藍月星雨
本人信奉之藍人準則：但求三餐不愁。睡大覺，喝小酒，穿花衣裳。
通往巴格達之路
理查德·霍爾布魯克*
《華盛頓郵報》
如果布什政府希望得到事關重大的國際社會的支持，就必須承認這麽一個顯而易見的事實，安理會是通往巴格達的必經之路。
想要獲取支持，一個新的安理會授權使用武力對付薩達姆·侯賽因的決議是必不可少的，如果薩達姆不肯接受一整套嚴格的武器檢驗製度，即可以在任何時間對任何目標進行突擊檢查。這一決議將會給那些支持“倒薩”的國家（土耳其、英國）提供對采取行動而言至關重要的法律依據，同時給那些搖擺不定的、甚或反對的國家（德國、法國、沙特阿拉伯）施加巨大的壓力。雖然安理會在很大程度上來講是美國在二戰後一手締造的，但是當今懂得它巨大的力量的美國人卻寥寥無幾，它的道德和政治力量在於，一個安理會授權動武的決議可以左右整個世界。這樣一個決議可以調動國際輿論，迫使國際社會采取行動並且使不同意見銷聲匿跡。假如關係到至高無上的國家安全，在不削弱總統直接應對能力的前提下是完全可以取得這種授權的，並且一旦取得了授權美國就將占盡先機。
1991年的布什當局是深明此理的，大約緣於老布什曾任美國常駐聯合國代表一職。國務卿詹姆斯·貝克和美國駐聯合國大使托馬斯·皮克林運用嫻熟的技巧，在沙漠風暴行動之前通過安理會的表決取得了國際社會的支持。
今天，不幸的是華盛頓對聯合國采取了全然不同的態度。繞過安理會的行為顯然體現出除鮑威爾之外的整個政府企圖對聯合國采取視若無睹的態度，而因此被在細枝末節上的無謂爭執和周期性的自取其辱所削弱。
沒有同盟是無法進行一場推翻薩達姆的運動的，從英國到土耳其，美國及所有的政府最需要的就是國內反伊聲勢的壯大。上個月布萊爾政府的一名資深顧問辛酸地告訴筆者，布萊爾對華盛頓的無私支持“沒有得到任何回報”，甚至使得不列顛內部對布萊爾親美姿態的反感情緒與日俱增。
有人可能會認為現存的安理會1991年的決議已經被薩達姆明白無誤地違反了，現在已經有了，用布萊爾的話說，“足夠的法律依據”來用武力製裁伊拉克當局。
這種看法或許還存在著一絲法律上的不足，但是從政治和務實的角度來看的確無傷大雅。正如貝克最近所說，由現有的安理會決議來預見推翻薩達姆的行動是遠遠不夠的。
當華盛頓的決策者們討論通過安理會的途徑時，他們最關心的是三個問題：第一，伊拉克將同意武器檢驗然後（再次）使用欺騙手段；第二，俄國和法國會把決議搞得麵目全非；第三，決議絕口不提改朝換代而是僅僅停留在次要問題諸如銷毀大規模殺傷武器。
從第一點來看，俄國、法國和中國是關鍵性的國家，其中任何一個都可以動用否決權否掉安理會的決議。如果說新的布什－普金關係物有所值的話，莫斯科是會支持這樣一個強硬的政策的，事實上莫斯科在私下裏已經做出了相應的表示。作為法國，它無疑會一如既往地扮演難以相處的、異議夥伴的角色，但是最終不會阻礙英美一致的決心。如果英國義無反顧地支持華盛頓，那麽一個強硬到足以為采取行動鋪平道路的決議就有可能形成。那時，中國盡管疑慮重重，但終不會運用否決去對抗整個國際社會。
這裏的賭注是美國的外交，包括總統的直接介入，正如老布什本人引人注目地親自演繹過的建立私人關係，以使安理會通過強硬到伊拉克稍有不從－事實上伊拉克以往在這個問題上屢教不改，就可以立刻采取行動的決議。假使，當局竭盡全力也無法在安理會達成這樣的決議，那麽無論是在國內或是在國際上我們的獲取的支持也都會遠遠多於根本不做這樣的嚐試。
關於美國的目標，本屆政府意在使伊拉克改朝換代。不幸的是，當今世界，特別是在中東地區公開附和此說的國家屈指可數。其他國家多半都是在尋求把決議限製在大規模殺傷武器的問題範圍內。
無論如何，這個問題也比先前的問題要簡單得多。一旦對巴格達的軍事打擊開始，事實就會證明不改朝換代就不可能銷毀大規模殺傷性武器。
試想伊拉克軍隊規模隻有上次戰爭前的三分之一，而美國軍隊卻遠為強大，這種差別傾向於美國的勝利。但是一旦開仗，沒有人可以清楚地預見，是否會產生暗殺、反叛、伊拉克軍隊的崩潰，速戰速決或伊拉克搶先導彈攻擊以色列，戰事長期拖延，或許還有比這更糟的情況？無論發生何事，戰事一經拉開反對薩達姆·侯賽因的努力就不能半途而廢一定要達到目使美國壓倒一切的力量獲勝。
總統在他難以做出決定時定將得到美國人民的支持，但如果他牢記運用一切非軍事的手段來獲取國際社會的支持，必將使他獲益非淺。這一切都始於聯合國安理會。
*作者理查德·霍爾布魯克為前美國克林頓政府駐聯合國大使
By Richard C. Holbrooke *
Washington Post
August 27, 2002
The road to Baghdad runs through the United Nations Security Council. This simple truth must be recognized by the Bush administration if it wants the international support that is essential for success in Iraq.
To build such support, a new Security Council resolution is necessary, one that authorizes the use of force if Saddam Hussein refuses to allow an airtight weapons inspection regime -- no-notice inspections anywhere, anytime. Such a resolution would provide those nations (Turkey, Britain) that want to support an effort to remove Hussein a vital legitimizing cover for action, and put great pressure on those (Germany, France, Saudi Arabia) that are wavering or opposed. Although the Security Council was in large part a creation of U.S. efforts at the end of World War II, few Americans today understand the enormous force, both moral and political, that a Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention carries in the rest of the world. Such a resolution mobilizes international opinion, forces concerted action and can mute much criticism. It can be sought without any weakening of the president's ability to act directly if vital national security interests are at stake; if achieved, it greatly strengthens America's hand.
The first Bush administration understood this perfectly in 1991, perhaps partly because George Herbert Walker Bush had once served as the American ambassador to the United Nations. Secretary of State James Baker and the American ambassador to the United Nations, Thomas Pickering, skillfully built international support through votes in the Security Council before Operation Desert Storm.
Today, unfortunately, Washington has a different attitude toward the United Nations. Bypassing the Security Council is obviously tempting for an administration that, with the exception of Secretary of State Colin Powell, shows little respect for the United Nations and has weakened it by unnecessary fights over secondary issues and periodic gratuitous insults.
But a campaign against Saddam Hussein cannot be waged without allies, and from Britain to Turkey the governments the United States needs most are facing growing domestic opposition over Iraq. Last month a senior adviser to British Prime Minister Tony Blair told me bitterly that Washington 'was giving Blair nothing' in return for Blair's unstinting support, even as British domestic opposition to Blair's pro-American position was growing.
Some will argue that because existing Security Council resolutions dating back to 1991 have been clearly violated by Hussein, there is already, in Baker's phrase, 'sufficient legal authority' to sanction the use of force against the Iraqi regime.
This argument may have some merit in legal circles, but it has none in political or practical terms. As Baker himself recently noted, predicating action against Hussein solely on existing Security Council resolutions will not be enough.
Washington policymakers have three core concerns when they discuss the Security Council route: first, that Iraq will agree to inspections and then cheat (again); second, that Russia or France will water down any resolution to the point of meaninglessness; third, that the resolution will not authorize regime change but only some lesser goal such as the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.
On the first point, Russia, France and China are the key countries; any one of them could block Security Council action by using its veto power. But if the new Bush-Putin relationship is worth anything, Moscow should support a tough regime; it has already indicated readiness to do so in private. As for France, it will undoubtedly play its normal role as a difficult and contentious ally, but in the end, it will not stop the concerted will of America and Britain. If London aggressively supports Washington, a resolution strong enough to lay the basis for action will be achievable. China will have its qualms, but it will not use the veto against the rest of the international community.
So the betting here is that effective American diplomacy -- including the direct involvement of the president, as was famously illustrated by the personal coalition-building efforts of the senior President Bush -- would result in a Security Council resolution strong enough to lay the basis for immediate military action if Iraq violated it, as it has violated previous resolutions. If, however, such a resolution cannot be achieved, the administration, having made a best-faith effort in the Security Council, will be in a much stronger position to garner international and domestic support for action than if it had never tried at all.
On the issue of American objectives, this administration has (rightly) called for regime change. Unfortunately, few other nations in the world, and especially in the region, will openly subscribe to such a goal. Other nations will probably seek to limit any resolution to the issue of weapons of mass destruction.
This is, however, less of a problem than it initially may appear. If military action against Baghdad begins, it will soon become evident that it is impossible to eliminate weapons of mass destruction without a change in regime.
Given that the Iraqi military is only one-third the size it was before the last war, and American forces far stronger, the odds favor an American success. But no one can foresee clearly what will occur once a war starts. Will there be an assassination, a rebellion, a crumbling of the Iraqi military, a quick victory that preempts Iraqi missile attacks on Israel, a protracted struggle, or something worse? Whatever happens, once launched, the effort against Saddam Hussein cannot be stopped until its goal is achieved and the overwhelming power of the United States has prevailed.
The president will have American support for the difficult decisions he will soon have to make, but it would strengthen his position greatly if he remembered the importance of using every nonmilitary tool
at his disposal to build international support -- starting with the U.N. Security Council.
* The writer was U.S. ambassador to the United Nations under President Clinton