62%比61%！這領域中國首次擊敗美國
2022年10月28日 參考消息
中共官媒參考消息報道：據美國《新聞周刊》網站10月25日報道，隨著人們對全球的西方式民主國家失去信心，中國在意識形態和政治鬥爭中首次擊敗美國，贏得發展中國家人民的好感。
報道稱，英國劍橋大學民主未來中心最近進行的一項民調顯示，發展中國家目前有62%的人對中國有好感，61%的人對美國有好感。這些數據融合了30個全球調查項目，涵蓋97%的世界人口。
報道稱，盡管西方式民主國家更加堅定地支持美國，對中國和俄羅斯持有一邊倒的負麵看法，但過去10年來，東歐、亞洲和西非的許多國家逐漸向中國靠攏。
報道稱，調查數據顯示，生活在全球136個非西方式民主國家的63億人口中，有70%的人對中國持正麵看法。
報道稱，為什麽中國能贏得發展中國家的支持？其背後的原因之一是它們認為自由主義國家的民主製度存在缺陷。
根據民主未來中心的調查，在大部分人對西方式民主製度感到不滿的國家當中，有四分之三國家的大多數民眾對中國持有正麵看法。
報道稱，不過，中國贏得發展中國家的支持背後也有經濟原因。中國在2013年提出了“一帶一路”倡議，已經同147個國家和32個國際組織簽署200餘份合作文件，用來建設能源基礎設施和交通運輸項目。
在獲得“一帶一路”倡議支持的國家的民眾當中，有近三分之二的人對中國持正麵看法。
另據美國之音電台網站10月25日報道，英國一家民調機構在全球所作的一項民調顯示，中國在西方國家以外的世界受歡迎程度遠高於西方國家。
報道稱，由英國獨立調查公司“輿觀調查網”以“輿觀-劍橋全球化項目”名義所作的民調發現，12個非西方國家中有9個國家的絕大多數受訪者對中國在世界上的作用持積極看法，而且北京在後疫情時代的聲望也在幾個國家中得到改善。
墨西哥對中國持積極看法的人從去年的50%上升到今年的59%；埃及和沙特對中國持積極看法的人也有所上升，泰國、肯尼亞和尼日利亞也出現了同樣的情況。
China is Beating U.S. in the Battle for Influence Over Developing Countries
https://www.newsweek.com/china-beating-us-battle-influence-developing-countries-1754421
Why China Growing Their Influence On World Trade And Ports Could Be A Problem
According to a recent poll by the Centre for the Future of Democracy of the University of Cambridge, U.K., 62 percent of people in developing countries are now favorable towards China, while 61 percent see the U.S. positively.
In this combination photo, a file photo of security guards walking past the Chinese national flag at the Military Museum of Chinese People's Revolution and U.S. President Joe Biden looks out to a crowd at Delaware State University on October 21, 2022. The president has shied away from any comment.
There's only a small distance between the two countries, and that one percentage point difference might not seem so significant. But the data reveals a world that has become more polarized since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February this year.
Data from the Centre for the Future of Democracy—obtained by merging 30 global survey projects that span a total of 137 countries representing 97 percent of the world population—shows that, among the 1.2 billion people living in the world's liberal democracies, 75 percent hold a negative view of China and 87 percent a negative view of Russia.
This same data is almost reversed in developing countries. Among the 6.3 billion people who live in the world's remaining 136 countries, 70 percent feel positively towards China and 66 percent towards Russia.
This divide, which has been in the making for the last 10 years as Russia and especially China expanded their influence in developing countries through investments and trades, has been exacerbated by the war in Ukraine.
Why Are Russia and China Gaining Support in Developing Countries?
One of the reasons linked to the increased support in developing countries for authoritarian powers like China and Russia are perceived shortcomings of democracies in liberal countries.
A majority of the public is dissatisfied with democratic performance in seven out of 10 countries that are majority-favourable to Russia, according to the Centre for the Future of Democracy, while most feel positively towards China in three-quarters of countries that are majority-dissatisfied with how their democracy is performing.
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But there are also economic reasons behind the support China enjoys in developing countries. In 2013, China launched the Belt and Road initiative, a massive project that has invested over $4 trillion into the 147 participating countries to build energy infrastructure and transportation projects.
Among the 4.6 billion people living in countries supported by the Belt and Road Initiative, almost two-thirds hold a positive view of China, compared
to just 27 percent in non-participating countries that have not received Beijing's assistance.
On the other hand, China has gained approval in developing countries while losing significant support in developed nations. Five years ago, 42 percent of Western citizens looked at China positively, while now only 23 percent do.
The same is true about Russia: the number of Western citizens holding a positive view of Russia dropped from 39 percent to 12 in the past 10 years, plunging from 23 to 12 percent only since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine.
The troubling factor to consider is that the Kremlin probably doesn't even care about losing support in Western democracies. "The real terrain of Russia's international influence lies outside of the West," writes the Centre for the Future of Democracy.
Some 75 percent of respondents in South Asia, 68 percent in Francophone Africa, 62 percent in Southeast Asia holds a positive opinion of Russia despite the ongoing war in Ukraine.
One last reason why developing countries might have swayed from the U.S. towards China and Russia are conflicting values: as the U.S. and Western nations have embraced more progressive values in the last decade—regarding LGBTQ+ rights, individualism, and gender equality—other countries have stuck to their traditional, conservative values.
This has offered an opportunity for authoritarian leaders like Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping to present themselves as defenders of "traditional" values in the face of a so-called western "decadence"—Putin's case—and protectors of their country's national sovereignty—Xi's case.
This new world's polarization clearly shows that the nations that feel closer to China and Russia are poorer, less stable, and more dependent upon their external support, while the liberal bloc rallying around the U.S. has a significant advantage, accounting for the lion's share of global military spending, foreign aid, and cultural influence.
Popular in the Community
Faith in democracy: millennials are the most disillusioned generation ‘in living memory’
https://www.cam.ac.uk/stories/populismandcovid?
Story: Fred Lewsey
“There is strong evidence that the pandemic has severely blunted the rise of populism”
A University of Cambridge team say there are clear signs of a turning tide for the “populist wave”, as the mishandling of coronavirus by populist leaders – along with a desire for stability and a decline in “polarising” attitudes as a result of the pandemic – starts to move public opinion.
The authors of the new report, from Cambridge’s Centre for the Future of Democracy (CFD), describe the study as the first global overview of how the Covid-19 crisis has affected political beliefs.
They say that threats posed by the pandemic saw a “technocratic” shift in political authority worldwide, with increased trust in government, and in experts such as scientists and civil servants.
Yet faith in the democratic processes by which people elect their representatives has continued to falter.
“The story of politics in recent years has been the emergence of anti-establishment politicians who thrive on the growing distrust of experts,” said Dr Roberto Foa, Co-Director of the CFD and the report’s lead author.
“From Erdogan and Bolsonaro to the ‘strong men’ of Eastern Europe, the planet has experienced a wave of political populism. Covid-19 may have caused that wave to crest.”
A protester calling for “Bolsonaro out” in Brazil last summer.
“Electoral support for populist parties has collapsed around the world in a way we don’t see for more mainstream politicians.
“There is strong evidence that the pandemic has severely blunted the rise of populism,” said Foa.
The findings are published by Cambridge’s Bennett Institute for Public Policy.
The first months of the pandemic saw many political leaders get a boost in ratings – a classic “rally round the flag” effect in troubled times, say researchers.
However, the approval ratings of populist leaders the world over began declining almost as soon as coronavirus hit, and have continued to sink ever since.
On average, populist leaders have seen a 10 percentage point drop between the spring of 2020 and the last quarter of 2021, while ratings for non-populists – on average – returned to around pre-pandemic levels.
Electoral support also plunged for their parties – seen most clearly in Europe, where the proportion of people intending to vote for a populist party* has fallen by an average of 11 percentage points to 27%.
Overall, across Europe, early lockdowns saw voting intention for incumbent parties increase. Yet all the continent’s governing populists – from Italy’s Five Star to Hungary’s Fidezs – bucked the trend with the largest declines in support.
Support for Europe’s opposition populist parties also fell over the pandemic – by 5 points on average to 11% – while it rose for “mainstream” opposition.
Researchers suggest several factors for populism’s fading appeal. One is simply the botch job made of the pandemic by populist governments: from Bolsonaro’s mask veto to Trump’s “bleach injection” suggestion.
The report’s polling shows the public considered populist leaders to be less trustworthy sources of virus-related information than centrist counterparts.
In June 2020, approval of government handling of the crisis was 11 percentage points lower on average in countries with populist leaders than in those with more centrist governance. By the end of 2020, this gap had widened to 16 points.
Researchers also found that political “tribalism” – fertile ground for populists – has declined in most countries. The percentage of party supporters expressing a “strong dislike” of those who vote for opposing politicians fell in most nations (although not the US) during the crisis.
“The pandemic fostered a sense of shared purpose that may have reduced the political polarisation we’ve seen over the last decade,” said CFD researcher and report co-author Dr Xavier Romero-Vidal. “This could help explain why populist leaders are struggling to mobilise support.”
Some of the ideas propagated by populists are losing ground. Levels of agreement with statements such as “corrupt elites” divide our nation or the “will of the people” should be obeyed fell in almost every nation surveyed.
For example, agreement with four such statements** fell on average by 9 percentage points in Italy to 66%, 10 points in France to 61%, and 8 points in the UK to 64%, between 2019 and 2021.
Commitment to these ideas has also waned. Even among supporters, in almost every nation a smaller number now “strongly agree” than did in 2019. In developed democracies, this shift is predominantly among those aged over 55.
Moreover, areas with the sharpest drops in populist attitudes are some of the poorer “left behind” regions – from Eastern Poland to Southern Italy and Northern Hungary – that have been a focus for populist rhetoric and support.
“This may be down to some rebalancing of wealth as people escaped cities overrun with the virus,” said Foa. “In addition, Covid-19 border closures stopped migration and globalised trade more effectively than any populist government.”
However, some “illiberal” policies gained traction while populations were in the teeth of the pandemic.
Majorities in all major nations surveyed in 2020 were content with banning handshakes, and much of the public – including majorities in Japan and Germany – supported restricting online discussions of the virus***.
The consequence of populist decline has not been renewed faith in liberal democracy, say researchers. Perhaps tainted by the record of populists in office, support for democracy has also waned.
Instead, citizens increasingly favour technocratic sources of authority, such as having “non-political” experts take decisions.
A 'Count Every Vote' rally in Washington DC after the 2020 US election.
By the start of summer 2020, belief that experts should be allowed to make decisions “according to what they think best for the country” had risen 14 points to 62% in Europe and 8 points to 57% in the US****.
While trust in government has steadily climbed since the pandemic hit, increasing by 3.4 percentage points on average right across the world’s democratic nations*****, faith in democracy as a political system barely changed.
“Satisfaction with democracy has recovered only slightly since the post-war nadir of 2019, and is still well below the long-term average,” said Foa.
“Some of the biggest declines in democratic support during the pandemic were seen in Germany, Spain and Japan – nations with large elderly populations particularly vulnerable to the virus.”
In the US, the percentage of people who consider democracy a “bad” way to run the country more than doubled from 10.5% in late 2019 to 25.8% in late 2021.
Added Foa: “The pandemic has brought good and bad news for liberal democracy. On the upside, we see a decline in populism and a restoration of trust in government.
“On the downside, some illiberal attitudes have are increasing, and satisfaction with democracy remains very low.”
*Parties were classified as “populist” according to Rooduijn et al (2019): “The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe”, www.popu-list.org.
**In all, four statements considered mainstays of populist sentiment were tested: belief that the country is divided between ordinary people and corrupt elites; belief that “the will of the people” should guide politics; that special interests block progress; that information is deliberately concealed from the public.
*** Respondents were asked what measures they would support in the event of a future crisis similar to coronavirus.
****Targeted surveys in the US and seven Western European nations (Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, UK, Denmark). First survey in Nov 2019, with follow-up in May 2020.
*****All countries currently rated as full “free” democracies by Freedom House. Increase between 2nd quarter of 2020 to last quarter of 2021.
Support for populist politics ‘collapsed’ during the pandemic – global report
https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/blog/great-reset/
Published on 18 January 2022
New report shows support for populist politics ‘collapsed’ during the pandemic but satisfaction with democracy also continued to falter.
Support for populist parties and politicians, and agreement with populist sentiment, has diminished during the pandemic, according to a “mega-dataset” taking in attitudes of over half a million people across 109 countries since 2020.
A University of Cambridge team say there are clear signs of a turning tide for the “populist wave”, as the mishandling of coronavirus by populist leaders – along with a desire for stability and a decline in “polarising” attitudes resulting from the pandemic – starts to move public opinion.
The authors of the new report, from Cambridge’s Centre for the Future of Democracy (CFD), describe the study as the first global overview of how the Covid-19 crisis has affected political beliefs.
They say that threats posed by the pandemic saw a “technocratic” shift in political authority worldwide, with increased trust in government, and in experts such as scientists and civil servants. Yet faith in the democratic process has continued to falter.
“The story of politics in recent years has been the emergence of anti-establishment politicians who thrive on the growing distrust of experts,” said Dr Roberto Foa, Co-Director of the CFD and the report’s lead author.
“From Erdogan and Bolsonaro to the ‘strong men’ of Eastern Europe, the planet has experienced a wave of political populism. Covid-19 may have caused that wave to crest.”
“Electoral support for populist parties has collapsed around the world in a way we don’t see for more mainstream politicians. There is strong evidence that the pandemic has severely blunted the rise of populism,” said Foa.
The findings are published today by Cambridge’s Bennett Institute for Public Policy.
The first months of the pandemic saw many political leaders get a boost in ratings – a classic “rally round the flag” effect in troubled times, say researchers.
However, the approval ratings of populist leaders the world over began declining almost as soon as coronavirus hit, and have continued to sink ever since.
On average, populist leaders have seen a 10 percentage point drop between the spring of 2020 and the last quarter of 2021, while ratings for non-populists – on average – returned to around pre-pandemic levels.
Electoral support also plunged for their parties – seen most clearly in Europe, where the proportion of people intending to vote for a populist party* has fallen by an average of 11 percentage points to 27%.
Overall, across Europe, early lockdowns saw voting intention for incumbent parties increase. Yet all the continent’s governing populists – from Italy’s Five Star to Hungary’s Fidezs – bucked the trend with the largest declines in support.
Support for Europe’s opposition populist parties also fell over the pandemic – by 5 pp on average to 11% – while it rose for “mainstream” opposition.
Researchers suggest several factors for populism’s fading appeal. One is simply the botch job made of the pandemic by populist governments: from Bolsonaro’s mask veto to Trump’s “bleach injection” suggestion.
The report’s polling shows the public considered populist leaders to be less trustworthy sources of virus-related information than centrist counterparts.
In June 2020, approval of government handling of the crisis was 11 percentage points lower on average in countries with populist leaders than in those with more centrist governance. By the end of 2020, this gap had widened to 16 points.
Researchers also found that political “tribalism” – fertile ground for populists – has declined in most countries. The percentage of party supporters expressing a “strong dislike” of those who vote for opposing politicians fell in most nations (although not the US) during the crisis.
“The pandemic fostered a sense of shared purpose that may have reduced the political polarisation we’ve seen over the last decade,” said CFD researcher and report co-author Dr Xavier Romero-Vidal. “This could help explain why populist leaders are struggling to mobilise support.”
Some of the ideas propagated by populists are losing ground. Levels of agreement with statements such as “corrupt elites” divide our nation or the “will of the people” should be obeyed fell in almost every nation surveyed.
For example, agreement with four such statements** fell on average by 9 percentage points in Italy to 66%, 10 points in France to 61%, and 8 points in the UK to 64%, between 2019 and 2021.
Commitment to these ideas has also waned. Even among supporters, in almost every nation a smaller number now “strongly agree” than did in 2019. In developed democracies, this shift is predominantly among those aged over 55.
Moreover, areas with the sharpest drops in populist attitudes are some of the poorer “left behind” regions – from Eastern Poland to Southern Italy and Northern Hungary – that have been a focus for populist rhetoric and support.
“This may be down to some rebalancing of wealth as people escaped cities overrun with the virus,” said Foa. “In addition, Covid-19 border closures stopped migration and globalised trade more effectively than any populist government.”
However, some “illiberal” policies gained traction while populations were in the teeth of the pandemic. Majorities in all major nations surveyed in 2020 were content with banning handshakes, and much of the public – including majorities in Japan and Germany – supported restricting online discussions of the virus***.
The consequence of populist decline has not been renewed faith in liberal democracy, say researchers. Perhaps tainted by the record of populists in office, support for democracy has also waned.
Instead, citizens increasingly favour technocratic sources of authority, such as having “non-political” experts take decisions.
By the start of summer 2020, belief that experts should be allowed to make decisions “according to what they think best for the country” had risen 14 points to 62% in Europe and 8 points to 57% in the US****.
While trust in government has steadily climbed since the pandemic hit, increasing by 3.4 percentage points on average right across the world’s democratic nations*****, faith in democracy as a political system barely changed.
“Satisfaction with democracy has recovered only slightly since the post-war nadir of 2019, and is still well below the long-term average,” said Foa.
“Some of the biggest declines in democratic support during the pandemic were seen in Germany, Spain and Japan – nations with large elderly populations particularly vulnerable to the virus.”
In the US, the percentage of people who consider democracy a “bad” way to run the country more than doubled from 10.5% in late 2019 to 25.8% in late 2021.
Added Foa: “The pandemic has brought good and bad news for liberal democracy. On the upside, we see a decline in populism and a restoration of trust in government. On the downside, some illiberal attitudes are increasing, and satisfaction with democracy remains very low.”
Report: The Great Reset: Public Opinion, Populism, and the Pandemic
Notes
*Parties were classified as “populist” according to Rooduijn et al (2019): “The PopuList: An Overview of Populist, Far Right, Far Left and Eurosceptic Parties in Europe”, www.popu-list.org
**In all, four statements considered mainstays of populist sentiment were tested: belief that the country is divided between ordinary people and corrupt elites; belief that “the will of the people” should guide politics; that special interests block progress; that information is deliberately concealed from the public.
*** Respondents were asked what measures they would support in the event of a future crisis similar to coronavirus.
****Targeted surveys in the US and seven Western European nations (Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, UK, Denmark). First survey in Nov 2019, with follow-up in May 2020.
*****All countries currently rated as full “free” democracies by Freedom House. Increase between 2nd quarter of 2020 to last quarter of 2021.
