US politico 張忠謀美國半導體製造瞎扯淡不如投資台灣

張忠謀：美國發展半導體製造業，不如投資中國台灣！

2023-02-15 18:45

https://www.sohu.com/a/641236264_128469

2月15日消息，據美國媒體Politico報道，2022年8月，美國眾議院議長佩洛西（Nancy Pelosi）竄訪中國台灣期間，台積電創始人張忠謀、董事長劉德音受邀參加了歡迎午宴。當時，張忠謀與佩洛西就美國積極發展半導體製造業交換了看法。

張忠謀對裴洛西表示，歡迎美國的《芯片與科學法案》及配套的527億美元的半導體製造補貼計劃，“520億美元，這是一個好的開始。很高興台積電可以從補貼中受益，台積電已經在亞利桑那州進行了一個重大的建設項目。但問題在於美國真的認為這樣就可以買下強大的芯片製造業嗎？”

在張忠謀看來，美國要借助提供補助來建立自給自足的半導體產業，未來還有很長的路要走。因為，半導體芯片製造極其複雜，需要大量高素質的人才，同時也需要長期持續的投資。如果美國以為靠砸大錢就可以搶進全球最複雜的電子製造市場，那就太天真了。因此，美國與其想要打造可信賴的半導體產業，更應該持續投資中國台灣。因為美國當前想要做的，中國台灣早已經完備。

張忠謀當時還強調稱，半導體產業發展迅速，就算美國現階段大量投資建設高質量的先進晶圓廠，未來也還要花更多錢來持續進行更新。否則，美國就隻是單次的投資，造成的就隻是擁有現在最先進的硬件設備而已。

裴洛西也指出，張忠謀很了解美國，也提到部分的問題的確是美國的挑戰。但是，裴洛西告訴張忠謀，美國知道自己在做什麽，“我們決心要成功，這將是一個好的開始”。

台灣《聯合報》提及，張忠謀的太太張淑芬一度打斷張忠謀讓他別講這麽久；在場的蔡英文則稱，張忠謀快人快語，一向敢言。

而據台灣《聯合報》報道，張忠謀還稱，半導體產業發展快速，即便美國現在大量投資建設高質量的工廠，未來還要花更多錢維持更新，否則，美國就隻是現在擁有最先進的硬件設備；單次投資是不夠的。

張忠謀談美國芯片策略：太天真了但是好的開始

半導體行業觀察 2023年02月15日 10:24:16 來自北京

編譯自politico，芯片製造巨頭台積電的 91 歲創始人張忠謀在之前台灣舉辦的一次午餐會上，就美國正在出現的新產業政策向南希佩洛西和其他來訪的美國立法者發表了尖銳的評價。

在此前未被詳細報道的評論中，張忠謀將矛頭對準了 CHIPS 和科學法案及其 520 億美元的半導體製造補貼計劃。

佩洛西在最近的一次采訪中告訴politico，在麻省理工學院和斯坦福大學接受過培訓的工程師張忠謀和她的交流以一句輕鬆的話開始。

“500 億美元——好吧，這是一個好的開始，”（原話：“Fifty billion dollars – well, that’s a good start）根據她的回憶。包括佩洛西在內的四名出席會議的人表示，很快就可以看出張不是開玩笑的。

這位億萬富翁企業家向佩洛西提出了關於 CHIPS 法的發人深省的問題——以及該政策是代表對支持先進產業的真正承諾，還是美國企圖在一個利潤豐厚的全球市場奪取一部分利益的衝動。

張忠謀說他很高興他的公司可以從補貼中受益；台積電已經在亞利桑那州進行了一項重大開發項目。但美國真的認為它可以像那樣給自己買下一個強大的芯片製造產業嗎？

這個問題現在籠罩著拜登政府，因為它準備實施 CHIPS 和科學法案中的半導體支出。下一階段將於本月開始，屆時商務部將公布補貼發放的詳細流程。對拜登來說，這項法律已經看起來像是一個有用的政治戰利品，在他的國情谘文中也占有一席之地。

用拜登的話來說，這項法律象征著他致力於創造未來的就業機會，並保護美國經濟免受可能造成的破壞。拜登告訴國會，向芯片製造提供補貼將“確保美國的供應鏈始於美國”。

但這遠非一個確定的賭注。正如張忠謀告訴佩洛西的那樣，削減政府支票與在美國建立自給自足的芯片產業之間還有很長的距離。

他粗略地指出了拜登的半導體政策如果要取得成功就必須應對的挑戰，尤其在直接的政治宣傳已經消退很久之後，這將遠遠超過其對大企業的慷慨補貼已經用完的時間點。

張忠謀在於佩洛西的午餐警告說，如果美國認為它可以迅速花錢進入世界上最複雜的電子製造市場之一，那就太天真了。他說，製造半導體芯片的任務是幾乎不可能的複雜，僅僅為了獲得原材料就需要大量的勞動力，而且在製造工廠的建造和芯片本身的組裝過程中都需要微觀精度。

該行業以驚人的速度發展，張忠謀繼續說道。即使美國以佩洛西所支持的支出成功建造了一些高質量的工廠，它也必須不斷加大投資以保持這些設施的更新。否則，他說，美國人很快就會發現自己擁有價值數百億美元的過時硬件。千載難逢的現金注入是不夠的。

張忠謀同時說道，如果美國想要一個它可以依賴的半導體產業，那麽它應該繼續投資於台灣。畢竟，他的公司很久以前就完善了美國人現在試圖自己設計的東西。

隨著一道道小盤子來來去去，張忠謀的演講持續了很長時間，以至於他的妻子 Sophie 在某一時刻插話，認為他說得太多了。

筆者表示，佩洛西是唯一一個同意與其公開談論張忠謀演講的人，她也是唯一一個聽上去對張對美國作為半導體貿易基地的懷疑不以為然的人。

“他非常了解美國，”她說，“他提出的問題我幾乎都認為是一個回應的機會，即使其中有些問題具有挑戰性。”

與我交談過的其他人不同，佩洛西說她並沒有因為張的語言嚴厲而退縮。她多次稱讚張是“標誌性人物”：“我非常敬畏他。”

但佩洛西說，她也傳達了她自己的堅定信息：“我們知道我們在做什麽，我們決心要成功——這是一個好的開始。”

佩洛西承認，在場的其他台灣高管表示猶豫，一些人質疑美國的環境和勞動法是否符合培育成熟產業的目標。在我們的談話中，她否認了她的政黨宏偉的經濟和社會抱負與 CHIPS 法的狹隘目標之間可能存在緊張關係的想法。

張忠謀自然不是美國半導體努力的無私觀察者。他的公司是一個獨特的全球力量；它在高科技供應鏈中的壓倒性重要性已成為台灣的重要戰略資產。

張忠謀在其他場合質疑美國是否適合半導體製造，指出勞動力缺口和商業文化缺陷。在去年由布魯金斯學會主持的播客中，張忠謀感歎美國缺乏“製造業人才”，因為幾代雄心勃勃的美國人轉而湧向金融和互聯網公司。（“我真的不認為這對美國來說是件壞事，事實上，”他說，“但對於試圖在美國進行半導體製造來說，這是一件壞事”）

在 8 月的午餐時間重複了該批評的一個版本，促使佩洛西代表團的一名成員，眾議員Raja Krishnamoorthi大聲疾呼，並敦促張忠謀訪問 Krishnamoorthi 的家鄉伊利諾伊州，以更好地了解美國勞動力，但張沒有表示他對邀請感興趣。

當我向幾位拜登政府官員詢問張的批評時，我得到的信息是聽起來很自信的“敬請期待”。他們說，CHIPS 實施的下一階段將更詳細地揭示該法律將如何用於釋放私營部門投資的洪流，並使美國的半導體製造成為一個穩固的、長期的企業。他們沒有否認 Chang 對當前美國勞動力的擔憂，而是指出美國的科技中心，如矽穀和北卡羅來納州的研究三角區，作為我們確實知道如何在這個國家建立充滿活力、人員齊全的科技中心的證據。現在，他們說，我們需要建造更多。

在與佩洛西共進午餐後不久，張訪問了一個有望成為這些樞紐之一的地區。在亞利桑那州，他在鳳凰城北部的一個大型建築工地與拜登會合，台積電正在那裏建造一個龐大的綜合體，這可能與張對法律的總體懷疑態度形成鮮明對比。他的公司在拜登成為總統之前製定了亞利桑那州項目計劃，但在 CHIPS 法通過後，台積電宣布將大幅增加對該州的投資——從 120 億美元增加到 400 億美元——並在那裏建造第二家工廠。

最終結果將是一個製造中心，該中心有望為蘋果和其他美國科技公司供貨，在恰好也是主要選舉戰場的州雇用數千人。並非偶然，它可能有資格獲得美國補貼。

拜登在去年 12 月表示，這不僅僅是一個良好的開端。他在鳳凰城宣布，美國“在未來幾年比任何其他國家都更有能力引領世界經濟——如果我們保持專注的話。”

張忠謀本可以告訴拜登這是一個很大的“如果”。

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Magazine COLUMN | TOMORROW

Taiwan's Tech King to Nancy Pelosi: U.S. Is in Over Its Head

https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/14/taiwan-tech-king-pelosi-powerhouse-microchip-industry-00082646

"Fifty billion dollars – well, that's a good start,” quipped the 91-year-old Morris Chang, warning that Washington’s new bipartisan industrial policy may not add up.

Nancy Pelosi, center, is pictured arriving at the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan's house of parliament.
Nancy Pelosi arrives at the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan's house of parliament, on August 03, 2022 in Taipei, Taiwan. | Annabelle Chih/Getty Images

By ALEXANDER BURNS 02/14/2023 04:30 AM EST

Alexander Burns is an associate editor for global politics at POLITICO. His Tomorrow column explores the future of politics and policy debates that cross national lines.

Nancy Pelosi arrived in Taiwan like a juggernaut. She defied threats from the Chinese regime in order to visit the island and ignored American generals who saw the trip as a reckless provocation. Ecstatic crowds greeted her at the airport and her hotel. Nothing, it seemed, could slow her down.

And then she met Morris Chang.

Chang, the 91-year-old founder of the chipmaking goliath TSMC, used a luncheon at Taiwan’s presidential palace to deliver a biting soliloquy to Pelosi and other visiting American lawmakers about the new industrial policy emerging in the United States. In comments that have not previously been reported in detail, Chang took aim at the CHIPS and Science Act and its $52 billion package of subsidies for semiconductor manufacturing.

Pelosi told me in a recent interview that Chang, an engineer trained at MIT and Stanford, began with a light remark.

“Fifty billion dollars – well, that’s a good start,” Chang said, according to her recollection.

Four people present for the meeting, including Pelosi, said it quickly became evident that Chang was not in a kidding mood.

With Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, looking on, the billionaire entrepreneur pressed Pelosi with sobering questions about the CHIPS law — and whether the policy represented a genuine commitment to supporting advanced industry or an impulsive attempt by the United States to seize a piece of a lucrative global market.

Chang said he was pleased that his company could benefit from the subsidies; TSMC already had a major development project underway in Arizona. But did the United States really think it could buy itself a powerhouse chipmaking industry, just like that?

That very question now hangs over the Biden administration as it prepares to implement the semiconductor spending in the CHIPS and Science Act. The next phase is due to begin this month with the unveiling by the Commerce Department of a detailed process for awarding subsidies. The law already looks like a useful political trophy for Biden, claiming a prominent spot in his State of the Union Address.

The law is an emblem, in Biden’s telling, of his commitment to creating the jobs of the future and armoring America’s economy against the disruptions that an increasingly militant China could inflict, potentially by attacking Taiwan. Pouring subsidies into chip fabrication would “make sure the supply chain for America begins in America,” Biden told Congress.

That is far from a sure bet. As Chang told Pelosi, there is a long distance between the cutting of government checks and the creation of a self-sustaining chips industry in the United States.

His candid concerns represent a rough guide to the challenges Biden’s semiconductor policy will have to address if it is to succeed, long after the immediate political fanfare has abated — and well past the point that its generous subsidies for big business have run out.

Over lunch, Chang warned that it was terribly naïve of the United States to think that it could rapidly spend its way into one of the most complex electronics-manufacturing markets in the world. The task of making semiconductor chips was almost impossibly complicated, he said, demanding Herculean labors merely to obtain the raw materials involved and requiring microscopic precision in the construction of fabrication plants and then in the assembly of the chips themselves.

Was the United States really up to that job?

The industry evolves at incredible speed, Chang continued. Even if the United States managed to build some high-quality factories with the spending Pelosi championed, it would have to keep investing more and more to keep those facilities up to date. Otherwise, he said, Americans would in short order find themselves with tens of billions of dollars’ worth of outdated hardware. A once-in-a-generation infusion of cash would not be enough.

Was America really prepared to keep up?

If the United States wanted a semiconductor industry it could rely on, Chang said, then it should keep investing in the security of Taiwan. After all, his company had long ago perfected what Americans were now trying to devise on their own.

As course upon course of small plates came and went, Chang’s discourse ran on so long that his wife, Sophie, cut in at one point with a terse interjection; Chang told the group she thought he was talking too much. Tsai, observing the whole exchange, noted to Pelosi and the other Americans that Chang had a reputation for always speaking his mind.

Several people described Chang’s remarks on condition of anonymity in order to discuss a sensitive private meeting. Indeed, the only person who agreed to speak with me about it on the record was Pelosi. She was also the only one who sounded untroubled by Chang’s skepticism about the United States as a home for the semiconductor trade.

Biden signs CHIPS and Science bill, boosting semiconductor production

“He knows America quite well,” she said, “and the questions he asked I saw almost as an opportunity to respond, even if some of it was challenging.”

Unlike other people I spoke to, Pelosi said she was not put off by the severity of Chang’s language. Lauding Chang as an “iconic figure,” she told me several times: “I was in such awe of him.”

But Pelosi said she had also delivered a firm message of her own: “That we knew what we were doing, that we were determined to succeed with it – that it was a good start.”

Other Taiwanese executives present voiced hesitation, Pelosi acknowledged, with some questioning whether American environmental and labor laws were consistent with the goal of nurturing a sophisticated industry. In our conversation, she rejected the idea that there might be tensions between her political party’s grand economic and social aspirations, and the narrower aims of the CHIPS law.

Chang, naturally, is not a disinterested observer of the American semiconductor effort. His company is a singular global power; its overwhelming importance in the high-tech supply chain has become a vital strategic asset for Taiwan as it gathers allies in an age of deepening conflict with the Chinese Communist Party. If China blockaded or invaded the island, the impact on TSMC’s operations alone would convulse the international economy. That is a strong incentive for wealthy democracies to defend Taiwan with more than blandishments about self-determination.

Chang has questioned in other settings whether the United States is a suitable environment for semiconductor manufacturing, pointing to gaps in the workforce and defects in the business culture. On a podcast hosted by the Brookings Institution last year, Chang lamented what he called a lack of “manufacturing talents” in the United States, owing to generations of ambitious Americans flocking to finance and internet companies instead. (“I don’t really think it’s a bad thing for the United States, actually,” he said, “but it’s a bad thing for trying to do semiconductor manufacturing in the U.S.”)

He repeated a version of that critique over lunch in August, prompting one member of Pelosi’s delegation, Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi, to speak up and urge Chang to visit Krishnamoorthi’s home state of Illinois to get a better sense of the American workforce. Chang did not indicate he was tempted by the invitation.

When I asked several Biden administration officials about Chang’s criticism, the message I got back was a confident-sounding “stay tuned.” The next stage of CHIPS implementation, they said, would reveal in more detail how the law would be used to unlock a torrent of private-sector investment and make American semiconductor fabrication a sturdy, long-range enterprise. They did not reject Chang’s concerns about the current U.S. workforce, but pointed to American tech hubs like Silicon Valley and North Carolina’s Research Triangle as evidence that we do know how to build dynamic, fully staffed tech hubs in this country. Now, they said, we need to build more of them.

Not long after his luncheon with Pelosi, Chang visited an area that figures to become one of those hubs. In Arizona, he joined Biden at a vast construction site in north Phoenix where TSMC is building a gargantuan complex that may stand as something of a counterpoint to Chang’s overarching skepticism about the law. His company mapped out plans for an Arizona project before Biden became president, but after the passage of the CHIPS law TSMC announced it would massively increase its investment in the state — from $12 billion to $40 billion — and build a second facility there, too.

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US politico 張忠謀 美國半導體製造瞎扯淡 不如投資台灣