李世默：兩岸猿聲啼不住，中國已達“新時代”

李世默：兩岸猿聲啼不住，中國已達“新時代”

【今日，《華盛頓郵報》與《赫芬頓郵報》同時刊發了複旦大學中國研究院研究員、春秋發展戰略研究院研究員李世默關於十九大的英文評論文章，作者獨家授權觀察者網刊登中文版，以饗讀者。】

美國媒體《華盛頓郵報》和《赫芬頓郵報》以“西方媒體又錯了，中國將繼續崛起”為題，聯袂發表李世默文章

這幾天，全世界最大的政黨——中國共產黨——在北京集會，這是中共自1921年建黨以來召開的第十九次全國代表大會。全世界的新聞媒體和那些時政專家們仿佛著了魔一般，都在臆測“誰進誰出、誰上誰下”。然而，研究中國的各國專業人士卻在逐字逐句分析3萬餘字的十九大報告全文（這份報告是習近平總書記花三個半小時一氣嗬成向全世界宣讀的），希望分析出這個全球最大國家的未來走向。但是如此之多的政治術語和如此具體的政策內容，要分析解讀還真不容易。

不過，要讀懂這份報告，倒確實有條捷徑可以走，那就是先閱讀《經濟學人》雜誌（The Economist）最新出版的關於中共十九大的社論——它的篇幅比十九大報告短得多——然後再反其意來理解就差不多了！

發行量超過150萬的《經濟學人》被許多人視為最具影響力的時政評論周刊之一，關於中國的誇張封麵，是其標誌性特征

好吧，還是解釋一下。

1992年10月，中共召開第十四次全國代表大會。當時《經濟學人》發表社論稱，中共在“倒退”（指中國政治經濟改革沒有進一步西方化），認為十四大報告提出的“社會主義市場經濟體製”完全是自相矛盾的說辭。

五年後的1997年，中共召開十五大。《經濟學人》又發社論認為，從私有化到解決就業問題，大會做出的都是“空洞的許諾”，根本不會兌現。它還不忘潑冷水稱，民眾希望越大，失望就會越大，最後可能導致“內亂”。

2002年11月，中共召開十六大。《經濟學人》社論宣稱，中共麵前的麻煩越來越大，此前總能“蒙混過關的策略”今後就不靈了。文中充斥著“危機”、“動蕩”等不詳的字眼，仿佛凶兆當頭。

又過了五年，這份雜誌再次盡心盡力地表達了失望，認為中共十七大沒有釋放出改革的信號：“從政治角度來看，什麽都沒做”。

2012年秋，中共召開十八大。《經濟學人》再次“打鳴”預警。這次它對中國的抨擊力度上升到了新高度，社論借某匿名學者之口稱：“中國的政治現狀是底層失穩、中層失落、上層失控”。

這還不是最激憤的，看看今年《經濟學人》有多“不爽”。在最新出版的一期中，《經濟學人》發表關於十九大的封麵文章，不但誇張地稱習近平總書記是“全世界最有權勢的人”，而且危言聳聽地警告世界各國，不要“指望習先生會帶領中國或世界朝好的方向發展”。

四分之一個世紀隻是曆史長河中的一瞬，但足夠我們認清一家媒體——哪怕是備享盛名的《經濟學人》雜誌。

1992年《經濟學人》稱中國在“倒退”，而正是那年，鄧小平發表了著名的“南巡講話——啟動中國新一輪改革開放，引發了人類曆史上前所未有的大變革。從2002年到2012年，也就是《經濟學人》筆下中共“蒙混過關”的十年，可中國的GDP總量增加了4倍，按購買力平價計算，已成為全世界最大的經濟體。唱衰中國的媒體遠不止《經濟學人》一家，不過它還是頗能代表主流西方媒體在報道“中華民族偉大複興”這一人類重大曆史事件時的“集體表演”。

中共十九大的特殊意義在於它對當今中國和世界遼闊的前瞻性。按慣例，每次黨代會都會繪製未來五年的藍圖。但十九大製定了中國從今天到2050年的發展目標。這種情況幾十年一遇。上一次發生在上世紀80年代，當時鄧小平把建設小康社會確立為中國的目標。他借用儒家典籍中的“小康”一詞，描繪了國家總體繁榮、社會穩定的圖景。具體而言，作為一個階段性目標就是爭取到2000年時，中國人均年收入要達到800到1000美元。什麽？800美元？即使扣除通脹因素，現在上海一名勤勞的外來農民工一個月掙的錢也不止800美元。然而1980年時，中國人均年收入還僅有250美元。收入增加四倍在當時看起來，頗像“麥克白式的不自量力”。

然而，鄧小平不是莎翁筆下的麥克白，他的憧憬已成為現實。今天的中國總體上實現了小康，人均收入接近10000美元，是世界第二大經濟體，銳意進取的社會湧現出大大小小許多領先於世界的互聯網公司，在醫療衛生、文化教育、科學技術、生活水平等領域都取得了廣泛而迅猛的進步，可謂前無古人。

在這個曆史的交匯點，中共召開十九大，習總書記在大會開幕當天宣布五年內全麵建成小康社會。人民共和國已站在新的曆史起點上，目標是：到本世紀中葉即2050年，全麵實現中華民族的偉大複興。

習近平總書記的報告分為13個部分，每部分又包含許多小節，議題從住房到醫療，從科技到國防，從人工智能到共享經濟可謂麵麵俱到。這可不是奧巴馬的“我們一定能”或者特朗普的“讓美國重新偉大”，中國的這些階段性、具體目標到2035年都要實現。

就連對專門研究政治的學生來說，閱讀報告全文也是件非常具有挑戰性的事，更何況普通人了。為便於理解，我把報告精神歸納為以下四點：

中國共產黨此次大會為全麵建成小康社會之後的30年，規劃了民族複興的方略，也就是建設新時代中國特色社會主義的宏偉藍圖。為了行文方便，我們簡稱其為習近平方略。

第一，經濟。

習近平方略提出，到2035年基本實現社會主義現代化，使中等收入群體比例明顯提高，並在此基礎上持續維持增長直至2050年。在中國政治語境中，這意味著經濟和科技達到發達國家水平。人均GDP將從當前水平提高2.5至3倍，達到30000美元。照這樣的速度發展下去，中國將在2035年之前超越美國，名正言順地成為世界頭號經濟體。

第二，可持續性。

習近平敏銳地指出，中國社會的主要矛盾已經從“人民日益增長的物質文化需要同落後的社會生產之間的矛盾”，轉化為“人民日益增長的美好生活需要和不平衡不充分的發展之間的矛盾”。習近平提出集中力量打贏扶貧攻堅戰，消除由快速發展所導致的貧富差距，確保長期可持續發展。在十八大以來的五年裏，6000萬中國人摘掉了貧困的帽子。照此速度，剩下的數千萬貧困人口將在2022年下一屆大會召開之前全部脫貧。環境問題是對可持續發展的另一大威脅。習近平在報告中規劃了重大經濟結構調整，強調了構建安全高效的能源體係，並提出加大力度解決環境問題，在20年內全麵改善生態環境。

第三，真正的中國要亮相了。

隨著小康社會全麵建成，鄧小平時代勝利落幕，中國“韜光養晦”的對外政策也將漸次步入尾聲。習近平提出的“一帶一路”倡議，在規模和地理覆蓋麵上都不是馬歇爾計劃可相提並論的，借此，中國將通過基建驅動的經濟發展模式，向廣大發展中國家和發達國家提供可借鑒的寶貴經驗和可資利用的基建產能。不過，中國更積極的對外政策與西方過去25年來的“模式輸出”，有著本質的區別。中國不會搞普世主義，不會像西方那樣尋求以新自由主義經濟政治規則和價值觀一統世界。習近平提出的新版全球化方略，是以“互聯互通”而不傷害國家主權為前提的，他將其稱為“命運共同體”。從此，關於全球化，全球思想界將迎來百家爭鳴，這對因西式全球化搞砸而踉蹌迷茫的世界而言，是一件好事。

第四，新時代的中國敘事。

當今思想界的理論不足以解釋主權國家何以興亡，所以在十九大報告中，習近平正式提出講好中國故事的要求。如果西方鼓吹的一人一票選舉和私有化是現代國家發展的前提，那麽沒有遵照這份“說明書”的中國為何能取得成功，許多按方抓藥的國家為何遭遇失敗？在過去30年裏，中國有效結合了社會主義和市場經濟這一對《經濟學人》眼中“自相矛盾”的製度，取得了卓越的成功。中國是如何做到的？習近平之前的新中國曆任領導人從未像他這樣強調傳統文化的重要性。同時，他還堅定不移地弘揚現代中國的馬克思主義。我們能否將現代的馬克思主義融合於中國五千年的文明，形成水到渠成的協進敘事？這並非不可完成的任務，早在一千多年前，中國就曾以本土的儒家文化政體成功融匯外來的佛教。這個過程持續了一百多年。西學東漸至今已過百年，包括馬克思主義在內的西方現代思想深刻地影響了中國。習近平決心開創“馬克思主義中國化”的新階段。自歐洲啟蒙運動以來，世界從來沒有像今天這樣期待治理原則的更新迭代。這很可能成為中國社會主義對21世紀最重大的思想貢獻。

總而言之，中國共產黨通過不斷的鼎革自我，展現出了順應時代變化的超凡能力。五年前，外界認為腐敗是對中共執政最大的威脅。十八大開啟了有史以來最嚴厲的反腐行動，其廣度和力度是許多人始料未及的。本屆大會將啟動新一輪政治改革，進一步加強黨和國家打擊腐敗的力度。中國沒有多黨選舉，中國共產黨的領導就是中國的政治體製。中共的廉潔與健康決定了國家的命運。目前所有的指向表明，中共具有強大的生命力。

如果把預測未來比作打賭，接下來輪到世界各方政治評論人士下注了。誠然，要列出可能使中國出岔子的問題，清單會很長，但就像上市公司招股說明書裏詳細羅列的風險因素一樣，很少有人真正逐條檢視，我也不在此一一贅述。鑒於中共的業績和《經濟學人》的預判截然相反的曆史紀錄，我確信習近平將帶領中國和世界朝更好的方向發展。

（翻頁閱讀英文版）

As the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China draws to a close, analysts are parsing through President Xi Jinping’s 30,000-plus-word report — delivered in a three-and-a-half-hour address without breaks — to decipher the direction of the most populous nation in the world. It is a laborious effort, especially considering the report’s extensive official jargon and policy details.

But there is a much easier way. Read The Economist’s coverage of the congress, which is considerably shorter in length, and bet on the opposite being true. Let me explain.

In October 1992, while the party was holding its 14th Party Congress, The Economist editorialized that the party had “stepped backwards” and called the socialist market economy (which the congress espoused) an “oxymoron.” Five years later in 1997, during the 15th Party Congress, it characterized the gathering as where “hollow promise[s]” were made and broken, from privatization to unemployment goals. Dashing raised expectations was a “recipe for civil strife,” opined the magazine.

At the 16th Party Congress in November 2002, the magazine pronounced that the “familiar policy of trying to muddle through” was no longer an option for a party that faced looming troubles; words such as “crisis” and “unrest” were ominously used. Another five years would pass. The same magazine dutifully expressed dissatisfaction at the lack of reform during the 17th Party Congress: “Politically, little has changed.”

The Economist’s howl reached a crescendo in the fall of 2012; during the 18th Party Congress, China was “unstable at the grassroots, dejected at the middle strata and out of control at the top,” quoting an anonymous source. That could only be outdone by this year’s cover, which warned the world not to “expect Mr. Xi to change China, or the world, for the better.”

When the magazine said China had “stepped backwards” in 1992, it was precisely the year of Deng Xiaoping’s now famous southern tour that launched a new wave of reforms the likes of which the world had never seen in history. The “muddling through” years between 2002 and 2012 saw China’s GDP quadruple and its economy become the world’s largest by purchasing power. The Economist is not alone, of course. It is more or less representative of Western media’s coverage of arguably the most consequential development of our time: the Chinese renaissance.

Now let’s actually look into the content coming from this congress.

Usually a party congress provides a five-year blueprint. What distinguishes this congress is how far into the future it looks. This congress set the timeline for China from today through 2050. The last time we saw this scope in reforms was in the 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping set out to build a “xiaokang society.” Taken from Confucius, “xiaokang” means a country of general prosperity and orderly social norms. Deng set an interim goal of reaching $800-$1,000 annual per capita income by the year 2000. In 1980, Chinese per capita income was $220. A fourfold increase seemed like “vaulting ambition” indeed.

Today, the China that Deng envisioned has arrived and then some. By several measures, China is the most powerful economic engine in the world. Per capita income is approaching $10,000. It’s a burgeoning entrepreneurial society that has created some of the largest companies in the world. China has led improvements in health, education, science and overall standard of living at a speed and scale that is unprecedented in human history.

It is at this historic junction that the current party congress was held. As Xi said at the outset of the congress, the party plans to conclude the “xiaokang” project in the next five years. China stands at a new point of departure. Destination: comprehensive national renaissance. Date of arrival: 2050. This is no “Yes, we can” or “Make America great again” agenda. Xi’s report includes 12 sections, each breaking into numerous parts covering, with mind-boggling specificity, issues including housing, health, science, defense, artificial intelligence and the sharing economy.

Beyond “xiaokang,” the party presents a roadmap for a new 30-year journey to realize the dream of a Chinese renaissance — the plan for a new era of Chinese socialism. The plan — let’s call it the Xi plan, for short — can be broken down into the following four main points.

First, economics. The Xi plan projects the basic realization of socialist modernization by 2035, resulting in a major expansion of the middle class, with continuing growth through 2050. In the Chinese political lexicon, this means becoming the economic and technological equivalent of a developed nation. In GDP per capita terms, this would imply up to three times the current level, to between $20,000 and $30,000. With this performance, China will formally surpass the U.S. well before 2035.

Second, sustainability. Xi pointedly said that the primary contradiction of Chinese society has now shifted from underdevelopment to imbalanced development and sustainability. The Xi plan calls for a concentrated drive to eradicate poverty, as the increasing wealth gap resulting from rapid development is the enemy of long-term sustainability. In the five years since the 18th Party Congress, at least 60 million people were lifted out of poverty. If such a rate is sustained, the tens of millions currently living below the poverty line will all be lifted out of poverty in only a few years.

The environment is, of course, the other threat to sustainability. The Xi plan maps out major structural changes to the economy and energy usage and envisions a substantially cleaner environment in two decades.

Third, expansion. For the rest of the world, China is coming to a theater near you. With the Belt and Road Initiative, which is larger than the Marshall Plan both in size and geography, China brings its considerable experience and capacity in infrastructure-led economic development to a vast number of developing and developed countries alike.

China’s active engagement with the world is based on a qualitatively different proposition than the one championed by the West in the recent past. Instead of a universalist approach seeking to standardize the world with the same set of neoliberal economic and political rules and values, Xi advocates a new version of globalization under which increased interconnectedness does not come at the expense of national sovereignty. He calls for a global “community of common destiny” but one that fosters a competition of ideas, which — given the trouble globalization is in — makes sense.

And last but not least, identity. With the 19th Party Congress, Xi is formally launching a project to provide a new narrative to current events. The prevailing theories that have guided the world’s thinking about the rise and fall of nations no longer make sense. If elections and privatization are the prerequisites to development, why has China succeeded without them, while so many others have failed after taking these prescriptions? In the past 30 years, China has effectively combined socialism and the market economy. In other words, what The Economist called an “oxymoron” has become an extraordinary success.

But how? No leader in the history of the People’s Republic has so emphasized the importance of Chinese traditional culture as Xi. Yet, he is adamant in preserving a Marxist outlook in modern China. Can we weave together a coherent narrative that absorbs modern Marxism into 5,000 years of China’s heritage? China has actually done it before, by absorbing foreign Buddhism into its Confucian cultural polity more than a millennium ago. That process took more than a hundred years. And now it has been more than a century since modern Western ideas, including Marxism, have begun to influence China.

Paradigm shifts in fundamental narratives take a very long time, and China’s is only at its formative stage. Xi seems determined to accelerate the initial phase of this project. He calls it the “sinicization of Marxism.” The exploration of ideas that this entails may be China’s most significant contribution to the 21st century. Not since the European Enlightenment has the world been so hungry for new approaches.

All in all, the party’s ability to adapt to changing times by reinventing itself is extraordinary. Five years ago, corruption was seen as the biggest threat to its hold on power. The 18th Party Congress then engineered a strict anti-corruption campaign, with a breadth and depth few anticipated. China does not have multiparty elections — the Chinese Communist Party is China’s political system. The health of the former is the barometer for the future of the country. All indications at this point are that it remains vital.

We have now come to the space where writers of op-eds like this one tend to hedge bets. I could write a long list of what could go wrong — like a list of risk factors in an IPO prospectus that no one reads. But I will skip it. Given the track record of the party and that of The Economist, my bet is that Xi will indeed “change China, and the world, for the better.”