風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
【編者按】傑克·馬特洛克（Jack Matlock，1929.10.1—）是美國駐蘇聯最後一任大使，見證了美蘇關係的重大變局及隨後的發展走向。本月14日，就在俄烏戰爭一觸即發之時，92歲的馬特洛克在美國美俄協議委員會（ACURA）官網發表長篇文章，題為Today's Crisis Over Ukraine（今日的烏克蘭危機），並在副標題稱此為一場“蓄意促成的”（willfully precipitated）危機。文章雖發表在戰爭爆發前，卻準確地預測和分析了戰爭的必然性以及導致戰爭的諸多因素，特別對美國長期以來針對俄羅斯的外交政策進行了深刻而犀利的反思，並透露出一些重大的珍貴史實，值得一讀。特予全文編譯分享。
美國駐蘇聯大使傑克·馬特洛克（1987-1991）
美蘇協議委員會官網發表馬特洛克文章（官網截圖）
副題：
今天，我們正麵臨著一場本可避免的危機。這是一場可以預見的、也確曾被預見的、卻又被蓄意促成的危機。但這也是運用常識即可輕易解決的危機。
我們每天都被告知，烏克蘭可能即將發生戰爭。我們還被告知，俄羅斯軍隊正在烏克蘭邊境集結，隨時可能發動襲擊。美國公民被建議離開烏克蘭，美國大使館工作人員的家屬正在被疏散。與此同時，烏克蘭總統建議民眾不要恐慌，並明確表示他不認為俄羅斯即將入侵。
俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普京否認他有任何入侵烏克蘭的意圖。他的要求是停止增加北約新成員的進程，特別是要向俄羅斯保證，烏克蘭和格魯吉亞永遠不會成為北約成員。拜登總統拒絕提供此類保證，但明確表示願意繼續討論歐洲戰略穩定問題。同時，烏克蘭政府已明確表示，它無意執行 2015 年達成的將頓巴斯省重新納入烏克蘭並擁有高度地方自治權的協議——這份與俄羅斯、法國和德國達成的協議得到了美國的支持。
也許我錯了，可悲地錯了。但我不能否認，我們正在目睹一場被美國媒體精英嚴重放大且被用以服務於國內政治目的精心策劃的鬧劇。麵對不斷上升的通貨膨脹、奧密克戎的肆虐、從阿富汗撤軍的指責（在很大程度上是不公平的），以及未能獲得本黨對“重建更好”法案的全力支持，拜登政府在低迷的支持下步履蹣跚，就像它為今年的國會選舉做準備一樣。既然在國內問題上取得明顯的“勝利”似乎越來越不可能，為什麽不假裝他通過“對抗弗拉基米爾·普京”阻止了對烏克蘭的入侵呢？實際上，普京總統的目標似乎很可能正如他所說的那樣——正如他自 2007年在慕尼黑發表演講以來所說的那樣。簡言之，就是：“請至少對我們展示哪怕一點尊重嘛。我們並不威脅你或你的盟友，你們為何拒絕我們的安全卻又堅持你們自己的安全？”
1991 年蘇聯解體時，許多觀察家忽略了標誌著 1980 年代末和 1990 年代初迅速發展的事件，認為冷戰結束了。他們錯了。冷戰至少在兩年前就結束了。它以談判結束，符合各方的利益。喬治·H. W.布什總統（以下簡稱老布什）希望戈爾巴喬夫能夠設法將十二個非波羅的海共和國中的大多數保持在一個自願聯邦中。 1991 年 8 月 1 日，他在烏克蘭議會（最高議會）發表講話，支持戈爾巴喬夫的自願聯邦計劃，並警告不要“自殺式民族主義”。後一句話意指格魯吉亞領導人Zviad Gamsakurdia 對蘇維埃格魯吉亞境內少數民族的迫害。出於我將在其他地方解釋的原因，這些話也適用於今天的烏克蘭。
底線是：並不像美國的“芸芸眾生”和大多數俄羅斯公眾都普遍認為的那樣，美國支持甚至導致了蘇聯解體。我們在愛沙尼亞、拉脫維亞和立陶宛的整個獨立過程中都予以支持，但也和蘇聯的態度是一致的：蘇聯議會的最後一項行動就是將他們的獨立要求合法化。順便說一句，普京盡管經常表達恐懼的聲音，但從未威脅要重新吞並波羅的海國家或索要他們的任何領土。盡管他批評了一些剝奪俄羅斯族人全部公民權利的做法，但這也是歐盟承諾強製執行的原則。
但是，讓我們回到副標題中的第一個斷言……
裏根總統（左）與戈爾巴喬夫總書記在日內瓦峰會上握手，桌子盡頭是馬特洛克（網絡）
危機可以避免嗎？
好吧，既然普京總統的主要訴求是保證北約將不再接納其他成員，特別是烏克蘭或格魯吉亞，那麽如果北約在冷戰結束後沒有擴大聯盟，或者如果這一擴張能與在歐洲建立包括俄羅斯在內的安全結構相協調，那麽顯然，當前的危機就沒有爆發的基礎。
也許我們應該更宏觀地看待這個問題。其他國家如何應對其邊境附近的外國軍事聯盟？既然我們在談論美國的政策，也許我們應該關注一下美國對外界試圖與其周邊國家建立聯盟的反應方式。還記得“門羅宣言”、那個涵蓋整個半球勢力範圍的“門羅主義”嗎（1823年，美國總統詹姆斯·門羅在國會演說中宣稱，歐洲列強不得再殖民美洲或涉足美國與墨西哥等美洲國家主權相關的事物，否則美國將視其為敵意行為——譯注）？
我們當時是認真的。當我們得知凱撒的德國在第一次世界大戰期間試圖將墨西哥作為盟友時，這成為我們隨後對德宣戰的重大理由。然後在我有生之年，我們經曆了古巴導彈危機。因為我當年在莫斯科的美國大使館翻譯赫魯曉夫的一些寫給肯尼迪的書信，所以我記憶猶新。
我們究竟是應該從一些國際法原則的角度來看待古巴導彈危機這樣的事件，還是從一個國家領導人在感到受到威脅時可能采取的行為的角度來看待這些事件？當時的國際法對古巴使用核導彈有何規定？規定就是：古巴是一個主權國家，有權從它選擇的任何地方尋求對其獨立的保障。而那時它受到了美國的威脅，美國甚至企圖策動反卡斯特羅的古巴人進行入侵。於是古巴請求蘇聯的支持。蘇聯領導人尼基塔·赫魯曉夫（Nikita Khrushchev）得知美國在土耳其部署了核武器，而土耳其實際上是與蘇聯接壤的美國盟友，蘇聯便決定在古巴部署核導彈。如果蘇聯部署的武器與美國針對它部署的武器類似，美國怎麽可能合法地反對呢？
顯然，這是一個錯誤。大錯特錯！（人們不由會想起塔列朗的話......“比犯罪更糟糕......”）國際關係，無論喜歡與否，都不是通過辯論、解釋和應用“國際法”的細節來決定的——無論如何這與僅在一國之內實施的國內法律不可相提並論。於是肯尼迪不得不做出反應以消除威脅。參謀長聯席會議建議轟炸摧毀導彈。幸而肯尼迪沒有這樣做，而是采取封堵措施，並要求蘇聯撤回導彈。
在來回溝通信息的那一周裏，我翻譯了赫魯曉夫最長的信息，最終赫魯曉夫同意從古巴撤回核導彈。當時沒有對外宣布的是，肯尼迪也同意從土耳其撤出美國導彈，但前提是這一承諾不得公開。
當然，我們駐莫斯科大使館的美國外交官對結果感到高興。我們甚至沒有被告知有關土耳其導彈的協議。我們不知道我們曾如此接近一場核戰爭。我們知道美國在加勒比地區擁有軍事優勢，如果美國空軍轟炸了這些（有蘇聯導彈的）地點，我們也會歡呼的。但我們錯了。在後來與蘇聯外交官和軍官的會麵中，我們了解到，如果這些地點遭到轟炸，現場的軍官可能會在沒有莫斯科命令的情況下發射導彈。我們會因此失去邁阿密，然後呢？我們也對一艘蘇聯潛艇差點向阻止其上浮的美軍驅逐艦發射一枚裝有核武器的魚雷一無所知。
千鈞一發的危機。卷入與擁有核武器國家的軍事對抗是相當危險的。你不需要國際法的高級學位來理解這一點。你隻需要常識。
這看來是可以預見的。但果真被預見到了嗎？
“冷戰結束以來最嚴重的戰略失誤”
我的話和我的聲音都不是唯一的。 1997年，當關於增加北大西洋公約組織（北約）成員的問題被討論時，我被傳喚到參議院外交關係委員會出席聽證。在我的介紹性發言中，我發表了以下聲明：“我認為政府在此時將新成員納入北約的建議是錯誤的。如果該建議得到參議院批準，很可能會成為冷戰結束以來犯下的最嚴重的戰略失誤而載入史冊。它不僅不能改善美國、其盟國和希望加入聯盟的國家的安全，還可能助長一連串事件，這些事件可能對這個國家產生自蘇聯解體以來最嚴重的安全威脅。”
我這麽說的理由，是俄羅斯聯邦存在核武庫，其總儲量與美國相當，甚至超過美國。我們的任何一個核武庫，如果真的用於熱戰，都具備終結地球文明的可能性，甚至可能導致人類和地球上許多其他生命的滅絕。盡管裏根政府和老任布什政府時期美蘇達成了一係列軍備控製協議，美國和蘇聯在克林頓政府期間就進一步削減軍備的談判還是陷入了停滯，甚至從歐洲撤出短程核武器的談判都未曾進行。
這並不是我建議將俄羅斯包括而不是排除在歐洲安全之外的唯一原因。我在聽證會上做如是解釋：“增加北約成員國的計劃沒有考慮到冷戰結束後的真實國際形勢，而是按照隻有在冷戰時期才有意義的邏輯進行的。在沒有考慮讓新成員加入北約之前，歐洲的分裂就結束了。沒有人威脅要重新分裂歐洲。因此，像一些人所說的那樣，聲稱有必要讓新成員加入北約以避免未來的歐洲分裂是荒謬的。如果北約要成為統一歐洲大陸的主要工具，那麽從邏輯上講，它能夠做到這一點的唯一方法就是擴大到包括所有歐洲國家。但這似乎不是政府的目標，即使是，實現目標的方法也不是零零散散地接納新成員。”
然後我補充說，“北約擴大的所有聲稱目標都是值得稱讚的。中歐和東歐國家在文化上當然是歐洲的一部分，應該保證在歐洲機構中占有一席之地。當然，我們與那裏的民主和穩定經濟的發展息息相關。但加入北約並不是實現這些目標的唯一途徑。在沒有明確和可識別的安全威脅的情況下，這甚至不是最好的方法。”
事實上，逐步擴大北約的決定是對導致冷戰結束和東歐解放的美國政策的逆轉。老布什總統宣布了一個“完整和自由的歐洲”的目標。蘇聯總統戈爾巴喬夫曾談到“我們共同的歐洲家園”，並歡迎東歐政府的代表擺脫共產黨統治者，還下令徹底裁減蘇聯軍隊，並解釋說，一個國家要想安全，就必須確保其他國家的共同安全。老布什總統還於 1989 年 12 月在馬耳他會晤期間向戈爾巴喬夫保證，如果允許東歐國家通過民主進程選擇其未來方向，美國將不會“利用”這一進程為自己牟利。（顯然，將當時加入華沙條約的國家帶入北約就是“牟利”。”）
第二年，戈爾巴喬夫得到保證，盡管沒有正式條約，如果蘇聯允許統一的德國（含原來華沙條約內的東德——譯注）留在北約，北約的管轄權就不會向東移動，“一英寸也不會”。
這些承諾是在蘇聯解體之前向戈爾巴喬夫總統提出的。一旦解體，俄羅斯聯邦的人口將不到蘇聯的一半，軍事機構士氣低落，充滿混亂。如果說，連蘇聯承認並尊重東歐國家的獨立後，北約都沒有擴大的理由，那就更沒有理由擔心俄羅斯聯邦是一種威脅。
任性而為？
在喬治·W·布什（以下簡稱小布什）政府（2001-2009 年）期間，東歐國家繼續加入北約，但這並不是唯一引起俄羅斯反對的原因。與此同時，美國開始退出軍控條約，這些條約一度緩和了一場非理性和危險的軍備競賽，是結束冷戰的基礎協議。最重要的是決定退出反彈道導彈條約（ABM Treaty），該條約是一係列協議的基石條約，曾一度終止核軍備競賽。
在紐約世貿中心和北弗吉尼亞五角大樓遭到恐怖襲擊後，普京總統是第一位致電布什總統並表示支持的外國領導人。他言出必行，促成了對阿富汗塔利班政權的襲擊，該政權窩藏了發動襲擊的基地組織領導人奧薩馬·本·拉登。當時很明顯，普京渴望與美國建立安全夥伴關係。瞄準美國的聖戰恐怖分子也瞄準了俄羅斯。盡管如此，美國通過入侵伊拉克繼續其無視俄羅斯及其盟國利益的做法，這種侵略行為不僅受到俄羅斯的反對，也受到法國和德國的反對。
隨著普京總統將俄羅斯從 1990 年代後期發生的破產中拯救出來，穩定了經濟，還清了俄羅斯的外債，減少了有組織的犯罪活動，甚至開始建立金融儲備金以抵禦潛在金融風險，但普京對俄羅斯尊嚴和安全的立場卻遭受了一次又一次的侮辱。他在 2007 年在慕尼黑的一次演講中提到這些侮辱。美國國防部長羅伯特·蓋茨回應說，我們不需要新的冷戰。當然這是真誠的，但他、他的上級和他的繼任者似乎都沒有認真對待普京的警告。然後，參議員約瑟夫·拜登（Joseph Biden）在 2008 年總統大選候選人競選期間向選民承諾，“要與弗拉基米爾·普京抗衡！”好奇怪，在這個世界上，普京到底對他或對美國做了什麽？
盡管巴拉克·奧巴馬總統上任之初承諾改變政策，但事實上，他的政府繼續無視俄羅斯最嚴重的關切，並進一步強化美國之前的努力，以使前蘇聯加盟共和國脫離俄羅斯的影響，乃至鼓動俄羅斯自身的“政權更迭”。俄羅斯總統和大多數俄羅斯人都認為，美國在敘利亞和烏克蘭的行動是對俄羅斯的間接攻擊。
敘利亞總統阿薩德是一個殘暴的獨裁者，但卻是對抗伊斯蘭國的唯一有效的堡壘。伊斯蘭國運動在美國入侵伊拉克後蓬勃發展，並正在蔓延到敘利亞。對敘利亞境內所謂的“民主反對派”的軍事援助很快落入與組織 9·11 襲擊美國的基地組織結盟的聖戰分子手中！但對附近俄羅斯的威脅要大得多，因為許多聖戰分子來自包括俄羅斯在內的前蘇聯地區。敘利亞也是俄羅斯的近鄰；有人認為，美國企圖將敘利亞政府斬首，客觀上加強了美國和俄羅斯的共同敵人。
就烏克蘭而言，美國對其國內政治的幹預很深——甚至到了似乎在為其挑選總理的地步。實際上，它還支持了 2014 年改變烏克蘭政府的非法政變，這一程序通常被認為不符合法治或民主治理。烏克蘭仍在醞釀的暴力事件始於“親西方”的西部，而不是頓巴斯。頓巴斯的衝突被視為是當地政府對俄羅斯族烏克蘭人施暴的反應。
在奧巴馬總統的第二個任期內，他的言辭變得更加個性化，加入了美國和英國媒體詆毀俄羅斯總統的日益高漲的大合唱。奧巴馬談到對俄羅斯人的經濟製裁是因為普京在烏克蘭的“不當行為”而使他“付出了代價”，但他很容易忘記普京的行動在俄羅斯很受歡迎，而且奧巴馬自己的前任則可能被確切地指控為戰犯。奧巴馬隨後開始對整個俄羅斯國家進行侮辱，並毫無依據地提出諸如“俄羅斯造不出任何人想要的東西”之類的指控，而忽略了這樣一個事實，即當時我們可以讓美國宇航員進入國際空間站的唯一方法是使用俄羅斯火箭。奧巴馬的政府也正在盡最大努力阻止伊朗和土耳其購買俄羅斯的防空導彈。
我相信有些人會說：“這有什麽大不了的？裏根稱蘇聯為邪惡帝國，但隨後通過談判結束了冷戰。”沒錯！裏根譴責舊的蘇聯帝國——並隨後稱讚戈爾巴喬夫改變了它——但他從未公開譴責過蘇聯領導人。他以個人的尊重和平等的態度對待他們，甚至請外交部長格羅米科參加通常為國家元首或政府首腦保留的正式晚宴。他在私人會議上的第一句話通常是這樣的：“我們將世界的和平掌握在我們手中。我們必須采取負責任的行動，這樣世界才能和平相處。”
在唐納德·特朗普任職的四年裏，情況變得更糟。在沒有證據的情況下，特朗普被指控是通俄騙子。（為證清白）他更加積極地通過了一係列反俄措施，一方麵又奉承普京是一位偉大的領導人。美國在奧巴馬任期的最後幾天開始的對外交官的互斥驅逐，在一個嚴峻的惡性循環中持續進行，導致使領館外交人員嚴重不足，以至於幾個月來美國在莫斯科沒有足夠的工作人員為俄羅斯人簽發訪美簽證。
與最近的許多其他事態發展一樣，外交使團的相互扼殺扭轉了冷戰後期美國外交最引以為豪的成就之一，當時我們努力成功地打開了蘇聯的封閉社會，拉倒了隔開“東”“西”的鐵幕。我們成功了，在一位蘇聯領導人的合作下，他明白他的國家迫切需要加入世界。
好吧，我相信今天的危機是“蓄意促成的”。但如果是這樣，我怎麽能說它可以憑借常識輕鬆解決？
應用常識便可輕鬆解決？
簡短的回答是因為它可以。普京總統的要求是非常合理的，即結束北約擴張並在歐洲建立一個確保俄羅斯和其他國家安全的安全框架。他沒有要求任何北約成員退出，也沒有威脅任何人。按照任何務實的常識標準，促進和平而不是營造衝突符合美國的利益。試圖使烏克蘭脫離俄羅斯的影響——那些鼓動“顏色革命”的人所公開的目標——是愚蠢的，也是危險的。我們這麽快就忘記了古巴導彈危機的教訓嗎？
現在，說批準普京的要求符合美國的客觀利益，並不意味著這很容易做到。民主黨和共和黨的領導人都形成了這樣一種恐俄立場（一個需要另作研究的議題），以至於需要高超的政治技巧才能駕馭危險的政治水域並取得理性的結果。
拜登總統明確表示，如果俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭，美國將不會用自己的軍隊進行幹預。那麽，為什麽要將這些軍隊派駐到東歐呢？隻是為了向國會的鷹派表明他的強硬立場？派駐東歐幹什麽呢？除了逃離敘利亞、阿富汗和非洲大草原幹旱地區的難民潮之外，沒有人威脅波蘭或保加利亞。那麽第82空降師的任務到底是什麽呢？
正如我之前提到的那樣，也許這隻是一個昂貴的遊戲。也許拜登和普京政府隨後的談判會找到解決俄羅斯擔憂的方法。如果是這樣，也許這個遊戲就達到了它的目的。也許那時我們的國會議員將開始處理我們在家中日益嚴重的問題，而不是讓它們變得更糟。
人是可以有夢想的，不是嗎？
原文鏈接：
https://usrussiaaccord.org/acura-viewpoint-jack-f-matlock-jr-todays-crisis-over-ukraine/
ACURA ViewPoint Jack F. Matlock, Jr.: Today’s Crisis Over Ukraine
ACURA VIEWPOINTFebruary 14, 2022
Today we face an avoidable crisis that was predictable, actually predicted, willfully precipitated, but easily resolved by the application of common sense.
We are being told each day that war may be imminent in Ukraine. Russian troops, we are told, are massing at Ukraine’s borders and could attack at any time. American citizens are being advised to leave Ukraine and dependents of the American Embassy staff are being evacuated. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian president has advised against panic and made clear that he does not consider a Russian invasion imminent. Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, has denied that he has any intention of invading Ukraine. His demand is that the process of adding new members to NATO cease and that in particular, Russia has assurance that Ukraine and Georgia will never be members. President Biden has refused to give such assurance but made clear his willingness to continue discussing questions of strategic stability in Europe. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government has made clear it has no intention of implementing the agreement reached in 2015 for reuniting the Donbas provinces into Ukraine with a large degree of local autonomy—an agreement with Russia, France and Germany which the United States endorsed.
Maybe I am wrong—tragically wrong—but I cannot dismiss the suspicion that we are witnessing an elaborate charade, grossly magnified by prominent elements of the American media, to serve a domestic political end. Facing rising inflation, the ravages of Omicron, blame (for the most part unfair) for the withdrawal from Afghanistan, plus the failure to get the full support of his own party for the Build Back Better legislation, the Biden administration is staggering under sagging approval ratings just as it gears up for this year’s congressional elections. Since clear “victories” on the domestic woes seem increasingly unlikely, why not fabricate one by posing as if he prevented the invasion of Ukraine by “standing up to Vladimir Putin”? Actually, it seems most likely that President Putin’s goals are what he says they are—and as he has been saying since his speech in Munich in 2007. To simplify and paraphrase, I would sum them up as: “Treat us with at least a modicum of respect. We do not threaten you or your allies, why do you refuse us the security you insist for yourself?”
In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, many observers, ignoring the rapidly unfolding events that marked the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, considered that the end of the Cold War. They were wrong. The Cold War had ended at least two years earlier. It ended by negotiation and was in the interest of all the parties. President George H.W. Bush hoped that Gorbachev would manage to keep most of the twelve non-Baltic republics in a voluntary federation. On August 1, 1991, he made a speech to the Ukrainian parliament (the Verkhovna Rada) in which he endorsed Gorbachev’s plans for a voluntary federation and warned against “suicidal nationalism.” The latter phrase was inspired by Georgian leader Zviad Gamsakurdia’s attacks on minorities in Soviet Georgia. For reasons I will explain elsewhere, they apply to Ukraine today. Bottom line: Despite the prevalent belief, both among the “blob” in the United States, and most of the Russian public, the United States did not support, much less cause the break-up of the Soviet Union. We supported throughout the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and one of the last acts of the Soviet parliament was to legalize their claim to independence. And—by the way—despite frequently voiced fears—Vladimir Putin has never threatened to re-absorb the Baltic countries or to claim any of their territories, though he has criticized some that denied ethnic Russians the full rights of citizenship, a principle that the European Union is pledged to enforce.
But, let’s move on to the first of the assertions in the subtitle…
Was the crisis avoidable?
Well, since President Putin’s major demand is an assurance that NATO will take no further members, and specifically not Ukraine or Georgia, obviously there would have been no basis for the present crisis if there had been no expansion of the alliance following the end of the Cold War, or if the expansion had occurred in harmony with building a security structure in Europe that included Russia.
Maybe we should look at this question more broadly. How do other countries respond to alien military alliances near their borders? Since we are talking about American policy, maybe we should pay some attention to the way the United States has reacted to attempts of outsiders to establish alliances with countries nearby. Anybody remember the Monroe Doctrine, a declaration of a sphere of influence that comprised an entire hemisphere? And we meant it! When we learned that Kaiser’s Germany was attempting to enlist Mexico as an ally during the first world war, that was a powerful incentive for the subsequent declaration of war against Germany. Then, of course, in my lifetime, we had the Cuban Missile Crisis—something I remember vividly since I was at the American Embassy in Moscow and translated some of Khrushchev’s messages to Kennedy.
Should we look at events like the Cuban Missile Crisis from the standpoint of some of the principles of international law, or from the standpoint of the likely behavior of a country’s leaders if they feel threatened? What did international law at that time say about the employment of nuclear missiles in Cuba? Cuba was a sovereign state and had the right to seek support for its independence from anywhere it chose. It had been threatened by the United States, even an attempt to invade, using anti-Castro Cubans. It asked the Soviet Union for support. Knowing that the United States had deployed nuclear weapons in Turkey, a U.S. ally actually bordering on the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, decided to station nuclear missiles in Cuba. How could the U.S. legitimately object if the Soviet Union was deploying weapons similar to those deployed against it?
Obviously, it was a mistake. A big mistake! (One is reminded of Talleyrand’s remark..”Worse than a crime …”) International relations, like it or not, are not determined by debating, interpreting and applying the finer points of “international law”—which in any case is not the same as municipal law, the law within countries. Kennedy had to react to remove the threat. The Joint Chiefs recommended taking out the missiles by bombing. Fortunately, Kennedy stopped short of that, declared a blockade and demanded the removal of the missiles.
At the end of the week of messages back and forth—I translated Khrushchev’s longest—it was agreed that Khrushchev would remove the nuclear missiles from Cuba. What was not announced was that Kennedy also agreed that he would remove the U.S. missiles from Turkey but that this commitment must not be made public.
We American diplomats in Embassy Moscow were delighted at the outcome, of course. We were not even informed of the agreement regarding missiles in Turkey. We had no idea that we had come close to a nuclear exchange. We knew the U.S. had military superiority in the Caribbean and we would have cheered if the U.S. Air Force had bombed the sites. We were wrong. In later meetings with Soviet diplomats and military officers, we learned that, if the sites had been bombed, the officers on the spot could have launched the missiles without orders from Moscow. We could have lost Miami, and then what? We also did not know that a Soviet submarine came close to launching a nuclear-armed torpedo against the destroyer that was preventing its coming up for air.
It was a close call. It is quite dangerous to get involved in military confrontations with countries with nuclear weapons. You don’t need an advanced degree in international law to understand that. You need only common sense.
OK—It was predictable. Was it predicted?
“The most profound strategic blunder made since the end of the Cold War”
My words, and my voice was not the only one. In 1997, when the question of adding more members to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), I was asked to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In my introductory remarks, I made the following statement: “I consider the Administration’s recommendation to take new members into NATO at this time misguided. If it should be approved by the United States Senate, it may well go down in history as the most profound strategic blunder made since the end of the Cold War. Far from improving the security of the United States, its Allies, and the nations that wish to enter the Alliance, it could well encourage a chain of events that could produce the most serious security threat to this nation since the Soviet Union collapsed.”
The reason I cited was the presence in the Russian Federation of a nuclear arsenal that, in overall effectiveness, matched if not exceeded that of the United States. Either of our arsenals, if actually used in a hot war, was capable of ending the possibility of civilization on earth, possibly even causing the extinction of the human race and much other life on the planet. Though the United States and the Soviet Union had, as a result of arms control agreements concluded by the Reagan and first Bush administrations, negotiations for further reductions stalled during the Clinton Administration. There was not even an effort to negotiate the removal of short-range nuclear weapons from Europe.
That was not the only reason I cited for including rather than excluding Russia from European security. I explained as follows: “The plan to increase the membership of NATO fails to take account of the real international situation following the end of the Cold War, and proceeds in accord with a logic that made sense only during the Cold War. The division of Europe ended before there was any thought of taking new members into NATO. No one is threatening to re-divide Europe. It is therefore absurd to claim, as some have, that it is necessary to take new members into NATO to avoid a future division of Europe; if NATO is to be the principal instrument for unifying the continent, then logically the only way it can do so is by expanding to include all European countries. But that does not appear to be the aim of the Administration, and even if it is, the way to reach it is not by admitting new members piecemeal.”
Then I added, “All of the purported goals of NATO enlargement are laudable. Of course the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are culturally part of Europe and should be guaranteed a place in European institutions. Of course we have a stake in the development of democracy and stable economies there. But membership in NATO is not the only way to achieve these ends. It is not even the best way in the absence of a clear and identifiable security threat.”
In fact, the decision to expand NATO piecemeal was a reversal of American policies that produced the end of the Cold War and the liberation of Eastern Europe. President George H.W. Bush had proclaimed a goal of a “Europe whole and free.” Soviet President Gorbachev had spoken of “our common European home,” had welcomed representatives of East European governments who threw off their Communist rulers and had ordered radical reductions in Soviet military forces by explaining that for one country to be secure, there must be security for all. The first President Bush also assured Gorbachev during their meeting on Malta in December, 1989, that if the countries of Eastern Europe were allowed to choose their future orientation by democratic processes, the United States would not “take advantage” of that process. (Obviously, bringing countries into NATO that were then in the Warsaw Pact would be “taking advantage.”) The following year, Gorbachev was assured, though not in a formal treaty, that if a unified Germany was allowed to remain in NATO, there would be no movement of NATO jurisdiction to the east, “not one inch.”
These comments were made to President Gorbachev before the Soviet Union broke up. Once it did, the Russian Federation had less than half the population of the Soviet Union and a military establishment demoralized and in total disarray. While there was no reason to enlarge NATO after the Soviet Union recognized and respected the independence of the East European countries, there was even less reason to fear the Russian Federation as a threat.
Willfully precipitated?
Adding countries in Eastern Europe to NATO continued during the George W. Bush administration (2001-2009) but that was not the only thing that stimulated Russian objection. At the same time, the United States began withdrawing from the arms control treaties that had tempered, for a time, an irrational and dangerous arms race and were the foundation agreements for ending the Cold War. The most significant was the decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) which had been the cornerstone treaty for the series of agreements that halted for a time the nuclear arms race. After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Northern Virginia, President Putin was the first foreign leader to call President Bush and offer support. He was as good as his word by facilitating the attack on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had harbored Osama ben Laden, the Al Qaeda leader who had inspired the attacks. It was clear at that time that Putin aspired to a security partnership with the United States. The jihadist terrorists who were targeting the United States were also targeting Russia. Nevertheless, the U.S. continued its course of ignoring Russian–and also allied–interests by invading Iraq, an act of aggression which was opposed not only by Russia, but also by France and Germany.
As President Putin pulled Russia out of the bankruptcy that took place in the late 1990s, stabilized the economy, paid off Russia’s foreign debts, reduced the activity of organized crime, and even began building a financial nest egg to weather future financial storms, he was subjected to what he perceived as one insult after another to his perception of Russia’s dignity and security. He enumerated them in a speech in Munich in 2007. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates responded that we didn’t need a new Cold War. Quite true, of course, but neither he, nor his superiors, nor his successors seemed to take Putin’s warning seriously. Then Senator Joseph Biden, during his candidacy for the presidential election in 2008, pledged to “stand up to Vladimir Putin!” Huh? What in the world had Putin done to him or to the United States?
Although President Barack Obama initially promised policy changes, in fact his government continued to ignore the most serious Russian concerns and redoubled earlier American efforts to detach former Soviet republics from Russian influence and, indeed, to encourage “regime change” in Russia itself. American actions in Syria and Ukraine were seen by the Russian president, and most Russians, as indirect attacks on them.
President Assad of Syria was a brutal dictator but the only effective bulwark against the Islamic state, a movement that had blossomed in Iraq following the U.S. invasion and was spreading into Syria. Military aid to a supposed “democratic opposition” quickly fell into the hands of jihadists allied with the very Al Qaeda that had organized the 9/11 attacks on the United States! But the threat to nearby Russia was much greater since many of the jihadists hailed from areas of the former Soviet Union including Russia itself. Syria is also Russia’s close neighbor; the U.S. was seen strengthening enemies of both the United States and Russia with its misguided attempt to decapitate the Syrian government.
So far as Ukraine is concerned, U.S. intrusion into its domestic politics was deep—to the point of seeming to select a prime minister. It also, in effect, supported an illegal coup d’etat that changed the Ukrainian government in 2014, a procedure not normally considered consistent with the rule of law or democratic governance. The violence that still simmers in Ukraine started in the “pro-Western” west, not in the Donbas where it was a reaction to what was viewed as the threat of violence against Ukrainians who are ethnic Russian.
During President Obama’s second term, his rhetoric became more personal, joining a rising chorus in the American and British media vilifying the Russian president. Obama spoke of economic sanctions against Russians as “costing” Putin for his “misbehavior” in Ukraine, conveniently forgetting that Putin’s action had been popular in Russia and that Obama’s own predecessor could be credibly accused of being a war criminal. Obama then began to hurl insults at the Russian nation as a whole, with allegations like “Russia makes nothing anybody wants,” conveniently ignoring the fact that the only way we could get American astronauts to the international space station at that time was with Russian rockets and that his government was trying its best to prevent Iran and Turkey from buying Russian anti-aircraft missiles.
I am sure some will say, “What’s the big deal? Reagan called the Soviet Union an evil empire, but then negotiated an end of the Cold War.” Right! Reagan condemned the Soviet empire of old—and subsequently gave Gorbachev credit for changing it—but he never publicly castigated the Soviet leaders personally. He treated them with personal respect, and as equals, even treating Foreign Minister Gromyko to formal dinners usually reserved for chiefs of state or government. His first words in private meetings was usually something like, “We hold the peace of the world in our hands. We must act responsibly so the world can live in peace.”
Things got worse during the four years of Donald Trump’s tenure. Accused, without evidence, of being a Russian dupe, Trump made sure he embraced every anti-Russian measure that came along, while at the same time flattered Putin as a great leader. Reciprocal expulsions of diplomats, started by the United States in the final days of Obama’s tenure continued in a grim vicious circle that has resulted in a diplomatic presence so emaciated that for months the United States did not have enough staff in Moscow to issue visas for Russians to visit the United States.
As so many of the other recent developments, the mutual strangulation of diplomatic missions reverses one of the proudest achievements of American diplomacy in latter Cold War years when we worked diligently and successfully to open up the closed society of the Soviet Union, to bring down the iron curtain that separated “East” and “West.” We succeeded, with the cooperation of a Soviet leader who understood that his country desperately needed to join the world.
All right, I rest my case that today’s crisis was “willfully precipitated.” But if that is so, how can I say that it can be…
Easily resolved by the application of common sense?
The short answer is because it can be. What President Putin is demanding, an end to NATO expansion and creation of a security structure in Europe that insures Russia’s security along with that of others is eminently reasonable. He is not demanding the exit of any NATO member and he is threatening none. By any pragmatic, common sense standard it is in the interest of the United States to promote peace, not conflict. To try to detach Ukraine from Russian influence—the avowed aim of those who agitated for the “color revolutions”—was a fool’s errand, and a dangerous one. Have we so soon forgotten the lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis?
Now, to say that approving Putin’s demands is in the objective interest of the United States does not mean that it will be easy to do. The leaders of both the Democratic and Republican parties have developed such a Russophobic stance (a story requiring a separate study) that it will take great political skill to navigate the treacherous political waters and achieve a rational outcome.
President Biden has made it clear that the United States will not intervene with its own troops if Russia invades Ukraine. So why move them into Eastern Europe? Just to show hawks in Congress that he is standing firm? For what? Nobody is threatening Poland or Bulgaria except waves of refugees fleeing Syria, Afghanistan and the desiccated areas of the African savannah. So what is the 82nd Airborne supposed to do?
Well, as I have suggested earlier, maybe this is just an expensive charade. Maybe the subsequent negotiations between the Biden and Putin governments will find a way to meet the Russian concerns. If so, maybe the charade will have served its purpose. And maybe then our members of congress will start dealing with the growing problems we have at home instead of making them worse.
One can dream, can’t one?
Jack F. Matlock served as US ambassador to the USSR (1987-1991). A member of the board of director of ACURA, he writes from Singer Island, Florida.
