 
在右翼,已經有一係列民粹主義者在軍事方麵對中國超級強硬,但他們不接受產業政策。我們為什麽要把那麽多錢花在精英身上?你憑什麽認為政府比市場更聰明?
 
在左翼,是那些希望利用產業政策為進步目標服務的人。拜登政府已經對接受《芯片法案》支持的公司發布了數量驚人的命令。這些命令將迫使企業服務於一些與產業不相關的進步優先事項——兒童保育政策、增加工會、環境目標,種族正義等。與其說它是一個專注於提振芯片的計劃,不如說它尋求同時實現所有功能。
 
人們希望,隨著冷戰氣氛的加劇,我們的政治將變得更加嚴肅。在上一次冷戰期間,當美國人去投票時,他們意識到自己的投票可能生死攸關。這種感覺可能會再次出現。
 
在這個時代,治理國家需要非凡的、經驗豐富的政治家才能——運行工業項目,但不令其變得臃腫;在不引發貿易戰的情況下部分地去全球化經濟;在不羞辱中國的情況下穩步超越中國。如果中國意識到自己每年都在進一步落後,那麽對台灣的入侵可能會更加迫在眉睫。
 
 有人問米勒,在未來五年內,中美之間發生危險的軍事衝突,會有多大可能製造出一場相當於大蕭條的經濟危機。他認為可能性是20%。
這樣高的可能似乎足以令人集中精神應對。

The Cold War With China Is Changing Everything

 
 

So I guess we’re in a new cold war. Leaders of both parties have become China hawks. There are rumblings of war over Taiwan. Xi Jinping vows to dominate the century.

I can’t help wondering: What will this cold war look like? Will this one transform American society the way the last one did?

The first thing I notice about this cold war is that the arms race and the economics race are fused. A chief focus of the conflict so far has been microchips, the little gizmos that not only make your car and phone work, but also guide missiles and are necessary to train artificial intelligence systems. Whoever dominates chip manufacturing dominates the market as well as the battlefield.

Second, the geopolitics are different. As Chris Miller notes in his book “Chip War,” the microchip sector is dominated by a few highly successful businesses. More than 90 percent of the most advanced chips are made by one company in Taiwan. One Dutch company makes all the lithography machines that are required to build cutting-edge chips. Two Santa Clara, Calif., companies monopolize the design of graphic processing units, critical for running A.I. applications in data centers.

 

These choke points represent an intolerable situation for China. If the West can block off China’s access to cutting-edge technology, then it can block off China. So China’s intention is to approach chip self-sufficiency. America’s intention is to become more chip self-sufficient than it is now and to create a global chip alliance that excludes China.

American foreign policy has been rapidly rearranged along these lines. Over the last two administrations, the United States has moved aggressively to block China from getting the software technology and equipment it needs to build the most advanced chips. The Biden administration is cutting off not just Chinese military companies, but all Chinese companies. This seems like a common-sense safeguard, but put another way, it’s kind of dramatic: Official U.S. policy is to make a nation of almost a billion and a half people poorer.

I’m even more amazed by how the new cold war is rearranging domestic politics. There have always been Americans, stretching back to Alexander Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures in 1791, who supported industrial policy — using government to strengthen private economic sectors. But this governing approach has generally been on the margins.

Now it is at the center of American politics, when it comes to both green technology and chips. Last year Congress passed the CHIPS Act, with $52 billion in grants, tax credits and other subsidies to encourage American chip production. That’s an industrial policy that would leave Hamilton gaping and applauding.

Over the next years and decades, China is going to pour immense amounts of money into its own industrial policy programs, across a range of cutting-edge technologies. One analyst from the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates China already spends over 12 times as much of its G.D.P. on industrial programs as the United States does.

 

Over these coming years, U.S. leaders will have to figure out how effective that spending is and how to respond. Even more than the last cold war, this one will be waged by technological elites. Both sides are probably going to be spending lots of money on their most educated citizens — a dangerous situation in an age of populist resentments.

Already you can begin to see a new set of political fissures. In the center are the sort of Neo-Hamiltonians who supported the CHIPS Act — including the Biden administration and the 17 non-Trumpy Republicans who voted with Democrats for the act in the Senate.

On the right, there are already a range of populists who are super-hawkish on China when it comes to military affairs but don’t believe in industrial policy. Why should we spend all that money on elites? What makes you think the government is smarter than the market?

On the left are those who want to use industrial policy to serve progressive goals. The Biden administration has issued an incredible number of diktats for companies that receive CHIPS Act support. These diktats would force businesses to behave in ways that serve a number of extraneous progressive priorities — child care policy, increased unionization, environmental goals, racial justice, etc. Rather than being a program focused on boosting chips, it seeks to be everything all at once.

One would hope that as the cold war atmosphere intensifies our politics will get more serious. When Americans went to the polls during the last cold war, they realized their vote could be a matter of life and death. It may feel like that again.

 

Governing during this era will require extraordinary levels of experienced statesmanship — running industrial programs that don’t become bloated, partially deglobalizing the economy without setting off trade wars, steadily outcompeting China without humiliating it. If China realizes it is falling further behind every year, then an invasion of Taiwan may be more imminent.

Miller was asked what were the odds that over the next five years a dangerous military clash between the United States and China would produce an economic crisis equivalent to the Great Depression. He put the odds at 20 percent.

That seems high enough to focus the mind.

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